NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250065-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0065 December 2, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Tazewell County HUNTER R. WATERS, ) No. 23CF821 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Christopher R. Doscotch, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, his postplea counsel strictly complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), and his postplea counsel did not labor under a conflict of interest.
¶2 Defendant, Hunter R. Waters, pleaded guilty to first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2022)) pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement, and the trial court
sentenced him to 70 years in prison. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea,
which the court denied.
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and (2) his counsel
(a) failed to strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024)and
(b) labored under an actual conflict of interest. ¶4 We disagree and affirm.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 A. The Charges and Preplea Proceedings
¶7 Following the death of defendant’s nine-week-old daughter, A.W., in November
2023, the State charged defendant with three counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),
(2) (West 2022)) and nine counts of aggravated battery to a child (id. § 12-3.05(b)(1)). The charges
alleged defendant, who was 19 during the commission of the offenses, inflicted blunt force trauma
to various parts of A.W.’s body causing severe injury and death. The trial court appointed the
public defender to represent defendant and set his jury trial for September 2024.
¶8 During an August 2024 pretrial conference, the trial court was informed defendant
was displeased with the “demeanor” of one of his two public defenders. The lead attorney on
defendant’s case informed the court he explained to defendant that defendant’s other attorney had
his “best interest at heart” and he was “much better off with two lawyers on this case.” After noting
defendant’s concern was a mere “personality issue” with one of his attorneys, the court concluded
no further action was necessary.
¶9 At a September 2024 pretrial conference, the parties brought to the trial court’s
attention a recorded video visit between defendant and his family, wherein defendant claimed he
planned to make statements about his counsel that would cause the court to “fire both [of his
attorneys].” After the court reviewed the recording, it admonished defendant not to engage in any
outbursts at trial. Thereafter, defendant’s lead counsel noted that although defendant had stated he
had issues with his other attorney, they tried to “patch those up,” and lead counsel was “surprised
to hear that [he] would be exposed.” Lead counsel stated he had asked defendant if he had any
complaints about counsel’s own representation and defendant had indicated he did not. The court
-2- asked defendant if that representation was accurate, and defendant responded, “Yeah.”
¶ 10 B. The Guilty Plea and Sentence
¶ 11 Later in September 2024, on the date set for trial, defendant chose to enter a guilty
plea pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. Before accepting defendant’s plea, the trial
court elicited from him that (1) he was mentally and physically capable of deciding whether to
plead guilty, (2) his highest level of education was the twelfth grade, (3) he could read and
understand English, and (4) he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney. Defendant noted
his counsel answered any questions he had and indicated he was satisfied with his lead counsel.
Defendant also confirmed he was not under the influence of alcohol or prescription medication
that would affect his ability to understand the nature of the agreement, the charges, or the penalties.
¶ 12 1. The Terms of the Plea Agreement
¶ 13 The prosecutor explained that under the terms of the agreement, defendant was
(1) pleading guilty to one count of first degree murder, which had a sentencing range of 20 to 100
years in prison and (2) agreeing to serve 70 years in prison, with 3 years of mandatory supervised
release. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The trial court clarified that
defendant would have the “opportunity for parole after 20 years” due to his age but elicited from
him that no one had promised him what the result of such a hearing would be. Defendant stated he
agreed that the prosecutor’s explanation of the agreement was correct. The court then read the first
degree murder charge, and defendant confirmed he understood it and wanted to plead guilty. In
response to questioning from the court, defendant stated he understood he could persist in a plea
of not guilty and seek a trial, but he affirmed he was waiving that right. He also stated he
understood and waived his rights to a trial and to cross-examine and confront witnesses.
¶ 14 2. The Factual Basis
-3- ¶ 15 The State provided the following factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea. On the
morning of November 26, 2023, the Pekin Fire Department responded to a residence regarding a
report of a two-month-old female, identified as A.W., who was having trouble breathing. A.W.
was transported to a hospital, where bruising was observed on her arm and chest and her head
appeared to be misshapen. She was unresponsive and was intubated because she was unable to
breathe on her own. Medical personnel described her condition as follows:
“A.W. had a large hematoma to the back of her head putting significant pressure on
her brain, and further imaging revealed A.W. to have a fractured skull, numerous
and scattered subarachnoid hemorrhages, three distinct subdural hemorrhages, a
midline hematoma beneath bone, a lacerated liver, hematoma to both adrenal
glands, sever[al] bilateral retinal hemorrhages, and multiple broken ribs.”
¶ 16 Defendant told a detective he was alone with A.W. in his bedroom on November
26, 2023, from 12:45 a.m. until the 911 call at 9:45 a.m., but he had no explanation for her injuries.
A.W.’s mother, Abigail C., confirmed defendant was left alone with A.W. at about 12:45 a.m.
A.W. appeared to have no signs of injury at that time.
¶ 17 Defendant initially claimed that A.W. woke up crying and he tried to feed her, but
she would not eat and appeared to be choking. Defendant stated he had become “frustrated, angry,
[and] pissed off” after A.W. woke up and he began handling her in a “rough manner” by dropping
her from a height of a few inches onto his bed, such that she might have hit her head on an Xbox
controller.
¶ 18 In a subsequent interview with a detective, defendant admitted he was angry,
overwhelmed, and frustrated with A.W. due to her crying. As a result, he handled her “roughly”
by striking her head on a changing table while changing her diaper, holding her tightly around her
-4- ribcage, shaking her, and repeatedly striking her head against his bedroom door.
¶ 19 Ultimately, A.W. was pronounced dead, and an autopsy established her cause of
death was blunt force injuries to her head and neck consistent with physical abuse.
¶ 20 3. Right To Appeal Admonitions
¶ 21 Following the State’s recitation of the factual basis, the following colloquy
occurred:
“THE COURT: *** All right. [Defendant], any promises been made to you
other than what we’ve discussed or as contained in the paperwork?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Anyone forcing you, coercing you, or threatening you into
entering this agreement?
THE COURT: All right. I’ll find your plea is made knowingly and
voluntarily, and you understood the penalty ranges; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
¶ 22 The trial court then accepted defendant’s guilty plea to first degree murder and
sentenced him to 70 years in prison in accordance with the plea agreement. The trial court then
admonished defendant as follows:
“You have a right to appeal. Prior to taking an appeal, you’d have to file in
this court within 30 days of today’s date, [on] which sentence is imposed[,] a
written motion asking to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw the
plea of guilty setting forth the grounds for the motion.
The motion must be in writing. It must be filed with the clerk within that 30
-5- days and include all the reasons I stated. If I grant it, the motion—your plea of
guilty would be withdrawn and your sentence and judgment vacated and the matter
[would] be set for trial.
Any counts that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement can be
reinstated as to the State’s request, and that would be the Counts 2 through 12 that
were dismissed, and this [count] could be reinstated as well. State would be released
from any other promises it had made.
If I deny your motion, then you’d have 30 days from the date the motion
was denied to file with the circuit clerk of this court a written notice of appeal or
request the circuit clerk [to] prepare it and file it on your behalf to start the process
for going to the Appellate Court.
If you can’t afford the assistance of an attorney for your motion or appeal,
an attorney would be appointed to represent you free of charge. If you can’t afford
the transcript, you’d get that for free as well. Did you understand your appeal
rights?”
Defendant responded, “Yes.”
¶ 23 C. The Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea
¶ 24 In October 2024, defendant’s lead counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea. In that motion, counsel asserted that defendant contacted him following defendant’s guilty
plea to inquire about an appeal, and they met to discuss that option. During their conversation,
defendant told counsel he did not feel coerced or forced to plead guilty, he was not under the
influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of his plea, and no one offered him anything to plead
guilty beyond the terms of the agreement. Defendant further stated he was taking medication as
-6- prescribed to him at the time of his plea and the medication did not impair his judgment. The
motion noted defendant told counsel that “he did not know of a basis on which to withdraw his
plea,” but he wanted “to appeal for the purpose of reducing his sentence.” Attached to the motion
was a written statement, signed by defendant, that reiterated the foregoing acknowledgements. The
statement also provided the following:
“I do not know of any reason to withdraw my plea. I did hear the Judge say I have
the right to an appeal and I do wish to appeal for the purpose of reducing my
sentence because I have read Supreme Ct. caselaw that states a male’s brain is not
fully developed until age 25.”
¶ 25 In January 2025, defendant’s counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, and the trial
court conducted a hearing on the motion to withdraw, at which defendant testified. Defendant
acknowledged that he (1) wanted to challenge his sentence and (2) signed the written statement
attached to the motion to withdraw his plea because it was an accurate reflection of his discussion
with his attorney. Lead counsel asked defendant, “[A]s I understand it, you’re really not wanting
to withdraw your plea, but you believe the law provides you an avenue to appeal for the purposes
of reducing your sentence; is that right?” Defendant responded, “Yeah.” When counsel asked
defendant why he believed he should be allowed to challenge his sentence, defendant responded,
“[I]t’s the law.” Defendant acknowledged, however, he could not give counsel any supporting
authority for defendant’s position.
¶ 26 In ruling on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court opined
it was “a very thorough plea” and defendant displayed no misunderstanding or hesitation when he
entered it. The court also emphasized that when defendant had answered the court’s questions
about his mental state, defendant affirmed he had a “clear mind” to enter his plea. The court then
-7- denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 27 This appeal followed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and (2) his counsel
(a) failed to strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) and
(b) labored under an actual conflict of interest.
¶ 30 We disagree and affirm.
¶ 31 A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Defendant’s Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea
¶ 32 Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea because his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Specifically, he contends he
entered his guilty plea under two misapprehensions of law such that withdrawal of his plea was
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. We disagree.
¶ 33 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 34 A defendant has no automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea because the entry of
such a plea is a grave act that is not reversible merely because the defendant wishes it. People v.
Burge, 2021 IL 125642, ¶ 37. Accordingly, the withdrawal of a guilty plea is not warranted simply
because the defendant is dissatisfied with the terms of a plea agreement. People v. Reed, 2020 IL
124940, ¶ 47. Instead, to obtain leave to withdraw a guilty plea, “a defendant must establish a
manifest injustice under the facts involved.” Burge, 2021 IL 125642, ¶ 37. A manifest injustice
may exist when a guilty plea was entered based upon a misapprehension of the facts or law. Id.
“In order to vacate a plea based on a misapprehension of law or fact, the defendant must establish,
-8- under an objective standard, that [his] mistaken beliefs or impressions were reasonably justified
under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the plea.” Id.
¶ 35 We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an
abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful,
or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. Id.
¶ 36 2. This Case
¶ 37 Defendant argues his guilty plea was premised upon two misapprehensions of law.
First, he asserts he did not know that by pleading guilty he would be unable to challenge his 70-year
prison sentence on appeal. Second, he claims he did not know he could have presented mitigating
evidence about his youth if he had insisted upon and received a sentencing hearing. According to
defendant, because his guilty plea was premised upon those misapprehensions, it was not made
voluntarily, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. This argument is unavailing.
¶ 38 a. Defendant’s Mistaken Belief He Could Challenge His Sentence Did Not
Render His Plea Involuntary
¶ 39 Defendant first asserts his plea was involuntary because he was never admonished
he would be unable to appeal his sentence by pleading guilty, which he intended to do, and, in fact,
the trial court “suggested” there was no “impediment to appealing his sentence” by admonishing
him only that he had “the right to appeal.”
¶ 40 When determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the trial court first looks to the
requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). Rule 402(a) instructs a
court to accept a guilty plea only after informing the defendant and determining he or she
understands (1) the nature of the charge, (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by
-9- law, (3) he has the right to plead not guilty or guilty, and (4) if he pleads guilty, there will be no
trial, and therefore, he waives the right to a trial by jury and to confront the witnesses against him.
Id.
¶ 41 The record in this case demonstrates the trial court complied with Rule 402(a). Prior
to accepting defendant’s plea, the court elicited from defendant he understood (1) the first degree
murder charge, (2) the minimum and maximum sentence for the offense, (3) he had the right to
persist in pleading not guilty, and (4) by pleading guilty, he would waive his rights to a trial and
to confront the witnesses against him.
¶ 42 Importantly, Rule 402(a) does not require courts to admonish defendants that by
pleading guilty pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement, they waive their right to challenge
their sentences on appeal. Cf. People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150679, ¶ 22 (noting Rule
402(a) “does not require courts to admonish a defendant pleading guilty as to the ramifications of
a sentencing cap”). Indeed, defendant acknowledges no admonishment “regarding a plea’s impact
on one’s right to appeal sentence” is required under Rule 402(a). Accordingly, the court had no
obligation under Rule 402(a) to inform defendant that by pleading guilty, he would be unable to
appeal the length of his sentence, and the court’s admonitions complied with the rule.
¶ 43 The trial court likewise complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(b) (eff. July
1, 2012), which requires the plea agreement to be stated in open court and the court must question
the defendant to (1) confirm the terms of the agreement and (2) determine whether any force,
threats, or promises apart from the plea agreement were used to obtain the guilty plea.
¶ 44 Again, the record shows the trial court complied with Rule 402(b) before accepting
defendant’s plea. The terms of the plea agreement were stated in open court, and the court
questioned defendant about his guilty plea. When questioned, defendant confirmed the terms of
- 10 - the agreement and denied that any force, threats, or promises other than the terms of the plea
agreement were used to secure his plea.
¶ 45 Finally, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) requires the trial
court to give the following admonitions to a defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a negotiated
agreement:
“(1) that the defendant has a right to appeal;
(2) that prior to taking an appeal the defendant must file in the trial court,
within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, a written motion asking
to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty, setting
forth the grounds for the motion; [and]
(3) that if the motion is allowed, the plea of guilty, sentence and judgment
will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the charges to which the plea of guilty
was made.”
¶ 46 In this case, the record establishes that the trial court properly admonished
defendant pursuant to Rule 605(c) regarding his appeal rights. The court informed defendant he
had a right to appeal but that he would first need to file within 30 days a motion (1) seeking to
vacate the judgment against him, (2) asking for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, and (3) setting
forth the grounds for the motion. Again, the court had no duty to advise defendant as to the effect
his guilty plea would have upon his ability to challenge the length of his sentence on appeal.
¶ 47 Given the foregoing, defendant cannot establish that his mistaken belief that he
could challenge the length of his sentence despite pleading guilty constituted a manifest injustice.
Defendant’s argument amounts to a claim the trial court was required to admonish him beyond
what is provided in the applicable supreme court rules, but that claim clearly is not correct.
- 11 - ¶ 48 We also note that at no point during the plea proceedings—or even on appeal—
does defendant allege he would not have pleaded guilty had he known he could not appeal the
length of his sentence. To the contrary, the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the statement signed
by defendant attached to the motion, and defendant’s own testimony at the motion hearing all
indicated defendant did not want to withdraw his guilty plea. Instead, the sole basis for his motion
was to challenge the length of his sentence. Absent a claim he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have proceeded to trial had he known he could not appeal the length of his sentence,
“defendant did not establish a basis for the withdrawal of his guilty plea and vacatur of the
judgment.” People v. Irrelevant, 2021 IL App (4th) 200626, ¶ 43 (concluding the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in part,
when the defendant never alleged he would not have pleaded guilty had he known he was required
to serve 85% of any prison sentence imposed pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement); see
People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (2d) 110559, ¶ 18 (affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea where the “defendant does not allege that he would not have pleaded
guilty”).
¶ 49 We further note the State raises the additional argument that no manifest injustice
occurred relating to defendant’s understanding of his appeal rights because his belief he could
challenge his agreed-upon sentence was not objectively reasonable. The State contends plea
agreements are governed by contract principles and when defendant agreed to serve a 70-year
prison sentence, he could not have reasonably believed he could thereafter unilaterally alter the
terms of the agreement while requiring the State to comply with its end of the bargain. We
acknowledge the State’s position is well supported (see People v. Millsap, 2022 IL App (4th)
210192, ¶ 19 (stating negotiated guilty pleas “are governed by contract law”)), and we note that
- 12 - “[a] defendant should not be allowed to withdraw his plea when the real basis for his withdrawal
is that he is dissatisfied with the length of his sentence” (People v. Cunningham, 286 Ill. App. 3d
346, 350 (1997)). However, because we rest our decision upon our determination defendant’s plea
was knowing and voluntary based upon the trial court’s substantial compliance with Rule 402(a),
Rule 402(b), and Rule 605(c), we need not directly address this additional argument.
¶ 50 As a result, we conclude that, despite defendant’s belief he could challenge the
length of his sentence on appeal, his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary such that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his plea.
¶ 51 b. Defendant’s Claim He Did Not Know He Could Have Presented Mitigating
Information About His Youth at a Sentencing Hearing Did Not Render His Plea
Involuntary
¶ 52 Defendant also argues that, at the time of his plea, he did not know he could have
presented mitigating evidence regarding his youth if he had not agreed to a fully negotiated plea
and instead received a sentencing hearing. He asserts he “learned about this area of mitigation”
only after he pleaded guilty, at which time he read United States Supreme Court cases stating a
male’s brain is not fully developed until age 25. He contends that because he entered his plea
“without full knowledge of potential sentencing strategies and outcomes applicable to him,” his
plea was not knowing and voluntary. We disagree.
¶ 53 As an initial matter, we agree with the State that defendant has forfeited this
argument because it was not raised in the trial court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr.
15, 2024) provides that “any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to *** withdraw the
plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived.” We agree. Nowhere in
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his signed statement attached to the motion, or his
- 13 - testimony did he assert that his decision to plead guilty was premised upon a misapprehension
about whether he could present mitigating evidence regarding his youth at a sentencing hearing.
¶ 54 Regarding authority relating to male brain development, defendant asserted only
that he “wish[ed] to appeal for the purpose of reducing my sentence because I have read Supreme
Ct. caselaw that states a male’s brain is not fully developed until age 25.” Because defendant did
not argue the issue he now raises on appeal, he has forfeited it. See People v. Williams, 299 Ill.
App. 3d 791, 795 (1998) (noting that, pursuant to Rule 604(d), defendant forfeited issue on appeal
when it was not presented to the trial court).
¶ 55 Forfeiture aside, defendant’s argument nevertheless fails. Defendant bore the
burden of establishing that his mistaken impression at the time of the plea was justified by objective
standards. See People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991) (“The burden is on the defendant to
establish that the circumstances existing at the time of the plea, judged by objective standards,
justified the mistaken impression.”). However, he provided no justification, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel or misrepresentations from the trial court, for his claim that his guilty plea
was based on a lack of knowledge about presenting mitigating evidence of youth at sentencing.
¶ 56 Nor does defendant argue he believed he was prohibited from presenting such
evidence; he argues only that he did not learn he could present potentially mitigating evidence at
a sentencing hearing until after he entered his plea. But this does not show defendant operated
under any misapprehension about the sentence he faced before he entered his guilty plea,
particularly in light of the court’s compliance with Rule 402(a), Rule 402(b), and Rule 605(c), as
we discussed earlier. Cf. People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (3d) 190298, ¶ 26 (concluding that even
though People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 42, which established a sentence greater than 40 years
in prison constitutes a de facto life sentence, was decided after the defendant’s guilty plea, the
- 14 - defendant failed to show he acted under a misapprehension about the sentence he faced at the time
he entered his plea).
¶ 57 Moreover, defendant has never asserted at any point that had he known he could
have presented mitigating evidence about his youth at a sentencing hearing, he would not have
pleaded guilty and pursued a trial. Irrelevant, 2021 Il App (4th) 200626, ¶ 43. Accordingly,
defendant cannot establish a basis warranting the withdrawal of his guilty plea.
¶ 58 In sum, because defendant has failed to establish he pleaded guilty pursuant to a
misapprehension of fact or law, he cannot show he suffered a manifest injustice that would warrant
the withdrawal of his guilty plea. To the contrary, the record demonstrates defendant entered his
guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. As a result, we conclude the trial court properly exercised
its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 59 B. Defendant’s Counsel Complied With Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
¶ 60 Next, defendant acknowledges that his counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate was
facially compliant. However, he contends the record refutes the certificate and shows counsel
failed to make amendments necessary to adequately present his claims. We disagree.
¶ 61 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 62 Rule 604(d) provides, in relevant part, the following:
“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the
attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means
or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the
entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of
proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing
hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate
- 15 - presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15,
2024).
¶ 63 Strict compliance with Rule 604(d) is required. People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th)
220573, ¶ 30. When the certificate fails to comply strictly with Rule 604(d), the appellate court
should remand the matter to the trial court to provide the defendant with the opportunity to file a
new postplea motion and conduct a new hearing on the motion. Id. Our review of counsel’s
compliance with Rule 604(d) is de novo. Id.
¶ 64 2. This Case
¶ 65 When arguing that defense counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d) despite his
filing a facially compliant certificate, defendant asserts that although the motion to withdraw his
guilty plea noted his contentions, counsel made no effort to shape those contentions into cognizable
legal claims. The State responds that defendant’s grievance amounts to his dissatisfaction with
counsel’s failure to better present a meritless claim.
¶ 66 In support of his argument, defendant relies upon People v. Gray, 2023 IL App
(4th) 230076, and People v. Keele, 210 Ill. App. 3d 898 (1991). However, defendant’s reliance on
these cases is misplaced.
¶ 67 In Gray, this court determined the defendant’s postplea counsel failed to strictly
comply with Rule 604(d) when the record established that counsel failed to meaningfully consult
with the defendant such that she “did not know specifics” regarding why the defendant wanted to
withdraw his guilty plea. Gray, 2023 IL App (4th) 230076, ¶¶ 33, 41. This court noted several
indicators in the record to support our conclusion, including (1) the defendant’s comments to the
trial court that his postplea counsel had not spoken to him, (2) counsel’s comment to the court
suggesting she did not know why the defendant did not understand the plea, (3) counsel’s failure
- 16 - to attach an affidavit to the motion to withdraw the defendant’s plea to substantiate a claim based
upon facts not appearing in the record, and (4) counsel’s reference to the wrong portion of the
sentencing transcript when arguing the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35-36.
¶ 68 In Keele, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Keele, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 903. The court explained that a
review of the plea transcript revealed a “less-than-model acceptance of a guilty plea under the
standards of Rule 402,” but the defendant’s motion alleged only generally “ ‘Rule 402 was not
complied with.’ ” Id. at 901, 903. Given its reading of (1) the transcript, which revealed issues
with the trial court’s acceptance of the defendant’s guilty plea, and (2) the motion to withdraw,
which lacked the “specifics of why the plea was involuntary,” the appellate court determined
factual issues existed as to whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. Id. at
903.
¶ 69 The present case, unlike Gray, does not involve counsel’s committing a myriad of
errors that hindered the presentation of the arguments defendant wished to raise for withdrawing
his guilty plea. To the contrary, although defendant claims his counsel failed to adequately present
a claim warranting the withdrawal of his plea, defendant himself told counsel he knew of no reason
to withdraw his plea. Indeed, at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, defendant
acknowledged to the trial court directly that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 70 In addition, as we earlier explained, our reading of the record in this case, unlike
Keele, reveals no concerns about the trial court’s compliance with Rule 402. Nothing in the record
suggests the existence of any issue regarding the voluntariness of defendant’s plea that
subsequently went unaddressed in his motion to withdraw, especially when defendant twice
affirmed he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea.
- 17 - ¶ 71 We have previously held that amendments to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
are not necessary when there are no amendments that could have salvaged a defendant’s meritless
claim. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573, ¶¶ 43, 50. Here, at bottom, defendant argues his counsel
should have better presented a claim that would warrant the withdrawal of his guilty plea despite
his own admission he could think of no reason to withdraw his plea.
¶ 72 Ultimately, however, defendant’s claim is meritless because, as we have noted, “[a]
defendant should not be allowed to withdraw his plea when the real basis for his withdrawal is that
he is dissatisfied with the length of his sentence.” Cunningham, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 350. “[I]t would
be an exercise in futility and a waste of judicial resources to remand for an attorney to replead a
claim that has already been adjudicated meritless.” Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573, ¶ 50.
Because nothing in the record refutes the assertion in counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate that he
made the amendments necessary to adequately present any defects in defendant’s plea
proceedings, we therefore conclude counsel complied with Rule 604(d).
¶ 73 C. Defendant’s Counsel Did Not Have a Conflict of Interest
¶ 74 Last, defendant argues that because the motion to withdraw his guilty plea prepared
by his defense counsel implicated potential claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the motion
created a conflict of interest necessitating counsel’s withdrawal. We disagree.
¶ 75 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 76 The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VI, XIV) guarantee a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel, which
includes the right to conflict-free representation. Gray, 2023 IL (4th) 230076, ¶ 18. “Attorneys
who represent defendants while having inconsistent loyalties to other clients, to the State, or to
themselves labor under a conflict of interest, which can amount to ineffective assistance of
- 18 - counsel.” Id. An attorney should withdraw when a defendant challenges the attorney’s
effectiveness in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because attorneys cannot argue their own
ineffectiveness or be a witness for or against the defendant when their representation is a contested
issue. Id.
¶ 77 A conflict of interest may be either per se or actual. People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d
356, 374 (2010). In the present case, defendant argues the existence of only an actual conflict of
interest. To establish an actual conflict of interest, a defendant must show some specific defect in
his counsel’s strategy, tactics, or decision-making attributable to the conflict. Id. at 376. Whether
counsel acted under a conflict of interest is a legal question subject to de novo review. People v.
Schutz, 2017 IL App (4th) 140956, ¶ 14.
¶ 78 2. This Case
¶ 79 Defendant argues his counsel acted under an actual conflict of interest because the
wording of the motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea recounted “everything that was done
right during the taking of this plea” (emphasis in original) and therefore suggested defendant
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. In essence, defendant asserts the motion argued against
itself. Defendant contends that counsel wrote the motion this way because counsel intended to
protect his own interest by insulating himself from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 80 The State argues no conflict of interest existed because (1) counsel raised the sole
claim defendant wished to raise and (2) defendant made no assertion in the trial court that counsel
provided ineffective assistance.
¶ 81 In making his argument, defendant relies upon People v. Zirko, 2021 IL App (1st)
162956, People v. Garcia, 2018 IL App (5th) 150363, People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (3d) 140921,
and People v. Kinard, 2023 IL App (4th) 210577-U. He asserts these cases support his claim that
- 19 - by discussing the procedurally compliant aspects of the plea proceeding in the motion to withdraw
defendant’s plea, counsel must have been protecting his own interests over defendant’s by
insulating himself from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant contends that had
counsel presented defendant’s claims that he was unaware that he (1) could not challenge the
length of his sentence and (2) was allowed to present mitigating evidence about his youth at a
sentencing hearing, counsel would have necessarily been conceding he failed to advise defendant
of those facts. Defendant continues, “[C]ounsel would potentially be presenting arguments about
his own ineffectiveness,” amounting to a conflict of interest. Defendant’s “labyrinthine” argument
is unavailing. Gray, 2023 IL App (4th) 230076, ¶ 17.
¶ 82 To begin, defendant’s reliance upon Zirko, Garcia, and Brown is misplaced. Each
of these cases involved the defendants’ attorneys filing a postconviction motion explicitly seeking
relief based upon the attorneys’ own admitted mistakes or ineffective assistance. Zirko, 2021 IL
App (1st) 162956, ¶ 8; Garcia, 2018 IL App (5th) 150363, ¶ 20; Brown, 2017 IL App (3d) 140921,
¶ 32. In each case, the appellate court held that a conflict of interest existed because, despite raising
those claims, each attorney failed to make any reasonable effort to argue them, such that they were
no longer vigorously representing the defendants. Zirko, 2021 IL App (1st) 162956, ¶¶ 25-26;
Garcia, 2018 IL App (5th) 150363, ¶ 39; Brown, 2017 IL App (3d) 140921, ¶ 33.
¶ 83 Unlike Zirko, Garcia, and Brown, defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea never
made an assertion of ineffective assistance. Nor does the record show counsel admitted to any
mistake or ineffective assistance during his representation of defendant.
¶ 84 Defendant’s reliance upon Kinard is similarly unavailing. In Kinard, although the
defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea did not explicitly allege ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant’s attorney admitted to the trial court that he provided the defendant with
- 20 - incorrect advice. Kinard, 2023 IL App (4th) 210577-U, ¶¶ 12, 15, 19. However, counsel never
amended the defendant’s motion to raise an ineffective assistance claim, nor did he argue the
matter under the appropriate legal principles, opting instead to place the blame for the defendant’s
misunderstanding upon information given to her by the probation office. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19. The
appellate court concluded counsel’s actions indicated a reluctance to acknowledge and argue his
ineffective assistance, which amounted to an actual conflict of interest. Id. ¶ 50.
¶ 85 In this case, unlike Kinard, no assertion that defense counsel’s performance was
deficient was made in defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in his written statement, or
at the hearing on the motion. Although defendant claimed he (1) believed he could challenge his
sentence on appeal and (2) did not know he could present mitigating evidence about his youth at a
sentencing hearing, defendant gave no indication that this misunderstanding was due to incorrect
or misleading advice from his attorney. In fact, defendant did not mention his attorney’s
performance at all in the motion. Defendant’s only assertion of any dissatisfaction with either of
his attorneys occurred prior to his plea and amounted to a mere “personality issue” with
defendant’s other attorney—not counsel who filed the motion to withdraw his plea.
¶ 86 Given this context, we reject defendant’s claim that the motion created a conflict of
interest for his attorney. See Gray, 2023 IL App (4th) 230076, ¶ 24 (concluding that because the
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance or
allege any mistake by his attorney, “[t]here was no reason for counsel to infer she would need to
argue her own ineffectiveness” as would create a conflict of interest). Accordingly, we conclude
defense counsel did not labor under a conflict of interest. See id. (concluding counsel did not
operate under a conflict of interest by filing a motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea that
repeated the defendant’s claims “almost verbatim” and alleged no mistake or ineffective assistance
- 21 - on the part of counsel).
¶ 87 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 88 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 89 Affirmed.
- 22 -