People v. Warner

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 3-24-0631
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 240631-U

Order filed June 2, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0631 v. ) Circuit No. 23-MT-8813 ) ALEXUS M. WARNER, ) Honorable ) Marzell Richardson, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Brennan and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an accident.

¶2 The defendant, Alexus M. Warner, appeals her convictions for leaving the scene of an

accident, arguing the evidence was not sufficient to prove her guilt. Two eyewitnesses identified

the defendant, but she contends those identifications were unreliable.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 Gumersindo Nunez and his wife, Sarai Nunez, were traveling west on Route 30 on

February 28, 2023, at around 6:15 p.m. While stopped at an intersection, their vehicle was struck

from behind. Gumersindo exited his car, went to the back to see where his car had been hit, and

told the other driver to wait because he was going to call the police. He also took two photographs

of the other car. As Gumersindo was returning to his car to wait for the police, the other driver

drove away. Based on this interaction, Gumersindo identified the defendant at a bench trial as the

driver of the other vehicle.

¶5 Gumersindo admitted on cross-examination that the collision happened at night, and there

were headlights pointing toward him when he observed the defendant. When Officer Robert Eber

arrived on scene, Gumersindo told him the other driver was a woman “wearing like a head

covering” and said, “she was probably around her 20’s.” He told Officer Eber that he saw her face,

although he didn’t describe it, and he conveyed that “her skin was similar to [his],” that she was

not Hispanic, but black.

¶6 Sarai got out of the car as well, and she also took a picture of the damage. She did not speak

to the other driver, but she saw her. She also admitted on cross-examination that the accident

happened at night, and there were headlights pointed in her direction. When Officer Eber arrived,

Sarai was being checked by medical personnel for injuries, and she was eventually transported to

the hospital for injuries. Because she was occupied receiving medical treatment, she did not

provide a description of the other driver to Officer Eber.

¶7 According to Officer Eber, there was moderate rear-end damage to the Nunezes’ car. He

ensured the Nunezes received medical treatment, completed a report, then communicated with the

Illinois State Police to circulate the license plate number of the offending vehicle, which was

2 visible in the photographs taken by Gumersindo and Sarai. He then used the Law Enforcement

Agencies Data System (LEADS) to access the name and address of the registered owner.

¶8 At trial, defense counsel objected when the prosecutor asked Officer Eber what he

discovered about the vehicle after inputting the information into the “state police emergency radio

network.” The court sustained defense counsel’s objection to a lack of foundation, and the

prosecutor asked Officer Eber to provide information about the police database, LEADS. Officer

Eber did so, and the prosecutor again asked what information Officer Eber gleaned from LEADS.

Defense counsel objected once more on the basis of hearsay and lack of foundation. The court

overruled the objection, and Officer Eber testified that he found the name and address of the

registered owner through LEADS. However, at the time of trial he could not recall the name of the

registered owner.

¶9 The prosecutor refreshed Officer Eber’s recollection using his police report, but when he

began to read from the report, defense counsel objected. Officer Eber recounted that he “learned

that the vehicle was registered to [the defendant],” and he looked up her address and phone number

in a “local police database.” The defense objected to Officer Eber’s testimony about information

gleaned from a local database, and the court sustained the objection. Officer Eber testified he also

obtained the defendant’s address from LEADS, but he was ultimately unable to locate the vehicle

on the night of the collision, and he did not make contact with the defendant that night.

¶ 10 On March 6, 2023, about one week later, Officer Eber was on duty when another officer

advised that he had pulled over a vehicle matching the description of the defendant’s vehicle with

the same license plate. Officer Eber responded to that location and found the vehicle pulled over

with damage to its front end. He spoke to the owner of the vehicle, who was a passenger at the

time. When asked whether he saw the vehicle owner in the courtroom, he said, “I don’t know.”

3 However, he recalled that he asked the owner about the collision, and she told him that “her friend

was driving the vehicle that day and her friend advised her that she hit a stationary object.” Officer

Eber could not recall any identifying information about the driver of the car.

¶ 11 In closing arguments, the defendant argued that the Nunezes could not properly identify

the defendant. The defendant also argued that the defendant was wearing a mask during the trial,

and she was wearing a head covering on the night of the incident.

¶ 12 The court found the defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an accident involving property

damage. In pronouncing its verdict, the court noted that Gumersindo and Sarai both identified the

defendant, and the photographs taken by Gumersindo led to a vehicle owned by the defendant. The

court sentenced the defendant to twelve months’ conditional discharge and ordered restitution in

the amount of $500. The defendant appealed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, the defendant argues that no rational trier of fact could have found the evidence

sufficient to establish her guilt because the eyewitness identifications were unreliable. In addition,

the defendant contends that “[w]ithout credible eyewitness testimony, the State’s only other

evidence [as to the defendant’s identity] was Officer Eber’s testimony,” which the defendant

asserts contained improper hearsay about the vehicle’s registration information. The defendant

does not allege the State failed to prove that a crime occurred or that the State failed to prove any

element of the offense. Instead, she asserts the State failed to prove she was the perpetrator.

¶ 15 In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original

and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). “This

4 standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact

finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People

v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009).

¶ 16 On appeal, we will not retry a defendant. People v. Austin M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 107. Our

review requires us to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State. People

v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42. A judgment will not be reversed unless it “is so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.”

People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). Where a finding of guilt depends on eyewitness

testimony, our task is to decide whether the tier of fact could reasonably accept the testimony as

true beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35.

¶ 17 We have long held that a valid conviction may be based on a positive identification by a

single witness with ample opportunity to observe the defendant. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 435

(2009). Relevant factors to be considered under such circumstances include (1) the witness’s

opportunity to view the offender at the time of the offense, (2) the witness’s degree of attention at

the time of the offense, (3) the accuracy of any previous description of the offender by the witness,

(4) the degree of certainty shown by the witness in identifying the defendant, and (5) the length of

time between the offense and the identification.” People v. Joiner, 2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶

47 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)). “No single Biggers factor by itself

conclusively establishes the reliability of identification testimony; instead, the trier of fact must

consider all the factors.” People v. Macklin, 2019 IL App (1st) 161165, ¶ 22. Importantly, “once

identification evidence has been properly admitted, the decision to credit the identification must

be resolved by the finder of fact.” People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 70.

5 ¶ 18 Thus, as Johnson instructs, the question before us is not whether the circumstances of the

identification create a substantial likelihood of misidentification, but whether “no reasonable

person could accept [the identification evidence] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 72. Reviewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot conclude that the evidence was so

unsatisfactory that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.

Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). The testimony of Gumersindo and Sarai was, in the circuit

court’s view, credible. See Macklin, 2019 IL App (1st) 161165, ¶ 23 (where the trial judge finds a

victim’s identification sufficient to sustain the burden of proof, the finding indicates the

identification is reliable under Biggers). Our task is to determine whether the circuit court’s

determination was erroneous under the Collins standard.

¶ 19 The record reflects that the court was aware of the conditions that may have interfered with

identifying the defendant, including the fact that it was night, the presence of headlights, the glass

between the victims and the defendant, the potential for distraction, the fact the defendant was

wearing a head covering, and the time between the offense and the trial. However, the court was

also aware that both victims had an opportunity to view the defendant from about six feet away,

both victims were looking at the defendant to see who had hit their vehicle, Gumersindo spoke to

the defendant and provided an accurate description of her to Officer Eber, and both victims

positively identified the defendant in court. “It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to determine the

witnesses’ credibility and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.” People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001).

Based on the record presented, a rational trier of fact could have found that the Nunuzes accurately

identified the defendant.

6 ¶ 20 In so finding, we reject the defendant’s argument that the defendant’s face mask at the time

of trial prevented the Nunezes from identifying her. The record is incomplete with respect to the

details of the mask worn by the defendant at trial. The defendant did not object to the Nunezes’

identifications at trial, and the record does not establish what type of mask the defendant wore,

how she wore it, or whether it was worn throughout the trial. Although the defendant’s attorney

referenced the mask in closing arguments, closing arguments are not evidence. See People v.

Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 40. In any event, the court was aware the defendant was wearing a

mask and accepted the identifications anyway. Facial coverings are not themselves disqualifying

of an identification. See People v. Barnes, 364 Ill. App. 3d 888, 894 (2006) (the defendant was

positively and reliably identified despite wearing a hood and a bandana covering most of his face).

¶ 21 In reaching this conclusion, we also reject the defendant’s assertion that the State’s

evidence was insufficient because the court relied on improper hearsay evidence. The defendant

herself suggests that this argument succeeds only if we reject the court’s findings with respect to

the Nunezes’ identification of the defendant. As noted above, the testimony of a single eyewitness

with an opportunity to observe the defendant is sufficient to sustain a conviction. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d

at 435. The erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless error “when it is merely

cumulative or is supported by a positive identification or other corroborative circumstances.”

People v. Prince, 362 Ill. App. 3d 762, 776 (2005). Here, where the Nunezes’ identification of the

defendant provided independent evidence of the defendant’s identity, we need not determine the

propriety of the court’s evidentiary rulings. To the extent the court erred in admitting hearsay

evidence, it was cumulative of the positive identification provided by the eyewitnesses.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

7 ¶ 24 Affirmed.