People v. Wang

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: May 3, 2013
• Docket: CF0518-12
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 -3 3 CRIMINAL CASJ:t;trp(:A{FM~ lr8df,RT 4 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) ) ) B;ej v v .._

5 v. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) On Defendant's Motion for Leave to 6 CHIN-HO PETER WANG, ) Place Mental State at Issue, for 7 ) Forensic Psychiatric Examination, and Defendant. ) Other Relief 8

10 INTRODUCTION 11

12 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Michael J. Bordallo on January 3, 2013 o

13 Defendant's Motion for Leave to Place Mental State at Issue, for Forensic Psychiatri 14 Examination, and for Other Relief. The People of Guam were represented by Assistant Attome 15 General Lisa Hack. The Defendant was represented by Assistant Public Defender Mari 16

17 Fitzpatrick. Having reviewed the memorandum and papers presented, the court now issues th

18 following decision GRANTING the Defendant's Motion to Place Mental State at Issue 19 GRANTING the Motion for Forensic Psychiatric Examination, and DENYING the Defendant' 20 Motion for a Protective Order. 21 FACTUAL HISTORY 22

23 The Defendant was indicted on one count of felony First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct

24 one count of felony Terrorizing involving a Special Allegation of Possession and Use of 25 Deadly Weapon, and one count each of misdemeanor Family Violence and Assault. Th 26 indictment arises from the allegation that the Defendant physically and sexual assaulted hi 27 girlfriend at knife point on August 31, 2012. Against the Defendant's wishes, Defense Counse 28

Page 1 of 10 now moves to place the Defendant's mental state at issue before the Court and to obtain a court- 2 ordered forensic examination. Assuming these two motions are granted, Defense Counsel furthe 3 argues that the Defendant is entitled to a protective order for all statements made during th 4 course ofhis psychiatric evaluation. 5

6 A defendant should plead the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness

7 disease, or defect defense within ten days of arraignment, unless good cause for delay i 8 demonstrated. §7.22(d). In the case presently before the Court, Counsel for the Defendant ha 9 moved to enter the plea more than three months after the Defendant was arraigned on Septembe 10 19, 2012. The People timely filed an opposition to the motion. Because the Court finds that ther 11

12 exists good cause for the delay, the Court grants the Motion to Place Mental State at Issue an 13 grants the Motion for Psychiatric Examination. For the following reasons the Court denies th 14 Motion for a Protective Order. 15 DISCUSSION 16

17 Guam law protects the right of defendants to plead the affirmative defense of menta

18 illness, disease or defect to pending criminal charges. 7 GCA §7.22. A defendant should plea 19 the defense within ten days of arraignment, unless good cause for delay is demonstrated. /d. I 20 the case presently before the Court, Counsel for the Defendant has moved to enter a plea of no 21 guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, but has done so more than three months after hi 22

23 arraignment. Defense Counsel has further moved for a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation an

24 for a protective order for all statements made during the course of the examination. The Peopl 25 oppose the Defendant's motion, but "leave the determination of"good cause" to the discretion o 26 the court." Each of the three motions will be evaluated in turn. 27

Page 2 oflO I. The Defendant Has Demonstrated Good Cause for Delaying his Plea 2 That a defendant is unable to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease o 3 defect within ten days of arraignment is not an absolute bar to the entering the affirmativ 4 defense. Guam law recognizes that there are circumstances that may necessitate a defendan 5

6 pleading not guilty at a later date and grants the court the discretion to accept the plea wher

7 good cause is demonstrated. Specifically, the law states that the defendant shall plead "not late 8 than ten days after his arraignment or at such later time as the court for good cause may allow.' 9 7 GCA §7.22(d) (emphasis added). 10 Guam's statute was modeled after California law. California case law provides guideline 11

12 for determining "good cause" in accepting a change of plea to not guilty by reason of menta

13 disease or defect. In California the defendant "should be required to produce evidence whic 14 would show the trial judge that there were reasonable grounds to believe that at the time of th 15 commission of the crime he was legally insane." People v. Hererra, 163 Cal.Rptr 435, 43 16

17 (1980) (citing People v. Morgan, 50 P2d. 1051, 1062). Such evidence includes medical record

18 of previously conducted psychiatric evaluation and treatment. See ld. Accordingly, a change to 19 plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may even be accepted after th 20 commencement of trial where its denial may result in the "withdrawal of a crucial defense." In r 21 Kubler, 126 Cal.Rptr. 25 (1975). 22

23 There is medical evidence indicating that the Defendant may be incompetent to stan

24 trial. The Defendant has previously undergone treatment with the Veteran's Administration, ha 25 been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ('PTSD'), and is being evaluated to determin 26 if he suffered brain damage from an explosion that occurred during his service in the U.S. Army. 27 The People oppose the motion, but provide little to no legal basis for their opposition. Becaus 28

Page3 oflO the Defendant can provide evidence that may implicate his mental state at the time of his allege 2 crimes, the Court's will not use its discretion to deny the affirmative defense. 3 The delay in pleading the affirmative defense is due to the Defendant's unwillingness t 4 enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Having tried to work with th 5

6 Defendant, Defense Counsel now asks the Court to mandate that he undergo a psychiatri

7 evaluation based upon unusual behavior exhibited throughout the course of the case. Thi 8 behavior has led Defense Counsel to conclude that "He [the Defendant] does not think clearl 9 and cannot make rational decisions." The Declaration of Defense Counsel detailing Defendant' 10 unusual behavior combined with the Defendant's medical history indicates that he could b 11

12 incompetent to stand trial. Because knowledge of the Defendant's mental state at the time of th

13 commission of the crime may prove critical to his own defense, the Court finds that good caus 14 for the delay in pleading the affirmative defense has been established. 15 II. Determining Competency to Stand Trial Requires a Psychiatric Evaluation 16

17 In order to determine whether or not the Defendant is competent to stand trial

18 psychiatric evaluation must be conducted. Having established that the Defendant has good caus 19 to plead the affirmative defense, statutory law requires that "Upon the giving of such notice o 20 upon a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness, disease or defect, the court shall order 21 examination to be conducted, as provided in § 7.25." 9 GCA § 7.22(d). Guam law furthe 22

23 requires that "Whenever a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness [] is entered or a notice i

24 given under § 7.22, the court shall appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or other qualifie 25 person (hereinafter referred to as psychiatrist) to examine the defendant and to report upon hi 26 mental condition." 9 GCA §7.25(a). 27

Page 4 oflO In their opposition to Defense Counsel's motion the People request that the Court defe 2 entry of the Defendant's plea until the reports from the psychiatric evaluation are filed with th 3 court. The Court finds this request unnecessary. Immediately following the court-ordere 4 psychiatric evaluation, Guam statutory law requires that "Each psychiatrist appointed by th 5

6 court who examines the defendant pursuant to this Section shall file a written report with th

7 clerk of the court who shall deliver copies to each party." By law, the psychiatric report will b 8 filed with the court shortly after the examination of the Defendant has been conducted. If th 9 People wanted entry of the Defendant's plea to be deferred for another reason, that reason wa 10

11 not clearly stated in their opposition.

12 Similarly, the People express concern that the Court will either appoint more than on 13 psychiatrist or that the Court will appoint a psychiatrist of the Defendant's choosing. Th 14 opposition states "The People urge the court to appoint the court retained psychiatrist to evaluat 15 the Defendant first." Again, the Court finds that the People's concerns are unfounded. In Peopl 16

17 v. Rabago, CF 0506-10, this Court made clear that it will only appoint a single, local psychiatris

18 and that "Absent a showing that the Court appointed psychiatrist is unqualified to report upon th 19 Defendant's mental condition, there is no requirement that the Court pay for an additiona 20 psychiatrist for the Defendant. The authorization of such additional expenses is at the discretio 21 of the Court and is not currently viewed as reasonable." Decision and Order on Defendant' 22

23 Application for Services, Fees & Costs.

24 Defense counsel has additionally requested that the report of the court-appointe 25 psychiatrist include eight itemized pieces of information. As with the People's first request, thi 26 request is unnecessary and the Court need not reiterate the eight items here. The eight item 27

Page 5 of tO delineated in Defense Counsel's motion are the exact same eight items that the court-appointe 2 psychiatrist is mandated, by Guam law, to include in his or her report. 9 GCA § 7.25(g). 3 III. The Defendant Has not Demonstrated a Need for a Protective Order 4 The Defendant has also motioned the Court to have all statements made during the cours 5

6 of his psychiatric evaluation placed under a protective order. The motion specifically states tha

7 the Defendant "should not be required to choose between waiving his doctor-patient privileg 8 and his right to remain silent." The Defendant correctly states that "the use at trial of statement 9 exacted by the compulsion of a court ordered psychiatric exam where the statement tends t 10 establish the fact of the offense is a violation of the privilege against self incrimination." Th 11

12 Defendant does not need a protective order, however, as the law already prohibits usin

13 privileged psychiatric statements to establish the facts of the offense. Because Defense Counse 14 appears to have forgotten, the Court will now reiterate the arguments previously provided in t 15 Counsel in People v. Uncangco, CF 0429-12. 16

17 A. Guam Law Requires Disclosure

18 Guam law mandates the disclosure of reports generated from court-ordered psychiatri 19 evaluations. The statutory law is not only unequivocal, it is decidedly detailed in the exac 20 procedure that must be undertaken. The law requires that "Each psychiatrist appointed by th 21 court who examines the defendant pursuant to this Section shall file a written report with th 22

23 clerk of court who shall deliver copies to each party." §7.25(g) (emphasis added). The law als

24 delineates the information the psychiatrist places within the report and that information to whic 25 the psychiatrist may testify to at trial. §7.25(g)(l)-(8); (h). The law governing the appointe 26 psychiatrist's report and testimony prevents the introduction of evidence not specific to the issu 27

Page 6 of 10 of mental competency and addresses the Defendant's concern that his statements be admitte 2 solely on the issue of his affirmative defense. 3 B. The Court Will Appoint a Psychiatrist and Will Not Sit as a Fact Finder 4 The Defendant correctly points out that an indigent defendant's right to psychiatri 5

6 counsel is not satisfied when the psychiatrist is required to disclose his evaluation to the cou

7 sitting as a fact finder. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F .2d 1153, 1158 (1990): Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 8 F .3d 815, 824 (200 1). The facts of the present case are distinguishable. By appointing 9 independent psychiatrist, the Court will not sit as a fact-finder and will not determine the scop 10

11 ofthe psychiatrist's duties.

12 The Pawlyk case, like Guam statutory law, very precisely delineates the constitutiona

13 rights afforded an indigent defendant who places his mental health at issue before the court. Du 14 process guarantees the defendant access to a single, competent psychiatrist. !d. at 823. Th 15 seminal U.S. Supreme Court case of Ake v. Oklahoma made clear that this does not give th 16

17 defendant "a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive fund

18 to hire his own." 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). Additionally, "Ake does not guarantee access to 19 psychiatrist 'who will reach only biased or favorable conclusions."' Pawlyk at 823 (quotin 20 Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1516-17 (9th Cir.1990)). The Ninth Circuit summarizes: 21 "That due process guarantees a defendant access to a single, competent psychiatrist, but does no 22

23 guarantee a favorable evaluation, leads inexorably to the conclusion that a psychiatrist'

24 evaluation or opinion may have an adverse, but constitutionally permissible, effect on particul 25 mental status defenses that a defendant might wish to present." !d. Therefore, defendants must 26 "consider whether the testimony will be harmful or helpful in light of the psychiatrist' 27

28 evaluation." !d.

Page 7 of 10 Defendants who place their mental health at issue before the court, do so knowing tha 2 the results of a court-order psychiatric exam will be made available to the People. Both befor 3 the psychiatric evaluation and after receiving the evaluation results, the Defendant must decide i 4 he wishes to assert the affirmative defense. Furthermore, because the defendant seeks to prov 5

6 that he is not criminally liable by reason of mental disease or defect, the defendant canno

7 withhold evaluation evidence relevant to the very issue he has placed before the court. See Jd. a 8 825. In Pawlyk, the defendant was able to obtain two independent psychiatric evaluations- th 9 first of which was unfavorable to his defense. When the defendant called the second psychiatris 10

to testify on his behalf, the prosecution sought to have the first psychiatric evaluation admitte 11

12 into evidence for the purpose of rebuttal. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Washington Suprem

13 Court's finding that the first report was discoverable, admissible evidence. The first evaluatio 14 was discoverable because "the compelled disclosure of Dr. Harris' evaluation was not tantamoun 15 to appointing a psychiatrist upon a condition of full disclosure, but was the consequence of [th 16

17 defendant's] decision to assert an insanity defense." ld. at 826.

18 C. The Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights are not Implicated

19 Where a psychiatrist's evaluation is limited to the issue of a defendant's competency t 20 stand trial and the ability to aid in his own defense, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. 21 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,465 (1981). The Defendant argues that he needs a protective orde 22

23 for his psychiatric evaluation because "Statements made about the event at issue should be seale

24 and not used in criminal proceedings and he [the Defendant] should not have to choose betwee 25 his right to remain silent and the right to have a diagnosis. Should he put his mental state at issu 26 then the report would be turned over to the prosecutor and the Court [sic]." The Defendant' 27 concern is addressed by statutory and case law requiring that the report be admitted for th 28

Page 8 oflO limited purpose of establishing a defendant's ability to stand trial and his mental competenc 2 during the acts charged. See Estelle (holding that psychiatric evaluation results could not be use 3 to establish 'future dangerousness' for sentencing purposes following conviction). 4 The Defendant's due process rights are not currently implicated. Defendant correctl 5

6 notes that allowing the prosecution to "enlist the psychiatrists' efforts to help secure a convictio

7 would deprive an indigent defendant of due process." While this statement is true, it does no 8 apply to this case. There is a critical distinction between using the information contained withi 9 the psychiatric evaluation for rebuttal purposes which is permitted by law- and using the sam 10 information to establish a conviction. The People have made no motion indicating that they see 11

12 to use the results of the as yet incomplete, future report to establish the Defendant's guilt.

13 Instead, the People seek only to enforce their statutory right to have access to the results of th 14 court-ordered evaluation. 15 The People's right to have access to the report is mandated by Guam law and supporte 16

17 by case law from both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court ha

18 made clear that, "Where, however, a defendant places his mental status at issue and thus relie 19 upon reports of psychological examinations, he should expect that the results of such reports rna 20 be used by the prosecutor in rebuttal." Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 425 (9187). I 21 Buchanan, the defendant challenged the introduction of results from a court-appointe 22

23 psychiatric evaluation on grounds that he had not been informed that his statements could b

24 used against him at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility of the reports and foun 25 no Fifth Amendment violation because "the psychiatrist had set forth his general observation 26 about the mental state of petitioner but had not described any statements by petitioner dealin 27 with the crimes for which he was charged." ld. at 424. 28

Page 9 of 10 When a defendant requests a psychiatric evaluation, the People can rebut "with evidenc 2 from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested," because the defendant has "n 3 Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of this psychiatric testimony by th 4 prosecution." !d. at 423. Additionally, a "defendant who asserts a mental status defense lacks 5

6 Fifth Amendment right to remain silent regarding the mental status that he has placed at issue,'

7 because "a defendant's communication to a psychiatrist regarding his mental status is often th 8 only meaningful evidence available to either the prosecution or the defendant regarding th 9 defendant's mental state." Pawlyk at 825 (citing Buchanan at 422-423; Estelle at 465). 10 Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases consistently find that reports from a court-appointe II

12 psychiatrist are discoverable material available to the People when an indigent defendant elect

13 to place his mental health at issue before the court. This case law, coupled with the mandate o 14 Guam law requiring that the report be delivered to "the other party in the action," prevents th 15 Court from granting a protective order. 9 GCA §7.25(g). 16

CONCLUSION 17

18 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion to Plac 19 Mental State at Issue and Motion for Forensic Psychiatric Examination. Because there is n 20 need, the Court DENIES the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order. Further Proceedings ar 21 0 8 2013 set for - - - - - - - · 13 at 9am. 22

24 SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of May 2013. 25

27 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 28

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