People v. Wandell

New York Court of Appeals

People v. Wandell

554 N.E.2d 1274, 75 N.Y.2d 951, 555 N.Y.S.2d 686, 1990 N.Y. LEXIS 934

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 26, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by42 cases

This text of 554 N.E.2d 1274 (People v. Wandell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Wandell, 554 N.E.2d 1274, 75 N.Y.2d 951, 555 N.Y.S.2d 686, 1990 N.Y. LEXIS 934 (N.Y. 1990).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

Defendant argues that, in the absence of a knowing waiver, he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his defense counsel’s concurrent representation of the prosecution’s primary witness on an unrelated civil matter (see, People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307; People v Macerola, 47 NY2d 257). Under the unique circumstances presented we conclude that there should be a reversal.

As a threshold, the principles of People v Gomberg (supra) and People v Macerola (supra) apply to the potential conflicts that arise from a defense counsel’s representation of an important prosecution witness, as well as to counsel’s representation of a codefendant (see, e.g., People v Lombardo, 61 NY2d 97, 102 [representing defendant and People’s chief witness]; People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1 [representing defendant and victim]). Additionally, both the prosecution and defense counsel are under a mandatory affirmative obligation both to recognize the existence of a potential conflict and to alert the court to the facts and circumstances surrounding that potential conflict (see, People v McDonald, supra, at 8), so that the Trial Judge can conduct a record inquiry and be satisfied that the defendant "has an awareness of the potential risks involved in that course and has knowingly chosen it” (People v Gomberg, supra, at 313-314; see, People v Macerola, supra, at 262-263; People v McDonald, supra, at 8-9). This inquiry is vital "because defendants may not always sense when a conflict exists [953]*953or perceive how it might undermine effective representation” (People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 468). None of these things were done in this case.

Here, both defense counsel and the prosecution were acutely aware that a conflict existed by virtue of defense counsel’s representation of the prosecution’s chief witness (see, e.g., People v Lombardo, supra). Their failure to bring the underlying facts to the court’s attention is inexcusable. Having previously been personally responsible for a reversal because of a similar omission, both the District Attorney and defense counsel were undoubtedly aware of their duty to alert the court to the need for a Gomberg inquiry (see, People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, supra). Under these circumstances, a reversal and new trial are required.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur in memorandum.

Order reversed, etc.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

Defendant argues that, in the absence of a knowing waiver, he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his defense counsel’s concurrent representation of the prosecution’s primary witness on an unrelated civil matter (see, People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307; People v Macerola, 47 NY2d 257). Under the unique circumstances presented we conclude that there should be a reversal.

As a threshold, the principles of People v Gomberg (supra) and People v Macerola (supra) apply to the potential conflicts that arise from a defense counsel’s representation of an important prosecution witness, as well as to counsel’s representation of a codefendant (see, e.g., People v Lombardo, 61 NY2d 97, 102 [representing defendant and People’s chief witness]; People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1 [representing defendant and victim]). Additionally, both the prosecution and defense counsel are under a mandatory affirmative obligation both to recognize the existence of a potential conflict and to alert the court to the facts and circumstances surrounding that potential conflict (see, People v McDonald, supra, at 8), so that the Trial Judge can conduct a record inquiry and be satisfied that the defendant "has an awareness of the potential risks involved in that course and has knowingly chosen it” (People v Gomberg, supra, at 313-314; see, People v Macerola, supra, at 262-263; People v McDonald, supra, at 8-9). This inquiry is vital "because defendants may not always sense when a conflict exists [953]*953or perceive how it might undermine effective representation” (People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 468). None of these things were done in this case.

Here, both defense counsel and the prosecution were acutely aware that a conflict existed by virtue of defense counsel’s representation of the prosecution’s chief witness (see, e.g., People v Lombardo, supra). Their failure to bring the underlying facts to the court’s attention is inexcusable. Having previously been personally responsible for a reversal because of a similar omission, both the District Attorney and defense counsel were undoubtedly aware of their duty to alert the court to the need for a Gomberg inquiry (see, People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, supra). Under these circumstances, a reversal and new trial are required.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur in memorandum.

Order reversed, etc.

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Bluebook (online)

554 N.E.2d 1274, 75 N.Y.2d 951, 555 N.Y.S.2d 686, 1990 N.Y. LEXIS 934, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-wandell-ny-1990.

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