People v. Walters

2025 IL App (4th) 240783-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 3, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-0783
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 240783-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 3, 2025 NO. 4-24-0783 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Jersey County JENNIFER JO WALTERS, ) No. 20CF203 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Allison Lorton, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed, finding (1) the trial court erred when granting the State’s oral motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition at the second stage and (2) the error was not harmless.

¶2 In October 2021, defendant, Jennifer Jo Walters, pleaded guilty to aggravated

domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2020)) and resisting or obstructing a peace officer

(id. § 31-1(a)). Defendant did not move to withdraw her guilty plea, and no direct appeal

occurred. In February 2024, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. The petition

advanced to the second stage of proceedings, where the trial court appointed postconviction

counsel to represent defendant. In May 2024, postconviction counsel moved to withdraw, and the

State orally moved to dismiss the petition. The court granted both motions. On appeal, defendant

argues the court erred when granting both motions. We reverse. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In October 2020, the State charged defendant by information with (1) aggravated

domestic battery for striking a family member, Adam Weaver, with a frying pan and causing

great bodily harm (id. § 12-3.3(a)); (2) aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(d)(4)) for committing a

battery against a peace officer, Sergeant Matt Stidd; and (3) resisting or obstructing a peace

officer for falling to the floor and pulling away from officers as they attempted to arrest her (id.

§ 31-1(a)).

¶5 In October 2021, defendant entered into an open plea agreement, wherein she

pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. The

State dismissed the aggravated battery charge. The trial court accepted the plea agreement,

ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI), and scheduled the matter for

sentencing.

¶6 A sentencing hearing was held on November 29, 2021. In the PSI, defendant

stated she was not guilty and described the underlying circumstances she found mitigating to the

events that led to her arrest. At the hearing, defendant again reiterated she was not guilty and

offered reasons for why she, nonetheless, pleaded guilty. The trial court sentenced defendant to

60 days in the Jersey County jail and 2 years of probation with various conditions. The court then

advised defendant of her appeal rights. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.

¶7 On November 20, 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation.

The petition alleged defendant had failed to undergo anger management treatment as ordered.

¶8 On February 9, 2024, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). In the petition,

defendant alleged she had proof she was innocent.

-2- ¶9 On February 20, 2024, defendant appeared in court on the State’s petition to

revoke her probation. The trial court stated it was aware of defendant’s postconviction petition

and appointed counsel to represent her.

¶ 10 On May 1, 2024, defendant filed four pro se motions. She filed a “Motion for

Appellate Court Appointment,” alleging her attorneys had violated her constitutional rights,

“leading to a false plea.” She filed a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Dismiss Criminal

Charges,” where again she alleged her constitutional rights had been violated and “Dereliction by

[her] Attorneys and [the] Police.” She filed a “Motion for Stay of Proceedings,” alleging the

police and defense attorneys “compromised” her right to a fair trial. Lastly, she filed a “Motion

for Continuance for Criminal Charges,” seeking a continuance and the appointment of another

attorney.

¶ 11 On May 16, 2024, postconviction counsel filed a certificate of compliance

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). That same day, counsel filed a

motion for leave to withdraw asserting he had complied with the requirements of Rule 651(c)

and it was his “position that Defendant’s claims are frivolous and without merit thereby

preventing Counsel from advocating Defendant’s position in good faith.”

¶ 12 The parties appeared before the trial court on May 20, 2024. The court stated it

had appointed counsel for defendant’s postconviction petition and that counsel had moved to

withdraw. Defendant interrupted to state counsel had been “fired by [her] over the telephone.”

The court stated:

“[Counsel] is asking the Court to withdraw. He’s indicated that he

cannot make any amendments to your motion under the law to

bring it up to something that’s not frivolous. That’s his opinion.

-3- That’s not my opinion. So, he’s going to be allowed to withdraw.

So, what we’re at is what’s called—this is a little different than the

prosecution of the case. This is post-conviction proceedings. So,

we’re at what’s called the second stage. So, you have your motion.

I know you have filed some additional motions and the Court has

reviewed that. The State will be filing a petition to dismiss or

answer her petition, I presume in second stage?”

¶ 13 The State answered, “Yes, Your Honor. At this time, we would certainly be

moving to dismiss I believe the certificate that [counsel] filed stated it was, you know, no legal

basis for her petition.” Additionally, the State indicated it was moving to withdraw its petition to

revoke defendant’s probation based on her “mental state.”

¶ 14 Defendant contended counsel would “not go through [her] stuff,” so she fired

him. She requested the trial court appoint a new attorney. Counsel interjected he had filed his

motion to withdraw pursuant to People v. Huff, 2024 IL 128492, which supported his view that,

as an officer of the court, he was required to withdraw. Defendant then alleged various facts she

believed supported her innocence. The court interrupted and stated the following:

“—hang on. Hang on. And you have filed a motion that says you

want an Appellate attorney. I can’t appoint an Appellate attorney

unless you file an appeal. *** I’m granting the State’s motion to

dismiss your post-conviction petition. So, you have the right to

have an *** Appellate attorney review this decision to see whether

or not you had something justiciable that requires further hearing.

Okay? So, I can’t—so, effectively [your] post-conviction petition

-4- is going to be dismissed. You have 30 days if you wish to file an

appeal.”

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) dismissing her

postconviction petition because her due process rights were violated when no written motion to

dismiss was filed, depriving her of notice and the opportunity to respond and (2) granting

postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw where it failed to provide a basis for concluding her

petition was without merit and where the record does not demonstrate counsel had complied with

Rule 651(c). In support of her contentions on appeal, defendant cites People v. Jackson, 2015 IL

App (3d) 130575. In addition, defendant argues the procedural due process violation was not

harmless, citing People v. Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680.

¶ 18 The State agrees the trial court erred when it granted the State’s oral motion to

dismiss defendant’s petition and permitted counsel to withdraw without stating why defendant’s

claims were without merit. The State disagrees counsel did not comply with Rule 651(c).

¶ 19 “The [Act] provides a procedural mechanism through which criminal defendants

can assert that their federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in their

original trials or sentencing hearings.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12. A postconviction

petition must clearly set forth the ways in which a defendant claims his constitutional rights were

violated. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2022). “The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits,

records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not

attached.” Id.

¶ 20 “The Act provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction

-5- petitions.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 45. Once a postconviction petition moves from the first to

the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel to represent the defendant and the State may

file responsive pleadings. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17. During the second stage, the

court determines “whether the postconviction petition and any accompanying documentation

make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Id. If a defendant fails to make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation, his or her postconviction claims are subject to

dismissal. Id. The court’s dismissal of a defendant’s claims at the second stage of proceedings is

subject to de novo review. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 14.

¶ 21 In Jackson, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition following his

conviction, which was summarily dismissed. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶¶ 5-6. Three

years later, he filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 7. The

trial court granted the defendant’s motion and appointed counsel to represent him. Id. During the

pendency of defendant’s petition, he filed several pro se motions requesting the appointment of

new counsel. Id. ¶ 8. Postconviction counsel eventually filed a combined motion for leave to

withdraw and to dismiss the defendant’s petition. Id. ¶ 9. At a hearing on counsel’s motion, the

State did not object to dismissing the petition. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 22 Along with being troubled by postconviction counsel seeking to dismiss the

defendant’s petition, the Jackson court noted “counsel’s motion to withdraw must explain why

each of the petitioner’s claims is frivolous or patently without merit.” Id. ¶¶ 16-17. “When the

trial court grants a motion to withdraw, the court may appoint new counsel or allow the

defendant to proceed pro se.” Id. ¶ 17. “It is improper for a trial court to dismiss a postconviction

petition simply because postconviction counsel has been allowed to withdraw as counsel.” Id.

¶ 18. The Jackson court did not find the State had affirmatively orally moved to dismiss the

-6- petition, but went on to state the Act does not authorize an oral motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 21; see

People v. Sherman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1133-34 (1981) (also finding the State’s oral motion

to dismiss a postconviction petition improper).

¶ 23 Defendant argues, like in Jackson, she was simultaneously required to respond to

her postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw and the State’s motion to dismiss without any

notice. Furthermore, neither postconviction counsel nor the State provided any substantive basis

for their respective motions to which defendant could respond. The State agrees with defendant

that Jackson is sufficiently analogous to the case at bar.

¶ 24 We agree with defendant and accept the State’s concession that Jackson is

guiding here and find the trial court’s grant of the State’s oral motion to dismiss was a procedural

due process violation. However, our analysis does not end here.

¶ 25 In Pingelton, our supreme court held it was a procedural due process violation to

grant the State’s motion to dismiss where the defendant had not been served the motion to

dismiss nor had an opportunity to respond to the State’s motion. Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680,

¶ 39. However, the court concluded that a harmless error analysis applies to a procedural due

process violation of this kind. Id. ¶ 43; see People v. Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 25 (stating an

error denying a defendant “a reasonable opportunity to respond to a dispositive motion in a

collateral civil proceeding and lack of notice before it was dismissed as a matter of law—cannot

be equated with the narrow class of automatically reversible errors articulated by the United

States Supreme Court and [the Illinois Supreme Court]”). “We will deem an error harmless

where the petitioner’s claims are ‘patently incurable as a matter of law’ and no additional

proceedings would result in the petitioner’s prevailing on his or her claims.” People v. Wells,

2023 IL 127169, ¶ 26 (quoting Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 26).

-7- ¶ 26 Defendant asserts the trial court’s error was not harmless. She contends her

original petition contained a claim of actual innocence, wherein she alleged to have recordings

and other proof of her innocence. Additionally, when she met with her postconviction counsel,

she became aware of photographic evidence she had not seen prior to pleading guilty. These

claims—coupled with the failure by postconviction counsel to explain why he found her petition

to be frivolous and the State’s failure to provide any basis to support its motion to dismiss—

would not render defendant’s petition patently incurable as a matter of law. The State agrees that,

unlike in Pingelton, the record here is insufficient to show harmless error occurred.

¶ 27 We agree with defendant and accept the State’s concession. A harmless error

finding would require us to accept that defendant’s claims—in their entirety—are patently

incurable as a matter of law and conclude no additional proceedings would result in her

potentially prevailing on any claims. Based on our review of the record, such a conclusion would

be premature. Because we find the trial court erred and that such error was not harmless, we need

not address the parties’ contentions on whether postconviction counsel complied with Rule

651(c).

¶ 28 Defendant requests we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of her petition and

remand the matter for further proceedings with new postconviction counsel. We agree. Where

counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted “after the postconviction petition had advanced to the

second stage of postconviction proceedings and counsel fails to explain why all of the claims are

frivolous and patently without merit, the proper remedy is to reverse and appoint new

postconviction counsel on remand.” Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 17.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the

-8- matter for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 31 Reversed and remanded with directions.

-9-