People v. Wallace

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in People v. Wallace. Read the opinion of the Court — 406 Ill. App. 3d 172 →

Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided July 13, 2010·No. 5-08-0598 Rel·Published

Opinion

Rule 23 Order filed NO. 5-08-0598 June 18, 2010; Motion to publish granted IN THE July 13, 2010 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT __________________________________________________________________ ______

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 04-CF-2401 ) CHADWICK WALLACE, ) Honorable ) Charles V. Romani, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. __________________________________________________________________ ______

JUSTICE SPOM ER delivered the opinion of the court:

On direct appeal, the defendant, Chadwick W allace, argues that the trial court

erred by failing to conduct an adequate jury voir dire under Supreme Court Rule

431(b) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May

1, 2007). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The defendant was charged with the murder of Jessie Emery and the

dismemberment of his body, stemming from an incident that occurred on August 28,

2004, in Madison County. During voir dire, the trial court brought in the 33

prospective jurors and divided them into three groups within the courtroom.

Addressing the entire venire, the trial court described the following "basic concepts

of criminal law": (1) the defendant is presumed innocent and this presumption

remains throughout the trial until all the evidence is presented and the jury is

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, (2) the burden is

1 on the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) the

defendant does not have to prove anything or present any evidence, if he does not

want to, (4) the defendant does not have to testify, and (5) if the defendant does not

put on any evidence or does not testify, the jurors are not to consider that in deciding

the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The trial court stated to the entire venire,

"Now, that is the basic concept of criminal law that we follow in this country and that

will be followed in this case."

Next, the trial court asked whether any of the venire knew anything about the

case before they came to the courthouse. After doing so, the court then stated: "Okay,

back up here. I–I told you what the basic concept of criminal law is, and we do have

to follow that. Presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and that has to be

followed." Addressing the first of the three groups, the trial court asked, "Do any of

you of the first 14 have any quarrel or objection to that basic concept of criminal

law?" The first group was given an opportunity to respond. When no member of the

venire indicated a quarrel or objection to the foregoing principles, the court further

inquired: "[I]s there anyone [sic] of you who thinks you cannot follow that concept

of criminal law? If so, raise your hand. I would want–want you to be honest."

Again, none of the potential jurors expressed any questions or reservations.

The trial court then turned to the second group: "Back here again. I explained

to you the concept of criminal justice in this country which must be followed. Do any

of you have any personal problems with that concept?" Again, the trial court stopped

to give the jurors an opportunity to respond before continuing: "Is there anyone who

feels they could not follow that concept of criminal justice? Anyone? Okay, no one."

Finally, addressing the third group, the trial court said: "Over here on the right. It

would be the same question. I explained to you what the concept of criminal justice

2 is. Is there anyone who has any personal problems with that concept? Is there

anyone who could not follow that just for some–for whatever personal reasons or

whatever you could not follow that concept? Anyone?" Once more, none of the

venire made any indication of any questions or objections.

Following the trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and

dismemberment; he was sentenced to 50 years for murder and 25 years for

dismemberment, to be served consecutively. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The defendant's sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly

inquired regarding whether prospective jurors understood the principles enunciated

in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b). Because this issue concerns compliance with

a supreme court rule, the standard of review is de novo. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d

37, 41-42 (2007). Rule 431(b) states as follows:

"The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group,

whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that

the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that

before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any

evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant's failure to testify

cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror

shall be made into the defendant's failure to testify when the defendant objects.

The court's method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity

to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this

section." Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b),

eff. May 1, 2007.

3 In this case, the "basic concept of criminal law" laid out by the trial court to the venire

reflects all four basic principles espoused in Rule 431(b): that the defendant is

presumed innocent, that the defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence in his own behalf, and

that the defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be held against him.

The defendant contends that the trial court informed prospective jurors of the

Rule 431(b) principles in narrative form and failed to ask the jury for individual

responses to the required questions. The 1997 committee comments to Rule 431(b)

note that the purpose of the rule is "to end the practice where the judge makes a broad

statement of the applicable law followed by a general question concerning the juror's

willingness to follow the law." 177 Ill. 2d R. 431(b), Committee Comments, at lxxix.

In order to achieve this purpose, the court "shall ask each potential juror, individually

or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts" the four Rule 431(b)

principles. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff.

May 1, 2007.

In People v. Schaefer, 398 Ill. App. 3d 963, 967 (2010), the appellate court

found that the trial court erred in not technically complying with Rule 431(b), even

though the trial judge had informed the venire in narrative form of the four Rule

431(b) principles, when it did not ask prospective jurors whether they "had any

problem" with all four principles. A failure to comply fully with Rule 431(b) resulted

when the court merely announced the four principles as a general matter of law and

did not allow the prospective jurors an opportunity to respond. Schaefer, 398 Ill.

App. 3d at 967. However, Schaefer is distinguishable from the present case. Here,

the trial judge properly followed his pronouncement of the four principles with a

timely questioning as required by Rule 431(b); in fact, he provided distinct

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