People v. Walker

2025 IL App (1st) 242464-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-2464
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 242464-U Fourth Division Filed March 24, 2025 No. 1-24-2464B

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County ) v. No. 24 CR 05375 01 ) XAVIER D. WALKER, ) The Honorable Tiana Blakely, ) Judge, presiding. Defendant-Appellant. )

JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders for continued detention were affirmed where new evidence proffered after the initial detention hearing, although relevant, did not show that continued detention was no longer necessary to protect the victim and the community.

¶2 The defendant, Xaiver Walker, was charged by complaint on May 17, 2024, with attempted

murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The State filed a petition to deny pretrial release

and, at his initial appearance that same day, the court held a detention hearing and ultimately denied

Walker pretrial release. About two weeks later, on May 30, 2024, the State filed a superseding

indictment charging Walker with attempted murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated unlawful

use of a weapon. The record shows that the court found that Walker’s continued detention was

necessary at his June 11 arraignment and at a July 19 status hearing. On September 10, Walker No. 1-24-2464B

filed a petition for pretrial release highlighting new information about the offense that the defense

had received in discovery. After a hearing held the next day, September 11, the court denied the

release petition and again found that Walker’s continued detention was necessary. Then, on

October 23, Walker filed a Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr.

15, 2024). The motion was heard and denied on November 22, and the court again found that

Walker’s continued detention was necessary.

¶3 At each of the hearings relevant to this appeal, the parties proceeded by proffer. For the sake

of clarity, we will not recount each of those proffers in sequence. Instead, we relate the facts

disclosed at the initial hearing, the facts disclosed at the subsequent hearings, and we note, where

appropriate, any conflicts or disagreements. As our review is de novo (see infra ¶ 10), it is

unnecessary to detail the reasons the court gave for its decisions at each hearing, but we note that,

at each of those hearings, the court specifically found that Walker’s release would pose a danger

both to the specific victim of the charged offense and to the community generally.

¶4 The charges in this case stem from an incident that occurred shortly before 10 p.m. on April

30, 2024, in south suburban Riverdale. The alleged victim was walking through an alley when

Walker, who was then 17 years old, and four or five other similarly aged boys appeared at the other

end. Walker and one of the other boys, identified in the record by the name “Weezi,” approached

the victim; Walker went directly in front of the victim, while Weezi circled behind. Walker

produced a gun and pointed at the victim, who tried to grab it away. At that point, five or six shots

were fired. The record contains conflicting information about who fired those shots. At the initial

detention hearing, the State asserted that it was Walker, but the defense proffered at later hearings

that a video of the incident shows that they were fired by Weezi. After his arrest, Walker gave a

statement admitting that he approached the victim and pointed a gun at him based on the victim’s

affiliation with group that Walker was unfavorably disposed toward.

¶5 Beyond the facts of the charged offense, the relevant information available at the initial

detention hearing was minimal. At the time of the charged offense, Walker was on pretrial release

in a juvenile matter in which he was alleged to have committed aggravated fleeing or attempting

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to elude a peace officer. At the initial hearing, the State proffered—inaccurately, as it turned out—

that the then-pending juvenile case also involved an allegation that Walker had committed

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The terms of his pretrial release in that case were minimal:

he was required to meet with pretrial services, attend school, and not commit any crimes. The only

time he violated those conditions was during the incident charged in this case. The defense

proffered that, if Walker was released, he would live his mother, who worked full-time from home

and would be able to watch over him to make sure he did not violate release conditions. A

representative from pretrial services reported that, on a risk assessment, Walker scored two out of

six on the new-criminal-activity scale and one out of six on the failure-to-appear scale. Pretrial

services recommended that he be released on conditions.

¶6 Additional information entered the picture at later hearings. The parties’ proffers disclosed

that, during the pendency of his juvenile case, Walker had spent 30 days on electronic monitoring

without any violations; the present charges were based on events that took place after he was taken

off of electronic monitoring. He had also developed a relationship with a male mentor through his

participation in pretrial services. A letter from the principal of the school Walker had been attending

at his arrest endorsed Walker’s academic abilities, leadership qualities, and strong character. A

letter from Walker’s former math teacher described him as someone who was respectful,

contributed positively to the classroom environment, and was well-liked by the school community.

Since his arrest, Walker had been held at the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC), even

after turning 18 years old. As of September 2024, his record at the JTDC was exemplary: he was

performing well in school, he had no violations, and he had quickly worked his way up to—and

remained at—the highest “level” that can be attained by JTDC detainees. His mother’s work-from-

home employment was as an insurance adjuster whose only other child, Walker’s older brother,

did not live at home, enabling her to supervise Walker exclusively. After the court expressed

concerns about allowing Walker movement to attend school at the September 11, 2024 hearing,

Walker’s mother identified a school in Country Club Hills that he would be able to attend virtually,

without having to leave the home and travel through the community.

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¶7 Walker now appeals from the trial court’s denials of his petition for release and his Rule

604(h)(2) motion for relief. 1

¶8 Pretrial release in Illinois is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of

1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (2022)), as recently amended by a series of provisions within

Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) popularly, albeit unofficially, known as the Pretrial Fairness

Act. Under the Pretrial Fairness Act, all defendants are eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-2(a) (West 2022). They are also presumed to be entitled to release, although there are

circumstances under which release can be denied. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e). To overcome the

presumption in favor of release, the State must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that those

circumstances exist. Id. §§ 110-6.1(e). Here, Walker was originally detained based on the State’s

allegation that he was dangerous. To rebut the presumption in favor of release on the ground of

dangerousness, the State must prove three things by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the proof

is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense; (2) the

defendant’s release would pose “a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case”; and (3) no combination of

release conditions “can mitigate” that threat. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1) to (3). Here, the court at Walker’s

initial detention hearing found that the State had proven all three propositions, and Walker does

not contest that finding.

¶9 When a defendant has been denied pretrial release, at each subsequent court appearance, the

trial court “must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the

case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West

2022). “The Code does not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved

the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing.” People

1 The notice of appeal also indicates that Walker is appealing from the initial detention order entered on May 17, 2024, but his arguments on appeal concern only the court’s continued-detention orders.

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v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13. At a continued detention hearing, the court starts from

the premise that detention was necessary to guard against the threat posed by the defendant and

“asks whether anything has changed such that a defendant’s detention is no longer warranted.”

People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14. The finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5),

is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are

concerned with fundamentally the same question.” Id. 2

¶ 10 Until recently, we would have reviewed a continued-detention determination for an abuse of

discretion. See Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 16. But the Illinois Supreme Court recently

held that, when the parties proceed by proffer at a detention hearing, the trial court’s determinations

are reviewed de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. While Morgan involved an initial

petition for detention, not a continued-detention determination, its reasoning applies equally to

hearings on continued detention where the parties again proceed solely by proffer, so we will

review the trial court’s findings de novo. See People v. Wilson, 2025 IL App (1st) 242454-U, ¶ 21

(reviewing continued-detention order de novo under Morgan); People v. Salley, 2025 IL App (1st)

242240-U, ¶ 22 (citing Wilson). 3 The State concedes that Morgan controls this case, and we accept that concession.

¶ 11 Turning to the merits, we start with the premise that Walker’s detention is necessary. Thomas,

2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14. Although Walker does not challenge the court’s decision at the

initial hearing, we must examine what the evidence showed to evaluate whether changes to those

circumstances undermine that premise. The facts proffered at the initial detention hearing

unambiguously showed that Walker and an accomplice, armed with guns and backed up by several

others, accosted a lone victim walking through an alley at night for no reason other than

2 It has been suggested that the standard of proof at a continued-detention hearing is clear and convincing evidence. See Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 24 (Reyes, P.J., concurring). As neither party asks us to depart from Thomas, we follow the majority’s description of a lesser standard. 3 At least one other case has posed the question without answering it. See People v. Davis-Peal, 2025 IL App (1st) 242239-U, ¶ 22 (finding that the result would be the same under any standard of review).

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dissatisfaction with the victim’s social affiliations. According to the State’s proffer at the initial

hearing, Walker drew his weapon, pointed it at the victim, and fired six shots at him. Given those

violent actions and the existence of a motive to repeat them, we have no difficulty agreeing with

the trial court’s initial determination that Walker’s release would pose a danger to the safety of the

victim or to members of the community against whom Walker would be similarly motivated. As

for the efficacy of release conditions, the parties’ initial proffers showed that, at the time of the

charged incident, Walker was on pretrial release in a gun case. Walker’s possession of a gun during

the charged offense demonstrated that, despite being on pretrial release, he was still able to obtain

a firearm. Furthermore, the particular safety threat shown at the initial hearing was that Walker had

displayed a willingness to not only carry a gun but also to use it against another person without

immediate provocation and for no reason beyond the other person’s relationship to a group that

Walker, for some reason, disliked. The trial court noted, and we agree, that the nature of that threat

diminished, to some extent, the ability of even stringent release conditions such as electronic

monitoring to prevent him from engaging in further acts of violence for similar reasons. Again, we

agree that the evidence at the original detention hearing supported the court’s conclusion that no

set of release conditions could adequately mitigate that threat.

¶ 12 The question becomes whether the new information presented at subsequent hearings

undermined the conclusion that Walker’s detention remained necessary. On appeal, Walker

emphasizes that the information that came out after the initial detention hearing showed that

Walker’s accomplice was the one who shot the victim, not Walker himself. Under the particular

circumstances of this case, that makes little, if any, difference. The newly proffered facts showed

that Walker’s accomplice circled behind the victim and started shooting when the victim tried to

disarm Walker. The obvious explanation for why Walker didn’t fire was that the victim was trying

to disarm him, not that Walker posed no threat. We do not see this as a material change in

circumstances.

¶ 13 Walker argues, however, that the new information proffered after the initial detention hearing

undermined the court’s original conclusion that no conditions of release could guard against that

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threat. Although we agree to an extent, we do not find that the changed circumstances were

substantial enough to call for his release rather than his continued detention. The clarification that

Walker’s then-pending juvenile case did not involve gun charges undermined the inference that

Walker was a second-time weapons offender. Even so, that does not change that the juvenile case

involved Walker fleeing from the police, which was highly concerning in and of itself. Walker also

highlights his exemplary record while in the JTDC, arguing that it demonstrates that he is capable

of successfully adhering to any release conditions he might be required to follow. We certainly

commend Walker’s conduct while in pretrial detention, but we do not think that his success there

would necessarily translate to a successful pretrial release. There are significant differences

between custodial detention and even highly-restrictive pretrial release. The moment-to-moment

supervision of JTDC personnel might be precisely why Walker has been successful, and the highly

structured and supervised environment of the JTDC simply cannot be replicated through release

conditions. Walker also points to the fact that, if he were released, he would live at his mother’s

home and under her supervision. The record shows that his mother has remained engaged with this

case, attending court dates and identifying a school that Walker would be able to attend virtually,

thus limiting his need for movement if placed on home confinement. But there are two reasons

why we are not satisfied that this sufficiently undermines the conclusion that Walker’s pretrial

detention remains necessary. First, Walker’s mother lives in the same community where the

charged offense takes place. Putting Walker back into the environment that produced the

underlying offense comes perilously close to setting him up for failure, with severe—and

potentially fatal—consequences for other people in that community. Second, although we do not

doubt that Walker’s mother would act to the best of her ability to ensure that her son complied with

release conditions, we cannot ignore that, despite her best intentions, Walker was still able to

acquire a gun while on pretrial release in his juvenile case and still able to accost the victim in this

case without any immediate provocation.

¶ 14 In sum, although we agree with Walker that new relevant information came out after his initial

detention hearing, we do not think that this information sufficiently undermined the court’s original

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determination that no set of release conditions could adequately mitigate the danger that he would

pose to the victim and others in the community with similar affiliations. Under the circumstances

presented by this case, we find that the trial court did not err when it determined that Walker’s

continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of the victim and

the community. For that reason, we affirm the trial court’s orders denying his petition for release,

denying his motion for relief, and requiring Walker’s pretrial detention to continue.

¶ 15 Affirmed.

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