2024 IL App (1st) 232223-U No. 1-23-2223 Order filed December 17, 2024 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County, ) v. ) No. 02 CR 27715 ) LESHAWN WALKER, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court’s order denying defendant leave to file a second successive postconviction petition is affirmed where defendant did not raise a claim of actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence.
¶2 Defendant Leshawn (or LeShaun) Walker appeals from an order of the circuit court
denying him leave to file a second successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). He contends that the court erred in denying him leave to
file because he stated a claim of actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence. We affirm. No. 1-23-2223
¶3 Following a 2003 jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to 55 years’ imprisonment. We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Walker, No. 1-04-0275 (2006)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶4 Defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Lashawn Randolph and attempted
first degree murder of Delwin Hayes by personal discharge of a firearm on or about June 18, 2002.
As we summarized the trial evidence in our direct appeal order, we recite only the portions relevant
to this appeal. Generally, the State’s eyewitnesses – Hayes, Randolph’s girlfriend Ebonnie Scott,
Rogers Britton, and DeMoyne Blakemore – gave a consistent account of the events of June 18,
2002, while the defense witnesses – defendant, his girlfriend Tamara Rose, and Victor Worthy –
gave another.
¶5 The State’s account was that Randolph, Hayes, Britton, Blakemore, and others (the group)
were in front of Hayes’s home when defendant and Worthy repeatedly rode past slowly. The group
walked to Randolph and Scott’s home. There, defendant and Worthy rode past again and, a short
time later, walked up to the group. Hayes and Worthy argued. Worthy accused Randolph of
previously shooting at him and defendant. The argument led to a brawl between Hayes and
Worthy, during which defendant shot Randolph in the back of the head and then fired more shots
into the fallen Randolph. Before leaving, defendant shot Hayes in the stomach. None of the State’s
witness saw Randolph with a firearm.
¶6 Randolph’s autopsy showed five gunshot wounds: four running “from back to front,”
including two to the back of his head, and the fifth a graze to the side of his knee. Defendant gave
a post-arrest statement that (1) Randolph and other men shot at defendant and Worthy in March
2002, and (2) in June 2022, as defendant and Worthy fought “some of the guys with” Randolph,
defendant shot Randolph as he turned, though defendant did not see him with a weapon.
-2- No. 1-23-2223
¶7 For the defense, defendant and Worthy testified that Randolph and others shot at them in
March 2002. Worthy testified that, on June 18, 2002, he saw Randolph standing with others in
front of a home and, a short time later, near another home. Randolph and his group argued with
Worthy and defendant, during which Randolph went into his home and exited with a firearm.
Worthy was about to run but Hayes and others jumped on him. They were beating him when he
heard gunshots, then “everybody” fled. Rose testified that she saw Randolph come outside and
draw a firearm, then heard shots as she ran away.
¶8 Defendant testified that, as Worthy fought with Hayes and Blakemore, Randolph walked
towards the crowd and drew a firearm. Defendant drew his own weapon and, when he saw
Randolph’s firearm was pointed at him, fired at Randolph. Upon being shot, Randolph spun
around, dropped his firearm, and fell to the ground. Hayes ran towards the firearm to pick it up, so
defendant shot Hayes, then fled. Defendant acknowledged hearing that Randolph was shot in the
back of the head but maintained that he shot Randolph face-to-face.
¶9 The jury was instructed on self-defense and second degree murder. It found defendant
guilty of first degree murder by personally discharging a firearm and not guilty of attempted
murder. The trial court sentenced him to 55 years’ imprisonment, including a 25-year firearm
enhancement.
¶ 10 On direct appeal, defendant raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
challenges to his enhanced sentence. Walker, No. 1-04-0275, at 1-2. In relevant part, he claimed
ineffectiveness based on counsel’s failure to call the police officers who arrested Randolph for the
March 2002 shooting incident. Id. at 14-17. In finding counsel was not ineffective, we noted that
the “officers would not have been able to testify that Randolph shot at defendant” but only “that
they arrested Randolph for firing a weapon.” Id. at 16. Whether Randolph shot at defendant in
-3- No. 1-23-2223
March 2002 was “not determinative” of his claim that he acted in self-defense on June 18, 2002.
Id. at 17.
¶ 11 In 2007, defendant filed a postconviction petition under the Act, alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for stipulating to the testimony of the physician who performed
Randolph’s autopsy. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirmed. People
v. Walker, No. 1-08-0316 (2009) (summary order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶ 12 In 2015, defendant filed a successive postconviction petition claiming newly-discovered
evidence of actual innocence from Jeffie Freeman and Drexel Ellis. Freeman averred that he saw
Randolph walking towards defendant with a firearm in hand. Freeman then fled and heard
gunshots. He also averred that Randolph shot into Freeman’s home a few days before Randolph’s
death. Ellis gave a statement that Randolph went into his home, came out with a firearm, and shot
at defendant before defendant shot him.
¶ 13 The circuit court denied the petition in 2016 and we affirmed, finding that defendant did
not present newly-discovered evidence of actual innocence. People v. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st)
160507-U, ¶ 2. In doing so, this court stated, the “primary evidence or factual proposition
defendant seeks to introduce – during the fight, Randolph went into his home and returned with a
gun, and thus Randolph was armed when defendant shot him – was not only known to defendant
at trial but placed before the jury by the testimony of himself, Worthy, and Rose. Only the new
sources of this evidence, Freeman and Ellis, were unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative.”
(Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 14. Also, the “new” evidence was not conclusive as it did not place
the trial evidence in a new light or undermine our confidence in the verdict. Id. ¶ 15. Freeman
averred, as Worthy and Rose had already testified, to seeing Randolph armed and hearing, but not
seeing, the gunshots being fired.
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2024 IL App (1st) 232223-U No. 1-23-2223 Order filed December 17, 2024 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County, ) v. ) No. 02 CR 27715 ) LESHAWN WALKER, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court’s order denying defendant leave to file a second successive postconviction petition is affirmed where defendant did not raise a claim of actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence.
¶2 Defendant Leshawn (or LeShaun) Walker appeals from an order of the circuit court
denying him leave to file a second successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). He contends that the court erred in denying him leave to
file because he stated a claim of actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence. We affirm. No. 1-23-2223
¶3 Following a 2003 jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to 55 years’ imprisonment. We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Walker, No. 1-04-0275 (2006)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶4 Defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Lashawn Randolph and attempted
first degree murder of Delwin Hayes by personal discharge of a firearm on or about June 18, 2002.
As we summarized the trial evidence in our direct appeal order, we recite only the portions relevant
to this appeal. Generally, the State’s eyewitnesses – Hayes, Randolph’s girlfriend Ebonnie Scott,
Rogers Britton, and DeMoyne Blakemore – gave a consistent account of the events of June 18,
2002, while the defense witnesses – defendant, his girlfriend Tamara Rose, and Victor Worthy –
gave another.
¶5 The State’s account was that Randolph, Hayes, Britton, Blakemore, and others (the group)
were in front of Hayes’s home when defendant and Worthy repeatedly rode past slowly. The group
walked to Randolph and Scott’s home. There, defendant and Worthy rode past again and, a short
time later, walked up to the group. Hayes and Worthy argued. Worthy accused Randolph of
previously shooting at him and defendant. The argument led to a brawl between Hayes and
Worthy, during which defendant shot Randolph in the back of the head and then fired more shots
into the fallen Randolph. Before leaving, defendant shot Hayes in the stomach. None of the State’s
witness saw Randolph with a firearm.
¶6 Randolph’s autopsy showed five gunshot wounds: four running “from back to front,”
including two to the back of his head, and the fifth a graze to the side of his knee. Defendant gave
a post-arrest statement that (1) Randolph and other men shot at defendant and Worthy in March
2002, and (2) in June 2022, as defendant and Worthy fought “some of the guys with” Randolph,
defendant shot Randolph as he turned, though defendant did not see him with a weapon.
-2- No. 1-23-2223
¶7 For the defense, defendant and Worthy testified that Randolph and others shot at them in
March 2002. Worthy testified that, on June 18, 2002, he saw Randolph standing with others in
front of a home and, a short time later, near another home. Randolph and his group argued with
Worthy and defendant, during which Randolph went into his home and exited with a firearm.
Worthy was about to run but Hayes and others jumped on him. They were beating him when he
heard gunshots, then “everybody” fled. Rose testified that she saw Randolph come outside and
draw a firearm, then heard shots as she ran away.
¶8 Defendant testified that, as Worthy fought with Hayes and Blakemore, Randolph walked
towards the crowd and drew a firearm. Defendant drew his own weapon and, when he saw
Randolph’s firearm was pointed at him, fired at Randolph. Upon being shot, Randolph spun
around, dropped his firearm, and fell to the ground. Hayes ran towards the firearm to pick it up, so
defendant shot Hayes, then fled. Defendant acknowledged hearing that Randolph was shot in the
back of the head but maintained that he shot Randolph face-to-face.
¶9 The jury was instructed on self-defense and second degree murder. It found defendant
guilty of first degree murder by personally discharging a firearm and not guilty of attempted
murder. The trial court sentenced him to 55 years’ imprisonment, including a 25-year firearm
enhancement.
¶ 10 On direct appeal, defendant raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
challenges to his enhanced sentence. Walker, No. 1-04-0275, at 1-2. In relevant part, he claimed
ineffectiveness based on counsel’s failure to call the police officers who arrested Randolph for the
March 2002 shooting incident. Id. at 14-17. In finding counsel was not ineffective, we noted that
the “officers would not have been able to testify that Randolph shot at defendant” but only “that
they arrested Randolph for firing a weapon.” Id. at 16. Whether Randolph shot at defendant in
-3- No. 1-23-2223
March 2002 was “not determinative” of his claim that he acted in self-defense on June 18, 2002.
Id. at 17.
¶ 11 In 2007, defendant filed a postconviction petition under the Act, alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for stipulating to the testimony of the physician who performed
Randolph’s autopsy. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirmed. People
v. Walker, No. 1-08-0316 (2009) (summary order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶ 12 In 2015, defendant filed a successive postconviction petition claiming newly-discovered
evidence of actual innocence from Jeffie Freeman and Drexel Ellis. Freeman averred that he saw
Randolph walking towards defendant with a firearm in hand. Freeman then fled and heard
gunshots. He also averred that Randolph shot into Freeman’s home a few days before Randolph’s
death. Ellis gave a statement that Randolph went into his home, came out with a firearm, and shot
at defendant before defendant shot him.
¶ 13 The circuit court denied the petition in 2016 and we affirmed, finding that defendant did
not present newly-discovered evidence of actual innocence. People v. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st)
160507-U, ¶ 2. In doing so, this court stated, the “primary evidence or factual proposition
defendant seeks to introduce – during the fight, Randolph went into his home and returned with a
gun, and thus Randolph was armed when defendant shot him – was not only known to defendant
at trial but placed before the jury by the testimony of himself, Worthy, and Rose. Only the new
sources of this evidence, Freeman and Ellis, were unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative.”
(Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 14. Also, the “new” evidence was not conclusive as it did not place
the trial evidence in a new light or undermine our confidence in the verdict. Id. ¶ 15. Freeman
averred, as Worthy and Rose had already testified, to seeing Randolph armed and hearing, but not
seeing, the gunshots being fired. Id. Ellis’s statement that Randolph fired was contrary to
-4- No. 1-23-2223
defendant’s testimony that he fired at Randolph as Randolph was raising his weapon toward him.
Id.
¶ 14 In February 2023, defendant filed the motion for leave to file a second successive
postconviction petition now at issue. He alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting
evidence, including police testimony, that Randolph was arrested for the March 2002 shooting.
Primarily, defendant claimed actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence in the form of
attached affidavits from Darry Toney, Samuel Randolph, Celester Edwards, and Kenneth Dorsey. 1
¶ 15 Toney averred that, on June 18, 2002, he saw Randolph and others approach defendant and
Worthy and a fight break out. Toney saw Randolph approach defendant while pointing a firearm
at him, then defendant shot Randolph. Toney fled the scene until the shooting stopped, then
returned, picked up the firearm next to Randolph, and left.
¶ 16 Samuel averred that, in March 2002, he saw Scott’s car drive past with two men in the front
and LaShawn Randolph in the back. “[T]wo guys” exited the car and shot at defendant and Worthy.
On June 18, 2002, Samuel saw Randolph, Hayes, and five other men approach defendant and
Worthy on the street. Samuel heard gunshots “about 10 minutes later.” After the shooting ended,
Samuel went to the scene and saw “this guy” pick up a firearm next to Randolph and walk away.
Samuel believed many people saw “that guy pick that up.”
¶ 17 Edwards averred that, on June 18, 2002, he saw “a crowd of people yelling and fighting.”
He then saw Randolph come out of a house with a firearm in hand, approach the crowd, and point
the firearm at defendant, who drew his own firearm. Edwards took cover, heard four or five
1 We refer to Samuel Randolph as Samuel to avoid confusion with decedent Randolph. Neither the proposed petition nor Samuel’s affidavit addresses whether Samuel was related to the decedent.
-5- No. 1-23-2223
gunshots, and returned to see Randolph’s body on the ground. “Someone” ran off with the firearm
that was next to the body.
¶ 18 Dorsey averred that, in March 2002, he saw Scott’s car stop with “Boo and C.G.” in front
and Randolph in back. Randolph handed a firearm to Boo and C.G., who exited the car and shot
defendant and Worthy. About two weeks later, Randolph told Dorsey he would “get rid of”
defendant, then showed Dorsey two pistols. On June 18, 2002, Dorsey heard the gunshots and saw
Toney pick up a firearm near Randolph’s body and walk away with it.
¶ 19 On February 22, 2023, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file the second successive
petition, finding the proposed petition was without merit and cumulative.
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file a
second successive postconviction petition that presented newly-discovered evidence of actual
innocence.
¶ 21 Generally, a defendant may file only one postconviction petition under the Act without
leave of the court, which may be granted if the defendant shows an objective cause for not
previously raising the claims of the proposed petition and prejudice from not raising them. 725
ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). Another basis for granting leave to file a successive petition is that
the proposed petition raises a claim of actual innocence. People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 33.
Well-pled factual allegations in a postconviction petition and supporting documentation must be
taken as true unless positively rebutted by the record. Id. ¶¶ 40, 55. Our review of the denial of
leave to file a successive petition is de novo. Id. ¶ 33.
¶ 22 For a claim of actual innocence, a defendant must present new, material, non-cumulative
evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result in a retrial. Id. ¶ 35. Evidence is
new if it was discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier by exercising due
-6- No. 1-23-2223
diligence, material if it is relevant and probative of the defendant’s innocence, and non-cumulative
if it adds to the evidence heard at trial. Id. Evidence is not newly discovered when it presents facts
already known to the defendant at trial, even if the source of those facts was unknown, unavailable,
or uncooperative. People v. Miranda, 2023 IL App (1st) 170218-B, ¶ 26. To be conclusive, a
defendant’s new evidence must raise the probability that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable trier of fact would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587,
¶ 45. In other words, the new evidence must place the trial evidence in a different light and
undermine the court’s confidence in the factual correctness of the guilty verdict. People v. Beard,
2023 IL App (1st) 200106, ¶ 38.
¶ 23 Here, defendant claims that his proposed petition presented newly-discovered evidence of
actual innocence because the affidavits show that Randolph brandished a firearm before defendant
shot him, which supports that he shot in self-defense. However, defendant’s proposed petition has
the same flaw as his previous proposed successive petition. Namely, the primary evidence or
factual proposition defendant seeks to introduce – that Randolph was pointing a firearm at him
when he shot Randolph – was not only known to defendant at trial but placed before the jury by
his testimony, corroborated in part by the testimony of Worthy and Rose that they saw Randolph
holding a firearm before they heard gunshots. Therefore, this evidence is not newly discovered.
Rather, only the new sources of this evidence were unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative. See
Miranda, 2023 IL App (1st) 170218-B, ¶ 26.
¶ 24 Moreover, we find the affidavits at issue are not conclusive because they do not place the
trial evidence in a new light nor undermine our confidence in the verdict. Beard, 2023 IL App (1st)
200106, ¶ 38. In addition to seeing Randolph holding a firearm, Toney and Edwards aver that they
saw Randolph point a firearm at defendant, while all four affidavits state that a firearm was on the
-7- No. 1-23-2223
ground next to Randolph before someone took it. However, the affidavits do not undermine our
confidence in the verdict when the autopsy showing that Randolph was shot in the back
fundamentally contradicts defendant’s testimony that he shot Randolph face-to-face as Randolph
pointed a firearm at him. Positing a trial with the existing trial evidence and the affiants testifying
consistently with their affidavits, we do not find it more likely than not that no reasonable trier of
fact would find defendant not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Given that the evidence was not
newly discovered nor so conclusive it would probably change the result in a retrial, defendant
failed to raise a valid claim of actual innocence. The circuit court did not err in denying him leave
to file the second successive petition.
¶ 25 Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
-8-