People v. Walker

2021 IL App (1st) 190410-U

Opinion

2021 IL App (1st) 190410-U No. 1-19-0410 Order filed April 19, 2021 First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 CR 12184 ) ROY WALKER, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Walker and Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer is affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to establish intent.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Roy Walker was convicted of aggravated battery of a

peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2016)) and sentenced to seven years’

imprisonment. He appeals, alleging the evidence was insufficient to establish intent. We affirm. No. 1-19-0410

¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with three counts of aggravated battery of a peace

officer (counts I-III) and one count of resisting or obstructing a peace officer (count IV) (720 ILCS

5/31-1(a-7) (West 2016)) following an incident on July 19, 2017.

¶4 At a proceeding on April 25, 2018, defense counsel asked that defendant be evaluated for

sanity at the time of the offense. On October 4, 2018, Kristin Schoenbach, a licensed clinical

psychologist, filed a letter with the trial court stating that based upon her evaluation, defendant

was “legally sane” at the time of the offense.

¶5 At trial, Chicago police sergeant Thomas Surma testified that around 7 or 7:30 p.m. on July

19, 2017, he was in uniform near Millennium Park in Chicago with his partner Officer Walker

when a citizen approached and complained of an “unruly or disruptive person.” 1 Surma responded

to the fountain area and saw defendant, whom Surma identified in court. Upon seeing Surma,

defendant knelt, wrapped his fist with a metal wallet chain, made two fists, and took a fighting

stance. Surma radioed for assistance, and additional police officers arrived. He initially intended

to “call for a wagon and possibly take [defendant] for a psychological [evaluation].”

¶6 Eventually, the officers handcuffed defendant and called for an ambulance. He was

sweating and his speech was incoherent, though Surma heard defendant say he was a violent man.

As the officers escorted defendant to the sidewalk to await the ambulance, he dropped to the

ground and wrapped his legs around Officer Walker’s leg, requiring the officers to intervene.

Officers placed defendant in an ambulance, and Surma and Officer Walker rode in back on the

way to the hospital.

1 Officer Walker’s first name does not appear in the report of proceedings. Because defendant and Officer Walker share the same last name, we refer to Officer Walker using his title. Surma testified that he was an officer, not a sergeant, at the time of the incident.

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¶7 When the ambulance arrived at Northwestern Hospital, a paramedic opened the back

ambulance door, and Surma removed defendant’s seatbelt. Defendant reached towards his back

pocket, retrieved a bottle, and drank. Surma tried to take the bottle, and defendant splashed him

with the contents, which smelled like alcohol. Defendant then stood, “chest-bumped” Surma, head-

butted Surma “[v]ery violently,” and a “scuffle began.” Defendant’s chest hit Surma’s chest, and

defendant’s head hit Surma’s nose. Surma fell to the ambulance floor, but tried to grab defendant

so he could not escape. Hospital personnel then detained defendant. Surma injured his face and

back during the incident, received treatment for pain in his neck and shoulder at the hospital, and

missed work for approximately two months.

¶8 On cross-examination, Surma testified that he was concerned about defendant’s mental

health during the initial encounter. Defendant voluntarily put his wallet back in his pocket before

officers handcuffed him. Surma clarified that defendant “tried” to drink while in the ambulance.

Surma stayed at the hospital until 8 or 9 a.m. the next morning, and received over-the-counter pain

medication and a back brace at discharge.

¶9 The State entered a stipulation that following the incident, doctors diagnosed Surma with

a “chronic mildly displaced bilateral L-3 pars lumbar vertebrae fracture.”

¶ 10 Christopher Wallace, a security team leader at Northwestern Hospital, testified that he

witnessed the incident at the hospital. Wallace stood directly behind the ambulance as it arrived.

When the doors opened, Wallace saw Surma remove defendant’s seatbelt. Defendant then reached

behind himself and retrieved a water bottle. Surma stopped defendant from drinking. Defendant

said, “one more drink.” He then stood, chest-bumped Surma, and head-butted him. Defendant’s

head-butt contacted Surma where his forehead met his nose. Surma fell with defendant on top of

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him. Wallace and another security guard pulled defendant off Surma and, along with other officers

and hospital personnel, brought defendant to the trauma bay. During this process, Wallace heard

defendant swear, make threats, and say, “I’m going to get you.”

¶ 11 Chicago police officer Miguel Martinez testified that he assisted Surma during the initial

encounter with defendant and also followed the ambulance to the hospital. Upon arrival at the

hospital, Martinez approached the ambulance, and was present when the incident occurred.

Martinez wore a body camera that day, and the State published the footage to the court.

¶ 12 The footage, included in the record on appeal, depicts Martinez approach Millennium Park,

where defendant is surrounded by other officers. A wallet chain is visible in defendant’s hand and

he makes fists, though moments later he allows officers to handcuff him. Defendant repeats, “I’m

a violent man.” Officers walk defendant to the sidewalk to await an ambulance. On the way,

defendant drops to the ground and wraps his legs around the leg of an officer. The officers then

shackle defendant’s legs. Eventually, an ambulance arrives and takes defendant to the hospital.

Martinez follows, and upon arrival, he approaches the parking lot where defendant is being

removed from the ambulance. Moments later, there is commotion as defendant emerges from the

back of the ambulance, though the events inside the ambulance are obscured because Martinez is

standing behind another individual. As Martinez approaches, defendant can be heard saying, “get

the f*** away from me,” and someone can be seen falling to the floor inside the ambulance.

Martinez, along with other officers and hospital personnel, detain defendant and bring him inside

the hospital.

¶ 13 Defendant entered a stipulation that Dr. Nathan Gruegr would testify that he examined

defendant on July 19, 2017, and diagnosed him with “excited delirium.”

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¶ 14 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that defendant suffered a “mental health

crisis” during the incident, and the State failed to prove defendant knowingly or intentionally

harmed Surma. The court interjected, “What is excited delirium?” and, “There is no evidence of

this so I don’t know what it is.” The State argued that defendant did not present a defense of

“sanity” or “intoxication,” the evidence suggested defendant had knowledge of his actions when

he head-butted Surma, and Surma sustained bodily harm as a result.

¶ 15 The court found defendant not guilty on count III for aggravated battery of a peace officer

and count IV for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, but guilty of counts I and II for aggravated

battery of a peace officer. In so finding, the court rejected defendant’s arguments regarding

intoxication or “excited delirium,” explaining that any argument regarding diminished capacity

was irrelevant because Illinois does not recognize the defense. The court found that defendant

knew Surma was a peace officer, head-butted him “purposely” when Surma tried to stop defendant

from drinking, and in doing so, caused bodily harm to Surma.

¶ 16 At a later proceeding, the court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. The matter

proceeded to sentencing, where the parties agreed defendant was subject to Class X sentencing.

The court merged count II into count I and sentenced defendant to seven years’ imprisonment on

count I for aggravated battery of a peace officer. The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider

sentence.

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted

knowingly or intentionally when physically contacting Surma, and instead showed the contact was

accidental.

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¶ 18 On sufficiency of the evidence review, the reviewing court construes the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State and determines whether any rational factfinder could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. All

reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the State, and the reviewing court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the factfinder regarding the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the

witnesses. Id. The factfinder’s decision should not be reversed unless the evidence is “so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35.

¶ 19 Relevant here, the State was required to prove that defendant knowingly or intentionally

caused bodily harm to Surma while knowing Surma was a peace officer, and that Surma was

performing official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2016); see also 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)

(West 2016) (“A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification ***

causes bodily harm to an individual.”).

¶ 20 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence regarding his intent to harm.

It is generally accepted that “[r]egardless of whether one calls battery a specific intent crime or a

general intent crime *** the criminality of a defendant’s conduct depends on whether he acted

knowingly or intentionally, or whether his conduct was accidental.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d 243, 258 (2009). Where a defendant disputes intent,

the State can prove this element using circumstantial evidence. Id. at 259. The defendant’s intent

is an issue of fact for the factfinder to determine. People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 131873,

¶ 14.

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¶ 21 Here, the record showed that Surma, while in uniform, encountered defendant in

Millennium Park, at which time defendant adopted an aggressive posture and repeated, “I’m a

violent man.” Surma and other officers eventually handcuffed defendant and placed him in the

back of an ambulance, which drove him to Northwestern Hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital,

Surma removed defendant’s seatbelt. Defendant then retrieved a bottle containing an unknown

liquid from his back pocket. Surma attempted to take the bottle from defendant, who said “one

more drink,” then stood up, chest-bumped Surma, and head-butted Surma. Defendant’s forehead

contacted Surma’s nose, which caused Surma to fall to the floor. At this point, hospital personnel

and other officers subdued defendant, who was swearing and making threats. Surma sustained

injuries to his back, neck, and shoulder, was treated in the hospital, and missed two months of

work.

¶ 22 On this record, we hold that a rational factfinder could have found that defendant acted

knowingly or intentionally in causing bodily harm to Surma, and did not act accidentally. Surma

and Wallace both testified that immediately after Surma tried to take defendant’s bottle, defendant

head-butted Surma. Surma described the act as violent. Wallace testified that defendant said, “one

more drink” prior to the act. Based on this evidence, a rational factfinder could find that defendant

was upset that Surma tried to take the bottle, and aggressively head-butted Surma in response, an

act defendant knew would likely harm Surma.

¶ 23 Defendant argues that the contact was accidental because the evidence suggested he was

either intoxicated, having a mental health disturbance, or both. This argument fails for two reasons.

First, as the trial court noted, diminished capacity is not a defense in Illinois. See People v. Frazier,

2019 IL App (1st) 172250, ¶ 35. Furthermore, no evidence established defendant’s alleged

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intoxication or mental health status, the “excited delirium” diagnosis was left unexplained, and

defendant did not present an affirmative defense of intoxication or insanity. Second, to the extent

defendant argues the court did not correctly weigh the evidence, this argument is untenable because

on sufficiency of the evidence review we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder

regarding the weight due any particular evidence or testimony. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37.

While other reasonable inferences might have been possible, a rational factfinder could have

credited Surma and Wallace to believe defendant’s physical contact was intentional or knowing,

particularly considering defendant’s aggressive conduct before and after the incident in the

ambulance. See People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 117 (2007) (on sufficiency of the evidence

review, the reviewing court “is not required to search out all possible explanations consistent with

innocence”).

¶ 24 Finally, defendant argues the contact was accidental because he intended to retrieve his

bottle, not to cause injury, and the fact that he was shackled and in a confined space suggests the

contact resulted because his balance was compromised. This argument fails because the record

supports the inference that the head-butt was a purposeful act and not the result of a loss of balance,

and we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37.

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

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