People v. Walker

2016 IL App (3d) 140723, 53 N.E.3d 995

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 25, 2016
• Docket: 3-14-0723
• Status: Published

Opinion

2016 IL App (3d) 140723

Opinion filed April 25, 2016 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-14-0723 v. ) Circuit No. 84-CF-190 ) JAMES WALKER, ) ) Honorable Robert P. Livas, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lytton and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In July 1984, a Will County jury convicted defendant, James Walker, of felony murder

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1). He was 17 years old at the time of the offense. The court

sentenced him to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant raised

three issues, including his sentence, on direct appeal; this court affirmed. People v. Walker, 136

Ill. App. 3d 177 (1985). The Illinois Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for leave to

appeal. People v. Walker, 111 Ill. 2d 563 (1985).

¶2 In June 2013, defendant filed a postconviction petition. Defendant argued that at his

sentencing hearing, the trial court did not consider his status as a juvenile and the attendant characteristics of his youth at the time of the offense. Citing Miller v. Alabama in support,

defendant alleges his constitutional rights were violated. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132

S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (hereinafter Miller). Defendant also claimed his sentence violated the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Upon the

State’s motion, the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition.

¶3 Defendant appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition, arguing his sentence: (1)

violates the United States Constitution; (2) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution; and (3) as it applies to juveniles, Illinois’s natural life sentencing scheme is

unconstitutional. In addition to countering defendant’s claims, the State asserts that defendant’s

postconviction petition is untimely. We find defendant’s petition is untimely, and affirm the trial

court’s ruling.

¶4 BACKGROUND

¶5 The defendant murdered Charles Davis during an attempted armed robbery. Defendant

and his codefendant, Xavier Williams, are African American. In March 1984, defendant and

Williams were minors—17 and 16 years old, respectively.1 They decided they needed money

and in order to get some, they should rob a cabdriver. Defendant called Davis’s taxi company

specifically because he thought they were known to employ “white drivers.” Walker, 136 Ill.

App. 3d at 178. Davis was, in fact, white.

¶6 Davis picked up defendant and Williams in his taxi cab. Defendant sat directly behind

Davis in the cab with a loaded, sawed-off shotgun concealed under his coat. After a brief drive,

1 In 1984, any minor over the age of 14 charged with murder or armed robbery was mandatorily

prosecuted as an adult pursuant to the Criminal Code of 1961. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, ¶ 702-

7(6)(a).

2 defendant produced the shotgun and demanded that Davis stop the cab. Williams exited the rear

passenger side of the cab, intending to take over as the driver. Before Williams reached the

driver’s side door, defendant fired the shotgun. Upon seeing the carnage that resulted from

defendant shooting Davis in the back of the head with a shotgun at point-blank range, Williams

fled; defendant followed.

¶7 Defendant and Williams both went to the home of a mutual friend where they

encountered friends throughout the night. Each separately told friends that defendant killed

Davis. Defendant and Williams were arrested a few days later. Each provided the police with a

confession that mirrored the other’s account of events in most respects. The significant

difference between their confessions was their professed intent. Williams said he concealed his

face with a cap and scarf, intending merely to rob the driver. Defendant said he was aware he

had no means to conceal his face going into the robbery, and killed Davis so that he could not

later identify him.

¶8 Defendant and Williams were indicted for murder and felony murder and tried jointly. A

jury found them both guilty of felony murder. At sentencing, the trial court discussed

defendant’s criminal record—containing both adult dispositions and juvenile records of

adjudication—and the fact that defendant received counseling “for a variety of family, social,

sexual and educational problems.” The trial court sentenced defendant to a discretionary natural

life imprisonment without parole and Williams to 35 years’ imprisonment.

¶9 On direct appeal, defendant contested, inter alia, the imposition of his life sentence. Id.

at 181-82. Most notably, defendant argued that none of the statutory requirements for imposing

a life sentence were met in his case. This court rejected all of defendant’s arguments and

affirmed his conviction. Before concluding, this court noted:

3 “Walker also suggests that this crime was not ‘brutal or

heinous’ since death was instantaneous and did not involve torture

of the victim. He would have us ignore the fact that the murder

was casually undertaken, was horribly mutilating to the body of the

victim, and was performed cold-bloodedly without any

provocation, real or imagined, on the part of the victim. No one

can say what mental and physical suffering the victim incurred

during his last few moments of life. We hold that the trial court

did not err in sentencing Walker to life imprisonment.” Id. at 182.

¶ 10 Defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)) in June 2013. He argued his life sentence was unconstitutional

under Miller and violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Miller,

567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455. In August of that year, the trial court advanced defendant’s

petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings. The State filed a motion to dismiss,

which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the original trial court had considered

defendant’s youth and other relevant factors before sentencing. In so doing, the trial court noted

the explicit discussion on the record of defendant’s age and life circumstances during

defendant’s sentencing hearing. The trial court also declined to extend Miller to defendant’s

case, reasoning that Miller applies to mandatory life sentences, not discretionary ones. Id.

¶ 11 Defendant appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition, arguing his sentence

violates both the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, contrary to the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Miller, and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

Additionally, defendant argues that, as it applies to juveniles, Illinois’ natural life sentencing

4 scheme is per se unconstitutional. The State rebuts defendant’s arguments and further asserts

that defendant’s postconviction petition is untimely. We affirm.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 We review the trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition in the second stage de

novo. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). “[I]ssues that were raised and decided

on direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata; issues that could

have been raised, but were not, are considered forfeited.” People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 13

(citing People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 328 (2009)).

¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides three stages to adjudicate postconviction

petitions. In the first stage, only petitions that are “frivolous or *** patently without merit” may

be dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2012). The State may file a motion to dismiss a

postconviction petition at the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2012). In order to survive

dismissal, the defendant must make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v.

Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001).

¶ 15 Defendant’s petition asserted two claims: (1) Miller requires defendant’s sentence to be

vacated and that he be resentenced; and (2) defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant’s arguments on appeal include the

additional assertion that Illinois’s natural life sentencing scheme is per se unconstitutional, as it

applies to juveniles. The record indicates that defendant declined to amend his petition in the

trial court to include the latter argument. As such, we need not address it. “Any claim of

substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is

waived.” 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2012).

¶ 16 I. The State’s Untimely Petition Argument

5 ¶ 17 The State argues defendant violated the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’s time limitations

(725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2012)), forfeiting all claims asserted in his petition. Defendant

asserts that the notion that juveniles are less culpable for their actions than adults is a recent

revelation and, therefore, his petition is timely. More precisely, defendant claims this strand of

thought has only been available to criminal defendants since the Supreme Court decided Miller.

We disagree.

¶ 18 Where, as here, the petitioner is not under sentence of death and has not petitioned for

writ of certiorari, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act prohibits filing a postconviction petition

more than six months after the conclusion of proceedings “unless the petitioner alleges facts

showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” Id.; see People v.

Paleologos, 345 Ill. App. 3d 700, 707-08 (2003).

¶ 19 A juvenile’s relative lack of fault, in comparison to their adult counterpart, is not an

intellectual breakthrough that came to light solely in the wake of Miller. Defendant’s position on

this point is undermined by cases he relies upon in his brief. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,

570 (2005), is the most prominent example (noting that juveniles have greater rehabilitative

potential than adults). In fact, the Roper Court explicitly noted the following:

“[D]ifferences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate

that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among

the worst offenders. *** The Thompson plurality recognized the

import of these characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16.

[Citation.] The same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders

under 18.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 553.

6 Given the language in Roper, the argument now asserted by the defendant was available to him

at least as early as 2005. Therefore, his petition is untimely and we affirm the trial court’s

dismissal.

¶ 20 II. Defendant’s Miller v. Alabama Argument

¶ 21 Even were his petition timely, defendant’s arguments fail. Miller holds that mandatory

life sentencing for juvenile offenders must be vacated and the defendant must be resentenced at a

discretionary sentencing hearing. The trial court has already provided defendant with the relief

to which defendant is entitled. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory

life sentences for defendants under the age of 18 violates the eighth amendment. U.S. Const.,

amend VIII; Miller, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455. The Illinois Supreme Court further held that

Miller applies retroactively. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 34. This reasoning was

recently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Montgomery v. Lousiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718

(2016). Miller and its progeny hold that the mitigating factors inherent in being a juvenile must

be considered before sentencing someone under the age of 18 to life in prison at the time of the

offense. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. That is, no mandatory life sentences for

juveniles.

¶ 22 The defendant in this case was not given a mandatory sentence. Ergo, Miller does not

apply. Defendant asserts, however, that the trial court did not consider his youth and other

relevant factors before sentencing him to life in prison without parole and, therefore, his sentence

is unconstitutional. We find two problems with this argument.

¶ 23 First, the record belies the argument. The transcript from defendant’s sentencing hearing

demonstrates the trial court was aware of defendant’s age and life circumstances at the time of

his offense. The trial court discussed defendant’s criminal record with trial counsel, which

7 contained recent juvenile records of adjudication. Defendant’s presentence investigation report

indicated that he received counseling “for a variety of family, social, sexual and educational

problems.”

¶ 24 After reviewing the record, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the trial

court, during defendant’s sentencing hearing, was unaware of, or failed to consider, the fact that

defendant was 17 years old with a grossly unstable living environment when he committed

murder.

¶ 25 The trial court imposed a discretionary sentence after a full sentencing hearing. Miller is

inapposite. The defendant is seeking on appeal that which he already received—a proper

sentencing hearing. Thus, defendant failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation at the hearing on the motion to dismiss his postconviction petition as required. People

v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001).

¶ 26 III. Defendant’s Proportionate Penalty Clause Argument

¶ 27 Defendant also argues his discretionary sentence of life without parole violates the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. This

clause mandates that penalties “be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense

and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Id. In other words, a

criminal penalty must be proportionate to the offense committed. People v. Grant, 2014 IL App

(1st) 100174-B, ¶ 41. Defendant’s proportionate penalties clause argument is both untimely and

meritless.

¶ 28 As discussed previously, defendant’s postconviction arguments must be brought before

the court within six months of the conclusion of proceedings “unless the petitioner alleges facts

showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)

8 (West 2012). The People v. Leon Miller (202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002)) decision was not a watershed

in proportionate penalty clause jurisprudence. The arguments Leon Miller relied upon in his

case were available to the defendant in this case at trial and within six months of the conclusion

of his proceedings. Even assuming Leon Miller did usher in a new era in proportionate penalties

clause arguments, it was decided in 2002. Id.

¶ 29 Furthermore, defendant’s argument fails on the merits. Leon Miller involved a timely

filed petition with facts that stand in stark contrast to those of this case. Leon Miller received a

mandatory life sentence for acting as a lookout during a robbery which he played no part in

planning, had approximately one minute to contemplate his decision to participate, and never

handled a gun in the course of the offense. Id. In short, he was “the least culpable offender

imaginable.” Id. at 341.

¶ 30 The defendant’s situation in this case is in no way similar to that of the defendant in Leon

Miller. Defendant was the triggerman, not a lookout. He planned his acts before deliberately

putting them into action. Again, he was sentenced at the discretion of the trial court.

Defendant’s sentence does not violate the proportionate penalties clause. See People v.

Lauderdale, 2012 IL App (1st) 100939, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521

(2005)).

¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.