FILED SUPERiOR COURT OFGUAM 1 2U22 UCT I I nH 10= i v 2 CLERKOF COURT 3 '*1~'. L>Y- 'UAJ 5
THE PEOPLE OF GUAM 6 Case No. CF0711-19 7
8 vs. DECISION AND ORDER 9 Motion to Suppress) ZERXES JABIDANDO VIVA 10 Defendant. 11
14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto E. Tolentino on July 19, 2022, for an
15 Evidentiary Hearing on Zeroes Jabidando Viva's ("Defendant") Motion to Suppress and 16 Request for Evidentiary Hearing ("Motion to Suppress"). Assistant Public Defender Gloria 17 Rudolph appeared for Defendant. Assistant Attorney General Katherine Nepton appeared for 18 the People of Guam ("People"). Having considered the testimony of the witnesses, arguments, 19 and applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 20 BACKGROUND 21
On January 3, 2022, the Grand Jury indicted Defendant on the following charges: (1) 22
23 Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver (As a First Degree
24 Felony) and (2) Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance (As a Third Degree'Felony).
25 Indictment, Jan. 2, 2020. Defendant filed the instant motion. Mot. to Suppress, May 24, 2022.
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Wva 27 Page 1 of 19
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I 1 .
1 The People filed an opposition. People's Opp'n. to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress, June 3, 2022. 2 Defendant Hied a reply to the People's opposition. Reply to People's Opp'n. to De£'s Mot. to 3 4 Suppress, June 14, 2022. On July 19, 2022, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. Minute
Entry, July 19, 2022. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 5
6 [Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Mot. to Suppress, Aug. 1, 2022,
7 People's Proposed Findings of.Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Evidentiary Hearing, Aug. 2,
8 2022. The Court took the matter under advisement.
10 Guam Police Department ("GPD") Sergeant Ephraim Amaguin, GPD Officer 11 Christopher Champion, and GPD Officer Johnathan Comer were the witnesses called by 12 Defendant during the evidentiary hearing. Digital Recording at 3:01 :32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. 13 July 19, 2022). GPD Sergeant Ephraim Amaguin, GPD Officer Christopher Champion, GPD 14 15 Officer Johnathan Conner, and Parole Officer Lisa Monique Castro Tainatongo were the
witnesses called by the People. Id. From the testimony of the witnesses and the parties' 16
17 proposed finding of facts the Court finds:
18 On December 28, 2019, Sergeant Amaguin parked his patrol vehicle at a private
19 residence while on patrol in the early morning hours. Digital Recording at 3:01 :32-3 :43:45
20 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). The private residence is located at the intersection of North Luisa 21 Street and Sunset Lane in Tum of Heights. Id. Sergeant Amaguin's patrol car is a Mitsubishi 22 Outlander with yellow Government of Guam license plates on the front of the vehicle and GPD 23 markings on the sides of the vehicle. Id. The vehicle was not running. Id. While sitting in his 24
26 Decision and Order CF07l1-19, People of Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Wva 27 Page 2 of 19
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1 patrol car, Sergeant Amaguin observed Defendant's vehicle failed to stop at the stop sign in the 2 intersection at approximately 1:30a.m. and Sergeant Amaguin initiated a traffic stop. Id. 3 Defendant pulled over onto the grass near his mother's house upon Sergeant Amaguin 4
5 initiating the traffic stop. Id. Sergeant Amaguin stated that he approached Defendant and they
6 had a brief conversation. Id. Sergeant AmagNin testified that he asked Defendant if he had any
7 drugs, Obtained consent to search the vehicle, and then "called for back-up." Id. Sergeant
8 Amaguin further testified that Defendant exited the vehicle without Sergeant Amaguin
9 reques'ting him to do so, which is "generally a cause for concern for [Sergeant Amaguin]." Id. 10 u , I . | . . . It also often indicates that the 1nd1v1dua1 possesses something in the vehlcle that he does not 11 want GPD to see. Id. 12 Sergeant Amaguin testified that he knew Defendant from previous encouNters, and 13 consequently did not ask for Defendant's license, registration, or insurance card. Id. He also 14 testified that he did not check to see who the car was registered to, but that Defendant informed 15
him that it was a rental car when he gave Sergeant Amaguin permission to search the vehicle. 16
17 Id. Sergeant Amaguin stated that he did not run the license plates to see if the car was stolen,
18 and he did not check to see if Defendant 11ad any outstanding warrants. Id. Sergeant Amaguin
19 further testified that he had no reason to believe that Defendant was impaired and did not offer
20 Defendant a field sobriety test. Id. 21 Officer Champion arrived on the scene approximately three or five minutes after 22 Sergeant Amaguin called for back-up Digital Recording at 3:45:27-4:10:07 (Mot. H'rg. July 23 19, 2022). Upon his amlval, he observed Defendant and Sergeant Arnaguin conversing outside 24 of Defendant's vehicle. Id. Officer Champion testified that his report states that he observed a 25 .
26 Decision and Order - CF0711-19, People 0f Guam v. Zenres Jabidando Wva 27 Page 3 of 19
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1 message banner on Defendant's phone, and no pictures or data were collected firm the banner. 2 Id. The banner said something about drugs. Id. Officer Champion was tasked with searching 3 the vehicle. Id. He testified that he observed a ldtchen knife almost immediately upon walking 4
over to the vehicle. Id. He stated that it "appeared to be placed in a manner that it would be 5
6 easily accessible for defense." Id. During his search of the vehicle, Officer Champion also
7 found a black pouch under the passenger's seat, which contained a plastic bag of a white
8 crystalline substance and a heat-sealed straw. Id. Officer Champion recovered$1,000 in cash
9 firm either the vehicle or Defendant's wallet( Id. Officer Champion testified that he did not 10 "recall there being a wallet" and the he believes that he obtained the wallet during a pat down. 11 Id. He further testified that he "would assume [the wallet] would be on [Defendant's] person, 12 however, it's not uncommon that it would be within the vehicle." Id. Officer Champion 13 believes someone verified that the vehicle was a rental car, but said that his report states that he 14 did not. Id. 15
16 Officer Conner amlved at the scene with Officer Champion, as a trainee. Digital
17 Recording at 4:11 :32-4:22:37 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Officer Conner testified that the
18 e.extent of his contact with Defendant was putting him in handcuffs. Id. He further testified that
19 his report did not contain anything about a kitchen knife found in the vehicle, about a message
20 banner on Defendant's phone, about verification of the vehicle registration, or about consent to 21 search the vehicle. Id. He did not indicate in his custody reports that a kitchen knife was 22 confiscated. Id. Officer Conner stated he did not read Defendant his Miranda rights and he 23 does not remember anyone reading Defendant his Mit'allda rights. Id. He did observe a black 24 pouch containing a crystalline substance. Id. The wallet was found on Defendant's person and 25
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Gumn v. Zeftxes Jabidando Viva 27 Page 4 of 19
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1 contained $1,700 in cash. Id. Officer Conner spoke to Officer Champion to verify 2 Defendant's identity and to look at Defendant's driver's license. Digital Recording at 4:37:13- 3 4 4:39:33 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022).
None of the officers issued a traffic ticket for failure to stop atlthe stop sign, offered 5
6 Defendant a Held sobriety test, verified the vehicle's registration and insurance, checked to see
7 if Defendant had any outstanding warrants, or ran the license plates to determine whether the
8 vehicle was stolen. Digital Recording at 3:01:32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022).
9 Parole Officer Tainatongo testified that she was Defendant's parole officer at the time 10 of the incident. Digital Recording at 3:01 :32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). She stated 11 that Defendant was on parole at the time of the incident. Digital Recording at 4:40:11-4:52:38 12 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Under Defendant's parole conditions, he cannot deny parole 13 officers' requests to search his vehicle for contraband. Id. 14 DISCUSSION 15
Defendant argues that the contraband GPD seized should be suppressed because there 16
17 was no consent to search the vehicle. Mot. to Suppress at 3-6. Defendant further argues that
18 his arrest was illegal because the officers did not have probable cause to make an arrest. Id.
19 The People assert that GPD obtained consent to search the vehicle. People's Opp'n. to Def.'s
20 Mot. to Suppress at 3-4. The People further assert that if the consent was insufficient, I
I 21 1 | o1 l, I
I Defendant was obligated under his parole condltlons to permlt the officers to search the I
22 . . vehlcle. Id. 23 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and is made 24 applicable to Guam via section 1421b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam. People v. Johnson, 1997 25
26 Decision and Order 27 CF071l-19, People o_/'Guam v. Zeroes Jabjdando Wva Page 5 of 19
I ORIGINAL 1
1 Guam 9 'll 4. "The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the 2 reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's 3 personal security."' Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (citing Terry v. 4 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (l968)). Every search or seizure must be reasonable under the 5
6 circumstances to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment. See Wlzren v. United States, 51'7
7 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
8 A. The initial stop of the vehicle was a valid Terljy stop under the Fourth Amendment but turned into an unlawful seizure after the purpose of the traffic stop was . 9 completed. 10 The Fourth Amendment tO the United States Constitution "permits brief investigative 11 detentions when a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged iN or 12
13 is about to be engaged in illegal conduct.39 Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 1[4 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
14 U.S. 1 (1968)) "The Terry stop doctrine has been extended to justify the investigatory stop of a
15 motor vehicle." Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 1[4 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682
16 (1985)). "As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile [without a warrant] is
17 reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. 18 Further, it is reasonable to Stop a car where the police merely have reasonable suspicion to 19 believe the driver has committed a traffic violation." People v. C/z aragulaf, 2001 Guam 1 1117 20 (citing Wirer v. United States, 51'7 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). "In order to determine whether an 21 officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant a traffic stop, the court must look at the 22 23 totality of the circumstances, taldng into account the facts known to the officers firm personal
24 observation." Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 1]4. Furthermore, reasonable suspicion must exist at the
25 time the stop was initiated. Id.
26 Decision and Order CF07l 1-19, People of Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Viva 27 Page 6 of 19
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1 Guam law requires motorists come to a full stop before entering an intersection when an 2 official stop sign has been erected. 16 G.C.A. § 3334(b). Sergeant Amaguin testified that he 3 4 observed Defendant fail to stop at a stop sign. Digital Recording at 3:01 :32-3:43:45 (Mot.
5 H'rg. July 19, 2022). Defendant contends that he did not fail to stop at the stop sign, he was
6 aware of the GPD vehicle parked at a residence near the intersection and made sure not to
7 commit a traffic violation because of his parole status. [Proposed] Findings of Fact and
8 Conclusions of Law Re: Mot. to Suppress at 4. However, it was dark outside and Sergeant
9 Amaguin's vehicle was turned off Digital Recording at 3 :01132-3:43:45 (Mot. H'rg. July 19,
10 2022). Exhibit F and Exhibit L do show some lighting to the area where Sergeant Amaguin was 11 parked, and Sergeant Amaguin's vehicle is a Mitsubishi Outlander that has Government of 12 Guam license plates and GPD markings on the sides. Digital Recording at 3:01 :32-3:43:45 13 . (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Even so, the darkness, the make and model of Sergeant Amaguin's 14 vehicle, and the position of Sergeant Amaguin's vehicle in the driveway would have made it 15
16 difficult for Defendant to discern that the vehicle belonged to law enforcement. The Court finds
17 that because there was minimal lighting and Sergeant Amaguin's vehicle is not a typical patrol
18 car, it is likely that Defendant did not realize Sergeant Amaguin was a law enforcement officer
19 and Defendant failed to stop at the stop sign. The Court finds nothing in the record suggesting
20 that Sergeant Amaguin is mistaken about Defendant running the stop sign. Sergeant Amaguin 21 is a seasoned law enforcement officer who was watching the road for traffic violations that 22 night. Therefore, because Sergeant Amaguin observed a traffic violation-failure to stop at a 23 stop sign-he had reasonable suspicion to pull over the vehicle for a valid Terry stop. As the 24
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zeltres Jabidando Wva 27 Page 7 of 19
ORIGINAL I
1 driver of the vehicle, Defendant was lawfully seized upon Sergeant Amaguin initiating the 2 traffic stop. 3 B. The search of Defendant's vehicle was outside of the scope of the traffic stop and, 4 therefore, constituted an unreasonable search. 5 "Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stopcontext is 6 7 determined bathe seizure's 'mission'-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop
g and attended to related safety concerns. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). as
9 "The scope of the detention must be carefully .tailored to its underlying justification." Florida v.
10 Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop,
11 it may 'last no longer than necessary to effectuate that purpose."' Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354
12 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500). "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks 13 tied to the traffic infraction are--or reasonably should have been-completed." Rodriguez v. 14 United States, 575 U.s. at 354 (citingUnited States v. Sharpe, 470 U.s. 675, 686 (I985)). 15 A11 three officers testified that Defendant was never issued a ticket for the traffic 16 violation. Digital Recording at 3:01:32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022) Accordingly, the 17 Terry stop ended when the purpose of the traffic stop issuing a citation for running a stop 18
19 sign should have been completed. Sergeant Amaguin states that Defendant exited the vehicle
20 before Sergeant Arnaguin instructed him to do so, which was "cause for concern." Digital
21 Recording at 3:01:32-3:43:45 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Officers are permitted to make
22 minimal intrusions into a driver's liberty during a traffic stop to protect their safety. See
23 Minims, 434 U.S. at 111-10 ("We think it is too plain for argument that the State's proffered 24 | , , . u . . _1ust1ficat1on-the safety of the officer--1s both. 1eg1t1mate and welghty."). Consequently, 25 Sergeant Amaguin would have been permitted to pat down Defendant to ensure he did not have 26 Decision and Order CF07l1-19, People of Guam v. Zences Jabidandq Wva 27 Page 8 of 19
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1 any weapons on his person after Defendant stepped out of the vehicle unsolicited. Nothing in 2 the record suggests that Sergeant Amaguin conducted a pat down after Defendant exited the 3 4 vehicle. As Defendant was already outside of the vehicle, there was no risk of Defendant
5 gaining immediate control of a weapon within reach. Instead, Sergeant Amaguin testified the
6 he asked Defendant if he had any illegal drugs. Digital Recording at 3:01:32-3:43:45 (Mot.
7 H'rg. July 19, 2022). Sergeant Amaguin testified that he had previous encounters with
8 Defendant where he was arrested for possessing illegal controlled substances. Id. Besides
9 Sergeant Amaguin's knowledge that Defendant was previously arrested for possession of illegal 10 , . controlled substances, nothing in the record indicates that Sergeant Amaguln had any reason to 11 believe Defendant possessed illegal drugs that night. Furthermore, the existence of illegal drugs 12 in the vehicle did not pose a threat to Sergeant Amaguin's safety. As a result, Sergeant 13 Amaguin was not permitted to ask Defendant if he possessed any illegal drugs when the 14 . 15. purpose of the traffic stop was Defendant's failure to stop at a stop sign.
"Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes 16 17 ordinary inquiries into the traffic stop." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (citing Illinois v. Caballed,
18 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). "Typically, such inquiries involve checldng the driver's license,
19 determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
20 automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. The purpose of 21 these inquiries and a limited search is to ensure officer safety and the safety of drivers on the 22 road. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("The purpose of this limited search is 23 not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without 24 fear of violence, and thus the iiisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, 25
26 Decision and Order 27 CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Ze/ores Jabidando Wva Page 9 of 19
ORIGINAL J. I
1 whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any state law."), see also 4 Wayne R. 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), (6th ed. 2021) (stating a warrant check makes it possible 3 4 to determine whether the person in front of the officer is wanted for previous traffic offenses).
Nothing in the record demonstrates that the officers performed any of the ordinary 5
6 inquires during the traffic stop. Sergeant Amaguin testified that because he knew Defendant, he
7 did not request Defendant's license, registration, or insurance card. Digital Recording at
8 3:01:32-3:43:45 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Sergeant Amaguin testified he did not check to see
9 ~if Defendant had any outstanding warrants, and he did not run license plates on the vehicle to
10 - see if it was stolen. Id. Officer Champion testified that he believed someone verified that the
11 vehicle was a rental vehicle, but he did not do so. Digital Recording at 3:45:27-4:10:07 (Mot. 12 H'rg. July 19, 2022). No other officer testified to verifying that the vehicle was a rental vehicle. 13 Officer Conner stated he obtained Defendant's driver's license from Officer Champion after the 14 15 search of the vehicle. Digital Recording at 4:11:32-4:22:37 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Officer
16 Conner also testified that he did not know the reason for the traffic stop. Id. Accordingly, the
17 Court finds the officers failed to perform any ordinary inquiries into the traffic stop and to issue
18 a citation for a traffic violation. The only inquiry the officers state performing is a check of
19 Defendant's driver's license, which they did after the search of the vehicle. Consequently, it
20 appears that upon recognizing Defendant, Sergeant Amaguin's purpose for the traffic stop was 21 to search Defendant's vehicle for illegal drugs. 22 Both Officer Champion and Officer Conner mentioned a pat down of Defendant during 23 their testimony. Digital Recording at 3:45:27-4:10:07 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). A pat down 24 of Defendant's person to check for weapons would have been valid, especially because he 25
26 Decision and Order 27 CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Ze/:res Jabidando Viva Page 10 of 19
ORIGINAL 1 exited the vehicle without being told to do so. However, Officer Conner's testimony denotes 2 that the purpose of the pat down was to look for illegal drugs, as illustrated by the fact that 3 4 $1,700 in cash was discovered in Defendant's wallet. -A Terry stop permits a frisk to check for
5 weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 30-31 (1968). A pat down during a Terfjy stop does not
6 permit the officers to confiscate Defendant's wallet and search the contents, unless the wallet
7 resembled a weapon during the frisk. Cf id. at 26 ("[A search for weapons] must be limited to
8 that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
9 others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even 10 . . . . . ,, . . _ . though it remains a serous intrusion. ). The officers did not state in thelr testlmony that they 11 mistook the wallet for a weapon. 12 Officer Champion states that he observed a kitchen knife in the vehicle that "appeared to 13 be placed in a manner that it would be easily accessible for defense." Digital Recording at 14 15 3:45:27-4:10:07 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). This kitchen knife was never recorded in the
16 custody papers and Officer Conner testified that his report contains no mention of the kitchen
17 knife. Digital Recording at 4:11:32-4:22:37 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Sergeant Amaguin did
18 not make any statement about a kitchen knife during his testimony. As a result, it is not clear to
19 the Court that Defendant's vehicle contained a kitchen knife. Assuming it did, the presence ofa
20 visible weapon would have permitted the officers to search Defendant's vehicle. See Terry, 392 21 U.S. at 24. Yet, Officer's Champion's testimony indicates that he did not find he knife until 22 aler he began searching the vehicle. Digital Recording at 3:45:27-4:10:07 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 23 2022). The discovery of the alleged knife, therefore, occurred during the unlawful search and is 24 not grounds to justify the search. 25
26 Decision and Order CF07l 1-19, People of Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Viva 27 Page 11 o f 19
ORIGINAL 1 Officer Champion testified that his report states that he observed a message banner on 2 Defendant's phone that discussed drugs. Id. Officer Conner testified that his report contains no 3 4 mention of this message banner. Digital Recording at 4:11:32-4:22:37 (Mot. H'rg. July 19,
5 2022). Sergeant Amaguin did not make any statement about the message banner during his
6 testimony. The Magistrate Complaint states that a message banner discussing
7 methamphetamine was observed on Defendant's phone aler he was transported to the precinct.
8 Mag. Con pl., Dec. 28, 2019. Like the existence of the knife, it is not clear to the Court that
9 Defendant's cell phone contained a message banner discussing illegal drugs, and if it did, that
10 the officers viewed the banner prior to the search of Defendant's vehicle. Assuming the officers 11 did, communications about illegal drugs would likely not support probable cause to search the 12 vehicle. Cf. Horton v. Calu'ornia, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (stating that not only must incriminating 13 evidence be in plain view, but that its "incriminating character must be immediately apparent."). 14 15 Officer Champion found a black pouch under the passenger's seat, which contained a plastic
16 bag of a white crystalline substance and a heat-sealed straw. As the crystalline substance and
17 heat-sealed straw were inside of the black pouch, their incriminating character was not
18 immediately apparent.
19 In Illinois v. Caballed, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) the Supreme Court of the United States
20 found that officers were permitted to prolong a traffic stop to use a narcotics detection dog to 21 look for contraband even though the defendant was initially pulled over for speeding. Caballed, 22 543 U.S. at 408-10. The Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that the use of a 23 narcotics detection dog does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy because there is 24 no legitimate interest to privacy in possessing contraband. Id. An exterior search of a vehicle 25
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zerxes Jabidando Wva 27 Page 12 of 19
ORIGINAL 1 with a narcotics detection dog reveals only unlawful activity and not any lawful activity. Id, 2 The Court finds this case is distinct firm Caballed. Unlike the use of a dog trained to uncover 3 only narcotics, a search of the inside of Defendant's vehicle by officers could reveal both lawful 4 5 and unlawful activity. Officers conducting a search inside of Defendant's vehicle could have
6 found no contraband items that were otherwise concealed from public view. Thus, the Court
7 finds the officers were not permitted to prolong the stop by searching Defendant's vehicle. The
8 Court holds that the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the tragic stop and constitutes
9 an unlawfLll search. Specifically, the officers' failure to perform any ordinary inquiries and
10 Sergeant Amaguin's question to Defendant regarding illegal drugs in the vehicle demonstrates 11- that the mission of the Terry stop was not to address the traffic violation and related safety 12 concerns, but to search Defendant's vehicle for illegal drugs. 13
14 C. The length of the detention violated Guam's "Stop and Frisk" Act.
15 Title 8 G.C.A. §§ 30.10-30.60 constitutes Guam's "Stop and Frisk" Act. Under the 16 "Stop and Frisk" Act, a peace officer may detain any person "under circumstances which 17 18 reasonably indicate that such a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
19 criminal offense." 8 G.C.A. § 30.10. The purpose of the detention is to ascertain "the identity
20 of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead [sic]
21 the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal
22 offense, but such person shall not be compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer." 8
23 G.C.A. § 30.20. However, the detention shall not last longer than Eileen minutes. 8 G.C.A. § 24 30.20. A peace officer may search a person to the extent necessary to disclose the presence of a 25 weapon if the peace officer "reasonably believes that a person whom he has detained, or is 26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zenres Jabidando I/Yva 27 Page 13 of 19 .
ORIGINAL I
I about to detain, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat to the safety of 2 the officer or another." 8 G.C.A. § 30.50. "If after an inquiry into the circumstances which 3 4 prompted the detention, no probable cause for the arrest s11al1 appear, he shall be released." 8
G.C.A. § 30.40. 5
6 Sergeant Amaguin stopped Defendant upon watching Defendant's vehicle fail to stop at
7 a stop sign, which was a valid traffic stop. Sergeant Amaguin testified that he stopped
8 Defendant at approximately l:30am. Digital Recording at 3:01:32-3:43:45 (Mot. H'rg. July 19,
9 2022). The record is not clear on the length of Defendant's detention before the search of his
10 vehicle. Sergeant Amaguin testified that upon Defendant exiting his vehicle, Sergeant Amaguin 11 approached him and they had a brief conversation. Id. Sergeant Amaguin testified that 12 following the conversation, he asked if Defendant had any drugs, requested consent to search 13 Defendant's vehicle, and called for back-up. Id. Officer Champion testified that he arrived 14 between three and five minutes after Sergeant Amaguin called for back-up. Digital Recording 15 16 at 3:45:27-4:10:07 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). Officer Champion testified that he was tasked
17 with searching Deflendant's vehicle, Id. It is unclear how much time passed between Officer
18 Champion's arrival and his search of Defendant's vehicle. Regardless, the Court estimates the
19 length of time between the initiation of the traffic stop and Officer Champion's search of
20 Defendant's vehicle exceeded fifteen minutes. 21 Moreover, 8 G.C.A. § 30.20 states that the purpose of the detention is for the officer to 22 ascertain the detained person's identity and the circumstances that led to the traffic stop. Yet, 23 during the first fifteen minutes the officers did not perform a check for outstanding warrants or 24 run Defendant's license plate, nor did they verify Defendant's driver's license, registration, or 25
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Wva 27 Page 14 of 19
ORI GINAL 1 insurance card. Digital Recording at 3:01:32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). The officers 2 did not issue Defendant a ticket for failing to stop his vehicle at the stop sign. Id. Accordingly, 3 4 the officers did not adhere to the purpose of the traffic stop, rather, the purpose of the traffic
5 stop was to search Defendant's vehicle for drugs. The officers would have been permitted to
6 search Defendant if they reasonably believed that he was armed with a dangerous weapon. See
7 8 G.C.A. § 30.50. Nonetheless, the record suggests that the officers did not perform a pat down
8 of Defendant until after they arrested him. The kitchen knife's existence is dubious, and even if
9 it was present in Defendant's vehicle, it is not sufficient to establish probable cause. Likewise, 10 , . . . __ . . the message banner s exlstence is dublous, and it is not sufficlent to establish probable cause. 11 As a result, the officers did not have a justification for extending the detention beyond fifteen 12 minutes, especially because they did not perform any actions consistent with the purpose of the 13 traffic stop. The Court holds the detention violation Guam's Stop and Frisk Act. 14 D. The officers did not know Defendant was on parole and, therefore, Defendant's 15 status as a parolee did not make the search reasonable. 16 The People argue that that "Defendant was under an obligation to comply with Peace 17 18 Officers to allow a search of his person and automobile. as People's Opp'n. to De£'s Mot. to
19 Suppress at 3. Parole Officer Tainatono testified that Defendant's Statements and Conditions
20 Upon Granted Parole or Full-Tenn Release require Defendant to permit "parole officers"--not
21 "peace officers" to conduct searches. Digital Recording at 3:01:32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. July
22 19, 2022). Yet, it is not clear to the Court that the officers knew that Defendant was on parole. 23 The Supreme Court of Guam has not explicitly stated whether police officers must know 24 that the defendant is on parole before conducting a search. of the defendant's automobile subject 25 to his parole conditions. The Supreme Court of the United States found that under California's 26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Wva 27
UWTNAL I
1 precedent "an officer would not act reasonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent 2 knowledge that the person stopped for the search is a parolee." Samson v. Calornia, 547 U.S. 3 843, 856 n. 5 (2006). Similarly, federal courts have found searches unreasonable where police 4
5 officers did not know that the defendant was on parole prior to conducting the search. See e.g.,
6 United States v. Caceres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The search condition
7 validates a search only if the police have advance knowledge that the search condition applied
8 before they conducted the search."), see also e.g,, Moreno v. Boca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir.
9 2005) ("[A] officer must know of a detainee's parole status before that person can be detained
10 and searched pursuant to a parole condition."), and Fitzgerald v. City of Los Angeles, 485 11 F.Supp. ad 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that an officer must have knowledge of an 12 individual's parole status before the suspicionless search beings, if tlle officer learns of the 13 suspicionless search after the search begins, it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 14 Sergeant Amaguin testified that he recognized Defendant from previous encounters 15
16 where he was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. Knowledge of Defendant's previous
17 arrests does not equate to knowledge that Defendant was on parole at the time of the traffic stop.
18 None of the officers testified that they asked Defendant if he was on parole or probation during
19 the traffic stop. Sergeant Amaguin's Supplement Narrative to the police report states that he
20 asked Defendant if "he was still on probation" and "[Defendant] stated yes." Sergeant 21 Amaguin's Supplemental Narrative further states "[Sergeant Amaguin] asked if [Defendant] 22 had any drugs on him. [Defendant] stated no and that he is clean." However, upon reviewing 23 the officers' testimony, it is not clear to the Court that Sergeant Amaguin asked if Defendant 24 was on probation prior to searching the vehicle for illegal drugs. The multitude of 25
26 Decision and Order 27 CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zezxes Jabidando Viva Page 16 of 19
ORIGINAL i
1 inconsistencies in the officers' testimony and the testimony that the officers did not perform the 2 ordinary inquiries during the traffic stop alludes that Sergeant Amaguin did not ask Defendant if 3 4 he was on probation orobtain consent to search the vehicle. Moreover, it is clear that the
5 officers did not verify Defendant's statement that he was on probation because if they had done
6 so, they would have Beamed that he was not on probation but on parole. Nowhere in the record
7 do the officers state they knew that Defendant was on parole. There are inconsistencies in the
8 officer's testimony regarding if and when they obtained consent to search the vehicle. Thus, the
9 Court finds that the officers believed Defendant was on probation because they previously
10 arrested him but did not actually know that Defendant was on parole. 11 Furthermore, Defendant's parole conditions require that he consent to a search by 12 "parole officers." Digital Recording at 3:01:32-4:54:01 (Mot. H'rg. July 19, 2022). As an 13 aside, Sergeant Amaguin, Officer Champion, and Officer Conner are not parole officers so it is 14 15 unclear that Defendant's conditions required him to consent to their request to search; Even so,
16 assuming Defendant's conditions required him to consent to a search by the any law
17 enforcement officer, Defendant still maintains the option to decline a law enforcement's request
18 to search his vehicle. If Defendant declines a search by law enforcement officers, it results in a 1
19 parole violation. Parole violations are handled by his Parole Officer, Parole Officer Lisa
20 Monique Castro Tainatongo. Consequently, if Defendant declined the Sergeant Amaguin's 21 request to search his vehicle, the Sergeant Amaguin was required to honor his refusal and 22 inform Parole Officer Lisa Monique Castro Tainatongo, he was not permitted to search the 23 vehicle anyways. 24
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guan2 v. Zeroes Jabidando Wva 27 Page 17 of 19
OR\GlNAL 1 E . Under the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the items found in the vehicle are products of an unreasonable search and are inadmissible. 2
3 Defendant moves the Court to suppress the evidence seized under the iiuit of the
4 poisonous tree doctrine. Mot. to Suppress at 5-6. "Before evidence may be suppressed under
5 [the fit of the poisonous tree] doctrine, the court must initially resolve whether the challenged
evidence was come at by the 1n1t1a1 lllegahty or instead by means sufficiently dlstlngulshable to 7 be purged of the primary taint." People v. Cundw'§ 2006 Guam 12 'II41 (quoting Segura v. 8 United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-05 (1984). Thus, the Court looks to see whether any 9 independent evidence was presented that would "break the casual chain" between the illegal 10 search of Defendant's vehicle and the seizure of items firm Defendant's vehicle and 11
12 Defendant's person. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
13 The illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia found in Defendant's vehicle were discovered
14 during Officer's Champion's search of the vehicle, which was an unlawful search. Any items
15 found on Defendant's person were found as the result of an arrest stemming from the unlawful
16 search, Defendant would not have been arrested absent the discovery of the illegal drugs and 17 » I . n | | . . drug paraphernalia in the vehlcle. There is nothing in the record that indicates there was any 18 intervening event or independent discovery to break the casual connection between the illegal 19 search and the discovery of the illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, the Court 20 finds the items obtained from Defendant's vehicle and Defendant's person must be suppressed. 21
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People 0f Guam v. Zeroes Jabidando Wva 27 Page 18 o f 19
ORIGINAL 1 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 3 ORDERS the items obtained from Defendant's vehicle and Defendant's person inadmissible. 4
5 Qfc@@ I g? khlolgisil- ®Y \\om 6 1 SO ORDERED, this \\ day of '<>c9€Q@€ 2022. 7
10 HONORABLE ALBERTO E. TOLENTINO 11 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 12
26 Decision and Order CF0711-19, People of Guam v. Zenres .labidando Wva 27 Page 19 of 19
ORIGINAL