People v. Vining

2025 IL App (1st) 241264-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-1264
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 241264-U

SECOND DIVISION October 14, 2025

No. 1-24-1264

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 20CR3945 ) TERRELL VINING ) Honorable ) Tyria B. Walton, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s sentence of 12 years for aggravated discharge of a firearm is affirmed where the sentencing court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense in crafting the sentence.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Terrell Vining was convicted of aggravated discharge

of a firearm and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). The trial court subsequently

sentenced him to 12 years in prison. On appeal, defendant solely argues that the trial court relied

on improper factors in imposing his sentence, including facts inherent in the offense and

speculation about potential harm. No. 1-24-1264

¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment in March 2020 with one count of aggravated

discharge of a firearm and four counts of AUUW. Defendant’s bench trial began in November

2023, and the following evidence was presented.

¶4 Chicago Sergeant Joseph Chilpala testified that in February 2020, he was an officer

assigned to the gang enforcement unit for Area 2. On February 8, 2020, he was on patrol with his

partner Officer Kevin O’Mara. At approximately, 10:20 p.m., he received a Shot Spotter report

of gunshots at 8103 South Green Street. Sergeant Chilpala explained that Shot Spotter “receives

information from various sensors located throughout the city” and it “triangulates a GPS location

for the gun fire.” Shot Spotter will provide the “exact address” and send an alert. The report

indicated that three subjects had fled southbound with the armed subject wearing a green jacket

with a fur collar. The sergeant proceeded to that location and observed three males running south

across South 83rd Street, including a man in a green jacket. The men continued to run into an

alley, and officers began to pursue on foot. Sergeant Chilpala saw them run to a house located at

8315 South Peoria and attempt to enter the home. When the sergeant arrived at that house, two of

the subjects were being detained by other officers. He identified defendant in court as one of the

detained individuals. When the sergeant observed defendant in front of 8315 South Peoria,

defendant was wearing a green jacket with a fur collar.

¶5 After the subjects were detained, Sergeant Chilpala backtracked to where the men had

been running and located a chrome .9-millimeter handgun in the north gangway of 8315 South

Peoria. This handgun was recovered and inventoried. He identified the handgun in court as the

one he recovered in February 2020.

¶6 Chicago Lieutenant Dennis O’Keefe testified that in February 2020, he was a sergeant

with the sixth district, which included 8103 South Green Street. He received the Shot Spotter

2 No. 1-24-1264

alert and responded to the scene. He was pursuing parallel to the foot chase and was in

communication with Sergeant Chilpala. The lieutenant went to 8315 South Peoria and was able

to detain two of the subjects. He identified defendant in court as one of the men detained. He

described defendant as wearing a dark colored coat with fur around the hood. Lieutenant

O’Keefe was notified by Sergeant Chilpala that the sergeant had recovered a firearm. The

lieutenant stated that the decision to perform a gunshot residue (GSR) test was up to a detective

or a supervisor, but none were on the scene. He also explained that the GSR test is typically

performed when someone has been shot and since there was no information that a person had

been struck, the test was not ordered.

¶7 Chicago Officer Jennifer Burmistrz reported to 8103 South Green Street with her partner.

She walked to the next address, 8101 South Green Street, and found two spent shell casings in

the front yard. The casings were recovered and entered into inventory. She identified the two

spent casings as .9-millimeter shell casings.

¶8 Marc Pomerance testified that he was employed as a forensic scientist in the firearms and

tool mark section of the Illinois State Police division of forensic services. In 2021, he was

assigned to examine evidence from this case. He received the two .9-millimeter fired cartridge

cases and a Bryco Arms Model Jennings .9-millimeter Lugar semiautomatic pistol. He was asked

to determine if the pistol was functional, and if so, to determine whether the two fired cartridges

were fired from that pistol. Pomerance then conducted a test firing and found that the gun was

working properly. He proceeded to fire the test shots and compared them to the cartridge cases

recovered by police. After comparing the test shots to the recovered cases, Pomerance opined

that the two fired cartridge cases recovered by police were fired from the recovered handgun.

3 No. 1-24-1264

¶9 The parties stipulated to the admission of a compact disc containing the surveillance

video from a “POD” camera that captured the shooting. The parties agreed that the video fairly

and accurately depicted the events that occurred on February 8, 2020, at 10:22 p.m. at 8103

South Green Street, Chicago, Illinois and the equipment was in proper working order at all times.

The video showed defendant and his two companions walking in a residential area and crossing

the street at approximately 10:20 p.m. on February 8, 2020. Defendant is shown wearing a dark

jacket with fur around the hood. Multiple two-flat residential homes are clearly visible, including

some with lights on in the front of the home. When a vehicle enters the scene, defendant and his

companions stopped, turned around, and walked closer to the vehicle. The men continued to

watch as the vehicle turns left onto the block next to where the men were standing. As the driver

began to exit the vehicle, defendant fired multiple shots toward the vehicle. The driver quickly

reentered the vehicle. Defendant then began to run while he continued to fire the gun toward the

vehicle and the residential homes. The driver of the vehicle quickly drove in the opposite

direction and away from the men. The video shows the flare of gunfire from the gun in

defendant’s hand.

¶ 10 After the State rested its case, defendant moved for a directed finding, which the trial

court denied. Defendant rested without presenting any evidence.

¶ 11 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of one count of

aggravated discharge of a firearm and three counts of AUUW.

¶ 12 At the May 2024 sentencing hearing, the State asked to present evidence in aggravation

that defendant committed a murder three weeks prior to the shooting at issue in this case.

Defendant objected to this evidence as irrelevant. The trial court allowed this evidence in

4 No. 1-24-1264

aggravation over defense objection. The State then presented three police officers as witnesses

who each recounted their investigation of the murder. 1

¶ 13 Chicago Detective Arthur Carlson testified that on January 15, 2020, he was assigned to

investigate a homicide located at 8259 South Peoria. At the scene, the detective observed shell

casings and a black Chevy Malibu with blood in the car and “bullet strike damage” to the rear

window. He spoke with a witness named Carl Jackson. Detective Carlson learned that Jackson

and Sasha Moore had been occupants of the Malibu. Moore had already been taken by

ambulance from the scene. She had been shot in the head and died from her injuries. His

investigation revealed that Moore had been struck by gunfire near the corner of West 83rd Street

and South Peoria before stopping at 1414 West 83rd Street.

¶ 14 Jackson told the detective that Moore had placed an ad on Facebook for the sale of

cannabis. She received a response from someone named Chris Paul. Detective Carlson then

obtained a search warrant for the Facebook account of Chris Paul. The account showed the email

address associated with account was “Terrell.Vining.9” and he identified defendant as the holder

of this account. He viewed Facebook messages between defendant and Moore detailing the time

and location for the sale of cannabis on January 15, 2020. Based on his investigation, he

identified defendant as the suspect in the murder. Detective Carlson testified that Jackson was

later murdered in 2021.

¶ 15 Chicago Detective James Smith Detective testified that on February 1, 2020, he

conducted a photo array with Jackson, and Jackson identified defendant as the individual who

shot and killed Moore. Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Sarah Karr testified that on February 1,

1 We briefly recite this testimony, but defendant has not challenged its admission on appeal. 5 No. 1-24-1264

2020, she was assigned to the felony review unit and took a video statement from Jackson in

which he identified defendant as the person who shot Moore on January 15, 2020.

¶ 16 The State also submitted Jackson’s grand jury testimony and defendant’s disciplinary

records from the Cook County Department of Corrections, including fights, drug possession,

possession of a shank, lighting a jail cell on fire, and flooding a jail tier.

¶ 17 In mitigation, defense counsel referred to defendant’s presentence investigation report

and argued that the evidence of the murder investigation was “irrelevant” to the case before the

court. Counsel contended that “[t]here was no victim” in the charge at issue. Counsel noted that

defendant was found guilty of shooting at an occupied vehicle. Counsel argued that defendant

was 18 years old at the time of the aggravated discharge offense and did not have a prior adult

record. Counsel acknowledged that defendant had spent time in juvenile detention but did not

have his juvenile records. Counsel asked the court to sentence defendant to probation.

¶ 18 After considering the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced

defendant to a term of 12 years in the Department of Corrections, to be served at 85% with credit

for 1544 days in pretrial custody. In its ruling, the court explicitly stated that it did not consider

the evidence of the murder investigation in aggravation. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider

his sentence, which the court denied.

¶ 19 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing his sentence because

the court relied on improper factors in crafting defendant’s sentence, including: (1) a factor

implicit in the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm, and (2) speculation about potential

harm unsupported by the record. The State responds that the trial court properly weighed the

factors and imposed an appropriate sentence based on the nature and circumstances of the case.

6 No. 1-24-1264

¶ 20 We initially consider whether defendant’s claims have been forfeited on appeal.

Defendant asserts that his sentencing claims were properly preserved in his motion to reconsider

his sentence. The State responds that defendant’s motion failed to assert these claims with

sufficient specificity. To preserve an error on appeal, defendant must object at trial and raise the

issue with some specificity in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186

(1988); People v. Mendoza, 354 Ill. App. 3d 621, 627 (2004). Failure to specify grounds in

writing in a posttrial motion can constitute forfeiture of the issue on review in the absence of

plain error. Id. at 187.

¶ 21 In his motion, defendant alleged multiple grounds for the court to reconsider his sentence,

including that the court “improperly considered in aggravation matters that are implicit in the

offense.” Defendant did not detail what element of the offense the court improperly considered,

nor did he allege that the court improperly speculated about potential harm in its findings.

Further, defense counsel did not address these alleged improper factors at the hearing on the

motion. We find defendant’s postsentencing motion was not sufficiently specific as to alert the

trial court to the alleged improper factors relied on at sentencing and deprived the court of the

opportunity to address these alleged errors. See People v. Panozzo, 2022 IL App (3d) 190499, ¶

35 (quoting People v. Coleman, 391 Ill. App. 3d 963, 971 (2009)) (“A posttrial motion will be

deemed sufficient to preserve a claim of error where it alerts ‘the trial court to the alleged error

with enough specificity to give the court a reasonable opportunity to correct it.’ ”). Since the

motion did not adequately inform the trial court of the alleged errors, these claims were forfeited.

¶ 22 Despite defendant’s failure to preserve this issue, he asks this court to review his claims

under the plain error rule. Supreme Court Rule 615(a) states that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity,

or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects

7 No. 1-24-1264

affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the

trial court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The plain error rule “allows a reviewing court

to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so

closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,

regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is

so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the

judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d

551, 565 (2007) (citing Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87). However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a

general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not

they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting

People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)). Rather, “Illinois’s plain error rule is a narrow

exception to forfeiture principles.” People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 18.

¶ 23 Defendant carries the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error rule.

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). Defendant asserts that this alleged error falls under the

first prong because the evidence at sentencing was closely balanced and the consideration of

improper factors tipped the scale in aggravation. However, the first step under either prong of the

plain error doctrine is to determine whether there was an error. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445,

¶ 49.

¶ 24 Generally, the trial court has broad discretionary authority in sentencing a criminal

defendant. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). But whether a sentencing court

relied on an improper factor in imposing a sentence presents a question of law to be reviewed de

novo. People v. Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046, ¶ 49. Defendant bears the burden to

affirmatively establish that the sentence was based on improper considerations and we will not

8 No. 1-24-1264

reverse a sentence imposed by a trial court unless it is clearly evident the sentence was

improperly imposed. Id.

¶ 25 We first consider defendant’s assertion that the trial court improperly relied on a factor

inherent in the offense. More specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred in

considering the fact that defendant shot at another person as an aggravating factor because the

firing of a gun in the direction of another is an element of aggravated discharged of a firearm.

¶ 26 In crafting a sentence, the trial court may not consider a factor that is an element of the

offense as an aggravating factor. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2004). “Stated

differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for

imposing ‘a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ ” Id. at 11-12

(quoting People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83- 84 (1992)).

¶ 27 However, the “trial court is not required to refrain from any mention of sentencing factors

that constitute elements of the offense.” People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 15. The

court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent

of each element of the offense committed by the defendant. Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046,

¶ 50 (citing People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268-69 (1986)). The mere reference to the

existence of such a factor is not reversible error. Id. We consider the record as a whole to

determine whether the trial court improperly imposed a sentence and will not focus on isolated

statements. Id. Further, a defendant’s conduct causing the threat of serious harm may be

considered a statutory aggravating factor and accorded weight in favor of imposing a more

severe sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2022).

¶ 28 Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Under the Criminal

Code of 2012, a person commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he or she knowingly or

9 No. 1-24-1264

intentionally “discharges a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction of a

vehicle he or she knows or reasonably should know to be occupied by a person.” 720 ILCS 5/24-

1.2(a)(2) (West 2018). Aggravated discharge of a firearm is a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-

1.2(b) (West 2018). The sentencing range for a Class 1 felony is a term between 4 and 15 years

of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2020). The trial court imposed a sentence of 12

years.

¶ 29 Before imposing the sentence, the trial court indicated that it did not consider the

evidence of the murder investigation and made the following findings on the record.

“The sentence of this court is going to be -- and this court has considered

that he doesn’t have a background but I am also considering the nature of the

charge [itself], the fact of when this incident occurred in the public residential

street that, no, there is not a victim who appeared in court but there was a person

that was shot at, [defendant] didn’t have a victim because he missed, and so even

though that person wasn’t here I still deem that individual to be a victim even

though he is charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm, and thankfully the

stray bullet which has no eyes and direction didn’t go through a window and

strike an innocent person who may have been sitting in their home.”

¶ 30 According to defendant, the court’s reference to the fact that defendant fired a gun in the

direction of a person constituted an improper use of an element of the offense as an aggravating

factor. However, when read in context, the court explicitly prefaced this statement by observing

that it was “considering the nature of the charge” before describing the circumstances of the

offense.

10 No. 1-24-1264

¶ 31 Additionally, the trial court explained the basis for the imposed sentence at the hearing on

defendant’s postsentencing motion.

“So when I gave this sentence, I considered all factors in aggravation that

were presented to me by the State collectively ***.

I considered the factors -- the facts that were in evidence primarily which

supports my decision as it relates to his sentence. This was a Class 1 felony. The

possible sentence ranged from 4 to 15 years. Could have been extendable based

on other things but the 12-year sentence that I gave him was within the guidelines

and purview of what the statute allows me to sentence him as. The factors that

were proven by the State during their trial are what really and truly warrant the

sentence that I gave to him.”

¶ 32 The trial court further explained its reasoning to support the imposed sentence. As we

previously noted, the trial court is allowed to consider the nature and circumstances of the

offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense committed by the

defendant. Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046, ¶ 50. Further, this court has held that the threat of

serious harm is not an inherent element of the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm and,

thus, the court can consider the threat of serious harm arising from the defendant’s act as an

aggravating factor at sentencing. People v. Ellis, 401 Ill. App. 3d 727, 731 (2010). The Ellis

court compared the firing of a “warning shot” that is intended to go “six feet over someone’s

head to a shot that sends a bullet flying within an inch of someone’s ear.” The reviewing court

thus concluded that “not every aggravated discharge of a firearm threatens the same amount of

harm.” Id.

11 No. 1-24-1264

¶ 33 This is precisely what the trial court did here. The court clearly stated that it considered

the nature and circumstances of the offense based on the evidence presented at trial. Our review

of the record fails to show that the court considered this element of aggravated discharge of a

firearm as an improper aggravating factor. The court was merely commenting on the nature and

circumstances of the offense, i.e., there was no victim because defendant fired a gun at an

individual and missed. These are proper sentencing considerations, and we do not find any error

in the trial court’s statements.

¶ 34 Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly considered potential harm

unsupported by the record as an aggravating factor. Specifically, defendant asserts that the court

improperly speculated that a bullet could have gone through the window of a residence and

struck an innocent person. According to defendant, this comment by the court was without a

basis in the record. Defendant relies on People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, for support,

but that decision has since been vacated pursuant to a supervisory order from the Illinois

Supreme Court, and a new opinion has not yet been filed. “Once an appellate decision has been

vacated by our supreme court, it ‘carries no precedential weight.’ ” People v. Erwin, 2023 IL

App (1st) 200936, ¶ 18 (quoting Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52, 66

(2006). The State responds that the court’s comment was supported by the video depicting the

shooting on a residential street. We agree with the State.

¶ 35 Again, the court prefaced these comments by stating that it was “considering the nature

of the charge,” including the fact that the shooting occurred on a “public residential street.” See

Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046, ¶ 50 (the trial court may consider the nature and

circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense

committed by the defendant). Our review of the evidence clearly supports the trial court’s

12 No. 1-24-1264

observation.

¶ 36 As previously discussed, the video depicted defendant and his two companions walking

along a residential block at approximately 10:20 p.m. on February 8, 2020. Multiple two-flat

residential homes are clearly visible, including some with lights on in the front of the home.

When a vehicle turned onto the block next to where defendant and his companions were walking,

the men stopped and watched the vehicle. As the driver began to exit, defendant fired multiple

shots toward the vehicle. These shots were fired in close proximity to several homes. Defendant

then ran while continuing to fire the gun toward the vehicle and the residential homes. The

potential for additional harm was clearly visible in this video. The trial court’s consideration of

the location of a shooting in a residential neighborhood, as depicted in the video, was part of its

review of the seriousness of the offense. Thus, the trial court did not consider an improper

sentencing factor when it observed the inherent risk of firing a weapon on a public residential

street. Accordingly, we conclude that no error occurred in the trial court’s observations about the

circumstances of the shooting.

¶ 37 Since we have concluded that no error occurred here, there cannot be a plain error. See

People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 139 (2005) (“there can be no plain error if there is no error”).

Thus, defendant’s sentencing claim fails.

¶ 38 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook

County.

¶ 39 Affirmed.