People v. Vinet

2025 IL App (1st) 250186-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 5, 2025
• Docket: 1-25-0186
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 250186-U No. 1-25-0186B

FIRST DIVISION May 5, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________ __

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________ __

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 24-CR-2155 ) RICHARD VINET, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Maryam Ahmad, ) Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________ __

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err when it granted the State’s petition for pretrial detention and denied defendant’s motion for relief.

¶2 Defendant, Richard Vinet, filed a Pretrial Fairness Act Appeal under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), from the circuit court’s order entered on February 1, 2024,

granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention. For the following reasons, we affirm. 1-25-0186B

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On February 1, 2024, the State filed a petition for pretrial detention hearing alleging that

the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the eligible offense of

armed robbery. On the same day, the court held a pretrial detention hearing. Defendant represented

himself at the pretrial detention hearing.

¶5 Pretrial Detention Hearing

¶6 At the pretrial detention hearing, the State proffered that on January 31, 2024, at

approximately 1:20 a.m., two individuals exited a rideshare at the 400 block of North Ogden in

Chicago, Illinois. Defendant approached the individuals and brandished a revolver. Defendant told

them, “Drop your s***. We will kill you.” Victim one gave defendant his cellphone and wallet.

Defendant then signaled to his co-offender, Ocampo, to come over. Ocampo approached victim

two and forced him to remove his backpack and give his cellphone to defendant. Defendant fired

his revolver twice into the air to intimidate them and told them to leave. They walked a block or

two away. Victim two then realized he still had his Apple Watch, which he used to call the police.

The police arrived within minutes. The victims described defendant as having tattoos on his neck,

long hair, and wearing a black and red Chicago Blackhawks jersey. The State noted that this

description matched defendant’s in-court appearance.

¶7 Victim two tracked his phone from his Apple Watch and informed the police of its location.

The police canvassed that area on the ground and in a helicopter. They separately located both

defendant and Ocampo. The police brought defendant and Ocampo to the victims for

identification. The victims identified both defendant and Ocampo as the individuals who had

robbed them at gunpoint. The police then recovered the stolen cellphones, credit cards, and keys

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from defendant’s person. The police located Ocampo’s vehicle a few blocks from where he was

arrested and observed victim two’s backpack in the vehicle.

¶8 The State then provided defendant’s criminal background, which included four prior felony

convictions: unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (2022), armed habitual criminal (2014),

aggravated battery of a peace officer (2002), and armed robbery (1996). In addition, defendant had

a 2023 misdemeanor conviction for intimidation in Indiana.

¶9 The State argued that the proof was evident or the presumption great that the defendant

committed the detainable offense of armed robbery with a firearm. The victims identified him, he

was arrested near the scene of the offense, and he was found in possession of the stolen items.

Regarding dangerousness, the State noted the randomness of the act of violence. Defendant went

to a location in the city “where people go out to have a good time,” targeted two individuals that

looked vulnerable, and pointed a gun at them. The State also noted defendant’s criminal history of

violent offenses. The State argued that defendant was unlikely to comply with any conditions of

release because he was on parole at the time he committed this offense. Additionally, electronic

monitoring would not prevent defendant from obtaining and using a firearm.

¶ 10 Defendant argued that the State “painted a real somewhat fraudulent picture because [the

prosecutor] was not there.” Later, while making a similar argument, defendant stated, “I was

there.” He argued that he was presumed innocent, was not dangerous, and that no one was harmed

during the offense. He alleged that the State’s proffer was a lie.

¶ 11 The circuit court granted the State’s petition for pretrial detention finding that the State

proved each prong by clear and convincing evidence. The court reiterated the State’s proffer and

determined that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the

offense of armed robbery. The court determined that defendant posed a real and serious threat to

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the community based on the random nature of the offense, verbal threats to the victims, firearm

use and discharge, and defendant’s criminal history. The court determined that there were no set

of conditions that would mitigate the risk defendant posed to the community since defendant

committed a violent crime with a firearm while on parole, and electronic monitoring allowed two

days of unfettered movement.

¶ 12 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) Hearing

¶ 13 During a subsequent hearing, defendant orally raised the issue of his pretrial release and

requested that the circuit court determine whether continued detention was necessary pursuant to

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5). Relevant to the issue of pretrial detention, defendant argued that he was

not a threat to the community and he was presumed innocent. In response, the State reiterated its

proffer and arguments from the initial detention hearing. Defendant responded that the State’s

proffer was not factual, but rather a presumption. He pointed out that no witnesses had yet testified

to the State’s proffer. The circuit court determined that continued detention was necessary.

¶ 14 Motion for Relief

¶ 15 Defendant filed a pro se motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)

(eff. Apr. 15, 2024) and a supplemental memorandum. In his motion and memorandum, defendant

raised numerous issues unrelated to his pretrial detention: (1) he had never consented to the laws

of any government and was independent of all laws; (2) the government violated its oath and due

process; (3) the circuit court exceeded its statutory limits and relinquished personal jurisdiction;

(4) he was deprived of physical access to the law library; (5) the grand jury indictment failed to

comply with 725 ILCS 5/109-3.1; (6) 720 ILCS 5/32-7 deprives the court of personal and subject

matter jurisdiction, and voids the judgment; (7) the State violated the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth

amendments; and (8) the State owed him compensatory damages. The only issues defendant

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arguably raised related to his pretrial detention were that (1) the circuit court failed to determine

that his continued detention was necessary at each subsequent appearance, and (2) pretrial release

was denied without the State presenting witness testimony.

¶ 16 At the hearing on defendant’s motion for relief, he raised additional issues unrelated to his

pretrial release. Additionally, he alleged that the State’s petition for pretrial detention was

untimely. He argued that he was not a flight risk and he was not a threat to the community. The

State relied on its petition for pretrial detention and again reiterated its proffer and prior argument.

The circuit court denied defendant's motion for relief. Defendant filed a notice of appeal. On

appeal, in lieu of filing an appellate memorandum, defendant relied on the arguments raised in his

motion for relief and supporting memorandum. The State filed a response. We review de novo the

circuit court’s denial of a defendant's pretrial release when the parties proceed by proffer. People

v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, the State argues that defendant’s claims either exceed the narrow scope and

purpose of pretrial detention review or have been waived. The State also contends that the circuit

court did not err in its determination that pretrial detention was appropriate.

¶ 19 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(“Code”), as recently amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), sometimes referred to as

the “Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act” or the “Pretrial Fairness

Act.” 1 Under article 110 of the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain

limited situations. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1.

1 Our supreme court has recognized that “[n]either name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public acts.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n. 1.

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¶ 20 If the State files a petition requesting denial of pretrial release, “the State has the burden to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that a

defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and

present threat to the safety of another person or the community or a flight risk, and that less

restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” People v. Vingara,

2023 IL App (5th) 230968, ¶ 7; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f). Our supreme court has instructed that

“[e]vidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact

as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023

IL 127712, ¶ 74; see also People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 12 (“Clear and convincing

evidence is that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder

about the truth of the proposition in question.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.))

¶ 21 The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is charged

with a qualifying offense and the court concludes the defendant “poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person” or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a). The statute provides a non-

exclusive list of “[f]actors to be considered in making a determination of dangerousness” that the

trial court may consider in assessing whether the defendant poses such a threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(g). These include the nature and circumstances of any offense charged, the defendant’s history

and characteristics, the identity of any person whose safety the defendant is believed to threaten,

and “[a]ny other factors, including those listed in Section 110-5 of this Article deemed by the court

to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or

assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g).

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¶ 22 If the trial court finds the State proved a threat to the safety of any person or the community,

the court must determine which pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the

appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the

likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a). In making this determination, the court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances

of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and

characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the

safety of any person or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, that

would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of

obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id.

¶ 23 “In criminal cases, ‘[a] notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court to

consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice.’ ” (Emphasis in

original.) People v. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 37

(2009). Section 110-6.6(a) states that all appeals of pretrial release decisions “shall be governed

by Supreme Court Rules.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.6(a) (West 2024). Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(h) recognizes four types of interlocutory orders that are “[a]ppealable.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)

(eff. Apr. 15 2024). Those appealable orders arise under sections 110-5, 110-6, and 110-6.1 of the

Code but specifically include appeals

“(i) by the State and by the defendant from an order imposing conditions of pretrial release; (ii) by the defendant from an order revoking pretrial release or by the State from an order denying a petition to revoke pretrial release; (iii) by the defendant from an order denying pretrial release; or (iv) by the State from an order denying a petition to deny pretrial release.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(i)-(iv) (eff. Apr. 15 2024).

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¶ 24 Defendant identifies the third paragraph as the basis for his appeal. However, defendant

fails to explain how a majority of the issues raised in his motion for relief fit within this category.

Supra ¶ 15. Rather, most of the issues in defendant’s motion for relief contain arguments which

fall outside the scope of the order denying him pretrial release. Accordingly, we disregard these

issues as they are inappropriate for our review at this time. See generally People v. Boose, 2024

IL App (1st) 240031.

¶ 25 Rule 604(h)(2) states that “[a]s a prerequisite to appeal, the party taking the appeal shall

first present to the trial court a written motion requesting the same relief to be sought on appeal

and the grounds for such relief” and “any issue not raised in the motion for relief *** shall be

deemed waived.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15 2024). “The motion for relief will serve as

the argument of the appellant on appeal***.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15 2024) “***[T]he

form of the appellants arguments must contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate

review, including the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore and citations of the

record and any relevant authorities.” Id. Furthermore, “[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the

issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authority and cohesive arguments; it is not merely

a repository into which an appellant may dump the burden of argument and research, nor is it the

obligation of this court to act as an advocate or seek error in the record.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Northbrook Bank & Trust Co. v. Abbas, 2018 IL App (1st) 162971, ¶ 34 (quoting U.S.

Bank v. Lindsey, 397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (1st Dist. 2009)).

¶ 26 We note that defendant’s motion for relief contains largely incoherent and unfocused

allegations. Liberally construed, we can decipher only two distinct arguments that are actually

relevant to his pretrial detention. The two issues that defendant raised in his motion for relief that

are relevant to his pretrial detention are (1) that the circuit court failed to determine that his

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continued detention was necessary at each subsequent appearance since only one detention hearing

was conducted, and (2) pretrial release was denied without the State presenting witness testimony.

¶ 27 Here, defendant’s contentions fail to meet the requirements of Rule 604(h)(2) and Rule

604(h)(7) and are arguably waived. Regardless, both of his contentions that the circuit court failed

to comply with 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024) is clearly rebutted by this record. The circuit

court at each proceeding made explicit findings that “continued detention is necessary to avoid a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the

specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant's willful flight from

prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). Furthermore, section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code

does not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved the three

propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing. People v. Casey,

2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13.

¶ 28 Defendant’s contention that the State failed to present witness testimony at the pretrial

hearing only highlights defendant's lack of understanding of the proceedings and the law. Section

110-6.1(f)(2) of the Code states in relevant part that “[t]he State or defendant may present evidence

at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West

2024). Thus, contrary to defendant’s repeated assertion during the pretrial proceedings, the State’s

proffer was appropriate.

¶ 29 Accordingly, most, if not all, of the issues defendant raised in his motion for relief are

inappropriate for our review at this time. To the extent any issues are appropriate for review, they

are likely waived for failure to contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate review, and

in any event, they are clearly rebutted by the record or contrary to article 110 of the code.

¶ 30 CONCLUSION

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¶ 31 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 32 Affirmed.

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