NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 221115-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is November 28, 2023 NO. 4-22-1115 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Woodford County MARY C. VINCENT, ) No. 21CF171 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Charles M. Feeney III, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence where the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for a canine sniff.
¶2 After the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence filed by defendant, Mary
C. Vincent, the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. Defendant was convicted of cannabis
trafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2020)) (count I) and possession with intent to deliver
cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2020)) (count II). After merging the counts, the court
sentenced defendant on count I, to 14 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that the
court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this order.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On November 4, 2021, defendant was charged with the aforementioned offenses.
In count I, the State alleged that on October 15, 2021, defendant, while driving from California,
knowingly brought 2,500 or more grams of cannabis into Illinois for the purpose of delivering said
cannabis. In count II, the State alleged that on October 15, 2021, defendant knowingly possessed,
with the intent to deliver, more than 5000 grams of a substance containing cannabis.
¶5 On February 7, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of cannabis
that was obtained during a search of her vehicle. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on
April 4, 2022.
¶6 At the hearing, defendant called Lieutenant Timothy Sweeney of the Illinois State
Police as a witness. Sweeney testified that he had 18 years’ experience as a state trooper and
became involved in criminal interdiction cases immediately after becoming a trooper. Throughout
Sweeney’s career, he self-initiated 100 traffic stops that were Class X-level trafficking cases.
Additionally, Sweeney had been “involved in approximately 400 of these types of cases” as a
backup officer or supervisor of criminal interdiction units. Sweeney reported that he attended
several drug interdiction training courses since 2006. For the last 10 years, Sweeney instructed
cadet classes in interdiction techniques at the Illinois State Police Academy.
¶7 Sweeney testified that on October 15, 2021, he was patrolling Interstate 74 when
he observed defendant driving a white vehicle with Nevada license plates three miles over the
posted speed limit of 70 miles per hour. Sweeney followed defendant’s vehicle and entered its
license plate number into the Law Enforcement Archival Reporting Network (LEARN), a license
plate reader database. Sweeney explained that LEARN was a fixed camera system that captured
passing vehicles’ data and imported the information into a database that officers could access to
determine “where that license plate has been.” Sweeney determined from the LEARN database
-2- that defendant’s vehicle crossed the California-Nevada border on Interstate 80 on October 13 at
10:28 a.m. Sweeney then stopped defendant’s vehicle. As he approached the vehicle, he noticed
that it appeared to have driven through rain or snow because there was grime on it. According to
Sweeney, it appeared the trunk had not been accessed, because there were no handprints or
markings indicating that the trunk had been opened or closed.
¶8 A video of the stop taken from Sweeney’s squad car was entered into evidence. In
the video, which this court has reviewed, Sweeney made contact with defendant at the 01:54 time
stamp. Defendant informed Sweeney that the vehicle was a rental, and Sweeney asked for the
rental contract. Sweeney informed defendant that he stopped her for speeding, and defendant
acknowledged that she was traveling at 73 miles per hour. Sweeney then asked defendant to
accompany him to his vehicle to review her license, and defendant agreed. While waiting for
defendant to exit her vehicle, Sweeney observed a dog in the vehicle and no luggage in the back
seat.
¶9 Once in Sweeney’s squad car, Sweeney began processing defendant’s information.
Sweeney testified that, over the next approximately 13 minutes, he entered into his computer
defendant’s driver’s license information, vehicle information, and the details of the traffic stop. As
Sweeney did so, he engaged in conversation with defendant. Sweeney asked defendant about her
destination, and defendant answered that she was traveling to Columbus, Ohio, to see family.
Several times during the conversation, defendant referred to her dog as “Doobie.” Defendant stated
that she last traveled to Columbus on the same route approximately six months prior. At the 05:41
time stamp, Sweeney requested a police canine. Defendant asked if her driver’s license was “not
good.” Sweeney responded that the license was “good” and told defendant that he intended to write
a warning. Sweeney then asked defendant if she ever flew to Columbus. Defendant responded that
-3- she did fly sometimes, but it was difficult to get a license for her dog to fly with her. Defendant
explained that she had been stopping at hotels during the trip. Sweeney asked if defendant had ever
“been in trouble for anything,” and defendant responded that she had been “years ago.”
¶ 10 At the 16:30 time stamp, Sweeney handed a warning to defendant and informed her
that they were “all done with the traffic stop.” Sweeney then asked defendant if he could ask her
some questions, and defendant answered, “[S]ure.” Sweeney asked about the contents of
defendant’s vehicle, and defendant responded that nothing inside it would get her in trouble. At
the 17:10 time stamp, Sweeney asked for permission to search the vehicle. Defendant responded
that she “really would like to go.” Sweeney then informed defendant that she was being “detained
for a canine” to conduct a sniff. They waited several minutes for another officer, who arrived and
conducted a sniff search at the 20:07 time stamp. Approximately 30 seconds later, the canine
provided a positive alert. Sweeney then searched defendant’s vehicle, revealing apparent cannabis
in the trunk.
¶ 11 Sweeney testified that, prior to giving defendant the warning for speeding, he
believed several factors gave him reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for a canine sniff of the
vehicle. Sweeney testified that he considered the fact that defendant was “coming from Northern
California” because that region was a “source area” he had “seen again and again and again as
from [sic] cannabis traffickers.” Similarly, Sweeney found defendant’s traveling to Columbus
significant because he had been involved in “countless narcotics trafficking cases” where the
destination was “specifically Columbus.” Sweeney also considered the facts that defendant “was
in a rental car [that] was dirty” and that the “trunk appeared not to have been accessed since it was
rented” because there were no handprints or markings on it. Sweeney explained that most cannabis
trafficking cases he encountered involved cannabis in the trunk of the vehicle. Sweeney testified
-4- that the presence of a dog in the vehicle was another factor he found significant. Sweeney
explained that, while he could not “put myself in everyone’s head, *** I think that they do it to
dissuade police [canines] from scanning the vehicle and also dissuade dogs from alerting to the
vehicle.” However, Sweeney acknowledged that he could not remember any case he handled
“where that defense was used.” Sweeney also noticed that defendant’s dog’s name was “Doobie,”
which meant “a small amount of cannabis.” Sweeney testified he also found significant the fact
that defendant was driving from California to Columbus instead of flying, because it would have
been less expensive for defendant to fly. Sweeney acknowledged that many individuals have a
preference between driving and flying and that defendant had referred to the difficulty of obtaining
a license for her dog to fly. Even so, Sweeney explained that he found driving from California to
Ohio “inconsistent with the innocent motoring public.” Sweeney testified that he also “put some
stock” in the fact that defendant had previously been arrested for cannabis possession and sales.
Sweeney noted, however, that he “called for a dog before I even noticed that” based upon “what I
had already seen.” Sweeney testified that he did not indicate in his report that he smelled an odor
of marijuana or that defendant appeared nervous.
¶ 12 Following Sweeney’s testimony, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
suppress. After determining that Sweeney had a basis to stop defendant for speeding, the court
concluded that Sweeney also had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for a canine sniff after
the traffic stop concluded. The court explained that, although the factors Sweeney relied upon in
deciding whether to detain defendant were “innocent,” they were nevertheless specific and
articulable facts which, in Sweeney’s training and experience, indicated that criminal activity was
occurring.
-5- ¶ 13 On November 3, 2022, the trial court conducted a stipulated bench trial. The parties
stipulated that Sweeney’s squad car video of the traffic stop would be considered an exhibit. The
parties also stipulated that the State would adduce testimony from Sweeney largely reiterating the
testimony he gave at the motion to suppress hearing. Additionally, Sweeney would testify that he
located 22 bundles, weighing 31 pounds in total, of what appeared to be cannabis in the trunk of
defendant’s vehicle. The parties further stipulated that a forensic scientist with the Illinois State
Police forensic crime lab would testify that testing of two of the bundles established that they
contained 5353 grams of cannabis. Finally, the parties stipulated that defendant would testify that
she lived in Northern California, possessed a medical cannabis license, grew and used cannabis
medically, and was compliant and did not appear nervous during the traffic stop.
¶ 14 The trial court found defendant guilty of both cannabis trafficking and possession
with intent to deliver cannabis. After determining that the counts merged, the court sentenced
defendant on the cannabis trafficking count to 14 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 15 This appeal followed.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress,
because Sweeney lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her after he completed the traffic stop by
issuing her a warning.
¶ 18 This court employs a two-part standard of review when reviewing a ruling on a
motion to suppress. People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 21. We will reverse the trial court’s findings
of fact only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 20. A
finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident
or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. People v.
-6- Patton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210561, ¶ 88. The trial court’s conclusions of law, by contrast, are
reviewed de novo. Patton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210561, ¶ 88.
¶ 19 Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. The
touchstone of fourth amendment analysis is the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security. People v. Carter, 2021 IL 125954, ¶ 22.
¶ 20 A traffic stop constitutes a seizure of the person, and if the seizure violates the
fourth amendment, any evidence the State obtains as a result of that violation is suppressible.
People v. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 66. While a police officer may stop and briefly
detain a motorist when the officer observes the motorist commit a traffic offense, the traffic stop
can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to satisfy the stop’s
initial purpose. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 68. The appropriate duration of police
inquiry in relation to traffic stops is determined by the mission of the seizure, i.e., addressing the
traffic violation that warranted the stop. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 68. The mission of
the stop amounts to checking the driver’s license, finding out if there are any warrants against the
driver, inspecting the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance, and deciding whether to issue
a ticket. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 68. An officer may conduct checks unrelated to the
traffic stop’s mission, but the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop unless he or
she has the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. People v.
Drain, 2023 IL App (4th) 210355, ¶ 43. In other words, when an officer, while investigating a
traffic violation and issuing a ticket, develops reasonable suspicion a different crime has been or
is being committed, further detention may be warranted. People v. Patel, 2020 IL App (4th)
190917, ¶ 16.
-7- ¶ 21 Reasonable suspicion is defined as the articulable, specific facts and the rational
inferences therefrom that suggest a crime has been or is about to be committed. Patel, 2020 IL
App (4th) 190917, ¶ 15. While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause, the officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or hunch of criminal activity. Patel, 2020 IL App (4th) 190917, ¶ 15. An officer need not rule out
the possibility of innocent conduct, as reasonable suspicion may emerge from seemingly innocent,
non-criminal activity. People v. Hill, 2019 IL App (4th) 180041, ¶ 13; People v. Smith, 331 Ill.
App. 3d 1049, 1055 (2002). However, an officer must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting that the stopped individual was violating the law. People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223,
¶ 20. When considering a police officer’s conduct in detaining an individual based upon reasonable
suspicion, we apply an objective standard—whether the “ ‘totality of the facts and circumstances
known to the officer at the time of the stop would warrant a reasonable and prudent person to
believe a crime had been committed.’ ” Patel, 2020 IL App (4th) 190917, ¶ 16 (quoting People v.
Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 73).
¶ 22 Given this framework, the relevant questions are: (1) whether the initial traffic stop
was valid, (2) if the stop was valid, whether it was prolonged beyond the time necessary to
complete the mission of the stop, and (3) if the stop was prolonged, whether the continued
detention of the defendant was supported by a reasonable suspicion. People v. Musgrave, 2019 IL
App (4th) 170106, ¶ 36.
¶ 23 Here, defendant does not contest that Sweeney legally initiated the traffic stop, as
she concedes that she was traveling 73 miles per hour on a road with a posted speed limit of 70
miles per hour. The State, in turn, acknowledges that the traffic stop was prolonged because
Sweeney detained defendant for approximately four minutes to wait for a canine after giving her
-8- a written warning. Instead, the parties dispute whether Sweeney’s detention of defendant following
the traffic stop’s conclusion was supported by reasonable suspicion.
¶ 24 Defendant argues that the factors Sweeney relied upon to justify her continued
detention were not, in their totality, sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion, because they
described a large category of “presumably innocent travelers.” The State responds that Sweeney
had reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity based upon the facts
known to him at the time of the stop and the inferences that his experience in law enforcement
taught him to draw from those facts.
¶ 25 In making her argument, defendant relies predominantly upon Thomas. We find
Thomas instructive. In Thomas, the defendant was charged with several drug offenses after a
canine alert on his vehicle led to the discovery of cannabis. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th)
170440, ¶ 4. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the officer who pulled
him over for an obstructed windshield unreasonably prolonged the stop, thereby subjecting him to
an unlawful seizure. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 6.
¶ 26 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer testified that he observed the
defendant’s vehicle traveling on the highway two miles under the speed limit with a bandana
hanging from the rearview mirror that appeared to be obstructing the defendant’s view. Thomas,
2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 11. The officer briefly drove alongside the defendant’s vehicle and
saw the defendant holding his steering wheel tightly while refusing to look at the officer. Thomas,
2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 12. After stopping the defendant, the officer asked him about his
travel plans. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 13-14. The officer testified that the defendant
still refused to look at him and appeared to be very nervous. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440,
¶ 14. The defendant’s license showed that he resided in Lakewood, Washington, and the defendant
-9- stated that he was driving “ ‘straight through’ ” to Alabama to visit his daughter for “ ‘a few
days.’ ” Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶¶ 14, 17. A backpack, several energy drinks, and
beef jerky wrappers were inside the vehicle. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 19. The officer
testified that he gave the defendant a warning for an obstructed windshield but that the defendant
stayed put even after being told several times that he was free to leave. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th)
170440, ¶ 20. The officer then learned that the defendant had a criminal history for drug
trafficking. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 23. Three minutes after last telling the defendant
he could leave, the officer informed the defendant that he was requesting a canine, and the canine
arrived ten minutes thereafter. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 24. The canine alerted to
narcotics, and a search of the vehicle revealed cannabis. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 24.
¶ 27 When asked why he believed he had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was a
drug trafficker, the officer responded,
“Washington plates, driving below the posted speed limit, that he would not look
over at me when I pulled up alongside of him, that he initially did not stop and then
stopped upon a guardrail, that he continued to not look at me during the traffic stop,
that he mumbled his words, [and] that he was driving 35 hours minimum to stay
somewhere two days is unreasonable. It would not be a cost efficient trip to drive a
vehicle that size 35 hours. It would be cheaper to fly. He would be off[-]route, in
my opinion, and his criminal history for controlled substance trafficking.” Thomas,
2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 25.
The officer also found the absence of luggage but the presence of “ ‘signs of hard travel’ ” like
energy drinks and beef jerky significant, explaining that traffickers “want to be back on the road”
and “get rid of those narcotics as soon as possible.” Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 27.
- 10 - ¶ 28 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and this court affirmed,
concluding that “[i]n the totality of [the] circumstances, *** [the officer] lacked reasonable
suspicion to detain [the] defendant for the dog sniff.” Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶¶ 43,
95. We explained that (1) nervousness and a criminal history alone were not enough to arouse
reasonable suspicion, (2) driving under the speed limit did not contribute to reasonable suspicion,
since it is illegal to drive faster than the speed limit, (3) contrary to the officer’s opinion, the
defendant was not on a route that was “far out of the way,” because he was only a few miles off
of a suggested Google Maps route from Lakewood, Washington, to Alabama, (4) the consumption
of energy drinks and junk food on long trips was common and described a very large category of
presumably innocent travelers, (5) it was not unusual for people to drive, even if flying would be
less expensive, and (6) not everyone owns luggage, and the defendant’s backpack could have been
stuffed with clothing. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶¶ 76-95. We concluded that, based on
the totality of the facts relied upon by the officer, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and
therefore, the defendant’s seizure was unreasonable. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 95.
Accordingly, we determined that the evidence of cannabis obtained via that unreasonable seizure
needed to be suppressed. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 95.
¶ 29 In evaluating the objective reasonableness of Sweeney’s suspicion here, we must
consider the totality of the circumstances known to him when he detained defendant for a canine
sniff. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 76. To justify defendant’s continued detention,
Sweeney explained that he relied upon the following factors: (1) defendant was traveling in a rental
car from Northern California to Columbus, Ohio, (2) the trunk, dirty from grime, did not appear
to have been accessed since the vehicle was rented, (3) defendant had a dog named “Doobie” with
her, (4) defendant was driving to Columbus even though it would have been less expensive to fly,
- 11 - and (5) defendant had previously been arrested for cannabis possession and sales. Like Thomas,
we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Sweeney lacked reasonable suspicion to
warrant prolonging defendant’s detention for a canine sniff.
¶ 30 The fact that defendant was traveling in a rental car from Northern California to
Columbus was too unparticularized to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In
People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 216, 225 (2000), for example, the appellate court determined
that the fact that the defendant was driving to Aurora, Illinois, did not support a reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking, even though the officer knew that
destination to be a “ ‘hotbed’ ” for drugs. The court explained that this fact described a large
category of presumably innocent travelers who would be subject to virtually random seizures.
Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 225. Thus, although Sweeney knew Northern California to be a “source
area” for drugs and he had been involved in several narcotics trafficking cases where Columbus
was the destination, the mere fact that defendant was traveling from California—her state of
residence, no less—to Columbus in a rental vehicle was too general to justify detaining defendant
for a canine sniff. See People v. Ruffin, 315 Ill. App. 3d 744, 750 (2000) (stating the facts that the
defendant was driving a rental car and had traveled from Southern California to Mexico, then to
New York did “not give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was
trafficking in cannabis”).
¶ 31 The absence of handprints in the grime on the trunk of defendant’s vehicle was also
too general to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime. Sweeney
testified that the lack of markings led him to believe that defendant was trafficking drugs because
“the trunk appeared not to have been accessed since it was rented,” and traffickers tended to place
drugs in the trunk, not luggage that would be frequently accessed on a long trip. However, nothing
- 12 - in the record indicated the length of time the grime was on the vehicle. Sweeney’s conclusion that
the trunk had not been accessed for several days relied upon his assumption that the grime was
present when defendant rented the vehicle or had accumulated very soon thereafter. None of the
facts known to Sweeney at the time of the stop, however, supported this. For all Sweeney knew
during the traffic stop, the grime could have accumulated at any time during defendant’s long trip,
including just hours before the stop. In other words, defendant’s access to the trunk did not
necessitate the presence of markings or fingerprints. Accordingly, the lack of handprints on the
trunk of defendant’s vehicle was too unparticularized to support reasonable suspicion. See
Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 92 (stating the defendant’s use of a backpack but not luggage
on a long trip did not contribute to reasonable suspicion, because the officer’s assumption that this
suggested criminal activity failed to account for the possibility that the defendant was using the
backpack to hold clothing in lieu of luggage).
¶ 32 Nor did the presence of a dog in defendant’s vehicle give rise to reasonable
suspicion. It is common for drivers to travel with their pets in their vehicles. If we were to deem
that the presence of a dog in a vehicle creates reasonable suspicion, we would be giving the police
unfettered discretion to intrude into the lives of this broad category of innocent travelers. “ ‘The
facts used to support an investigatory detention are insufficient when they describe a very large
category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.’ ”
Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 86 (quoting Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 225). Moreover, this
factor is particularly weightless in this case, as Sweeney failed to articulate why the presence of a
dog suggested criminal activity. Sweeney testified only that he thought traffickers traveled with
dogs to “dissuade” police canines from providing positive alerts but acknowledged that he could
remember no case he handled in which that explanation “was used.” Additionally, the fact that the
- 13 - name of defendant’s dog was “Doobie” did not support an inference that defendant was engaged
in criminal activity.
¶ 33 Next, Sweeney’s determination that it was suspicious that defendant was driving
from Northern California to Columbus when flying would have been less expensive lacked the
particularized and objective basis necessary to suspect defendant of a crime. Sweeney’s conclusion
was derived almost entirely from his subjective belief of what was reasonable under the
circumstances. However, travelers commonly drive on long trips even if flying would be less
expensive. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 90. For example, travelers drive instead of flying
“to see the scenery or stop at places along the way, or [because] they need transportation once they
reach their destination.” Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 90. Indeed, here, defendant
explicitly told Sweeney that it was difficult to obtain a license for her dog to fly with her, which
explained her choice to drive instead of fly. Accordingly, the fact that defendant was driving to
Columbus when it would have been less expensive to fly also failed to raise a reasonable suspicion.
¶ 34 Finally, the fact that defendant had a criminal history of cannabis possession and
sales was insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion. “A criminal history and nervousness, without
more, do not arouse reasonable suspicion.” Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 94. Here,
nothing in the record established that Sweeney observed any nervousness from defendant, so
defendant’s mere criminal history has even less bearing upon reasonable suspicion. Moreover,
Sweeney acknowledged that defendant’s criminal history had little influence upon his decision to
request a canine, as he did not learn of her arrests for cannabis possession and sales until after he
decided to conduct a canine sniff.
¶ 35 We acknowledge that Sweeney was not required to rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct. However, even when considering the factors Sweeney relied upon in their
- 14 - totality, Sweeney’s belief that defendant was trafficking cannabis amounted to no more than an
inchoate and unparticularized hunch. We conclude that Sweeney lacked reasonable suspicion that
defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Thus, Sweeney’s continued detention of defendant
after the conclusion of the traffic stop constituted an unreasonable seizure, and evidence of the
cannabis obtained from that unreasonable seizure must be suppressed.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further
¶ 38 Reversed and remanded.
- 15 -