People v. Villarreal

2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 20, 2023
• Docket: 2-23-0313
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U No. 2-23-0313 Order filed December 20, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 23-CF-553 ) RUDY A. VILLARREAL JR., ) Honorable ) James S. Cowlin, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant, Rudy A. Villarreal Jr., appeals from the denial of his pretrial release under

section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West

2022)).1 The Office of the State Appellate Defender declined to file a memorandum pursuant to

1 Section 110-6.1 of the Code was amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1,

2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act or Safety, Accountability, Fairness and 2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023), and defendant stands on his notice of

appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 On June 29, 2023, a grand jury returned a 10-count indictment against defendant related to

his actions on June 2, 2023, which involved his alleged discharge of a firearm during an argument

with his wife, Susana Villarreal. The indicted offenses included armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-

2(a) (West 2022) (Class X felony)) in that defendant discharged a black pistol into the air three

times during an argument with Susana; harassment of a witness (720 ILCS 5/32a(a)(2) (West

2022) (Class 2 felony)), namely, Susana; unlawful possession of weapons by a felon (720 ILCS

5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022) (Class 2 felony)), based on defendant’s prior conviction of first-degree

murder; three counts of reckless discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.5(a) (West 2022) (Class

4 felony)); and violation of an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12-3.4(a)(1)(i) (West 2022) (Class

A misdemeanor)), based on defendant’s direct contact with Susana.

¶4 The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release on September 21, 2023, alleging

that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of others or the community. The trial

court heard defendant’s motion for release the same day. The parties agreed that defendant was

indicted with detainable offenses.

¶5 The State identified Officer Jacob Wajda of the Marengo police department, who

responded on June 2, 2023, to a report of shots fired at a bar on State Street in Marengo. The State

proffered that Wajda spoke with several witnesses on scene, who provided the following

statements. Emma Wrona observed defendant enter the bar, argue with Susana, pull out a firearm,

and discharge it three times into the air. Maria Wrona also saw defendant fire a gun into the air.

Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act.

-2- 2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

Jakson Bennet saw defendant argue with a woman behind the bar, pull a firearm from his right hip

area, and fire it into the air. Zachary Alverado left the bar when defendant and Susana started

arguing, and he heard gunshots while walking away from the bar. Joel Acevedo, who was Susana’s

brother, observed defendant and Susana arguing and later heard gunshots.

¶6 Wajda also spoke with Susana, who identified defendant as the man she argued with at the

bar. She said that defendant fired a gun into the air after they had taken their argument outside

behind the bar. Susana had recently obtained an order of protection against defendant following a

domestic violence incident. Since obtaining the order of protection, she stated that defendant and

his friends had been sending her harassing and threatening messages over Facebook.

¶7 Beyond the witness statements to Wajda, the State asserted that officers searched behind

the building and located three bullet casings. The State also argued that defendant’s release on

bond for a domestic battery (No. 23-CF-530), where he allegedly struck Susana and put his hands

on her neck, demonstrated the real danger he posed. It further cited defendant’s prior conviction

of first-degree murder.

¶8 Defense counsel admitted that defendant had an order of protection against him and that

the protected party, Susana, was at the bar. Counsel argued that when defendant tried to leave,

Susana attacked defendant and his guest, a woman that counsel identified as Ms. Pilar. Counsel

proffered that he spoke with Susana on the phone, and she told him that she never saw defendant

with a gun. Counsel also spoke with Ms. Pilar, who told him that defendant did not possess a gun

that entire day.

¶9 In the trial court’s written order entered nunc pro tunc to September 21, 2023, it found that

the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption

great that defendant committed a detainable offense, that defendant posed a real and present threat

-3- 2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

to the safety of persons or the community, and that no condition or combination of conditions

could mitigate the threat. The trial court noted that defendant had fired a gun into the air three

times while on pretrial release for a domestic battery and had been convicted of first-degree

murder. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 10 Defendant raises four grounds for relief: (1) the State failed to prove that defendant

committed the offenses charged, (2) the State failed to prove that defendant posed a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or the community where the shots fired were fired into

the air, (3) the State failed to prove that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate

defendant’s threat to others’ safety because it failed to show that GPS and electronic monitoring

were not less restrictive alternatives, and (4) the court erred in determining that no condition or

combination of conditions would reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance at later hearings or

prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent offense. As to the fourth ground, the trial

court made no findings regarding conditions ensuring defendant’s appearance or preventing

subsequent charges, finding only that no set of conditions could mitigate defendant’s threat to

others’ safety, which is sufficient to deny pretrial release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West

2022) (the State must prove that no condition can mitigate (i) the defendant’s real and present

threat to the safety of any person(s) or the community or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight). We

therefore review only the first three grounds for relief.

¶ 11 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code. Id. § 110-1 et seq. Under the Code,

a defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only for certain charged offenses. Id. §§ 110-2(a),

110-6.1. Defendant does not dispute that he was charged with detainable offenses under section

110-6.1(a) of the Code. To detain defendant, the trial court had to find that the State proved the

following by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great

-4- 2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

that defendant committed a detainable offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)); (2) defendant’s pretrial release

posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community (id. § 110-

6.1(e)(2)); and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from

prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)). At a hearing on the State’s petition to deny release, the State may

present evidence by way of proffer based on reliable information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2).

¶ 12 We review whether the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the

evidence. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13; People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App

(5th) 230698, ¶ 10; cf. People v. Tennort, 2023 IL App (2d) 220313, ¶ 15 (applying the manifest-

weight-of-the-evidence standard to the trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress

evidence). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when it is unreasonable. People

v. Sims, 2022 IL App (2d) 200391, ¶ 72. We review the trial court’s ultimate decision regarding

pretrial release for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13.

¶ 13 Here, the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The

State proffered the statements of five witnesses in addition to Susana’s, and all witnesses stated

that they either saw defendant fire a gun or heard gunshots. Multiple witnesses saw defendant enter

the bar, argue with Susana, and discharge a firearm. Defendant, through counsel, admitted that he

and Susana were at the bar and that Susana had an order of protection against defendant. Although

defense counsel proffered Susana’s subsequent statement denying that defendant had a gun and

Ms. Pilar’s statement that defendant never possessed a gun, those statements were directly at odds

with the statements of uninterested third parties who saw defendant fire a gun or heard gunshots,

and it was the trial court’s job to resolve conflicts in the evidence (see People v. Long, 351 Ill.

App. 3d 821, 824 (2004) (the trial court was in the best position to resolve conflicts in testimony

-5- 2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

related to its probable cause ruling)). The trial court resolved the conflict in the evidence by

reasonably believing the State’s proffers, which were further supported by the recovery of three

bullet casings behind the bar, matching the number and location of shots reportedly fired by

defendant.

¶ 14 Under these facts, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant committed a detainable

offense, including unlawful possession of weapons by a felon (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6)(C) (West

2022)). We also reject defendant’s assertion that he did not pose a danger because the State’s

proffered evidence was that he fired shots into the air. Discharging a firearm in any direction while

in public and near others clearly poses a danger to those persons and the community. See id. § 110-

6.1(g)(1), (7) (offense involving or defendant possessing a weapon). Moreover, defendant had

previously been convicted of first-degree murder, and he acknowledged an altercation at the bar

with Susana, his wife, who had obtained an order of protection against him and who was serving

as a witness against him in his domestic battery prosecution, for which he had been on pretrial

release. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(2)(A), (8). Finally, these facts supported the conclusion that neither GPS

nor electronic monitoring would mitigate the real threats that defendant would continue to harass

Susana, would carry a gun, or would fire a gun again. The trial court reasonably found that

defendant’s actions at the bar on June 2, 2023, posed a real and present threat to the physical safety

of others, and knowing where defendant is located does little to prevent the type of grave harm

that defendant threatened in this case. As the trial court’s challenged findings were not against the

manifest weight of the evidence, we cannot say the trial court’s denial of defendant’s pretrial

release was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 15 For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s pretrial

release. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.

-6- 2023 IL App (2d) 230313-U

¶ 16 Affirmed.

-7-