People v. Vickers

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: 5-25-0246
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250246-U NOTICE Decision filed 04/06/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0246 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 14-CF-1428 ) TRACEY VICKERS, ) Honorable ) Jeffrey K. Watson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vaughan and Hackett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: It was error for the circuit court to treat the defendant’s petition as a section 2-1401 petition after it had been recharacterized as a postconviction petition and advanced to the second stage.

¶2 The defendant, Tracey Vickers, filed a pro se pleading challenging the constitutionality of

the habitual criminal statute, which resulted in the defendant receiving an extended sentence. The

circuit court initially treated the pleading as a successive postconviction petition and advanced it

to the second stage. Later, the circuit court, with a different judge, treated the pleading as a petition

under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) and

dismissed it as untimely. The defendant appeals the dismissal of what was recharacterized as a

postconviction petition. We reverse and remand.

1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 23, 2014, the defendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder.

In July 2016, the State filed a new count for the lesser offense of second degree murder, and the

defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of second degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of

the first degree murder counts. The defendant had a criminal history with at least two prior Class

2 felonies or higher offenses which subjected him to the habitual criminal statute in effect at the

time and mandatory Class X sentencing for second degree murder. The defendant, therefore, faced

a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release and truth

in sentencing would not apply. The defendant was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment and 3

years of mandatory supervised release. The defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, nor did he file an appeal.

¶5 In June 2018, the defendant filed a postconviction petition where he alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel. The circuit court dismissed the petition at the second stage, and this court

affirmed the dismissal. People v. Vickers, 2023 IL App (5th) 210219-U.

¶6 In December 2021, the defendant filed a pro se “Petition to Vacate Judge/Sentence under

2-1401 and Rules of Civil Procedure ‘Relief from a Judgment or Order’ Rule 60(b)(4),”

challenging the constitutionality of the habitual criminal statute. At a status conference in March

2022, the circuit court apparently recharacterized the pro se petition as a successive postconviction

petition and advanced it to the second stage by appointing counsel. 1 Appointed counsel filed two

amended petitions for postconviction relief on behalf of the defendant.

1 The record does not contain a transcript of the proceedings for the March 7, 2022, status conference. 2 ¶7 In January 2023, the matter was reassigned to a different circuit court judge. A hearing was

held on the defendant’s second amended postconviction petition on February 6, 2025. At the outset

of the hearing, the circuit court noted the matter was before the court on a second amended

postconviction petition, and added that the pleading stated it sought relief under 2-1401.

Ultimately, the circuit court stated it had “no intention of recharacterizing [the pleading] as a

postconviction petition.” The hearing proceeded, and the circuit court treated the pleading as a

petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735

ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) and dismissed the petition as untimely. The defendant’s timely appeal

followed.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 The defendant raises two issues on appeal; however, we need only address the defendant’s

claim regarding the circuit court treating his petition as a section 2-1401 petition after it had

previously been recharacterized as a postconviction petition and advanced to the second stage by

a different judge. The State confessed error on this issue, and we find the confession to be well

taken.

¶ 10 It is well-settled that, even when a pro se petition is labeled as a different action, if the

petition alleges a deprivation of a constitutional right cognizable under the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)), a circuit court may treat the pleading as a

postconviction petition. People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 52-53 (2005). While a circuit court is

not required to recharacterize a pleading as a postconviction petition, it may do so. People v.

Helgesen, 347 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676 (2004).

¶ 11 In the present case, as in the case of People v. Stoffel, 239 Ill. 2d 314 (2010), the defendant

filed a postconviction petition that was treated as a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction

3 Hearing Act, and then later the court considered it to be a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of

the Code of Civil Procedure. Like in Stoffel, it was error for the circuit court to treat the defendant’s

petition as a section 2-1401 petition after it had been recharacterized as a postconviction petition

and advanced to the second stage. Id. at 329. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s March 3,

2025, dismissal of the postconviction petition and remand for second stage postconviction

proceedings.

¶ 12 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s March 3, 2025, order is reversed, and the

matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

¶ 14 Reversed and remanded.