2026 IL App (1st) 250329-U No. 1-25-0329 Order filed June 12, 2026 Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 24 CR 1786 ) EPIGMENIO VENANCIO-HERNANDEZ, ) Honorable ) Joseph Michael Cataldo, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GAMRATH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm a 14-year sentence for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under age 13 where the sentence is not excessive.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Epigmenio Venancio-Hernandez was found guilty of
predatory criminal assault of a child under age 13 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)) and
sentenced to 14 years in prison. He appeals, arguing the sentence is excessive due to the facts of
the case, his minimal criminal history, his rehabilitative potential, and a prior six-year plea offer No. 1-25-0329
from the State, which he refused. We reject these arguments. The trial court made a strong record,
thoughtfully considered all relevant factors, and imposed a fair sentence on the low end of the
statutory range. There is no basis to reverse.
¶3 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 The imposition of a sentence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
altered on review absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212
(2010). An abuse of discretion will be found only where the sentencing court's ruling is arbitrary,
fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the trial court. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000). The trial court is granted such deference
because it is in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence, as
it has the firsthand opportunity to weigh factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor,
general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL
111382, ¶ 36. In determining an appropriate sentence, relevant considerations include the nature
and seriousness of the crime, the protection of the public, deterrence, and punishment, as well as
the defendant’s rehabilitative prospects. People v. Kolzow, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1998). The weight
to be attributed to each factor in aggravation and mitigation depends upon the circumstances of
the case. Id.
¶5 Unless there is evidence to the contrary, a sentence imposed within the statutory sentencing
range is presumed to be proper. See People v. Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 105. The
sentencing range for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under 13 years of age is 6 to 60
years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2018). Venancio-Hernandez received 14
years.
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¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 Despite receiving a sentence on the low end of the statutory range, Venancio-Hernandez
contends the sentence is excessive considering the facts of the case, his minimal criminal history,
his rehabilitative potential, and “the State’s belief that a six-year term was appropriate in this case.”
We address these arguments in turn.
¶8 First, Venancio-Hernandez argues that his 14-year sentence is an abuse of discretion
because the trial court failed to consider the relative seriousness of the offense and specific facts
of the case. He contends that the incident involved the “least serious conduct” permitted under the
statute, specifically, brief touching of An.S’s vulva with no penetration, and that the sentence
should reflect this distinction. We believe it does.
¶9 Venancio-Hernandez conveniently omits An.S.’s testimony that she was only eight to nine
years old when she was abused by Venancio-Hernandez, her mother’s live-in boyfriend. She
testified that when her mother was at work, Venancio-Hernandez called An.S. into the bedroom
where he was lying in bed alone, covered with a blanket. He told An.S. to sit between him and the
wall, and when she sat down, he placed his hand on her thigh, over her shorts. He then moved his
hand up her inner thigh, on her skin, toward her vagina area. Although she told him to stop, he
touched the skin of her vagina under her underwear and rubbed it in circular motions for a few
seconds. After Venancio-Hernandez refused to move his hand, An.S. grabbed his hand and moved
it away. He was smirking. As An.S. stood to leave, Venancio-Hernandez told her not to tell anyone.
¶ 10 An.S. also testified about a separate incident that occurred in April or May 2023. That time
she and Venancio-Hernandez were alone in the house when Venancio-Hernandez grabbed her
“butt” with one hand and squeezed. He smirked and grabbed his “penis area” with his other hand.
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An.S. pushed Venancio-Hernandez away and left the room. Additionally, An.S.’s older sister Ar.S.
testified that when she was between 13 and 14 years old, Venancio-Hernandez “touched [her] in
an inappropriate way” by grabbing and releasing her breast while she was sleeping. Ar.S. then
heard her mother say to him, “[D]id you touch her boob?” Venancio-Hernandez answered, “[N]o.”
The next morning, she told her mother, “[Y]es, he did do that,” but her mother “brushed it off.”
¶ 11 As the trial court observed, Venancio-Hernandez was in a position of trust and authority
when he committed the sexual act against An.S. and he also “threatened” her not to tell anyone
what happened. Although Venancio-Hernandez disputes the court’s characterization of his
directive as a “threat,” An.S. unequivocally testified that he told her not to tell anyone. Viewed in
context, the court reasonably treated this statement as a threat to a young victim and did not violate
Venancio-Hernandez’s due process rights or misremember the testimony in imposing sentence.
See People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 45 (1992) (“We recognize that victims of sexual abuse are
often threatened not to tell anyone about the abuse, and that such threats may explain a child’s
delay in reporting abuse.”); People v. O’Brien, 74 Ill. App. 3d 256, 259 (1979) (“There was also
[the defendant’s] implied threat in telling [the victim] not to tell anyone.”).
¶ 12 Venancio-Hernandez downplays the offense, but his illegal actions caused greater harm
than he admits. In a victim impact statement, An.S. stated, “[M]y childhood was ruined,” and
explained that her life has changed forever, noting “I will never let anyone hug me, touch me or
even get really close to me without making me uncomfortable.” She continued, “You took that
innocen[ce] of a little girl, and I truly hope you will suffer in prison and for the rest of your life
like I will have to as well.” Her sister Ar.S. also wrote how she “dreaded coming home knowing
what [Venancio-Hernandez] did not once or twice but many times having to lock and triple lock
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my window and door to be able to sleep somewhat peacefully, having to live in constant fear when
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2026 IL App (1st) 250329-U No. 1-25-0329 Order filed June 12, 2026 Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 24 CR 1786 ) EPIGMENIO VENANCIO-HERNANDEZ, ) Honorable ) Joseph Michael Cataldo, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GAMRATH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm a 14-year sentence for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under age 13 where the sentence is not excessive.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Epigmenio Venancio-Hernandez was found guilty of
predatory criminal assault of a child under age 13 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)) and
sentenced to 14 years in prison. He appeals, arguing the sentence is excessive due to the facts of
the case, his minimal criminal history, his rehabilitative potential, and a prior six-year plea offer No. 1-25-0329
from the State, which he refused. We reject these arguments. The trial court made a strong record,
thoughtfully considered all relevant factors, and imposed a fair sentence on the low end of the
statutory range. There is no basis to reverse.
¶3 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 The imposition of a sentence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
altered on review absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212
(2010). An abuse of discretion will be found only where the sentencing court's ruling is arbitrary,
fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the trial court. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000). The trial court is granted such deference
because it is in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence, as
it has the firsthand opportunity to weigh factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor,
general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL
111382, ¶ 36. In determining an appropriate sentence, relevant considerations include the nature
and seriousness of the crime, the protection of the public, deterrence, and punishment, as well as
the defendant’s rehabilitative prospects. People v. Kolzow, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1998). The weight
to be attributed to each factor in aggravation and mitigation depends upon the circumstances of
the case. Id.
¶5 Unless there is evidence to the contrary, a sentence imposed within the statutory sentencing
range is presumed to be proper. See People v. Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 105. The
sentencing range for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under 13 years of age is 6 to 60
years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2018). Venancio-Hernandez received 14
years.
-2- No. 1-25-0329
¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 Despite receiving a sentence on the low end of the statutory range, Venancio-Hernandez
contends the sentence is excessive considering the facts of the case, his minimal criminal history,
his rehabilitative potential, and “the State’s belief that a six-year term was appropriate in this case.”
We address these arguments in turn.
¶8 First, Venancio-Hernandez argues that his 14-year sentence is an abuse of discretion
because the trial court failed to consider the relative seriousness of the offense and specific facts
of the case. He contends that the incident involved the “least serious conduct” permitted under the
statute, specifically, brief touching of An.S’s vulva with no penetration, and that the sentence
should reflect this distinction. We believe it does.
¶9 Venancio-Hernandez conveniently omits An.S.’s testimony that she was only eight to nine
years old when she was abused by Venancio-Hernandez, her mother’s live-in boyfriend. She
testified that when her mother was at work, Venancio-Hernandez called An.S. into the bedroom
where he was lying in bed alone, covered with a blanket. He told An.S. to sit between him and the
wall, and when she sat down, he placed his hand on her thigh, over her shorts. He then moved his
hand up her inner thigh, on her skin, toward her vagina area. Although she told him to stop, he
touched the skin of her vagina under her underwear and rubbed it in circular motions for a few
seconds. After Venancio-Hernandez refused to move his hand, An.S. grabbed his hand and moved
it away. He was smirking. As An.S. stood to leave, Venancio-Hernandez told her not to tell anyone.
¶ 10 An.S. also testified about a separate incident that occurred in April or May 2023. That time
she and Venancio-Hernandez were alone in the house when Venancio-Hernandez grabbed her
“butt” with one hand and squeezed. He smirked and grabbed his “penis area” with his other hand.
-3- No. 1-25-0329
An.S. pushed Venancio-Hernandez away and left the room. Additionally, An.S.’s older sister Ar.S.
testified that when she was between 13 and 14 years old, Venancio-Hernandez “touched [her] in
an inappropriate way” by grabbing and releasing her breast while she was sleeping. Ar.S. then
heard her mother say to him, “[D]id you touch her boob?” Venancio-Hernandez answered, “[N]o.”
The next morning, she told her mother, “[Y]es, he did do that,” but her mother “brushed it off.”
¶ 11 As the trial court observed, Venancio-Hernandez was in a position of trust and authority
when he committed the sexual act against An.S. and he also “threatened” her not to tell anyone
what happened. Although Venancio-Hernandez disputes the court’s characterization of his
directive as a “threat,” An.S. unequivocally testified that he told her not to tell anyone. Viewed in
context, the court reasonably treated this statement as a threat to a young victim and did not violate
Venancio-Hernandez’s due process rights or misremember the testimony in imposing sentence.
See People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 45 (1992) (“We recognize that victims of sexual abuse are
often threatened not to tell anyone about the abuse, and that such threats may explain a child’s
delay in reporting abuse.”); People v. O’Brien, 74 Ill. App. 3d 256, 259 (1979) (“There was also
[the defendant’s] implied threat in telling [the victim] not to tell anyone.”).
¶ 12 Venancio-Hernandez downplays the offense, but his illegal actions caused greater harm
than he admits. In a victim impact statement, An.S. stated, “[M]y childhood was ruined,” and
explained that her life has changed forever, noting “I will never let anyone hug me, touch me or
even get really close to me without making me uncomfortable.” She continued, “You took that
innocen[ce] of a little girl, and I truly hope you will suffer in prison and for the rest of your life
like I will have to as well.” Her sister Ar.S. also wrote how she “dreaded coming home knowing
what [Venancio-Hernandez] did not once or twice but many times having to lock and triple lock
-4- No. 1-25-0329
my window and door to be able to sleep somewhat peacefully, having to live in constant fear when
I was home alone.” She also related that she suffered fear, anxiety, and depression because of his
actions. In these circumstances, we cannot find that the record indicates the trial court failed to
adequately consider the relative facts of this case in imposing an appropriate sentence.
¶ 13 Next, Venancio-Hernandez argues his 14-year sentence is excessive considering his
minimal criminal history and rehabilitative potential. We disagree.
¶ 14 At sentencing, the court considered the PSI, the parties’ arguments, and the relevant factors
in aggravation and mitigation. The PSI reflected that Venancio-Hernandez had three pending cases
and five prior convictions, including a 2009 felony conviction for aggravated DUI. It also detailed
his personal history: he was born in Mexico, grew up in poverty, lost his father at age eight, left
school after second grade, and immigrated to the United States at 13 to help support his family.
Before his incarceration, he worked two full-time jobs, reported supportive relationships with
family and friends, denied gang affiliation, and denied any significant substance-abuse or mental-
health issues.
¶ 15 In aggravation, the State presented evidence concerning the three other pending cases
involving allegations of sexual touching and attempted sexual assault of An.S. and Ar.S. The State
also noted additional allegations by An.S. of repeated prior abuse and other inappropriate conduct.
In mitigation, defense counsel emphasized Venancio-Hernandez’s difficult upbringing, limited
education, and steady work history, and requested the minimum sentence.
¶ 16 The trial court expressly stated that it had considered the PSI, counsel’s arguments,
Venancio-Hernandez’s history and character, and all aggravating and mitigating factors, whether
specifically mentioned or not. The court also gave due regard to both the seriousness of the offense
-5- No. 1-25-0329
and the goal of restoring Venancio-Hernandez to useful citizenship. In imposing sentence, the
court noted that the victim was eight to nine years old, that Venancio-Hernandez occupied a
position of trust or authority, and that he threatened the victim not to disclose the abuse. The court
further acknowledged that Venancio-Hernandez’s criminal history was nonviolent and “not very
significant,” that he had grown up in poverty, and that he had been employed in two full-time jobs
before his arrest.
¶ 17 The record thus defeats Venancio-Hernandez’s claim that the court failed to account for
his limited criminal history. On the contrary, the court expressly recognized that history as modest
and nonviolent. Venancio-Hernandez’s argument therefore asks this court to reweigh the
sentencing factors and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, which we may not do. See
People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999) (“In considering the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing
court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
merely because it would have weighed the factors differently.”).
¶ 18 Nor does the record support Venancio-Hernandez’s claim that the court overlooked his
rehabilitative potential. The information he now relies on—his family support, work history, lack
of gang involvement, and absence of ongoing substance-abuse issues—was before the court
through the PSI and mitigation argument. Absent some indication to the contrary, we presume the
court considered that evidence. See People v. Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, ¶ 67. We find no
contrary indication here.
¶ 19 Venancio-Hernandez further contends that rehabilitation should have carried greater
weight and disputes the proposition that the seriousness of the offense is the most important
sentencing factor. But Illinois law is settled that, although penalties must reflect both the
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seriousness of the offense and the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship, the
seriousness of the offense remains the most important sentencing consideration and “a defendant’s
rehabilitative potential is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010); Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 11; see also People v. Hussain, 2024 IL App (1st) 230471, ¶ 44. On this record, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 14-year sentence.
¶ 20 Lastly, Venancio-Hernandez argues that his 14-year sentence is excessive where it is “far
harsher” than the 6-year term the State had offered him if he were to plead guilty. Venancio-
Hernandez cites no authority in support of this argument. In contrast, this court has held that, unless
the trial court was involved in the plea-bargaining process, whatever the State may have offered a
defendant during pretrial plea negotiations is irrelevant when determining whether a trial court
abused its discretion in fashioning a sentence. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 2021 IL App (4th)
190073, ¶ 71; People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 93. Here, the court was not a party
to the plea negotiations and, thus, whatever the State may have offered during plea negotiations is
irrelevant. Venancio-Hernandez still managed to receive a sentence 46 years short of the statutory
maximum. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1).
¶ 21 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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