2020 IL App (1st) 171490-U No. 1-17-1490 & 1-17-1491 (cons.) Order filed March 30, 2020 First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) Nos. 15 CR 1923 ) 15 CR 1924 ) EVERETT VAUGHN, ) Honorable ) James M. Obbish, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Griffin and Justice Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s convictions for armed robbery where (i) defendant’s motions to suppress evidence were properly denied by the trial court; and (ii) defendant’s concurrent 27- year sentences were not excessive.
¶2 After a simultaneous bench trial on two cases for armed robbery with a firearm, the trial
judge found Everett Vaughn guilty twice and sentenced him to 27 years’ imprisonment in each
case, to be served concurrently. Vaughn appeals the convictions. We granted leave to consolidate
the appeals. Vaughn argues (i) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence No. 1-17-1490 & 1-17-1491 (cons.)
because his girlfriend’s consent to police to search her apartment was given involuntarily; and (ii)
Vaughn’s 27-year sentence is excessive given his lack of a prior criminal background. We affirm.
We find the trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness was not “clearly unreasonable.” As to his
sentence, we conclude that Vaughn has not shown the court failed to give the proper weight to his
lack of a criminal record, especially where the evidence showed the seriousness of the robberies.
¶3 Background
¶4 The charges stem from two separate armed robberies at a Circle K gas station on Van Buren
Street. In case no. 15 CR 1923, Vaughn was charged with two counts of armed robbery with a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014)) of Claudia Szczerba and Daniel Caguana, two counts
of aggravated unlawful restraint of Szczerba and Caguana, and three counts of aggravated unlawful
use of a weapon, arising from a robbery on January 14, 2015. In case no. 15 CR 1924, Vaughn
was charged with one count of armed robbery with a firearm of Szczerba, one count of aggravated
unlawful restraint of Szczerba, and three counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, arising
from a robbery on November 3, 2014. The parties agreed the cases would be tried together.
¶5 In both cases, Vaughn filed motions to suppress evidence recovered during a search of the
apartment of Matrice Vaughn, his girlfriend, arguing her consent to the search was coerced and
involuntary. Although they are not related, Vaughn shares the same last name as Matrice. At the
hearing on the motions, Matrice testified she was Vaughn’s girlfriend in 2014 and early 2015, and
Vaughn lived at her apartment during that time. While he lived with her, Vaughn stored “some
duffle bags” on the floor of her bedroom next to the bed. He did not “let” her look inside the bags,
and she did not know what was inside of them.
¶6 On January 20, 2015, Matrice owned a car, a red PT cruiser, which she had given Vaughn
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permission to use. On that day, he had been using her car and was supposed to pick up her daughter
from school. That afternoon, the school called and told her that Vaughn was in jail. To retrieve her
car, she went to the police station holding Vaughn. Detectives brought her into a room, and she sat
at a long table. She saw photographs of herself, her ex-boyfriend, and Vaughn on the table. The
detectives asked her about Vaughn and their relationship. They showed her a video of a man with
a gun robbing a gas station, and a video of her car leaving the gas station. The detectives told her
they thought Vaughn was the person who robbed the gas station and asked if she knew anything
regarding Vaughn’s activities. She said she did not.
¶7 The detectives then told her that although her car was evidence, they had “no problem”
giving it back to her. The detectives also told her “a few things about [herself],” including that she
worked a full-time job and that she had financed her car. They then said “if [she] let them search
[her] house, go in [her] house, then *** [she] won’t be in any trouble.” And, “we know that you
have kids. We don’t want you to be in any trouble. We don’t think you are involved. You [sic]
never been in trouble before.” The detectives said “if they find anything in [her] house, that [she]
would be responsible. And there is a possibility that *** [her] children will get took and [she will]
get in trouble.” The officers “basically said if [Matrice] let them search [her] house, [she] won’t
get in trouble. They said if [she signed] this paper, then they can search [her] house and [she] won’t
be accountable for anything they find.” They did not tell her what would happen if she refused to
sign.
¶8 Vaughn submitted a consent to search form signed by Matrice Vaughn into evidence. The
form indicated she had been advised of her constitutional rights to refuse to consent to a warrantless
search, and authorized Officers Considine and Reszutko to conduct a search of her apartment. The
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names of the officers and the description of the premises were handwritten on the form. Her name
had been handwritten at the top of the page and her signature and the date “1/20/15 at 11:35 p.m.”
appeared at the bottom. She did not recall whether the blanks had already been filled in on the
form when she received it. The form was not read to her; she did not read it. She printed her name
at the top, signed the bottom to allow the search, and understood what she was doing when she
signed.
¶9 Then the police officers gave her the car keys and followed her to her apartment. She was
present when the police searched the duffle bags. The police officers showed her what they found
in the duffle bags.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, she testified she was not told she had to come to the police station.
She went to get her car. When she arrived, the police officers did not handcuff her, and she never
felt as though she were under arrest. After she spoke with the officers, she signed the consent to
search form because she had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. She acknowledged the
form stated she did not have to consent.
¶ 11 At the time, she had not been dating Vaughn for long, but had known him before dating.
By trial, they were no longer in a relationship. She showed the officers where the duffle bags were
located, and the officers did not search any other part of the apartment, did not wake her children,
and were respectful of her property. She did not know that the duffle bags contained guns.
¶ 12 After the officers recovered the duffle bags, she returned with them to the police station
where she spoke with an assistant state’s attorney and gave a handwritten statement. The assistant
state’s attorney asked her how she had been treated by the police and she responded she “had been
treated pretty nice.” She said “nobody forced [her], there were no threats or promises made to
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[her]” to give [the] handwritten statement. Her statement was not admitted into evidence or is it in
the record on appeal.
¶ 13 On redirect examination, Matrice testified that, when the police “were going over” the
consent to search form, they did not read the form to her or tell her she did not have to give them
consent. After police showed her the photographs and videos, she worried she might be in trouble
and wanted to cooperate so she would not be held responsible “for this.” Police told her
“cooperation would be good.” Before she signed the form, the police officers told her they were
looking for a gun and, if they found a gun, “it could be a possibility that [she] get in trouble”
because it was in her apartment.
¶ 14 The court granted the State’s motion for a directed finding, ruling the evidence, taken in a
light most favorable to Vaughn, “fell far short” of demonstrating coercive tactics or threats to get
Matrice Vaughn to sign the consent to search form. The police showing her the videos of the armed
robberies did not amount to coercion, and was a “display of the evidence to try to alert this young
lady * * * of the dangerous nature of the relationship she had with the person that they were
alleging committed these armed robberies.” The court found the police officers “didn’t threaten
her,” “didn’t coerce her,” and “pretty much could not have been nicer to her.”
¶ 15 The court noted the officers told her (i) they did not believe she was involved, (ii) she had
children, and (iii) they wanted to inspect her apartment to see if there were any proceeds of the
armed robberies there because she did not want to be held responsible for hiding evidence. The
court stated she signed the form indicating she did not have to give consent to a warrantless search
and authorizing the search. The form also indicated that by signing it, she “state[d] and certif[ied]”
that she knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search without being threatened or promised
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anything. The court held that the police did not set up a coercive environment, did not restrain her
liberty, and searched only the duffle bags she told them about. The court concluded that the officers
“just put it all out there,” likely to convince her it was the right action to take but their conduct did
not create a coercive atmosphere to induce signing the consent form.
¶ 16 At trial, Claudia Szczerba testified that in November 2014, she worked as a cashier at the
Circle K gas station on West Van Buren Street, and in January 2015, she had been promoted to
manager. Just before 8:00 p.m. on November 3, 2014, Szczerba was behind the counter when a
man came in holding a gun. The man wore a hat, hoodie, black and white Air Jordan sneakers, and
a construction vest. She identified the man’s clothing. When the man first entered, he was not
wearing a mask, so Szczerba saw his face. The man put on a face mask “when he’s about to reach
in with the gun.” He “clocked the gun,” leaned over the counter, put down a green pillowcase, and
told Szczerba to place the money from the register in the bag and get down on the floor. She did
as instructed. The man also asked for cigarettes but left before she handed them over.
¶ 17 Szczerba had seen guns and shot them at the police academy, so she was familiar with
semiautomatic weapons. She heard the man rack the slide of the gun and recognized the sound.
Szczerba identified a gun in court as the gun pointed “into her face.” When the court pulled the
slide back on the gun, she identified the sounds as the same she heard the man’s gun make.
The State published surveillance video showing the November 3, 2014, robbery from
multiple angles. Szczerba said the video accurately depicted the events of the night. (Although the
record on appeal includes a DVD containing the November 3, 2014, the court was unable to review
the clips. This court could review two DVDs with video clips of the January 14, 2015, robbery.)
¶ 18 On January 14, 2015, Szczerba was working at the gas station shortly after 8:15 p.m., and
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a friend, Daniel Caguana, was with her. Szczerba was cleaning the bathroom when the door
sounded, indicating someone opening the front door. She saw a man wearing a face mask, a
construction vest, and a hoodie with the hood over his head, come in holding a gun. He said, “you
already know what time it is, pointed the gun at Caguana, and then said, “if you f****** move I’ll
f****** blow – or I’ll kill you.” With the gun “in [her] face,” Szczerba gave him money from the
register.
The man then asked for cigarettes. When Szczerba asked him what kind of cigarettes he
wanted, the man told her “well, I’m black, what do you think I smoke?” Szczerba understood this
to mean he Newport cigarettes but purposely gave him the wrong brand. When the man left the
store, Szczerba followed him but came back inside when he waved the gun at her. She saw the
man get into a red PT Cruiser and drive off. She ran out of the store again and followed the car,
calling 911 on her cell phone. When the car stopped at a red light, Szczerba relayed the car’s year
and make and a partial license plate number.
Szczerba was unable to see the man’s face because of the face mask but said she would
never forget his eyes. When police officers showed her photographs, she recognized the man as
the same man who committed the November robbery. Szczerba identified the face mask, gun, and
construction vest used in the robbery and confirmed the gun was the same gun used in the
November robbery.
The State played multiple surveillance video recordings showing interior and exterior
views of the Circle K gas station during the January 14, 2015, robbery. Szczerba testified the video
clips were accurate depictions of the events of the January robbery. (It is unclear which of the
January 14, 2015, video recordings included in the record were played at trial. This court reviewed
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all the recordings.)
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Szczerba acknowledged that after the November 2014 robbery, she
believed the gun may have looked like a .22 caliber but did not recall telling that to the
investigating officer. Szczerba had entered the police academy and had seen and fired only “[n]ine
millimeters.” She did not recall telling the investigating officer whether she heard the man rack
the slide and did not see him pulling it back in the surveillance video, but the man was in front of
her when he did it, so the cameras may not have been able to view that angle.
¶ 20 After the January robbery, Szczerba told the investigating officer the man pulled the slide
back as he was entering and pointed the gun at Caguana. After the robber left the store, Szczerba
ran out twice, because after the first time the man pointed a gun at her and she ran inside to take
cover, but the second time she ran out and was able to view the license plate.
¶ 21 Daniel Caguana testified that on January 14, 2015, at 8:15 p.m., he was at the Circle K gas
station, “hanging out” with the cashier, Szczerba, whom he knew. Caguana was standing about
five to six feet away from the door with an unobstructed view when a man walked in and stood
next to the register. The man wore a gray hoodie, a “lime green, yellowish” construction vest, nice
gym shoes, and jeans. Caguana could only see the man’s eyes, since he was wearing a mask
“covering up to his nose.” The man pulled out a dark silver, chrome gun, “cocked it back,” started
“waving it around, pointing it,” and said, “you know what time it is.” He pointed the gun at
Caguana, and said “if you move, I’ll shoot.”
¶ 22 The man asked for cash and a pack of Newport cigarettes, and then walked out and headed
toward Van Buren Street, at which point Caguana and Szczerba followed to see where the man
was going. They called police and watched the man get into a red PT cruiser, which went north on
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Van Buren. Caguana testified surveillance footage from the Circle K gas station accurately
depicted the events.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Caguana said police officers asked him to make an identification
but he identified “the wrong person” in a photo array. Caguana was “not sure” whether Vaughn
was the man he saw wearing the construction vest in the gas station.
¶ 24 Police sergeant John Considine testified that, on January 20, 2015, he was working with
his partner Ken Reszutko on a “string of armed robberies” at the Circle K gas station on Van Buren
Street. Considine saw a red PT cruiser with a license plate that matched the description of the car
involved in the robberies. The driver matched the description of the offender. Considine and
Reszutko curbed the car and arrested the driver, whom he identified in court as Vaughn. Inside the
car, the officers found packaging for a half-face mask, which he identified in court.
¶ 25 After Vaughn had been taken into custody, Considine met with Matrice Vaughn at the
police station and was present when she was asked to consent to a search of her apartment. After
she signed the consent form, she drove her car to her apartment. Considine followed. She let the
officers into her apartment and. directed them to the bedroom where she and Vaughn “stayed” and
to bags containing Vaughn’s belongings. Considine searched the bags in her presence. Considine
identified a yellow and orange construction vest, blue-green pillowcase, half-face mask, bb gun,
and firearm as items he recovered. He identified a hat, hooded sweatshirt, and Air Jordan sneakers
as items recovered from the bedroom. When he recovered the firearm, it was loaded and had one
bullet in the chamber.
¶ 26 On cross-examination, Considine stated he told Matrice he thought there might be firearms
at her house, did not have a search warrant, and would like her to consent to the search. Considine
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told her “what the consequences would be” if she did not consent, namely, that the officers could
“legally get a search warrant.” Considine did not recall telling her what would happen if he found
anything in her home and she had not given consent.
¶ 27 Matrice testified that between November 2014 to January 2015, she had known Vaughn “a
little bit over a year” and had been dating him since the summer of 2014. They broke up “[a]round
the time he went to jail.” While they were dating, Vaughn lived with her and kept his belongings
inside three or four bags which he kept on the floor of her bedroom. She never looked inside the
bags, because Vaughn told her “[n]ot to touch them.” During that time, she was the sole owner of
a red PT cruiser, which she allowed Vaughn to use.
¶ 28 On January 20, 2015, she learned from her daughter’s school that Vaughn would be unable
to get her daughter from school. Having determined Vaughn and her red PT cruiser were at a police
station, she went there and learned of Vaughn’s arrest. She did not know why. She spoke with
police officers and a detective who showed her videos of events which took place at a Circle K gas
station on November 3, 2014, and January 14, 2015. She had given Vaughn permission to use her
car on those days and saw Vaughn and her car in the videos for both dates. She told police she
recognized her car. They asked her if they could search inside her apartment and showed her a
consent to search form. The officers said they wanted to search for weapons. She did “[n]ot
entirely” read the form but did read it “a little bit,” and then signed it.
¶ 29 She went to her apartment. Officers followed her. She showed them Vaughn’s bags. The
officers searched the bags in her presence. She saw them remove a yellow construction vest, a
pillowcase, a mask, plastic gloves, and two guns, one of which the officer characterized as a
“fake.” The officers unloaded the real gun. She had seen the construction vest before in the trunk
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of her car. When she asked Vaughn about it, he told her “none of your business.” She identified
the items removed from the bags, as well as a gray hoodie, gym shoes, security officer badge, and
hat belonging to Vaughn, all of which had been recovered from her bedroom. She said Vaughn
smoked Newport cigarettes.
¶ 30 On cross-examination, Matrice said she got her car back after the police recovered the items
from her apartment, and she had returned to the station. Before she signed the consent form, the
police told her they wanted to search her home; they believed firearms were there. The police did
not say they whether they had a search warrant. They told her she could possibly “get in trouble
for a gun” if she did not sign the form. This influenced her to sign. Police also did not say that if
she refused consent and guns were found, she would be held responsible for them.
¶ 31 On redirect examination, she testified that when police told her that weapons could be in
her apartment, she wanted them to search for weapons because she had children. She did not know
there were guns in the apartment and went with the police voluntarily. When police showed her
the video of the two robberies, she recognized Vaughn as the robber. When the State showed her
a frozen still from the surveillance footage, she identified Vaughn as well as his gray sweatshirt,
the construction vest, and face mask. She also recognized her car in the surveillance footage.
¶ 32 Detective Steve Buglio testified he investigated the two armed robberies of the Circle K
gas station and had the partial plate information and car description of the red PT Cruiser. The
partial plate was registered to a car belonging to a “Latrice” Vaughn, which got a ticket in
November 2014. Buglio passed the information to Chicago police officers Considine and
Reszutko. They stopped a car matching that description on January 20, 2015, and arrested the
driver. Buglio interviewed the driver at the police station, whom he identified in court as Vaughn.
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¶ 33 After advising Vaughn of his rights, Buglio asked him questions concerning the PT Cruiser.
Vaughn said his girlfriend “Latrice” owned the car and he was the only man who drove the car.
After the initial conversation, Buglio received information from Considine and Reszutko regarding
clothing, a weapon, and mask packaging recovered from the apartment and the car. Buglio showed
Vaughn the vest, hat, and shoes and “a couple of clips” of the surveillance videos from the
robberies. When Buglio showed Vaughn the clip from the January 2015 robbery, Vaughn said,
“yeah that’s me.”
¶ 34 On cross-examination, Buglio said Vaughn did not sign a written statement, and he did not
show Vaughn the weapons. Vaughn did not say which weapons were used in either robbery.
Vaughn told Buglio he did not remember other robberies, “but that he was snorting a lot at that
time period.” This statement was not recorded.
¶ 35 The court granted Vaughn’s motion for a directed verdict in part, acquitting Vaughn of the
armed robbery of Caguana and three counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in case no.
15 CR 1923, and all three aggravated unlawful use of a weapon charges in case no. 15 CR 1924.
¶ 36 Vaughn then proceeded by way of stipulation. If called to testify, Chicago police officer
Jacquelin Gregory would testify she interviewed Claudia Szczerba about the November 3, 2014,
robbery. Szczerba described the gun as a “small black gun” and believed it was .22 caliber.
Gregory’s police report did not say Szczerba told her the offender “racked the slide” during the
robbery. The parties also stipulated that, if called to testify, Chicago police officer Laura Bragiel
would testify she interviewed Szczerba regarding the January 14, 2015 robbery. Szczerba
described the firearm used by the offender as a “chrome handgun” and she did not write in her
police report that Szczerba told her the offender “racked the slide” during the robbery. Vaughn
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rested without presenting any further evidence.
¶ 37 The court found Vaughn guilty of the armed robbery of Szczerba in both cases, the
aggravated unlawful restraint of Szczerba and Caguana in case no. 15 CR. 1923, and the
aggravated unlawful restraint of Szczerba in case no. 15 CR 1924, holding the counts in each case
merged for purposes of sentencing. In ruling, the court found Szczerba was an “extraordinarily
credible witness,” and almost everything to which she testified had been corroborated by the
videos. The court stated it examined the firearm identified by Szczerba and it was operable, and
Szczerba described the sound of Vaughn pulling the slide back on the gun to chamber a bullet.
¶ 38 The trial court acknowledged minor impeachment of Szczerba but found, “even taking that
impeachment into consideration,” she was a credible witness. The court stated police officers only
make a “quick report” and invariably some witness testimony is left out. The court concluded,
“[t]he evidence against [Vaughn] is so strong. It’s one of the strongest cases that’s ever been put
forth probably in this building.” After ruling, the court addressed Vaughn directly, noting for the
record that Vaughn had been “smirk[ing] and laugh[ing]” during the State’s argument when it was
displaying the physical evidence against him.
¶ 39 Vaughn filed motions for a new trial, arguing, in part, that the court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence. The motions were denied. Vaughn’s presentence investigation report
showed no prior juvenile or adult convictions. Vaughn reported his childhood was “normal,” and
his relationship with his father had been “good,” and his relationship with his mother was “very
good.” Vaughn was in a seven-year relationship with a woman and they had a daughter and he had
a second daughter from another relationship. Vaughn denied affiliation with a street gang and any
substance use other than alcohol and marijuana.
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¶ 40 In aggravation, the State called Omar Breton, the victim of a third armed robbery, case no.
15 CR 1925. The State argued that the testimony and video evidence regarding this robbery “shows
how dangerous this Vaughn was” because he fired a gun. The State argued that, while Vaughn did
not have any prior felony convictions, armed robbery carried “a significant sentence.” The State
urged the court to consider all the testimony from the victims at trial and the sentencing hearing
and sentence Vaughn over the statutory minimum.
¶ 41 In mitigation, defense counsel argued the third armed robbery victim’s identification of
Vaughn was faulty for various reasons, and Vaughn likely accidentally fired the gun because the
victim had pushed a “display case” onto him. He added that Vaughn had been a law-abiding citizen
for many years, and something must have happened in his life that caused him to rob gas stations.
Counsel argued Vaughn’s lack of criminal history, the support of his family, and that nobody was
hurt during the robberies. All this warranted sentencing him to the “low end” of the range.
¶ 42 In allocation, Vaughn apologized for his behavior during the last court appearance. The
court told Vaughn it would not hold his behavior against him.
¶ 43 The court sentenced Vaughn to concurrent 30-year sentences on the armed robbery counts
in each case, noting Vaughn’s lack of criminal history and that he did not appear to come from an
“environment of people that would regularly engage in criminal behavior.” The court stated
Matrice Vaughn seemed like an “extraordinarily decent model citizen,” who had been “taken in
and duped by what the Vaughn was really doing” when he used her car and stored his armed
robbery tools.
¶ 44 The court noted Vaughn’s argument that firing the gun during the third robbery could have
been unintentional, but found “the real aggravating factor” was that Vaughn had been armed with
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a real firearm, loaded with live ammunition and one bullet chambered at the time of the robbery,
and that the firearm was fired. This showed the “inherent dangerousness” of an armed robbery and
the third robbery was “just a slight finger pull away from a murder.” Stating it considered all
matters in aggravation and mitigation, the court considered neither the minimum nor maximum
sentence appropriate and sentenced Vaughn to concurrent 30-year terms. After the sentencing
hearing, the State nol-prossed the charges in the third armed robbery case, no. 15 CR 1925.
¶ 45 Vaughn filed motions to reduce sentence, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing 30-year sentences for armed robbery with a firearm. He argued the sentences were
“greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense,” and the court improperly balanced the factors in aggravation and mitigation.
¶ 46 The court reconsidered the sentences, emphasizing the witness from the third armed
robbery, presented in aggravation, testified that a gun in Vaughn’s hand discharged during that
robbery. Because of this testimony, the court found “there wasn’t a lot mitigating with respect to
[Vaughn’s] behavior here.” The court commented “[t]he only thing that is mitigating is [Vaughn]
does not have any prior convictions.” Vaughn behaved as a person “living in some sort of dream
world” while reacting in court to the strong evidence against him, which the court found did not
benefit his case. Nevertheless, the court granted Vaughn’s motions and reduced Vaughn’s
sentences to 27 years in each case, to be served concurrently.
¶ 47 Analysis
¶ 48 Motions to Suppress Evidence
¶ 49 Vaughn first argues for us to reverse the denial of his motions to suppress evidence and
remand for a new trial. He maintains that the evidence from the search “played a key role” in the
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convictions, and the consent to search the apartment had been obtained involuntarily.
¶ 50 We review rulings on motions to suppress evidence under a two-part standard of review.
People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2006). A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
clear error and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “A
reviewing court, however, remains free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to
the issues and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted.” Id. So
we review de novo the legal ruling on whether suppression is warranted. Id.
¶ 51 Searches normally require a warrant supporting probable cause. U.S. Const., amend. IV.
Nonetheless, courts allow warrantless searches in limited situations, including where consent has
been given voluntarily without duress or coercion. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“Consent must be received, not extracted
‘by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’” (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 229).
¶ 52 The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was
voluntarily given. People v. Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d 414, 417 (1991). Voluntariness depends on the
totality of the circumstances. Id. Consent cannot result from express or implied coercion,
intimidation, or deception and cannot be the result of “acquiescence or submission to the assertion
of lawful police authority.” People v. Buschauer, 2016 IL App (1st) 142766, ¶ 38. That a written
consent form was signed does not necessarily mean voluntariness when circumstances show
coercion. People v. Wall, 2016 IL App (5th) 140596, ¶ 14. We will reverse the trial court's
determination on voluntariness when it is “clearly unreasonable.” Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d at 417-18.
¶ 53 Vaughn contends the officers’ statements to Matrice at the police station were “deceptive,”
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“misleading,” and “based on the unsavory but time-honored practice of threatening to take a
woman’s children away to get her to comply with law enforcement.” Vaughn made substantially
the same argument during the suppression hearing. There, the trial court heard Matrice testify on
what the police officers told her to persuade her to sign the consent form, and found it “fell far
short” of actual coercive tactics and At the suppression hearing, amounted to a “display of the
evidence” to convince her of the dangerous situation with which she was involved. We agree.
¶ 54 At the suppression hearing, Matrice Vaughn testified she had been worried she might be in
trouble with the police and wanted to cooperate so she would not be held responsible for any illegal
activities Vaughn may have committed. The police told her they were looking for a gun, for which
she could “get in trouble” if located in her apartment. The trial court determined the police officers
conducted themselves “respectful[ly],” and signing the consent form was “entirely reasonable”
based on what she had learned. We find the State has carried its burden to show the consent had
been voluntarily given. The totality of the circumstances show that (i) Matrice never believed she
was under arrest, (ii) the police told her they did not believe she was involved in any illegal
activities, (iii) she had the keys to her car returned to her, (iv) she signed the consent to search
form, and (v) the form, which she read “a little bit,” stated she did not have to consent to the search.
See Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d at 417.
¶ 55 Further, evidence at trial may be considered by the reviewing court on whether to sustain
the decision to deny a motion to suppress. People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 34-36 (1984). At
trial Matrice testified not only that she went voluntarily with the police to her apartment, but, after
the police officers told her Vaughn may have kept guns at her apartment, she wanted the officers
to search for guns because she had children. Her trial testimony supports the trial court’s ruling
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that Matrice voluntarily consented to the search of the duffle bags due to her concern about the
guns and the possible ramifications for her and her children.
¶ 56 Citing People v. Purchase, 214 Ill. App. 3d 152 (1991), and People v. Daugherty, 161 Ill.
App. 3d 394 (1987), Vaughn argues the officers were “deceptive and misleading” and threatened
to take Matrice’s children away. Both cases are distinguishable.
¶ 57 In Purchase, the appellate court affirmed suppression of all evidence seized during a search
based on considerable evidence that the consents signed by the defendant and his wife “were
obtained through coercion and trickery.” Purchase, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 154-55. Police officers
informed the wife, who was pregnant and home alone, that “if she did not cooperate, they would
put her in jail and take custody of her baby” and led her to believe they had a search warrant. Id.
at 153. They had no warrant and caused the wife to believe that unless she cooperated by signing
the consent form, the officers could take her to jail and make her baby a ward of the court. Id. Also,
the officers covered up the form’s top portion and told her signing the “piece of paper” would
show her cooperation. Id. The trial court granted the suppression motion because the police officers
placed the wife in a “very coercive and duressful [sic] environment,” and she had “no choice” but
to sign a form she did not understand. Id. at 154-155. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s
determination was not manifestly erroneous. Id. at 155.
¶ 58 In Daughtery, this court affirmed the suppression of all evidence seized from and
statements made by the defendant. The trial court found police used improper subterfuge to obtain
consent from defendant’s wife to enter their home. Daugherty, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 400. A
police officer told the wife that he had questions regarding a theft of money from her house, a theft
which the wife felt had already been resolved. Id. at 396. Based on information he received in
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reviewing the theft case, the officer had gone to the home not only to talk about the theft report
but to find out if there were drugs or marijuana there. Id. The officer “ordered” the wife to show
him from where the money had been taken and where other money was kept. Id. When she took
him into the kitchen, he saw marijuana on the counter and seized it. Id. When the officer threatened
to take her children if she did not cooperate, she turned over more marijuana. Id. The officer did
not have a search warrant and did not ask the wife to sign a consent form. Defendant was convicted
of possession of marijuana. Id. at 397. The trial court found the wife’s consent invalid as it was
given only because of the officer’s ruse about investigating the theft. Id. This court agreed, finding
the officer’s use of his “official position of authority” to falsely claim legitimate police business
to search for evidence of another crime rendered the subterfuge “so unfair as to be coercive and
renders the consent[to enter] invalid.” Id. at 400.
¶ 59 Unlike in Purchase and Daugherty, the police officers here did not engage in coercion or
subterfuge to obtain consent. They did not make false threats to put Matrice in jail or to take away
her children as in Purchase and Daugherty. They did not use their official position of authority or
trickery to obtain consent by hiding the real reason for their request as in Daugherty. Rather, the
officers informed her of potential, legitimate consequences should she be found to be involved
with Vaughn’s criminal activities or should firearms be found. They informed her that she could
be found responsible for the guns, and there existed a “possibility” her children could be taken
should that happen, an accurate assessment.
¶ 60 Unlike the wives in Purchase and Daugherty, Matrice knowingly signed a consent to
search form, testifying she read the form in part and wanted the police to search for firearms in her
home because of her children’s presence. The police officers’ actions in attempting to convince
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her to allow the search did not rise to the level of duress or coercion as in Purchase and Daugherty.
¶ 61 We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motions to suppress evidence.
¶ 62 Sentence
¶ 63 Vaughn contends that his 27-year sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to
adequately weigh the mitigating evidence of Vaughn’s lack of a criminal background, the events
at issue were “short in duration, and no one was hurt,” and the negative impact of Vaughn’s lengthy
incarceration would be felt by his children. Vaughn requests that we reduce his sentence to the
minimum term of 21 years.
¶ 64 We review a sentencing decision under the abuse of discretion standard of review. People
v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). A reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion where
the sentence is “‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’” Id. The trial court has broad discretion in imposing
a sentence as the trial judge “observed the defendant and the proceedings,” and can better weigh
factors such as defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social
environment, habits, and age. Id. But, we interpret sentencing laws “in accord with common sense
and reason” and not merely rubber stamp the trial court’s judgment, so as to “avoid an absurd or
unduly harsh sentence.” People v. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st) 151540, ¶ 1.
¶ 65 Vaughn was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm, a Class X offense, for which 15
years shall be added to the sentence, resulting in a range of 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment. 720
ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2014); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2014). Vaughn’s 27-year
sentence, which falls within the sentencing range is presumed proper. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st)
120349, ¶ 46.
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¶ 66 A sentence should reflect both the seriousness of the offense and the objective of restoring
the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I § 11; People v. Neasom, 2017 IL App
(1st) 143875, ¶ 48. While a trial court must consider all factors in aggravation and mitigation, the
seriousness of the offense is the most important factor in sentencing rather than the mitigating
evidence. People v. Kelley, 2015 IL App (1st) 132782, ¶ 94. The trial court is presumed to consider
“all relevant factors and any mitigation evidence presented” (People v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (1st)
123258, ¶ 48), but has no obligation to recite and assign a value to each factor (People v. Perkins,
408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 763 (2011)). Rather, the defendant must make an affirmative showing that
the court did not consider the relevant sentencing factors. People v. Burton, 2015 IL App (1st)
131600, ¶ 38.
¶ 67 Vaughn does not satisfy that showing. He appears to argue that, because he had no prior
criminal record and did not injure anyone during either charged robbery, any sentence imposed
above the 21 years’ minimum would be excessive. Sentencing decisions, however, are subject to
the court’s discretion and the trial court found it extremely relevant that Vaughn was armed with
a loaded firearm which discharged during the third robbery. While Vaughn characterizes the armed
robberies as not causing physical harm, the court emphasized that Vaughn, who used a firearm in
all three robberies, had been only a “trigger pull” away from causing a murder during the third
robbery. See Kelly, 2015 IL App (1st) 132782, ¶ 94 (“‘The seriousness of the crime is the most
important factor in determining an appropriate sentence, not the presence of mitigating factors
such as the lack of a prior record.’”) (quoting People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002)).
¶ 68 Further, the record shows the trial court specifically considered Vaughn’s lack of a criminal
background, commenting on his lack of a criminal background as well as his education and work
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histories when initially sentencing him. Then, in response to Vaughn’s motion to reconsider the
sentence, the court reduced the sentences to 27-year terms based on Vaughn’s lack of a prior
criminal record, the only relevant mitigating evidence presented in the motion. This reflects the
trial court’s acknowledgment of the weight of this mitigating evidence in its sentencing decision.
¶ 69 Vaughn also argues the trial court failed to consider the negative effects of incarceration
on Vaughn and his children. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2014). The trial court reviewed
the PSI and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume that the trial court
considered the relationship between Vaughn and his children and any negative effects of
incarceration. See People v. Gordon, 2016 IL App (1st) 134004, ¶ 51; Jackson, 2014 IL App (1st)
123258, ¶ 48.
¶ 70 In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing concurrent
27-year sentences for each of the charged robberies.
¶ 71 Affirmed.
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