2025 HAR 12 itM S: 22' 2 CLER.K OF COURT 3
4 BY; _ _ ___h._ 5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM i 6 ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0727-24 7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) GPD Report No. 24-24735 ) 8 vs. ) ) 9 ) ) DECISION & ORDER IO SUNNI KLARISA VARGAS, ) RE. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO aka Linda Belinda ) SUPPRESS 11 aka Belinda Vargas ) 12 DOB: 10/09/1990 ) ) 13 Defendant. ) 14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto E. Tolentino on December 12, 2024, for 15
16 a Motion Hearing. Defendant Sunni Klarisa Vargas ("Defendant") was present with counsel
17 Alternate Public Defender Ana Maria Gayle. Assistant Attorney General Matthew Wermager was 18 present for the People of Guam ("People"). Following the hearing, the court took the matter under 19 advisement pursuant to Supreme Court of Guam Administrative Rule 06-001, CVR 7.l(e)(6)(A) 20
21 and CRl.1 of the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Guam. Having duly considered the parties'
22 briefings, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the court now issues this Decision and Order 23 GRANTING the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 24 \\ 25 \\ 26
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Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page I ofl9 BACKGROUND
2 A. Allegations against Defendant Vargas in the Magistrate's Complaint
3 On October 20, 2024, Guam Police Department ("GPD") Officers conducted a check of 4 the "Guma Trankilidat parking area" at about 2:30 a.m. Affidavit to Magistrate's Comp!. (Oct. 5 21, 2024). During this check, GPD officers observed a female in the driver's seat of a vehicle 6 who "appeared to be rummaging through items." Id. Officers also observed that the vehicle was 7
8 running and looked a mess inside. Id. Although the female stated to GPD officers that her name
9 was "Linda Belinda," a GPD Enterprise Law Enforcement Mobile photo and tattoo identification 10 identified her as "Sunni Klarisa Vargas DOB: 10/09/1990" -the Defendant in this case. Id. When 11 Officer Sumagaysay asked her about the vehicle's owner, the Defendant responded that "Dan" 12
13 was the owner. Id. In a rush, she exited the vehicle and began walking away from the officers. Id.
14 When Officer Sumagaysay informed her that she was not free to leave, and requested for her 15 driver's license, she continued walking away. Id. 16 While Officer Sumagaysay followed the Defendant, Officer Pangelinan remained with the 17 vehicle. See Affidavit (Oct. 21, 2024). Looking through the driver's side window of the vehicle, 18
19 Officer Pangelinan "observed in plain view a glass pipe with a bulbous end within the open
20 compartment of the center console area." Id. Upon a further check of the area where the pipe was 21 located, the officer found a "clear resealable plastic baggie containing a crystalline substance 22 suspected to be methamphetamine." Id. Using a sample of the substance from this plastic baggie, 23 the officer "conducted a NARK II test which yielded a presumptive positive for 24
25 methamphetamine." Id. GPD officers arrested the Defendant at 2:55 a.m. Id.
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 2 of 19 Based on the events above, the Defendant was charged with POSSESSION OF A
2 SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (As a 3rd Degree Felony). See Indictment (Oct.
3 28, 2024). 4 B. Defendant Vargas' Motion to Suppress 5 The Defendant asserted her right to speedy trial at Arraignment on November 7, 2024. 6 See Assertion (Nov. 12, 2024). She subsequently filed her Motion to Suppress Evidence 7
8 ("Motion") on November 20, 2024. 1 The court scheduled a Motion Hearing for December 12,
9 2024, to hear the parties' oral argument and testimony from the GPO officers involved this case. 10 See Notice (Nov. 25, 2024). Because the People did not file its Opposition by the December 4th 11 deadline, the People filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file an Untimely Opposition on 12
13 December 12, 2024. See Pp!. 's Mot. Leave (Dec. 12, 2024). Attached to its Motion for Leave of
14 Court was the People's Opposition to the Motion. Id. 15 C. Defendant Vargas' Suppression Hearing 16 At the evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Suppress ("Suppression Hearing"), the court 17 first addressed the issue of whether to grant the People leave of court to file its Opposition. See 18
19 Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3: 10:36 - 14:58PM (Dec. 12, 2024). Pursuant to 8 GCA § 65.45, the
20 court did not allow the People to make an oral argument before the court on the Motion. 2 Id. at 21 3:14:59 - l 7:30PM. The court only permitted the People to lay foundation of the events in this 22 case by questioning the subpoenaed GPO Officers. Id. Upon the court's ruling, the court heard 23
24 1 The Guam Supreme Court acknowledged that delays for the benefit of the defendant constitute good cause for
25 tolling the speedy trial clock. See Ungacta v. Superior Court of Guam, 2013 Guam 29 (arguing that "delays caused by, or for the benefit of the defendant constitute good cause for speedy trial purposes."). Because suppressing 26 evidence in this case would benefit the Defendant, the Defendant's speedy trial clock tolled as of November 20, 2024. 27 2 If a motion is untimely filed, the court may allow the filing of motions beyond the time limit previously set by the
court. See 8 GCA § 65.45 ("Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be 28 made prior to trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to§ 65.15, or prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.")
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 3 of 19 testimony from two out of three 3 GPD Officers involved in the events leading up to the
2 Defendant's arrest on October 20, 2024: Officer Sammy J. Sumagaysay ("Sumagaysay") and
3 Officer Donny Topasna Pangelinan ("Pangelinan"). 4 1. Testimony of the Initial Stop 5 While patrolling the Tamuning/Tumon village area at 2:30 a.m. on October 20, 2024, 6 Sumagaysay drove his patrol vehicle into Guma Trankilidat4 with Officers Pangelinan and 7
8 Togawa. 5 See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:32:50 - 35:30PM (Dec. 12, 2024). Upon driving into
9 Guma Trankilidat's parking lot area, the officers observed a vehicle parked in a handicapped 10 parking stall with the Defendant in the driver's seat. Id. at 3:23:22 - 23:27PM. Sumagaysay II testified that he flashed his patrol vehicle's headlights on high beam and drove up behind the 12
13 vehicle in question. Id. at 3:21:50-22:40PM. Sumagaysay parked his patrol vehicle at an angle
14 behind the vehicle before turning it off. Id. at 3:42:24 - 42:58PM. Pangelinan later testified that 15 parking GPD patrol vehicles directly behind a vehicle in question is considered normal when an 16 officer wants to check that vehicle in question. Id. at 4: 16:30 - l 7:20PM. 17 Sumagaysay testified that he "called in the license plate" upon parking his patrol vehicle. 18
19 Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:43:02 -46:24PM (Dec. 12, 2024). Although Pangelinan did not call
20 in the license plate himself, he reasoned that Sumagaysay did so "to make sure that there was no 21 burglary or theft going on." Id. at 4:05:38- 06:06PM. Neither officer could testify as to the results 22
3 25 GPD Officer Togawa ("Togawa") was the third officer who was present throughout these events leading up to the Defendant's arrest. Although he was not called to testify, both officers testified about his involvement, which is 26 sufficient for the court's consideration. 4 See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:35:47 -37:37PM (Dec. 12, 2024) (testifying that Guma Trankilidat is Government 27 of Guam housing for the elderly; not a business). 5 Although a patrol vehicle should seat two GPD officers in the front and an arrestee in the back, Pangelinan testified
28 that he sat in the back of the patrol vehicle due to a shortage of vehicles at the time they were out patrolling, which was not unusual. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4: 12:49 - 13: 12PM (Dec. 12, 2024).
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 4 of 19 of the call, such as the name of the car's registered owner or if someone reported it as stolen. Id.
2 at 4:43:02-46:24PM.
3 Before speaking to the Defendant, the officers made some initial observations. After using 4 his report to refresh his recollection, Sumagaysay testified that the car was running with the 5 driver's side window rolled down. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:47:43 - 48:25PM (Dec. 12, 6
7 2024). Although Sumagaysay could not confirm on the stand if the driver's side door was open,
8 Pangelinan confirmed that it was open. Id. at 4:15:18 - [6:08PM. The officers also noticed the
9 Defendant rummaging through the car and grabbing a cat. Id. at 3:23:43 - 24:0IPM; 4:05:56 - 10 06:06PM. According to Sumagaysay's testimony, he asked the Defendant for identification upon 11 approaching her. Id. at 3:24:15 - 24:20PM. After indicating she had none, the Defendant 12
13 continued reaching around the car and grabbed the cat before exiting the vehicle. Id. at 3:24:24-
14 24:33PM. At the time, the only identification she provided to Sumagaysay was the name "Linda 15 Belinda." Id. at 3:24:46 - 24:57PM. 16 Despite Sumagaysay's requests for further identification, the Defendant ignored them and 17 continued walking away from the officers. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:25:04 - 25:20PM 18
19 (Dec. 12, 2024). According to his police report, Sumagaysay told the Defendant, "Stop, you
20 cannot leave." Id. at 3:50:00 - 50:47PM. At some point, he "informed her that she was not free 21 to go and asked for her license." Id. at 3 :51 :52 - 52: 16PM. Meanwhile, Togawa was watching 22 Sumagaysay's back as both officers followed her. Id. at 3:50:48- 51 :06PM. While the Defendant 23 was walking away from the officers, she shouted that "Dan was in the distance." Id. at 3:25:16- 24
25 25:34PM. She also stated, "I can see the door." Id. at 3:51:52 - 52:16PM. When Sumagaysay
26 asked if she stayed at building K, the Defendant said, "No, I stay in Maite." Id. 27 \\ 28
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 5 of 19 2. Testimony of the Search
2 While Sumagaysay and Togawa were following the Defendant, Pangelinan approached
3 the vehicle in question. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:06:43 - 07:07PM (Dec. 12, 2024). 4 Although the vehicle's driver's side door was now closed, Pangelinan noticed that the window 5 was down. Id. at 4: 19:40 - 20:0SPM. Through the open driver's side window, he saw a pipe with 6 a bulbous end in "plain view." 6 Id. at 4:01:50 - 07:07PM. Specifically, Pangelinan testified that 7
8 the pipe was located inside the "car's center console compartment, which was open." Id. at
9 4:20:10 - 21:23PM. Pangelinan then entered the vehicle to remove the pipe, describing it as a 10 "cylindrical, glass pipe with a bulbous end." Id. at 4:07:56-24:37PM. Further check of the pipe 11 showed that the pipe contained residue. Id. at 4:24:40 - 24:43PM. After removing the pipe from 12
13 this compartment, he also noticed a resealable baggie containing a crystalline substance in that
14 same compartment. Id. at 4:08:25 - 08:37PM. Pangelinan notified the other officers of his 15 findings "almost immediately." Id. at 4:08:45 - 08:53PM. 16 3. Testimony of the Defendant's Arrest 17 Although Sumagaysay instructed her multiple times to stop, the Defendant refused,
19 leading him to handcuff her "under the awning in front of the elderly home." Suppression H'rg
20 Mins. at 3:26:40 - 27:06PM (Dec. 12, 2024). Although Sumagaysay could not recall an exact or 21 approximate time, he testified that he handcuffed the Defendant before Pangelinan informed him 22 about the evidence found in plain view. Id. at 3:29: 10-29:27PM; 3:53: 12- 53:41PM. In contrast 23 to Sumagaysay's testimony, Pangelinan testified that he "highly doubted that she was in cuffs 24
25 prior to him informing the officers." Id. at 4:08:54 - 09:24PM. According to Pangelinan,
27 6 Under the plain view doctrine, "if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its 28 incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 13 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 6 of 19 Sumagaysay arrested the Defendant after he and Togawa read the Defendant her Miranda 7 rights
2 and questioned her. Id. After her arrest, Pangelinan tested the suspected methamphetamine using,
3 which yielded presumptive positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 4:09:25 - 10:02PM; 4:26:04 - 4 26:22PM. Although he testified about field testing the suspected methamphetamine, Pangelinan 5 later testified that he was unsure whether he conducted the test at the scene or at the precinct. Id. 6 Pangelinan confiscated the evidence roughly around 2:50 a.m. See Suppression H'rg 7
8 Mins. at 4:10:39 - 11:16PM (Dec. 12, 2024). He testified that the "entire investigation from
9 observation until final confiscation of the drugs was roughly 20 minutes." Id. After confiscating 10 the evidence, the three officers left the scene with the Defendant. Id. at 4: 11 :35 - 12:06PM. II 4. Defendant's Relief Sought 12
13 At the end of questioning, the Defendant argued that GPD officers seized her in violation
14 of the Stop and Frisk Rule of fifteen (15) minutes. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:35:38 - 15 35:53PM (Dec. 12, 2024). Because of this, she seeks the suppression of anything found after the 16 initial illegal stop. Id. at 4:35:38-35:53PM. Based on the court's earlier ruling, the People could 17 not make any oral argument on the testimony and evidence presented. 8 The court then took the 18
19 matter under advisement. Id. at 4:39:40 - 39:45PM.
20 \\ 21 \\ 22
23 7 Under the Fifth Amendment, "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against [themselves]." U.S. Const. Amend. V. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), protects an individual's fifth 24 amendment right against self-incrimination by preventing the admissibility of statements made while a defendant was in custody during an interrogation. However, such statements may be admissible as evidence so long as law 25 enforcement inform the defendant of their right to remain silent and their right to speak with an attorney before and during the custodial interrogation; and the defendant either exercises these rights or knowingly, voluntarily, and 26 intelligently waives them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 8 Despite the People's failure to timely file its Opposition in this case, the court still has an obligation to analyze the
27 merits of the issue before it. In Petition of Quitugua v. Flores, the Supreme Court of Guam held that "the failure to file a written opposition, the filing of a notice non-opposition, or the disregard of untimely filed papers" does not 28 relieve the lower court of its obligation to consider the merits of a motion before rendering its decision. Petition of Quitugua v. Flores, 2004 Guam 19 ,r,r 27-28.
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vorgas, CF0727-24 Page 7 of 19 DISCUSSION
2 The Fourth Amendment provides "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
3 houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, [and] shall not be 4 violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 5 and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. 6 Const. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and 7
8 seizures apply to Guam through§ 142lb(c) of the Organic Act of Guam. See People v. Yer/en,
9 2021Guam8117 (citing People v. Johnson, 1997Guam914). 10 A. Guam Police Department Officers seized Defendant Vargas at or around 2:50 11 a.m. 12 The Defendant argues that GPD unlawfully seized her for longer than the fifteen minutes 13 allowed under 8 GCA § 30.30; beginning when Officer Sumagaysay observed her at 2:30 a.m. 14 See Def.'s Mot. Suppress at 4-5 (Nov. 20, 2024). Under 8 GCA § 30.30, a person's detention 15
16 shall not be "longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no
17 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). Further, "[s]uch 18 detention shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity 19 thereof." Id. To determine whether the Defendant was seized in violation of 8 GCA § 30.30, the 20 court must analyze the totality of the circumstances surrounding the events leading up to her 21
22 eventual arrest at 2:55 a.m.
23 The United States Supreme Court has long held that "[a] person has been 'seized' within 24 the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding 25 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." People v. 26 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12121 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 27
28 For instance, a reasonable person would not believe they are free to leave through a police
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 8 of 19 officer's use of physical force or show of authority to restrict a person's ability to walk away. See
2 People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I 121.
3 As mentioned earlier, Sumagaysay turned off his patrol vehicle, parking it directly behind 4 the vehicle the Defendant was found in. This vehicle was still running with its driver-side door 5 open. Should the Defendant want to drive out of the Guma Trankilidat parking lot, she could not 6 do so safely without crashing into the patrol vehicle. Although this alone may be a sufficient 7
8 seizure if conducting a traffic stop, Pangelinan testified that the officers did not conduct a traffic
9 stop on the Defendant. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:17:39 - 17:42PM (Dec. 12, 2024). 10 While all three officers did not make their initial approach at once, Sumagaysay and 11 Togawa both approached the driver's side of the vehicle, where the Defendant was seated and 12
13 reaching around the car. Sumagaysay was the only officer who interacted with the Defendant.
14 Meanwhile, Togawa watched Sumagaysay's back, serving as Sumagaysay's back-up without 15 interacting with the Defendant. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:50:48 - 51:06PM (Dec. 12, 16 2024). The manner of the officers' approach to the Defendant is likely not enough to exhibit a 17 "show of authority" that would make a reasonable person feel that they were not free to leave. 18
19 Although the Defendant exited the vehicle, both Sumgaysay and Togawa continued
20 following her to obtain further identification after the Defendant informed Sumagaysay that she 21 had none on her. While following the Defendant on foot, Sumagaysay told the Defendant at 22 different times: (1) "Stop, you cannot leave" 9 and (2) she was not free to go and asked for her 23 license. 10 Despite these statements, the Defendant's actions - leaving the officers at the vehicle 24
25 and walking some distance away from them - would cause a reasonable person to believe that the
26 officers were not restricting her freedom of movement at his time. Notably, the amount of distance 27
28 9 Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:50:00- 50:47PM (Dec. 12, 2024). 10 Id. at 3:51:52 - 52: !6PM.
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vorgas, CF0727-24 Page 9 of 19 the Defendant traveled between the location of the officer's initial approach (the handicapped-
2 accessible parking stall) and the point of detention (under the awning in front of the elderly home)
3 show that she still felt free to leave and was not immediately detained upon the officers' initial 4 approach. 5 Although Sumagaysay could not recall on the stand, the Affidavit of Probable Cause stated 6 that he arrested her at 2:55 a.m. See Magistrate's Comp!. (Oct. 21, 2024). This timestamp aligns 7
8 with Pangelinan's testimony that he confiscated the evidence roughly around 2:50 a.m., which
9 occurred either after or during the time Sumagaysay eventually made the arrest. 11 10 Looking at the totality of these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to 11 leave at or around 2:30 a.m. Further, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave until 12
13 Officer Sumagaysay handcuffed the Defendant at approximately 2:50 a.m. Therefore, the
14 Defendant's seizure did not begin until this time; and no violation of 8 GCA § 30.30 occurred. 15 B. Guam Police Department Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain 16 Defendant Vargas as permitted under 8 GCA § 30.10.
17 Under Guam's Stop and Frisk Act, a peace officer may detain any person "under 18 circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is 19 about to commit a criminal offense." 8 GCA § 30.10. Under 8 GCA § 30.20: 20 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the identity 21 of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad 22 which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be compelled to 23 answer any inquiry of the peace officer. 24
27 11 Although Pangelinan could not recall whether the officers handcuffed the Defendant before notifying the other officers of the suspected methamphetamine in the vehicle, he "highly doubted that she was in cuffs prior to him 28 informing the officers." Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:08:54 - 10:02PM (Dec. 12, 2024). In response, the officers proceeded with Miranda rights and questioning and eventually making an arrest. Id.
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vorgas, CF0727-24 Page 10 of 19 When analyzing the legality of seizures, such as detentions under Guam's Stop and Frisk
2 Act, the court utilizes the same standard of reasonable suspicion articulated in the United States
3 Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio. See People v. Taman, 2013 Guam 22, 21. In Terry, the Court 4 found that "reasonable suspicion" existed: 5 [W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 6 conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 7 the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 8 makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety .... 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30 (1968). To determine whether such reasonable suspicion exists, IO
II courts review the contents and reliability of the information in the police's possession, through
12 the perspective of"an objectively reasonable police officer." Yerten, 2021 Guam 8, 17 (internal 13 citations omitted). 14 When Sumagaysay handcuffed the Defendant at or around 2:50 a.m., the information he 15
16 possessed included a suspicious-looking female, rummaging through a messy car in the early
17 morning hours at Guma Trankilidat. He also recalled a reported burglary at Guma Trankilidat the 18 week before the Defendant's arrest. In addition, the Defendant informed Sumagaysay of two 19 different names and that she lived in Maite. 20 During the Suppression Hearing, neither Sumagaysay nor Pangelinan indicated that the 21
22 Defendant put them in fear for their individual safety or that of their fellow officers. For instance,
23 neither officer testified in court or stated in their police reports that the Defendant had a weapon 24 or suspected that she was armed and presently dangerous. 25 After handcuffing her, the Defendant gave him the name "Linda Vargas" as another form 26 of identification. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:28:00 - 28:28PM (Dec. 12, 2024). But he 27
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page II ofl9 confirmed that her real identity was "Sunni Vargas." Id. Ascertaining Defendant Vargas' identity
2 is a sufficient purpose for detaining her under 8 GCA § 30.20.
3 In regards to Sumagaysay's reasonable suspicion that the Defendant committed or was 4 committing a crime, he testified that he handcuffed the Defendant based on her refusal to stop, 5 inability to identify the vehicle's owner, and possible break-in of a messy vehicle. See 6 Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:27:39 - 27:53PM (Dec. 12, 2024). The court is concerned with 7
8 Sumagaysay's initial purpose for her detention made on the record: her refusal to stop.
9 Throughout the Suppression Hearing, Sumagaysay either testified or agreed with counsel several 10 times that he handcuffed her, because she would not stop. For instance, when the People asked II when he placed the Defendant in handcuffs, Sumagaysay replied that it was "after she kept 12
13 refusing to stop." Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:26:45 - 26:S0PM (Dec. 12, 2024). When
14 explaining his reasons for handcuffing her, Sumagaysay testified as to three reasons: "she refused 15 to stop;" the officers' inability to identify the owner of the vehicle; and to determine whether she 16 was breaking into the vehicle. Id. at 3:27:39 - 27:53PM. When cross-examined, Sumagaysay 17 testified again that he handcuffed her because she would not stop: 18
19 GAYLE: Because he kept instructing her to stop, as she was heading towards K building ... that she never stopped, then you put her hands in handcuffs. Is that 20 correct? 21 OFFICER SUMAGAYSAY: Yes ma'am. 22 GAYLE: At the moment you put the handcuffs on her, was she under arrest? 23 OFFICER SUMAGAYSAY: Yes ma'am. 24
25 GAYLE: Okay, and what was the charge?
26 OFFICER SUMAGAYSAY: Uh, Possession. 27 GAYLE: That's not what you said. You said 'she wouldn't stop.' Then, you put the 28 handcuffs on her. Is that what you testified to?
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 12 of 19 OFFICER SUMAGAYSAY: I did. 2 Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:52:20 - 53:1 lPM. Without more information regarding the crime 3 that he believed she was committing or already committed, he should not have detained her 4
5 merely for her refusal to stop and answer his questions. Although Sumagaysay said that they
6 could not identify the vehicle's owner, his testimony did not prove that the Defendant was unable 7 to identify the owner. She simply ignored the same questions about the vehicle's owner after 8 previously indicating that "Dan" owned the vehicle she was found in. 12 Magistrate's Compl. (Oct. 9
IO 21, 2024).
II Sumagaysay testified that the officers "were not finished investigating why she was in the
12 car parked in a handicapped stall." Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:50:00 - 50:47PM. Based on the 13 Defendant's occupancy within the messy vehicle, and her lack of physical identification at the 14 time, he testified that he "could've made an investigation for burglary." Id. When asked about the 15
16 results of this investigation, Sumagaysay could not recall information regarding this messy
17 vehicle, even with his police report to refresh his recollection. For instance, he could not recall: 18 the vehicle's registered owner after calling in the license plate; checking the physical copy of the 19 registration in the vehicle; or whether the car had a handicapped-accessible parking stall placard. 20 See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3:43:02- 50:47PM. 21
22 When looking at the contents and reliability of this information, it is still unclear what
23 crime Sumagaysay believed he had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant for. Although 24 Sumagaysay stated that he "could've made an investigation for burglary," it is unclear whether 25 he actually conducted an investigation into the Defendant's commission of a burglary when 26
28 12 The driver is not required to answer such questions, see Royer, 460U.S. at 497-98, 103 S.Ct. at 1324, just as surely
he is not required to submit to a request to search. See People v. Chargualaf 2001 Guam 11] 24 n.3.
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 13 of 19 Substance. Id. at 3:52:20 - 53:llPM. However, Pangelinan did not inform him about the
2 suspected methamphetamine pipe and resealable baggie until after she was cuffed.
3 After reviewing all this information through a reasonably objective police officer's 4 perspective, it is not likely that Officer Sumagaysay had enough reasonable suspicion that the 5 Defendant committed, was committing, or was about to commit a burglary or theft. Because 6 Officer Sumagaysay did not have enough reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant for 7
8 burglary, her detention was therefore unlawful.
9 C. Guam Police Department Officers conducted an unlawful, warrantless search 10 of the vehicle.
II Before ruling on the suppression of evidence in this case, the court must look at whether 12 Officer Pangelinan unlawfully seized the evidence found in the vehicle. Although Pangelinan did 13 not have a warrant to search the vehicle, he testified that he observed, through the open driver's 14 window, a pipe with a bulbous end in plain view inside the "car's center console compartment, 15
16 which was open." Id. at 4:01:50 - 07:07PM; 4:20:10 - 21:23PM (emphasis added). After
17 removing the pipe, he also found a resealable baggie containing a crystalline substance in that 18 same compartment. Id. 19 To apply the Plain View Doctrine as an exception to a warrantless search, all three of the 20 following elements must be satisfied: "(l) the officer must 'arriv[ e] at the place from which the 21
22 evidence could be plainly viewed' without violating the Fourth Amendment, (2) the evidence
23 must be in 'plain view' and its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent, and 24 (3) the officer 'must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself."' People v. Camacho, 25 2004 Guam 6 ,r 20 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-67, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308). 26 Although it is the People's burden to prove that the warrantless search was lawful, the 27
28 court denied the People's request to submit arguments on the Motion to Suppress pursuant to its
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas. CF0727-24 Page 14 of 19 (3) the officer 'must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself."' People v. Camacho,
2 2004 Guam 6 ,r 20 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-67, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308).
3 Although it is the People's burden to prove that the warrantless search was lawful, the 4 court denied the People's request to submit arguments on the Motion to Suppress pursuant to its 5 ruling during the Suppression Hearing. However, the court still has an obligation to analyze the 6 merits of whether this evidence, seeking to be suppressed, was lawfully obtained. See Quitugua, 7
8 2004 Guam 19 ,r,r 27-28.
9 As to the first element, Pangelinan got out of the patrol car and stood outside of the vehicle 10 in question, which was parked in Guma Trankilidat's parking lot. However, the Defendant had 11 already shut the driver's side door and left the vehicle, with the other two officers following her. 12
13 Prior to finding the evidence, Pangelinan testified that he had no role in this investigation;
14 Sumagaysay was the lead officer in this incident and Togawa acted as Sumagaysay's backup. See 15 Suppression H'rg Mins at. 4: 18:40 - 19:39PM (Dec. 12, 2024). During his testimony, Pangelinan 16 did not explain why he looked into the vehicle after the Defendant already walked some distance 17 away from it. Without more information as to why he found himself standing next to the vehicle 18
19 in question, there would have been no lawful reason for Pangelinan to look into the vehicle with
20 his flashlight and retrieve the suspected pipe and methamphetamine. Because he was not in a 21 place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed without violating the Fourth Amendment, 22 the first element is not met. 23 As to the second element, Pangelinan testified that he saw the pipe with a bulbous end 24
25 from the vehicle's open center console compartment as he shined his light inside the
26 compartment. See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:22:44 - 24:30PM (Dec. 12, 2024). Although he 27 testified that the driver's side window was down, it is not likely that the evidence was immediately 28
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 15 of 19 apparent if Pangelinan only viewed the suspected pipe and baggie while shining his flashlight
2 into the vehicle; in the parking lot with "lights illuminating the area." Id at 4:19:40 - 20:08PM.
3 Therefore, second element is not met. 4 As to the third element, Pangelinan found evidence of illegal contraband for suspected 5 methamphetamine-use in the vehicle. But because the court found above that he was not in a place 6
7 where the illegal contraband could be plainly viewed without violating the Fourth Amendment,
8 and such contraband was not immediately apparent, Pangelinan had no lawful right to access the
9 illegal contraband. Therefore, the third element is not met. 10 Because all three elements were not met, the court finds that the evidence was not found 11 in the GPD Officer's plain view. Therefore, the search of the vehicle was unlawful. 12
13 D. Guam Police Department Officers conducted an unlawful arrest of Defendant Vargas. 14 The next issue is whether GPD conducted a lawful arrest of the Defendant while detaining 15
16 her without sufficient reasonable suspicion that she committed a burglary. "If at any time after
17 the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.10, probable cause for arrest of the person shall 18 appear, the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. As mentioned above, the court found that 19 the Defendant's detention was unlawful without reasonable suspicion that she committed a crime; 20 meaning that this detention was not authorized by 8 GCA § 30.10. 21
22 During the Suppression Hearing, neither officer clearly testified as to the specific crime
23 Sumagaysay arrested the Defendant for. Based on Pangelinan's testimony, Sumagaysay arrested 24 the Defendant after Pangelinan informed the other two officers about the evidence he found: a 25 glass pipe with a bulbous end containing residue; and a clear, resealable baggie containing a 26
27 crystalline substance. As the arresting officer, Sumagaysay stated that he arrested her because she
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 16ofl9 would not stop. At another point, he testified that he arrested her for Possession before conceding
2 to his previous testimony that he arrested her because "she wouldn't stop." 13
3 Because the court found that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the 4 Defendant for the crime of burglary, it would have been unlawful to arrest her for burglary, absent 5 probable cause. Although Pangelinan discovered evidence of suspected methamphetamine-use in 6 the vehicle, the court also found above that he obtained the evidence unlawfully. So, an arrest for 7
8 Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance would also have been unlawful. In either event
9 and without more information, the court finds that the arrest of the Defendant was therefore IO unlawful. II E. The evidence found from the unlawful search must be suppressed as Fruit of 12 the Poisonous Tree. 13 The last issue is whether the evidence derived from the unlawful, warrantless search of 14 the vehicle in question must be suppressed under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine. See 15
16 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In this case, the Defendant seeks to suppress
17 anything found "after the initial illegal stop." Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:35 :38 - 35 :53PM (Dec. 18 12, 2024). 19 Evidence may be suppressed under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine once the court 20 determines "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of[the initial] illegality 21
22 or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." People v.
23 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ,r 4 (internal citations omitted). In this case, the court must determine 24 whether Officer Pangelinan exploited the Defendant's unlawful detention to come by the bulbous 25 pipe and resealable baggie of suspected methamphetamine in the vehicle. 26
28 13 See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 3 :52:20 - 53: 11 PM.
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 17ofl9 Here, Officer Pangelinan was not involved in the Defendant's detention or any interaction
2 with her. Based on his testimony, Pangelinan approached the vehicle after the Defendant exited
3 and was walking towards the overhang/laundry area with Sumagaysay and Togawa following her. 4 See Suppression H'rg Mins. at 4:18:40 - 19:39PM (Dec. 12, 2024). As mentioned earlier, 5 Pangelinan did not explain why he looked into the vehicle only after the Defendant already 6
7 walked some distance away from it. Without additional information to prove otherwise, it is not
8 likely that Officer Pangelinan would have looked into the vehicle and found the challenged
9 evidence if the Defendant and the two other GPD officers remained at the vehicle. Therefore, the 10 challenged evidence - the bulbous pipe and resealable baggie of suspected methamphetamine - 11 are fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed from trial. 12
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Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page 18 of 19 CONCLUSION
2 For the reasons set forth above, the court holds the following:
3 1. That Defendant Vargas' seizure did not result in a violation of 8 GCA § 30.30; 4 2. That Defendant Vargas' detention was unlawful for lack of reasonable suspicion that 5 the Defendant was committing or committed a crime; 6
7 3. That Defendant Vargas' arrest was unlawful for lack of probable cause that the
8 Defendant was committing or committed a crime;
9 4. That the warrantless search of the vehicle, which Defendant Vargas was found in, was 10 unlawful; and 11 5. That the evidence seized in this matter must be suppressed as Fruit of the Poisonous 12
13 Tree.
15 Therefore, the court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The court 16 hereby ORDERS that the evidence of the bulbous pipe and resealable baggie of suspected 17 methamphetamine shall be SUPPRESSED from trial. 18
21 SO ORDERED this MAR 12 2025 ----------- 22
25 SERVICE VIA E-MAIL 26 I acknowlegde that an electronic HONORABLE AiBE;&TO, . , ---::.:,,. E. TOLENTINO ,_' / copy of the original was emailed to: Af'.!#; A-PD Judge, Superior Ccii11fofJ;Jam . ,.,.,- . 27
Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress People v. Vargas, CF0727-24 Page19of19