People v. Vargas

2019 IL App (1st) 172420-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 14, 2019
• Docket: 1-17-2420
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2019 IL App (1st) 172420-U No. 1-17-2420 Order filed November 14, 2019 Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 MC3 001865 ) SERGIO ORTIZ VARGAS, ) Honorable ) Steven Goebel, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for criminal damage to property affirmed over his contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the damage to his apartment.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Sergio Ortiz Vargas was found guilty of criminal

damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), and sentenced to one year of

conditional discharge. On appeal, defendant contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt because there was “no evidence” that he caused the damage to his apartment, No. 1-17-2420

and, even assuming that he caused the damage, there was no evidence that he caused it

knowingly. We affirm.

¶3 Matt Orlando testified that he worked in maintenance for the Rand Grove Village

apartment complex in Palatine. On June 12, 2017, after being notified of a “disturbance,”

Orlando went to a building and saw objects, including a closet door and some “plastic parts,”

coming out of a third-floor window. Defendant was inside the apartment. When defendant came

outside, Orlando did not speak to him because the police had already been called. Orlando saw a

closet door, pieces of plastic, and a broken television, computer, and lamp on the ground.

¶4 During cross-examination, Orlando testified that he did not see defendant damage the

apartment, but saw defendant’s face at the window as items came out. Orlando did not see a light

fixture fall out of the window. When defendant came outside, he began to pick items up and put

them in a dumpster. Defendant had previously told Orlando that someone had entered the

apartment and damaged his possessions. Orlando did not specify when this conversation took

place, but only that it occurred prior to June 12, 2017. When Orlando was escorted inside the

apartment by the police, he did not see damage around the door frame. Defense counsel

published a photograph of the apartment and Orlando agreed that it depicted damage to the door

frame, but stated that he did not notice the damage until defense counsel pointed it out. 1 Orlando

did not know how the damage was caused, but thought it looked like the paint was peeled away

from the doorjamb.

¶5 Susan Nichols, the apartment complex property manager, testified that she received a call

about items being thrown from a window, and went to the building with Orlando. There, she saw

1 This photograph, defendant’s exhibit No. 1, is not included in the record on appeal.

-2- No. 1-17-2420

defendant throwing plastic, wood, and “all kinds of stuff” out of a window. Nichols did not see

anything on the ground when she came to work that morning. She told Orlando to call the police

and asked defendant what he was doing. Defendant did not answer and continued to throw things

out of the window. Defendant then came downstairs and began picking items up and throwing

them away. When the police arrived, defendant said that he did not want to talk to them.

¶6 Nichols identified photographs of defendant’s apartment, including one that showed a

closet where the door was “off” and lying against a shelf inside the closet. Other photographs

showed plaster pulled off a wall in the dining room, and the ceiling fan and the blinds from the

living room windows lying down. She next identified a photograph of “what’s left of” the dining

room fan, which had been “pulled *** right out,” with wires hanging from the ceiling and the

blades and light bulbs missing. The photographs were entered into evidence, and copies are

included in the record on appeal. Nichols added that only defendant and his dog lived in the

apartment, and she never gave defendant permission to damage anything in the apartment.

¶7 During cross-examination, Nichols testified that she had “hear[d]” through “police

reports and such” that the apartment complex previously had trouble with break-ins. Nichols and

Orlando stood “away” from the building so that they would not be hit by anything being thrown

out of the window. When defense counsel asked her whether a photograph of the apartment door

showed damage, she replied that it looked like paint was peeling and that many apartments in the

complex were “like that.” Nichols did not know when the peeling occurred, and did not see

anyone damage the drywall, fixtures, or closet in the apartment.

¶8 During redirect, the State asked Nichols whether there was damage to the apartment

before defendant lived there. She answered no, and stated that “[t]hey do not turn units over like

-3- No. 1-17-2420

that.” The defense objected and the court overruled the objection. Nichols testified she was

referring to the property managers and maintenance staff, who put the apartments in “clean

condition” by ensuring the carpets were shampooed or replaced, the walls were repaired and

painted, and everything was in working order. The defense again objected to the “hypothetical”

questions, and the court overruled the objection. Nichols further testified that if a maintenance

call was made, routine maintenance was performed. When the State asked Nichols whether the

damage to the apartment was present before defendant moved in, she replied that she was not the

property manager before defendant moved in and she therefore could not identify who would

have examined the apartment and performed the maintenance.

¶9 During recross-examination, Nichols acknowledged that she did not personally know the

condition of the apartment when it was rented to defendant, and that “offhand,” she did not know

when maintenance was last called to the apartment. She was aware that in December 2016, the

owners walked through every unit and decided what would be renovated.

¶ 10 After the State rested, the defense rested and the court admitted the defense’s exhibits

over the State’s objection.

¶ 11 In finding defendant guilty of criminal damage to property, the trial court found that he

was identified by two witnesses as the person throwing items out of a window and that

photographs revealed “extensive damage” to the apartment, including “hacked up drywall” with

at least five holes and a light fixture “pretty much ripped out from the ceiling.” The court further

noted that the apartment was relatively bare with little furniture, and there was “no reason this

defendant should be throwing [out] items, especially items that are part of the apartment itself,”

including the ceiling fan, drywall, and the closet door. As there was “no reasonable explanation”

-4- No. 1-17-2420

for defendant’s actions, the court concluded, based upon the circumstantial evidence, that the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the person who damaged the

apartment.

¶ 12 In denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the court further stated that the direct and

circumstantial evidence in this case was “overwhelming,” and noted that defendant threw “parts

of the apartment,” including drywall and plastic parts, out of the window and the apartment was

“trashed.” The court found that it defied logic and common sense that someone would throw

things out of a window rather than going to the building’s management and reporting that

someone damaged the apartment. Following a hearing, defendant was sentenced to one year of

conditional discharge.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

because no evidence established that he damaged the apartment and there was evidence that

someone had broken in. Defendant further argues that even if the State showed that he caused the

damage, no evidence proved that he caused the damage knowingly.

¶ 14 When a defendant challenges his conviction based upon the sufficiency of the evidence

presented against him, we must ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. All reasonable

inferences from the record must be allowed in favor of the State. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL

113510, ¶ 42. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to

weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.

A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving

-5- No. 1-17-2420

the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A defendant’s conviction will

not be overturned unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there

remains a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Id.

¶ 15 A person commits criminal damage to property when he “knowingly damages any

property of another.” 720 ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1) (West 2016). An individual acts knowingly when he

is consciously aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result. 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b)

(West 2016); see also People v. Hauschild, 364 Ill. App. 3d 202, 219 (2006), aff’d in part and

rev’d in part, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007) (a person acts with knowledge of the result of his or her

conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that a result

is practically certain to be caused by his conduct).

¶ 16 Here, defendant does not dispute that damage was done to the apartment; rather, he

argues that the State failed to prove that he was the person responsible for the damage. He argues

that the facts that no one saw him damage the apartment and that the apartment was broken into

were fatal to the State’s case.

¶ 17 However, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the evidence

satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. People v. Hall,

194 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2000). The trier of fact does not need to be satisfied beyond a reasonable

doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances, but rather it is sufficient when all of the

evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt. Id.

¶ 18 The evidence at trial established, through the testimony of Orlando and Nichols, that

defendant threw items including a closet door and pieces of plastic out of his apartment window.

-6- No. 1-17-2420

Moreover, through Nichols’ testimony and certain photographs, the evidence established that a

door had been removed from one of the closets, a ceiling fan and window blinds were lying

down, the dining room fan had been “pulled *** right out” of the ceiling, and there were holes in

the drywall. Although Nichols acknowledged she was not the property manager when defendant

moved into the apartment, she testified that generally apartments were not turned over to tenants

in that condition. Rather, a unit was in “clean condition” when it was rented, and no evidence

suggested that defendant’s apartment had not been rented in a clean condition. Taking all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, there was sufficient evidence from

which a rational trier of fact could have determined that defendant, the only occupant of an

apartment, knowingly damaged the apartment’s walls and fixtures. Brown, 2013 IL 114196,

¶ 48.

¶ 19 Although defendant is correct that no witness testified to seeing him damage his

apartment, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction so long as it satisfies the

fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at

330. Here, defendant was not only present at the scene, but was throwing apartment fixtures out

of a third-story window. Defendant is also correct that Orlando testified that some time before

June 12, 2017, defendant had stated that someone entered the apartment and damaged his

possessions. Notably, Orlando did not testify that defendant claimed that whoever entered the

apartment also caused damage to the unit itself, including the closet door, drywall, fan, and

blinds. It was for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence presented at trial. Brown, 2013 IL

114196, ¶ 48. Here, as evidenced by its guilty finding, the trial court did not afford Orlando’s

testimony the weight that defendant believes it should have been given. Defendant also argues

-7- No. 1-17-2420

that the State failed to establish that the door he was seen picking up from the ground was part of

the apartment. However, in weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard

inferences flowing naturally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible

explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to the level of reasonable doubt. In re

Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60.

¶ 20 In the alternative, defendant contends that even assuming that he caused the damage to

the apartment, the State failed to establish that he did so knowingly. In other words, there was no

evidence that defendant was “consciously aware” that damage to his apartment was “practically

certain to occur.” See Hauschild, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 219-20 (when the defendant discharged

multiple gunshots in a “pitch black” room occupied moments earlier by a dog, the trier of fact

could conclude that the defendant knew his act was “practically certain” to injure the animal so

as to support conviction for criminal damage to property). Defendant argues that “things break

within a home inadvertently or due to negligent behavior.” While defendant may be correct that

homes suffer routine wear-and-tear, the evidence at trial established that doors were removed

from a closet, holes were made in the drywall, parts of a ceiling fan and window blinds were on

the ground, and another ceiling fan was “pulled” from the ceiling, leaving wires exposed. A

rational trier of fact could infer, based upon the evidence presented at trial, that defendant

knowingly caused damage to the apartment.

¶ 21 Ultimately, defendant’s arguments on appeal offer an explanation for the damage to the

apartment, i.e., that it was broken into and ransacked and that he was merely trying to clean up

by throwing the detritus out of the window, which the trial court rejected. We decline

defendant’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. See People v. Abdullah, 220 Ill. App. 3d 687, 693

-8- No. 1-17-2420

(1991) (“A reviewing court has neither the duty nor the privilege to substitute its judgment for

that of the trier of fact.”). A defendant’s conviction will be overturned only if the evidence is so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of his guilt

(Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48); this is not one of those cases. We therefore affirm defendant’s

conviction.

¶ 22 For the forgoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

-9-