Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Vanhorn CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
THE PEOPLE, C102356 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21CF05832)
v.
THOMAS BRIAN VANHORN, Defendant and Appellant.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Thomas Brian Vanhorn was found guilty by a jury of multiple drug and firearm counts. On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of the motion to suppress. He contends that the trial court erred in finding he voluntarily consented to law enforcement retrieving his identification from his car, which led to the discovery of methamphetamine inside. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and agree with its legal conclusion that defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable search because he consented to the officers retrieving the identification. We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In July 2021, Chico Police Lieutenant Terry Tupper responded to a radio call about a car that had become stuck on a median in Butte County. When Lieutenant Tupper arrived at the scene, defendant and another officer were discussing how the accident happened. Defendant provided his name, and the other officer asked him for
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identification. Defendant responded that he did not have his identification on him but believed it was in the car. Lieutenant Tupper then asked where the identification was in the car and walked around the back of the car toward the passenger side because the driver’s side was inaccessible. Defendant stated that his wallet was on one of the front seats. When Lieutenant Tupper reached the passenger’s side of the car, he asked defendant, “Which seat was it?” Defendant described the seat and said, “something to the effect I can grab that for you.” However, the officer would not allow defendant to get the wallet due to officer safety concerns. Lieutenant Tupper assumed defendant was giving him permission to retrieve his wallet by telling him where it was in the car.
Because the car was tilted up on the median, Lieutenant Tupper had to stand up on the curb to look inside. He shined his flashlight into the car and “immediately saw a large bag of quite a bit of what appeared to be methamphetamine crystal, white-ish kind of clear-ish crystalline substance” on the floor of the driver’s side of the car. Lieutenant Tupper then closed the door and radioed another officer to have him detain defendant because he saw something in the car.
Defendant was arrested after the discovery of the methamphetamine and handcuffed for officer safety reasons because he was agitated. Another officer opened the door of the car to retrieve the methamphetamine and saw a firearm in the pocket of the driver’s side door and a .40 caliber bullet on the front passenger floorboard. Officers subsequently found a small digital scale and vials of clear liquid in a backpack believed to belong to defendant. Ultimately, officers recovered 1.72 ounces of methamphetamine.
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The People charged defendant with possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1); possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 2); selling, offering to sell, or transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 3); being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4); and unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 5).
Defendant moved to suppress his statements and all evidence obtained during the encounter arguing, among other things, that he had been unlawfully detained. Defendant further argued (1) the drugs were not in plain view and the officers could not see them until Lieutenant Tupper opened the car door; (2) the officers did not ask for consent to open defendant’s car door; (3) the officers could have identified defendant without seeing his identification; and (4) the identification was never found and defendant had not been suspected of committing a crime before the search of the car. In addition, defendant noted he never gave the officer explicit permission to open the car door, and when he informed the officer that he could retrieve the wallet, the officer declined to allow him to do so. Defendant argued that by ignoring his request to retrieve the wallet himself, the officer led him to believe the officer was going to enter his car regardless, and he therefore never implicitly consented to the search.
After discussing applicable authorities on warrantless searches and implied consent, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the following facts:
“One, at approximately 10:30 p.m., defendant was involved in a single vehicle collision into a shopping center driveway median causing…defendant’s vehicle’s driver’s side to be dipped down into an unfilled planter area of the median. Two, defendant was speaking with Sergeant Bower when Lieutenant Tupper arrived as support. Three,
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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defendant was shirtless, … very aggravated, agitated, and demonstrative. Four, the defendant was not handcuffed. Five, the defendant stated he was not injured or in need of medical treatment. Six, … [d]efendant was asked for his identification. Defendant said he didn’t have I.D. on him, but believed it was in the car. Lieutenant Tupper then asked where [it was] in the car … and the defendant described [his] identification’s location on one of the front seats. This discussion occurred while Lieutenant Tupper was walking from the driver’s side around the backside of the vehicle towards the passenger side. On the passenger side, Lieutenant Tupper asked for clarification, which seat is it. The defendant described the location. The defendant said also something to the effect of I can grab it for you. Seven, Lieutenant Tupper never asked the defendant specifically may I go grab your identification. Eight, the defendant never objected to Lieutenant Tupper obtaining the identification from the vehicle. Nine, Lieutenant Tupper, with almost 18 years of law enforcement experience, interpreted the defendant’s description on two occasions of where the identification was located as implied consent. Lieutenant Tupper did not accept the defendant’s offer to retrieve the identification himself due to officer safety concerns, based upon the defendant’s very agitated state and police policy. Ten, Lieutenant Tupper opened the passenger door without breaking the plane of the car with his body or flashlight for the purpose of obtaining the defendant’s identification, and from that location observed a large bag of what appeared to be methamphetamine on the driver’s side floorboard. Lieutenant Tupper communicated the observation by radio to the other officers.
“In this Court’s determination, the facts present a very close call regarding implied consent. But ultimately the Court is persuaded the People have satisfied their burden by preponderance of the evidence that the voluntariness of the defendant’s implied consent has been shown. Here the defendant was not handcuffed. Defendant provided Lieutenant Tupper with the location of his identification in the car on two separate occasions. Simultaneously to these statements by the defendant, the lieutenant was
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moving in the direction of the passenger door, which was the only way to access the front seat. By doing so, he communicated to the defendant [his] intention to follow the defendant’s directions as to the location of the identification. Lieutenant Tupper reasonably rejected the defendant’s offer to obtain the identification for officer safety reasons in light of the circumstances, including the time of night, the response to a single vehicle collision, the position of the vehicle, which made access limited, and the defendant’s agitated state. Thus, the opening of the passenger side door authorized by a theory of implied consent provided Lieutenant Tupper with a lawful vantage point from which the observation of the large bag of what appeared to be methamphetamine. The search and seizure of the bag of methamphetamine was justified by the plain view doctrine. Defendant was then arrested. Incident to this arrest, and having heard Lieutenant Tupper’s transmission that there was controlled substances in the vehicle, Officer Jukestock had probable cause to enter the vehicle [and] seize the bag of methamphetamine. When the car door was opened, he observed the firearm in the driver’s side inside door pocket, and the .40 caliber bullet on the front passenger floor. The backpack in the defendant’s possession was searched incident to an arrest as well. The inevitable inventory search prior to towing does provide an alternative exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”
The jury later found defendant guilty of all counts. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five years four months in state prison.2 Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding he voluntarily consented to the officers retrieving his identification from his car, including its implied finding that
2 This sentence includes an eight-month consecutive term in Butte County Superior Court case No. 24CF02500, a case not at issue in this appeal.
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defendant was not illegally detained, and therefore the evidence obtained during and after their search of the car must be suppressed.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend.) “[A] warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the People prove that the search comes within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” (People v. Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 604, 609-610.) One such recognized exception is a search conducted pursuant to a subject’s consent.3 (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) But consent must be voluntary, not submission to an assertion of authority. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341.) Consent that is the product of an illegal detention is not voluntary. (Ibid.) The People have the burden to prove consent was given freely and voluntarily, under the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at pp. 341, 346; see also People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152 [preponderance of evidence applies to prosecution’s burden in opposing suppression motion].) “[C]onsent to enter and search may be express or implied, and may be demonstrated by conduct as well as words.” (People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1012.)
Our review of the trial court’s finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search is limited. “ ‘The … voluntariness of the consent is to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact; and in that stage of the process, “The power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court’s findings–whether express or implied–must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 758; see People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) We consider the
3 The People do not contend there was probable cause for an arrest or search before the officers discovered the methamphetamine on the floor of defendant’s car.
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evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s suppression motion ruling. (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 673-674.)
Defendant first contends that he was illegally detained by the officers and thus he could not have voluntarily consented. Defendant argues the officers detained him by, among other things, insisting that he produce identification and refusing to allow him to retrieve it himself, after he had already provided his name. The People claim the issue is forfeited by defendant’s failure to specifically argue in the trial court that he was detained. We note that defendant did argue in his moving papers that he was detained. But even assuming defendant did not properly argue to the trial court he was detained, we will address the claim here. It is well established that “an appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching questions that have not been preserved for review by a party.” 4 (People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1215.)
“A detention occurs when an officer intentionally applies physical restraint or initiates a show of authority to which an objectively reasonable person innocent of wrongdoing would feel compelled to submit, and to which such a person in fact submits.” (People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 57.) “Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) “The test for the existence of a show of authority is an objective one and thus, ‘[n]either the officer’s uncommunicated state of mind nor the subjective belief of the individual citizen is relevant to the determination of whether a police contact is a detention.’ ” (Linn, at p. 58.) Questions of a “sufficiently accusatory nature” may “ ‘be cause to view an encounter as a nonconsensual detention.’ ”
4 Because we address defendant’s claim that he was detained, we do not address his alternative argument that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve this issue.
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(Ibid.) “[T]here is ‘no “bright-line” distinction between a consensual encounter and a detention …. “The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 59.)
Although the trial court did not explicitly find that defendant was not detained, it impliedly found that he was not when it found defendant implicitly consented to the search. (See People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 341.) Substantial evidence supports that implied finding. Defendant had not been pulled over by law enforcement, and there were only two officers on the scene before the search of defendant’s car. There is no evidence that the officers displayed weapons, used any physical force, placed him under arrest, or used any language or tone “indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (See In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) While they did request defendant’s identification twice and declined his offer to retrieve the identification, it appears their questioning was neutral, not accusatory.
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s explicit finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the officers retrieving his identification from his car. As we have already discussed, defendant was not detained at the time of the search. He then volunteered that his identification was in his car on the seat, did not object to Lieutenant Tupper looking for the identification, and was engaged in an ongoing conversation with that officer about the location of the identification. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that defendant impliedly consented, through his conduct and words, to the officers retrieving his identification from his car. (See People v. Superior Court (Chapman), supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at
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p. 1012.) Once defendant consented, officers lawfully discovered the methamphetamine in the vehicle and arrested him.5 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\ KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\ EARL, P. J.
\s\ HULL, J.
5 Defendant does not separately challenge the searches that led to the discovery of the firearm, ammunition, and other evidence after the initial discovery of the methamphetamine in the car.