2020 IL App (1st) 190005-U
FIFTH DIVISION November 25, 2020
No. 1-19-0005
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 15 CR 15359 ) ) ) ISIDRIO VALVERDE, ) ) Honorable Carol M. Howard Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Cunningham concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s facial constitutional challenge to the Sex Offender Registration Act and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law. Appeal dismissed.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Isidrio Valverde was convicted of criminal sexual
assault on October 26, 2018, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant
contends that various provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1
et seq. (West 2018)) and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (the Notification Law) No. 1-19-0005
(730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2018)) are facially unconstitutional because they violate (1) his
substantive due process rights, or in the alternative, (2) his procedural due process rights. We
dismiss the appeal.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant challenges neither the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction nor
his sentence. Accordingly, we will omit an extensive recitation of the evidence at trial. The State
charged defendant by indictment with, inter alia, three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault
and two counts aggravated battery on a public way in connection with the assault on the victim,
K.G. 1 Defendant waived a jury trial and elected to proceed with a bench trial. After the
presentation of the evidence and closing arguments, the circuit court found defendant guilty of one
count of the lesser-included offenses of criminal sexual assault and two counts of misdemeanor
battery.
¶5 The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of six years’ imprisonment for the criminal
sexual assault conviction and 364 days of jail for the battery convictions. In response to the State’s
comment, the court informed defendant that, upon his release from prison, he would have to register
“with the police authority in the jurisdiction to which you move within three days of being
released.” This appeal follows.
¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 On appeal, defendant contends that the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act
(SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law
1 We note that, in one instance in his brief, defendant reveals K.G.’s full name. While not explicitly prohibited, this has long been disapproved of, and we have consistently admonished parties to avoid this practice. See, e.g., People v. Leggans, 253 Ill. App. 3d 724, 727 (1993). Although this isolated instance appears to have been inadvertent, we nonetheless encourage parties to carefully review their documents for compliance before filing them in this court. 2 No. 1-19-0005
(the Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2018)) are facially unconstitutional for
violating either his right to substantive due process, or in the alternative, procedural due process.
The State responds that, pursuant to the holding in People v. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, we must
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Defendant acknowledges the holding in Bingham but
argues that it is either factually distinguishable or wrongly decided.
¶8 In Bingham, the defendant had a conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault that
predated SORA. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant was, however, convicted of felony theft in 2014 and thus
required to register as a sex offender due to his prior attempted criminal sexual assault conviction.
Id. Notably, the court stated, “Sex offender registration is a matter controlled by statute and was
not a requirement imposed by the trial court in this case, and it is thus not reflected in the trial
court’s judgment.” Id.
¶9 The Bingham court explained that, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff.
Jan. 1, 1967), the scope of appellate review derives from the circuit court’s judgment and any
proceedings and orders related thereto. Id. ¶ 16. Rule 615(b) permits a reviewing court to “(1)
reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; (2) set aside,
affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or
order from which the appeal is taken; (3) reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant
was convicted; (4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or (5) order a new trial.”
(Emphases added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).
¶ 10 Although the appellate court had examined (and then rejected) the defendant’s as-applied
challenge to the sex offender registration scheme, the supreme court held that the appellate court
had not been called on to exercise its delineated powers regarding the defendant’s constitutional
claims. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 17. The supreme court held that “a reviewing court has no
3 No. 1-19-0005
power on direct appeal of a criminal conviction to order that defendant be relieved of the obligation
to register as a sex offender when there is neither an obligation to register imposed by the trial
court nor an order or conviction that the defendant is appealing that is directly related to the
obligation or the failure to register.” Id. ¶ 18. The Bingham court then vacated the portion of the
appellate court’s judgment that addressed defendant’s constitutional claims on the merits and
dismissed defendant’s appeal. Id. ¶ 25.
¶ 11 The situation presented here is nearly identical to that in Bingham. The central holding in
Bingham was that this court’s power of review under rule 615 extends only to an order that either
obligates defendant to register under SORA or is related to the reasons for conviction or sentence.
There is, however, no order or conviction related to defendant’s failure to register here, and
defendant’s conviction and sentence relate to his assault on K.G. and not the failure to register.
Defendant’s obligation to register will arise upon his release from imprisonment by operation of
law. See 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(4) (West 2018). This case thus falls squarely under the holding in
Bingham, and we must dismiss defendant’s appeal.
¶ 12 Nonetheless, defendant argues that we need not follow Bingham because it is factually
distinguishable. Namely, defendant notes that Bingham involved an as-applied challenge
necessitating a developed record (unlike the facial challenge here). Defendant further points out
that, unlike in Bingham, the registration requirement applies directly because of his criminal
conviction and the circuit court “expressly ordered” defendant to register. We disagree.
¶ 13 First, we reject defendant’s claim that Bingham only applies to as-applied challenges.
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2020 IL App (1st) 190005-U
FIFTH DIVISION November 25, 2020
No. 1-19-0005
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 15 CR 15359 ) ) ) ISIDRIO VALVERDE, ) ) Honorable Carol M. Howard Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Cunningham concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s facial constitutional challenge to the Sex Offender Registration Act and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law. Appeal dismissed.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Isidrio Valverde was convicted of criminal sexual
assault on October 26, 2018, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant
contends that various provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1
et seq. (West 2018)) and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (the Notification Law) No. 1-19-0005
(730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2018)) are facially unconstitutional because they violate (1) his
substantive due process rights, or in the alternative, (2) his procedural due process rights. We
dismiss the appeal.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant challenges neither the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction nor
his sentence. Accordingly, we will omit an extensive recitation of the evidence at trial. The State
charged defendant by indictment with, inter alia, three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault
and two counts aggravated battery on a public way in connection with the assault on the victim,
K.G. 1 Defendant waived a jury trial and elected to proceed with a bench trial. After the
presentation of the evidence and closing arguments, the circuit court found defendant guilty of one
count of the lesser-included offenses of criminal sexual assault and two counts of misdemeanor
battery.
¶5 The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of six years’ imprisonment for the criminal
sexual assault conviction and 364 days of jail for the battery convictions. In response to the State’s
comment, the court informed defendant that, upon his release from prison, he would have to register
“with the police authority in the jurisdiction to which you move within three days of being
released.” This appeal follows.
¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 On appeal, defendant contends that the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act
(SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law
1 We note that, in one instance in his brief, defendant reveals K.G.’s full name. While not explicitly prohibited, this has long been disapproved of, and we have consistently admonished parties to avoid this practice. See, e.g., People v. Leggans, 253 Ill. App. 3d 724, 727 (1993). Although this isolated instance appears to have been inadvertent, we nonetheless encourage parties to carefully review their documents for compliance before filing them in this court. 2 No. 1-19-0005
(the Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2018)) are facially unconstitutional for
violating either his right to substantive due process, or in the alternative, procedural due process.
The State responds that, pursuant to the holding in People v. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, we must
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Defendant acknowledges the holding in Bingham but
argues that it is either factually distinguishable or wrongly decided.
¶8 In Bingham, the defendant had a conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault that
predated SORA. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant was, however, convicted of felony theft in 2014 and thus
required to register as a sex offender due to his prior attempted criminal sexual assault conviction.
Id. Notably, the court stated, “Sex offender registration is a matter controlled by statute and was
not a requirement imposed by the trial court in this case, and it is thus not reflected in the trial
court’s judgment.” Id.
¶9 The Bingham court explained that, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff.
Jan. 1, 1967), the scope of appellate review derives from the circuit court’s judgment and any
proceedings and orders related thereto. Id. ¶ 16. Rule 615(b) permits a reviewing court to “(1)
reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; (2) set aside,
affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or
order from which the appeal is taken; (3) reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant
was convicted; (4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or (5) order a new trial.”
(Emphases added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).
¶ 10 Although the appellate court had examined (and then rejected) the defendant’s as-applied
challenge to the sex offender registration scheme, the supreme court held that the appellate court
had not been called on to exercise its delineated powers regarding the defendant’s constitutional
claims. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 17. The supreme court held that “a reviewing court has no
3 No. 1-19-0005
power on direct appeal of a criminal conviction to order that defendant be relieved of the obligation
to register as a sex offender when there is neither an obligation to register imposed by the trial
court nor an order or conviction that the defendant is appealing that is directly related to the
obligation or the failure to register.” Id. ¶ 18. The Bingham court then vacated the portion of the
appellate court’s judgment that addressed defendant’s constitutional claims on the merits and
dismissed defendant’s appeal. Id. ¶ 25.
¶ 11 The situation presented here is nearly identical to that in Bingham. The central holding in
Bingham was that this court’s power of review under rule 615 extends only to an order that either
obligates defendant to register under SORA or is related to the reasons for conviction or sentence.
There is, however, no order or conviction related to defendant’s failure to register here, and
defendant’s conviction and sentence relate to his assault on K.G. and not the failure to register.
Defendant’s obligation to register will arise upon his release from imprisonment by operation of
law. See 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(4) (West 2018). This case thus falls squarely under the holding in
Bingham, and we must dismiss defendant’s appeal.
¶ 12 Nonetheless, defendant argues that we need not follow Bingham because it is factually
distinguishable. Namely, defendant notes that Bingham involved an as-applied challenge
necessitating a developed record (unlike the facial challenge here). Defendant further points out
that, unlike in Bingham, the registration requirement applies directly because of his criminal
conviction and the circuit court “expressly ordered” defendant to register. We disagree.
¶ 13 First, we reject defendant’s claim that Bingham only applies to as-applied challenges. This
argument has been considered and rejected before. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 2019 IL App (1st)
163247, appeal denied, No. 125194 (Nov. 26, 2019) (Table). In addition, defendant’s argument
4 No. 1-19-0005
that his registration requirement is directly related to his criminal conviction has also been
repeatedly rejected. See id. Defendant offers no reason for us to depart from existing precedent.
¶ 14 Defendant’s argument that the circuit court expressly ordered defendant to register is also
unavailing. The record in this case reveals that, at sentencing, the State first informed the court
that defendant would have to register as a sex offender. In response, the court agreed: “the State
is correct.” Under these circumstances, the court’s agreement with the State’s recitation of a
statutory obligation cannot reasonably be equated with a court order. 2 Since Bingham is not
factually distinguishable, we decline defendant’s invitation to ignore it . Defendant’s contention
of error is therefore without merit.
¶ 15 Defendant also argues that Bingham was wrongly decided, but it is axiomatic that we must
follow the law as declared by our supreme court. See, e.g., Illinois Labor Relations Board v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 341 Ill. App. 3d 751, 758 (2003); Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’
Local Union 130, U.A. v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, 201 (2001) (observing
that an intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule or modify a supreme court
opinion). Defendant is free, of course, to seek review by the Illinois Supreme Court and ask it to
overrule Bingham.
¶ 16 CONCLUSION
¶ 17 The circuit court’s order sentencing defendant to six years in prison does not require him
to register as a sex offender under SORA, and it does not implicate the Notification Act. Thus, as
2 We further note that the notice of appeal in this case indicates that defendant was only appealing the order dated October 26, 2018, which was the circuit court’s finding of guilty. That order does not explicitly order defendant to register pursuant to SORA following his release from prison. 5 No. 1-19-0005
in Bingham, his constitutional challenges to SORA and the Notification Act are beyond the scope
of our power to grant relief under rule 615(b). We must therefore dismiss defendant’s appeal.
¶ 18 Appeal dismissed.