People v. Valentino
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE No.CF 0592-10 4 ) ) & 5 v. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) On Defendant's 6 VALENS VALENTINO. ) Motion for Deferred Plea 7 ) Defendant. ) 8
INTRODUCTION 11
12 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Michael 1. Bordallo on September 7, 20120 13 Defendant's Motion for Deferred Plea. The People of Guam were represented by Assistan 14 Attorney General Christina Lum. The Defendant was represented by Assistant Public Defende 15 Maria Fitzpatrick. Having reviewed the memorandum and papers presented, the court now issue 16
17 the following decision DENYING the Defendant's Motion for Deferred Plea.
18 FACTUAL HISTORY
19 The Defendant was indicted on charges of felony Family Violence, Aggravated Assault an 20 Child Abuse, as well as misdemeanor Assault on October 15, 2010. On June 14, 2011 th 21 Defendant filed three motions with the previous Family Violence Court judge, the Honorabl 22
23 Alberto C. Lamorena, III. The three motions asked the court to grant Diversion, reduce al
24 felony charges to misdemeanors, and to strike submission of sealed Child Protective Service 25 records. All three motions were denied. 26 On March 19, 2012 the Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration for Diversio 27
28 arguing that there had been a change in circumstances and an error in the previous court'
Page I of5 rulings. On June 29, 2012 this Court issued an order denying the Defendant's Motion fo 2 Reconsideration on the basis that the Defendant did not meet the standards for reconsideration a 3 established by the Supreme Court of Guam. On March 28, 2012 the amendment to the Family 4 Violence Act took effect, replacing the former Diversion program with a Deferred PIe 5
6 agreement. The Defendant has now filed a Motion for Deferred Plea to which the People hav
7 filed an opposition. For the following reasons, the Court now denies the Defendant's motion. 8 DISCUSSION 9 The Defendant was indicted on felony charges of Family Violence, Aggravated Assaul 10
11 and Child Abuse, as well as misdemeanor Assault, for an alleged incident that occurred betwee
12 him and his minor son on October 5, 2010. While the case was before the previous Famil 13 Violence Court Judge, the Defendant motioned that court for entry into the Diversion program. 14 The Judge denied the Defendant's motion on the basis that he was statutorily ineligible pursuan 15 to the Family Violence Act. When the case was later transferred to this court, the Defendant file 16
17 a motion for reconsideration challenging the previous Judge's rulings. Because the Defendan
18 presented no new evidence and because motions for reconsideration do not exist to "secure 19 rehearing on the merits with regard to issues already decided," this Court denied the motion. Us. 20 v. Demosthene, 326 F.Supp.2d 531,534 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 21 The Defendant now moves the Court for a Deferred Plea agreement. 22
23 agreements replaced the former Diversion program on March 28, 2012 for all cases involvin
24 charges of Family Violence. While the amendment replaced diversion's pre-trial probationar 25 period vvith a deferred guilty plea, the eligibility requirements for both programs are nearl 26 identical. The Defendant was not statutorily eligible for entry into Diversion, nor is he no 27
28 statutorily eligible to receive a deferred plea. Nonetheless, the Defendant argues that the Co
Page 2 of5 should exercise discretion and grant him a plea agreement based upon changed circumstance 2 since his initial arrest. The People oppose granting the Defendant a deferred plea arguing that 3 "denial for diversion is a denial for a deferred plea." 4 The Defendant is not statutorily eligible for a deferred plea for the same reason he wa 5
6 not eligible to enter the former Diversion program. The Family Violence Act makes explicit tha
7 a "defendant whose current charges involve serious bodily injury" is not eligible to receive th 8 benefits of a deferred plea agreement. 9 GCA §30.80.1(a)(4) (2011). Aggravated Assault as 9 third degree felony is charged when an individual is accused of recklessly causing or attemptin 10
II to cause "serious bodily injury to another." 9 GCA §19.20(a)(2). Because the Defendant wa
12 charged with Aggravated Assault as a third degree felony, he is statutorily ineligible for a Famil 13 Violence deferred plea agreement, much as he was statutorily ineligible for diversion. 14 The Family Violence Act makes a distinction between those Defendants who are statutoril 15 ineligible for a Deferred Plea and those who are deemed ineligible based upon the discretionar 16
17 power of either the prosecutor or the court. A defendant whose current charges involve seriou
18 bodily injury remains ineligible for a deferred plea "unless the court finds due to unusua 19 circumstances deferral of the criminal proceedings is manifestly in the interest of justice.' 20 §30.80.1(a)(4) (emphasis in the original). To address this statutory requirement, the Defendan 21 argues that he has "suffered enough punishment in this case" because he has been on house arres 22
23 for over a year. He further argues that the court should take judicial notice of the agreement h
24 completed for the corresponding PINS case that arose from the same alleged incident with th 25 Defendant's minor son. 26 The Defendant presents insufficient evidence to establish unusual circumstances tha 27
28 warrant deferring proceedings in the interest of justice. While it is true that the Family Violenc
Page 3 of5 Act was recently amended, the change in the law does not make a defendant who was ineligibl 2 for diversion, now eligible for a deferred plea. The ineligibility criteria for both programs ar 3 nearly identical and it is difficult to imagine a factual scenario where a Defendant would b 4 ineligible for one program, but eligible for the other. The evidence the Defendant presents to th 5
6 Court in support of his current motion is the same evidence he presented in his previous tw
7 motions. There is no new evidence for the Court to evaluate and the fact that the Court has twic 8 reviewed this same evidence and both times denied entry into Diversion does not now suppo 9 granting the Defendant a deferred plea. 10
11 The Defendant was indicted on three felony charges involving violence for allegedl
12 beating his minor son with a belt. The grand jury found reasonable cause to return an indictmen 13 on all three felony charges, including the Aggravated Assault charge involving serious bodil 14 injury. The injuries sustained by the minor were "severe" according to the responding polic 15 officers, who felt it necessary to immediately transport the minor to Guam Memorial Hospital. 16
17 This Aggravated Assault charge makes the Defendant statutorily ineligible for a deferred pie
18 agreement pursuant to Family Violence Act. 9 GCA §30.80.1(a)(4) (2011). That the Defendan 19 has completed a court-ordered period of house arrest and complied with the court-ordered term 20 of his corresponding PINS case does not constitute "unusual circumstances," nor does it chang 21 his eligibility status pursuant to the law. 22
40f5 CONCLUSION
2 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Defendant is statutorily ineligible for 3 deferred plea agreement pursuant to the Family Violence Act. Because the Defendant ha 4 provided insufficient evidence that granting a Deferred Plea is manifestly in the interest 0 5
6 justice, the Court will not use its discretion to override the mandate of the Act. Accordingly, th
7 court DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Deferred Plea.
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