Filed 3/6/14 P. v. Valencia CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E056735 & E056955
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. SWF023109 & SWF10001941) JUAN VALENCIA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Timothy F. Freer, Judge.
Affirmed.
Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Meagan J. Beale and
William M. Wood, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 On November 16, 2012, we consolidated case Nos. E056955 and E056735,
designating case No. E056735 as the master file. Defendant Juan Valencia challenges the
jury trial convictions and resulting sentences in the trial in Riverside County Superior
Court case No. SWF10001941 (E056955). In Riverside County Superior Court case
No. SWF023109 (E056735) he was on three years’ probation for possession of a
concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code,1 former § 12020, subd. (a)). His conviction in
E056955 provided the basis to revoke probation in E056735, for which he was sentenced
to two years in state prison to run concurrent to his sentence imposed in E056955.
Defendant does not challenge the revocation or two-year sentence.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of shooting at an inhabited
dwelling (§ 246, count 2) with a personal firearm use allegation (§§ 667, 1192.7, subd.
(c)(8)) and a criminal street gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); two counts of assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b), counts 3 & 4) with personal firearm use
allegations (§ 12022.5, subd. (a) and § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and criminal street gang
allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); and felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021,
subd. (a)(1), count 5).2 On July 12, 2012, defendant was sentenced to the middle term of
six years on the semiautomatic firearm assault conviction (count 4), enhanced four years
for the firearm use finding and 10 years for the criminal street gang finding, for a total of
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Beri Perez was charged as a codefendant. A joint trial began on January 9, 2012, but after the public defender’s office was relieved, the trial court granted Perez’s motion to sever. Defendant was appointed new counsel from the conflicts panel (hereafter defense counsel or trial counsel).
2 20 years. A consecutive term of 15 years to life was imposed on the shooting at an
inhabited dwelling conviction (count 2). Defendant’s total term is 20 years, plus 15 years
to life.3
Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the prosecutor misstated the law governing the
charge of shooting at an inhabited dwelling; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support
his semiautomatic firearm assault convictions; (3) this trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance; and (4) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct.4
I. FACTS
On the evening of August 11, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Luis Calvillo and
Freddy Coronel were standing in the alley of the apartment building, where his garage
was located, on West Limited Street where he lived with his family. Defendant and
Perez, who were carrying handguns, approached the two. Perez pointed his gun at
Calvillo’s face and said “‘Raza Trece,’” and “‘F[uck]’ EYC.” He fired a round into the
air and yelled “‘Psycho, Raza 13.’”
Calvillo had known Perez, who lived in a nearby apartment, for about three years,
and they had been friends. Perez was a member of the Raza Trece criminal street gang;
he was known as “Psycho,” and about three months earlier he had been assaulted by
3A term of 29 years was imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654 for the assault conviction (count 3) and a concurrent term of two years was imposed on the firearm possession conviction (count 5).
4Defendant has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in case No. E058411. We ordered the writ petition considered with this appeal. By separate order, we summarily deny the writ petition.
3 Calvillo’s cousin, who was a member of the Elsinore Young Classics (EYC), another
criminal street gang. About a week prior to August 11, 2010, Perez contacted Calvillo
and wanted to know the whereabouts of his cousin. When Calvillo told Perez he did not
know, Perez became angry.
After Perez fired his gun in the air, he stepped back, and defendant approached
Calvillo and pointed a gun in his face. Defendant “slant[ed]” the gun to the left and fired
a shot over Calvillo’s shoulder. Directly behind Calvillo was the storage room for the
apartment trash containers, which was part of the apartment building and next to the
stairs to the second floor apartment where Calvillo’s sister lived. There were apartments
above the trash can storage room and other apartments to the left. After the shot, Calvillo
started running toward his sister’s apartment, making a quick left “a little way.”
Defendant chased him, firing three or four more shots.
Calvillo’s sister, Diana Calvillo, heard loud voices and looked out her livingroom
window, which overlooks the alley. She saw Perez pointing a gun at her brother. She
also saw defendant approach her brother and her brother run away. Defendant’s father,
Roberto Calvillo, also looked out the window when he heard shots. He and Diana went
to the stairs and saw Calvillo running down the walkway between the apartment
buildings with defendant in pursuit, firing at him.
After Calvillo escaped, defendant and Perez confronted Coronel. They gestured
with their hands, making gang signs; Perez said “‘La Raza.’”
4 Members of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department searched the crime scene;
however, no bullet strike marks were discovered on the apartment buildings, and only
one expended shell casing, a .380-caliber Winchester, was found in the alley. Deputy
Jared Hansen described the exterior of the buildings as old and deteriorating. Sheriff’s
Patrol Corporal David Flannery, who found the shell casing, described the difficulty of
locating strike marks and shell casings, particularly at night using flashlights. A search of
defendant’s residence produced a .22-caliber rifle and Raza Trece paraphernalia in his
bedroom.
Detective John Juarez provided testimony regarding the Raza Trece and EYC
gangs. Detective Juarez interviewed Perez, and the recording of the interview was played
for the jury. The parties stipulated that Perez pled guilty to attempted murder arising out
of this shooting. Detective Juarez also interviewed defendant, who admitted confronting
Calvillo with Perez and firing his gun in the air and at the ground during the
confrontation. Detective Juarez opined that the August 11, 2010, shooting was
committed at the direction of, in association with, and for the benefit of the Raza Trece
criminal street gang.
II. SHOOTING AT AN INHABITED DWELLING
Defendant raises several issues regarding his conviction of shooting at an
inhabited dwelling (§ 246). First, he contends the prosecutor misstated the law governing
the charge of shooting at an inhabited dwelling by arguing that defendant “could be
convicted of violating section 246 if the prosecution had proved that ‘he was just at that
location in close proximity to where people were living and he was shooting that
5 firearm.’” Second, he faults his trial counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the law during closing argument. Third, he claims the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the law amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. And finally, he asserts the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of shooting at an inhabited dwelling.
A. Did the Prosecutor Submit an Incorrect Legal Theory Regarding Section
246?
“The elements of [a section 246] offense are (1) acting willfully and maliciously,
and (2) shooting at an inhabited house. [Citation.]” (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45
Cal.4th 980, 985, fn. omitted.) Here, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No.
965 that in order to “‘prove [] that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that: [¶] “1) The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm, and; [¶]
“2) The defendant shot the firearm at an inhabited house.’” The acts proscribed by
section 246 include shooting directly at an inhabited dwelling house and shooting “in
close proximity to an inhabited or occupied target under circumstances showing a
conscious disregard for the probability that one or more bullets will strike the target or
persons in or around it.” (People v. Overman (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356
[Fourth Dist., Div. 2] (Overman).)
In Overman, the defendant was charged and convicted under section 246 of
discharging a firearm at an occupied building. (Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p.
1350.) The evidence showed the defendant fired his rifle at persons who were in close
proximity to an occupied building, but no strike marks were found on the building. (Id.
6 at pp. 1352-1353.) This court rejected the argument that “section 246 requires a
defendant to shoot directly at and strike an occupied building.” (Id. at p. 1357.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury not to be confused about the use
of the word “at” in CALCRIM No. 965.5 He stated: “When it says that you have to
shoot at an inhabited house, what it is here is in the law—there’s two things. There is—is
what is called a general intent crime. There’s what—what’s called a specific intent
crime. [¶] [Discussion re: the difference between general and specific intent.] [¶] And
what do we have here? There’s nothing in this instruction that says he has to have the
intent to strike the building. He doesn’t need to have that specific intent to actually point
the gun . . . or try to shoot at that building. All that’s required is a general intent that he
fire that gun. [¶] The fact that—that a gun or that bullet is in the area of where these
occupied apartment buildings are, that’s what makes it a 246. It’s not required that he
have this—the specific intent to shoot at that apartment building, just the fact that he has
the intent to shoot that gun to do a wrongful act. All that’s required is the fact that the
apartment building happens to be right there, that those garbage bins are right there.
Those apartments down that walkway or either side of him, that’s what makes it a 246.
He doesn’t have the—doesn’t have to have the intent to take the gun and, you know, fire
it off into the building from four feet away. Just as long as he has the intent to shoot the
gun and that—it just happens to be that those apartments are right there and occupied.”
5The reporter’s transcript references the word “act.” However, this is clearly a typographical error and the word should have been “at.”
7 In response, defense counsel argued: “The People must prove that the defendant
willfully and maliciously shot a firearm and the defendant shot the firearm at an inhabited
house. That’s the law. It’s not shot in the vicinity of a house because if—if that were the
law, that’s what the People in Sacramento would have said, in the vicinity of a house. On
the ground in front of a house, in the air, down the street from a house, that’s not what
they say. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If he shot by a house or around a house, that’s close enough.
[¶] Ladies and gentlemen, it’s not because that is not the law. That’s not what this says.
If they wanted to say, ‘by’ or ‘close,’ or ‘in the vicinity of,’ they would have said that.”
Later, defense counsel added, “The evidence does not support a conviction of [section]
246, firing at an inhabited house—at an inhabited house, not in the vicinity of an
inhabited house, not close to an inhabited house, because the evidence doesn’t support
that was what happened that night.”
On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s remarks as follows:
“Let’s go to Count 2 then. . . . Count 2 is shooting at an inhabited house. This [is] where
[defense counsel] and I disagree on what it means to shoot at an inhabited house. [¶]
The evidence shows that [defendant] did actually shoot in the direction with that first shot
at those garbage bins, but beyond that there is another interpretation of the words, not that
you actually shot at and pointed at the building and fired, but the words can also mean
that he was shooting at that location, at that apartment complex, when he was running
through that walkway. [¶] He was at that apartment complex and he was firing a gun in
close proximity to where families were living and enjoying their evening. That is the
interpretation of the word that I’m asking [] you [to] adopt because that is what 246 is,
8 and we talked about the fact that this is a general intent crime. [Defendant] doesn’t need
to have the specific intent to shoot at a structure. If that was required, the legislature
would have put in there that people have to prove that the building was actually struck.
But know the word ‘at’ means that he was just at that location in close proximity to
where people were living and he was shooting that firearm.”
Defendant claims the prosecutor incorrectly argued that the jury could find him
guilty “merely for discharging a firearm while present at the apartment complex . . . .”
Referencing People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, he argues that the word “at” as used
in section 246 means “in the direction of,” or “towards.” Here, the prosecutor did not
argue that defendant could be found guilty simply on the basis of his location. Rather, he
argued that defendant did not have to have the “specific intent to shoot at that apartment
building . . . .” The prosecutor noted his disagreement with defense counsel regarding
what it means to shoot at an inhabited dwelling and pointed out that in addition to the
evidence showing defendant actually shot in the direction of the building with his first
shot, “there is another interpretation of the words, not that you actually shot at and
pointed at the building and fired, but the words can also mean that he was shooting at that
location, at that apartment complex, when he was running through that walkway.” This
second kind of act falls under section 246, which “proscribes shooting either directly at
or in close proximity to an inhabited or occupied target under circumstances showing a
conscious disregard for the probability that one or more bullets will strike the target or
persons in or around it.” (Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356, italics in
original.)
9 “The act of shooting ‘at’ an inhabited or occupied target was defined in People v.
Chavira (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 988 . . . . There, the defendant and his associates fired
several shots at persons ‘congregated in front of, and on the driveway leading to’ an
inhabited dwelling. [Citation.] The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient
to support his section 246 conviction, because he did not fire ‘at’ the dwelling but ‘at’
persons outside it. [Citation.] The court rejected this argument, noting that ‘[d]efendant
and his associates engaged in a fusillade of shots directed primarily at persons standing
close to a dwelling.’ [Citation.] On this basis, the court reasoned, ‘[t]he jury was entitled
to conclude that they were aware of the probability that some shots would hit the building
and that they were consciously indifferent to that result. That is a sufficient “intent” to
satisfy the statutory requirement [of section 246].’ [Citation.] [¶] As Chavira
demonstrates, section 246 is not limited to the act of shooting directly ‘at’ an inhabited or
occupied target. Rather, the act of shooting ‘at’ a proscribed target is also committed
when the defendant shoots in such close proximity to the target that he shows a conscious
indifference to the probable consequence that one or more bullets will strike the target or
persons in or around it. The defendant’s conscious indifference to the probability that a
shooting will achieve a particular result is inferred from the nature and circumstances of
his act.” (Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356-1357, fn. omitted.)
During oral argument, defendant parceled out the prosecutor’s words, “shooting at
that location, at that apartment complex,” and argued that these words could not be
pushed into the theory of conscious disregard. However, these words were not the only
words offered by the prosecutor. Rather, as the People aptly note, the prosecutor’s 10 argument focused on the act of shooting while running in the walkway, which was in
close proximity to people inside the apartment buildings. This argument described an act
defined by this court to be proscribed by section 246. (Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1356-1357.) Moreover, the prosecutor reminded the jury that section 246 is a
general intent crime. (People v. Watie (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 879.) Thus, the
statute did not require a specific intent to strike an inhabited or occupied building.
Rather, it required only that defendant shoot under circumstances that indicate a
conscious disregard for the probability that such result would occur.
For the above reasons, we conclude the prosecutor did not present an incorrect
legal theory to the jury.
B. Was Defense Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Object to the Prosecutor’s
Closing Argument?
Having found that the prosecutor did not present an incorrect legal theory
regarding section 246, we reject defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument.
C. Did the Prosecutor Commit Misconduct in Arguing that Defendant Could
be Convicted of Section 246 if the Jury Found that He Discharged a Firearm While
Present at the Apartment Building?
Having found that the prosecutor did not present an incorrect legal theory
regarding section 246, we reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed
misconduct in his closing argument.
11 D. Is Defendant’s Conviction of Section 246 Supported by Sufficient
Evidence?
Defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of section
246, because (1) as far a Calvillo knew, defendant could have fired into the air, (2) there
is no evidence where defendant was standing when he fired the gun, or the direction in
which the shot was fired, and (3) the officers were unable to find any evidence that any of
the shots fired hit any of the structures.
“On appeal, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Snow
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.)
According to the record before this court, Calvillo was standing in the alley
between the row of apartment buildings and the row of garages, with the trash can storage
room behind him, when defendant approached. There were apartments above the trash
can storage room, and other apartments to the left. At a distance of about three feet,
defendant pointed his gun toward Calvillo’s face, “slanting” it to the left, and fired.
Calvillo claimed all he could see was “the flame go over here somewhere.” Calvillo was
pointing to the left side of his body when he said “‘over here,’” and agreed that it was
“[a]round [his] shoulder.” On cross-examination, Calvillo reiterated that defendant had
pointed the gun “[d]irectly at me[,]”and then “he kind of slanted [it], and it went to the
side of my left shoulder.” When asked if the shot was in the air, at the ground, or straight
12 ahead, Calvillo said, “I just remember it going to my left side somewhere. I didn’t get to
see where it went.” Based on Calvillo’s testimony, it was reasonable for the jury to infer
that defendant fired at the apartment buildings and not up in the air.
Nonetheless, defendant questions Calvillo’s testimony with respect to his position
in regard to the trash cans and storage room. According to defendant, Calvillo’s
testimony as to where he was standing does not match the positions he marked on the
photographic evidence. However, the People explain that Calvillo had difficulty
identifying locations on the photographs. The People also maintain that Calvillo was
consistent in his testimony that the trash can storage room was behind him. Moreover, as
defendant chased Calvillo down the walkway between the apartment buildings, defendant
continued firing.
Defendant’s actions support a finding of conscious indifference to the probable
consequence that one or more bullets will strike the target or persons in or around it.
(Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356-1357.) The fact that the deputies were
unable to find any bullet strike marks on the buildings is a red herring. First, the
exteriors of the buildings were old and deteriorating. Second, the deputies were
attempting to locate the strike marks at night using flashlights. And finally, as we
previously stated, section 246 is not limited to the act of shooting directly “at” an
inhabited dwelling. “Rather, the act of shooting ‘at’ a proscribed target is also committed
when the defendant shoots in such close proximity to the target that he shows a conscious
13 indifference to the probable consequence that one or more bullets will strike the target or
persons in or around it.” (Overman, supra, at p. 1356-1357.)6
Based on the above, we conclude that defendant’s conviction of committing an
offense proscribed by section 246 is supported by sufficient evidence.
III. ASSAULT WITH A SEMIAUTOMATIC FIREARM
Defendant contends the semiautomatic firearm assault convictions (§ 245, subd.
(b)) in counts 3 and 4 are not supported by substantial evidence that a semiautomatic
firearm was used. He further claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel (IAC) in conceding guilt on those counts.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
As we stated above, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 66.)
Section 245, subdivision (b), states: “Any person who commits an assault upon
the person of another with a semiautomatic firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for three, six, or nine years.” According to defendant, of the three
witnesses to the assault on Calvillo, not one testified that the defendant used a
semiautomatic firearm. Neither defendant nor Perez identified the type of firearms that
6 Clearly the commission of this offense does not test the marksmanship of the offender.
14 were used. Rather, defendant maintains the only direct evidence that a semiautomatic
weapon was used is found in one of the 911 calls which were played for the jury. In that
recording, the caller stated that one of the guns “was like a black pistol with like, like a
compact pistol, not really like a revolver.” However, the caller did not state that the gun
was a semiautomatic, only that it was not like a revolver, and the caller attributed use of
the semiautomatic to Perez, or the one who was yelling during the assault.
Defendant acknowledges the testimony of Deputy Hansen that a semiautomatic
firearm ejects the spent shell casing at the time a shot is fired, along with the testimony of
Patrol Corporal David Flannery that he found a single expended .380-caliber shell casing
in the general area where the assault occurred. Nonetheless, defendant discounts these
testimonies, contending there is no evidence that the spent shell casing is from one of the
shots fired during the assault; it is equally plausible that it had been there for days or
months. Further, given the testimony that there were a number of shots fired, defendant
questions why the officers found only one spent shell casing. According to defendant,
the fact that only one spent shell casing was found suggests it was from another source.
In contrast, the People point out that both defendant and Perez were armed with
firearms, and both assaulted Calvillo and Coronel with their firearms. In distinguishing
how shells are expended from revolvers and semiautomatic guns, Patrol Corporal
Flannery testified that the basic difference between semiautomatic and revolvers is in
how the expended shells are removed. Deputy Hansen added that in a semiautomatic
firearm, bullet casings are discharged and will be found at the scene unless picked up.
One casing was found at the scene. The People also note that one of the 911 callers
15 reported seeing a shooter “cock his pistol back” and described the pistol as “not really
like a revolver.” According to the People, this provided sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that a semiautomatic firearm was used.
To the extent defendant argues that, at best, the evidence shows it was Perez who
was in possession of a semiautomatic weapon, the People respond that the jury was
instructed on aider and abettor liability, which made Perez and defendant liable for each
other’s actions. Nonetheless, defendant further argues that this court may take judicial
notice of the fact that there are pistols which are neither revolvers nor semiautomatics,
i.e., breech loaders, muzzle loaders, and fully automatics that can be “cocked.” Thus,
defendant submits that “even if there was proof that the spent cartridge was fired by one
of the assailants . . . it could not possibly prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
semiautomatic pistol was used.” While the evidence may show that a pistol other than a
revolver or semiautomatic was used, it also shows that a semiautomatic weapon was used
and a spent shell casing was found during a search of the scene. Other than the night in
question, there was no evidence of any semiautomatic or other weapon being fired in that
location. Thus, circumstantial evidence exists to support defendant’s conviction with
respect to counts 3 and 4. (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296.)
B. IAC
Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt on counts
3 and 4. However, as stated above, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
convictions of assault with a semiautomatic weapon. Thus, this IAC claim fails.
16 IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In addition to the previous claims of IAC, defendant faults his trial counsel for
(1) allowing defendant to go to trial on the charge of being a felon in possession of a
firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)); (2) failing to object to the admission of seven 911
calls; (3) failing to object to the prosecutor’s repeated elicitation of hearsay evidence; (4)
failing to object to the prosecutor playing the recorded interview of Perez; and (5) failing
to request a jury instruction on accomplice testimony.
A. Standard of Review
“The standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. A
defendant must demonstrate that: (1) his attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been more
favorable to the defendant. [Citation.] A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Citation.]” (People v. Stanley
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 954.)
B. Counsel’s Strategy
Before considering each claim of IAC, the People note the importance of defense
counsel’s trial strategy. Most importantly, defendant was charged with, but not convicted
of, premeditated attempted murder. (§§ 187, 664, count 1) In arguing to the jury, trial
counsel began by asking the jurors to find defendant guilty, but only of “what he did . . .
not the trumped up charges . . . .” Counsel told the jury, “The first thing is the easiest
thing to—to take care of Count No. 5, being in possession of a firearm . . . . [¶] . . . He’s
17 guilty.” Regarding the other four counts, counsel argued they were “tough to arrive at.”
Regarding count 1, the attempted murder charge, defense counsel told the jury “this is . . .
where you all are going to earn your money.” He maintained the evidence showed no
intent to kill, because although the gun may have been pointed at Calvillo’s face, it was
directed away from him when it was fired. Trial counsel conceded that pointing the gun
at Calvillo’s face was assault under count 2, but “there’s no intent to kill.”
As to count 2, the charge of shooting at an inhabited dwelling, trial counsel told
the jury the shots were not fired “at” the dwellings, but conceded they were probably
fired with gross negligence under the lesser included offense of section 246.3.7 The jury
was instructed on section 246.3. Counsel reminded the jury that at the outset, he had
asked them to find defendant guilty “of what he did, not the trumped up charges, but what
the evidence supports.” He told the jury that the evidence did not support the section 246
charge, which required proof of shooting at an inhabited house, not in the vicinity or
close to an inhabited house.
Defendant faced prison sentences of life with a minimum of 15 years before parole
eligibility on the charges of attempted murder and shooting at an inhabited-dwelling, with
their attendant enhancements. He was susceptible to imprisonment for 29 years on each
felony assault charge and for three years on the firearm possession charge. If the jury
accepted trial counsel’s argument, then it would accept that evidence on the life term
charges was not overwhelming, in view of the fact that defendant did not kill Calvillo
7Reporter’s transcript states section 245.3. Again we assume this was a typographical error.
18 when he had the opportunity and there was no direct proof that any of his shots struck the
apartment buildings. On the other hand, proof of the felony assaults and the firearm
possession offenses was strong. Thus, trial counsel adopted a strategy of conceding guilt
on the determinate term offenses and challenging the life term offenses.
C. Concession that Defendant Was a Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Defendant’s case came on for trial on January 10, 2012, at which time he was
represented by a deputy public defender. On that day, he pled guilty to what was then
count 5 of the information, that he had possessed a firearm after having been convicted of
a felony in violation of former section 12021, subdivision (a)(1).8 On January 17, the
public defender declared a conflict, and the local conflicts panel (trial counsel) was
appointed to represent defendant. Defendant was being tried jointly with Perez; however,
the joint trial was aborted after the public defender was relieved and Perez’s trial was
severed. Trial counsel was appointed sometime prior to April 24, 2012.
When the case came back for trial with new counsel, the prosecutor told the trial
court that he and trial counsel were discussing how to handle the firearm possession
charge. The trial court suggested either stipulating to or bifurcating the felony conviction
element. Because the jurors were waiting, the matter was deferred. On May 21, 2012,
the jury heard evidence and rendered a verdict on the firearm possession charge.
8 A search of defendant’s home revealed a .22-caliber rifle and magazine loaded with bullets for the rifle under defendant’s bed. Possession of the rifle formed the basis for the former section 12021, subdivision (a), charge.
19 Defendant contends “there is simply no satisfactory explanation for trial counsel
allowing [defendant] to go to trial on a weapons charge to which he had already pled
guilty.” The People respond there was a tactical reason for trial counsel’s decision to
keep the charge before the jury, namely, to increase the charges upon which a concession
of guilt could be made. However, defendant maintains that “[n]o tactical consideration
could override” the prejudice created by allowing the jury to hear evidence that he
unlawfully possessed a firearm. Assuming, without deciding, that trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in keeping the charge
before the jury, we must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, defendant would have received a more favorable result. Defendant
argues he would have received a more favorable result because the jury would never have
learned of his firearm possession. He asserts the “only evidence in the record regarding
how [defendant] came to possess a firearm on the night of the assault was [his] recorded
interview.” In his interview, defendant explained that he had never shot a gun before and
was given the gun by gang members who bullied him into carrying out the assault. Thus,
defendant argues that after “hearing evidence that [he] kept a gun and loaded magazine at
his home,” “the prosecutor was able to argue that [defendant] was someone for whom
firearms were a regular part of life, someone who kept his own gun under his own bed.”
Even if trial counsel had not allowed defendant to go to trial on a weapons charge
that he had already pled guilty to, we are unable to conclude it is reasonably probable that
defendant would have received a more favorable result. Defendant was initially charged
with attempted premeditated murder. In order to prove intent, along with defendant’s
20 knowledge of the dangers that firing a firearm could produce (§ 246), evidence that a rifle
with a loaded magazine was stored underneath his bed was relevant. Thus, the prosecutor
would have introduced such evidence regardless of trial counsel’s action. Moreover,
despite the evidence, the jury did not convict defendant of attempted premeditated
murder. Thus, there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable result. As
defendant admitted, fellow gang members gave him a gun and he committed the assault
on Calvillo. Accordingly, he was convicted of gang charges, shooting at an inhabited
dwelling, and assault with a semiautomatic firearm.
D. Admission of the 911 Calls
Defendant faults trial counsel for failing to object to the admission of seven 911
calls as irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
There were seven 911 calls that were recorded and admitted. When defendant’s
case first came on for joint trial with Perez, defendant’s public defender counsel objected
to the calls and the trial judge (Judge Angel M. Bermudez) excluded the first, second,
fourth, fifth and seventh calls on the grounds they were cumulative, confusing, multiple
layers of hearsay, unreliable, and emotionally inflammatory. In contrast, after the trial of
Perez’s case was severed from the trial of defendant’s case, defendant’s trial counsel
failed to object to the introduction of any of the 911 calls, resulting in their admission
into evidence. On appeal, defendant contends the calls had little probative value. We
disagree. While the callers may not have known the exact details of the incident, they
were able to confirm what the witnesses had testified to, namely, that multiple shots had
been fired outside the apartment buildings; Spanish was spoken; gang names were
21 shouted; the shooter fled the scene in a vehicle; and that one of the weapons used was not
a revolver.
Nonetheless, defendant contends the probative value of the calls was outweighed
by the “number of statements in the 911 calls that were highly inflammatory, and
therefore likely caused an emotional response that was prejudicial to [him].” Defendant
notes that one caller said they had a house full of kids who were lying down on the floor
because all of the doors and windows were open. Another caller described the incident as
a “drive-by.” Yet another caller said the shooters were shooting out of a truck.
According to defendant, evidence of a drive-by shooting where children had to hide on
the floor “is highly inflammatory” and likely to cause a juror who is a parent “to reach a
verdict based on emotion rather than on the evidence presented at trial.” Moreover,
defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s reference to the 911 calls in his closing argument
certainly elicited a response from the jurors. Describing the prosecutor’s case as weak,
defendant argues “there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror voted to convict
[him] of at least one charge because of his or her emotional response to the 911 calls.”
Thus, he maintains that admission of these calls requires reversal of his conviction. We
disagree.
As the People point out, the jurors were aware that the shooting occurred in an
apartment building where families lived. One caller describing the incident as a “drive-
by” is no more prejudicial than the testimony that defendant fired shots in a narrow
walkway between two occupied buildings while chasing after Calvillo. More
importantly, despite admission of the 911 calls, defense counsel successfully obtained an
22 acquittal of the attempted murder charge. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that
counsel was deficient in failing to challenge admission of the 911 calls.
E. Failure to Object to Hearsay Evidence
Next, defendant claims trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object when the
prosecutor elicited hearsay evidence from the witnesses.
1. Hearsay References to Defendant’s Gang Membership
Defendant points out that Detective Juarez was allowed to testify that he “had
information from another member that . . . defendant was also a member of Raza
Trece. . . .” and that “another member stated [defendant] was an actual full-fledged
member [of the gang] . . . .” Ultimately, the detective stated, “[T]hrough our
investigation it was determined [defendant] was at least an active participant and stated
that he associated with the gang.” On appeal, defendant argues this hearsay evidence
contradicts the gang expert’s testimony and defendant’s own admission that he
sometimes associated with members of the Raza Trece gang.
In general, experts are permitted to identify and explain the information and
sources on which they base their opinions, and such sources may include hearsay.
(People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) An
expert’s opinion may be founded on various matters, regardless of whether those matters
are admissible. (Ibid.) “Crawford [v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36] does not
undermine the established rule that experts can testify to their opinions on relevant
matters, and relate the information and sources upon which they rely in forming those
opinions. This is so because an expert is subject to cross-examination about his or her
23 opinions and additionally, the materials on which the expert bases his or her opinion are
not elicited for the truth of their contents; they are examined to assess the weight of the
expert’s opinion.” (Ibid.)
Hearsay that is ordinarily inadmissible may form the proper basis for an expert’s
testimony. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 847.)
However, an expert may not testify to incompetent hearsay under the guise of stating
reasons for an opinion. (People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 659,
disapproved on another point in People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047, fn 3.) An
expert’s need to consider extrajudicial matters and a jury’s need for information sufficient
to evaluate an expert opinion may conflict with a defendant’s interest in avoiding
substantive use of unreliable hearsay. Such conflicts are generally left to the trial court’s
sound judgment. Most often, any hearsay problems are cured by instructing the jury that
matters admitted through an expert go only to the basis of his or her opinion and should
not be considered for their truth. (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 919.)
Here, as the People point out, regardless of the hearsay evidence or Detective
Juarez’s expert testimony, defendant admitted being associated with the gang, joining
other members, accepting a firearm from them, and participating in the attack on Calvillo
to redress a prior act of disrespect. Any objection to the hearsay evidence would have
been inconsequential when compared to defendant’s own admissions. At best, an
objection would have resulted in an instruction to the jury. However, given the record
before this court, we can discern no prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to object.
24 2. Hearsay Identification of Defendant as Perez’s Companion
Detective Juarez testified as to the steps he took which led to the identification of
defendant as Perez’s companion in the shooting. He stated that Calvillo was able to
identify Perez; however, he did not recognize the second assailant. Rather, Calvillo
reported to the detective that Juan Carlos Castillo had identified defendant as Perez’s
companion. The detective prepared a photographic lineup with defendant’s photograph
and showed it to various witnesses, including Calvillo’s companion, Coronel. Coronel,
an EYC gang member, “didn’t want any part of it.” However, Coronel acknowledged
that Perez’s companion was in the lineup with defendant’s photograph.
Although defendant challenges his trial counsel’s failure to object to this hearsay
testimony, the People point out that the out-of-court identifications had the nonhearsay
purpose of explaining the course of Detective Juarez’s investigation and how he ended up
focused on defendant. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) They contend that, at worst, any
objection would have resulted in a limiting instruction. (Evid. Code, § 355; People v.
Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377, 389.) Further, the People point out that defendant
admitted being Perez’s companion. Thus, the People argue that “the failure to object was
neither deficient performance nor prejudicial.” We agree.
3. Perez’s Interview
Defendant faults his trial counsel for not objecting to Detective Juarez’s testimony
regarding what Perez told him during an in-custody interview on the grounds that (1) the
interview with Perez was a testimonial statement, the admission of which violated
25 defendant’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine (citing Crawford v.
Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 52), and (2) it was hearsay.
While trial counsel could have objected to Detective Juarez’s testimony about
Perez’s statements as constituting hearsay, it would have been an exercise in futility.
Perez admitted his gang membership, his moniker, and his prior run in with an EYC gang
member. These admissions constitute statements against penal interest. (Evid. Code,
§ 1230.) Regarding defendant’s constitutional challenge, the People point out that
nothing Perez said implicated either himself or defendant in the shooting; defendant
admitted his association with Raza Trece; and he admitted that the motive for attacking
Calvillo was Perez’s prior run in with an EYC gang member. We agree with the People
and reject this claim of ineffective assistance.
4. Primary Activity of the Gang Includes Grand Theft
Detective Juarez testified that based on his investigation of Raza Trece, the
primary activities of the gang were “felony assaults such as assault with a deadly weapon,
and weapons possessions, and robbery . . . as well as low level narcotics sales.” The
detective described a robbery committed by three gang members who forcibly took the
victim’s cell phone.
Defense counsel did not object to this testimony; however, as previously noted,
experts are allowed to testify to information that formed the basis of their opinions.
Thus, any defense objection on grounds of hearsay would have, at best, resulted in a
limiting instruction.
26 5. Failure to Request Accomplice Instructions
Defendant contends he and Perez were accomplices, as shown by the fact that
Calvillo testified they both assaulted him with a firearm. Thus, defendant argues that
when Perez’s recorded interview was played for the jury, the jurors should have been
instructed with CALCRIM No. 325 regarding how to evaluate the testimony of an
accomplice. He faults trial counsel for failing to request such instruction. Assuming trial
counsel’s deficiency, we consider whether defendant was prejudiced. As we previously
noted, Perez’s statements did not connect defendant to the charged crimes, with the
exception of the gang allegations. However, defendant admitted his association with the
Raza Trece gang, along with the prior run in with an EYC gang member, and that he
went with Perez and that he “just scaring” Calvillo. Other statements made by Perez
were corroborated by both Detective Juarez and Calvillo. Because there was sufficient
corroboration of Perez’s statements, the failure to instruct on accomplice testimony was
harmless. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 303.)
6. Cumulative Effect
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the above asserted deficient acts
undermined his right to a fair trial. While we may have agreed that some of defense
counsel’s actions were deficient, we have not concluded that defendant was prejudiced by
any of such actions. Furthermore, we do not agree that the cumulative effect resulted in
prejudice. Despite strong evidence that defendant attempted to murder Calvillo, the jury
acquitted him of the charge.
27 V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
when he tried defendant on a charge (felon in possession of a firearm) to which he had
already pled guilty.
Prior to trial, the following discussion was held:
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I don’t think it’s going to become an issue today, but me
[sic] and [defense counsel] are trying to figure out the best way to handle Count [5],
which [is] the [former section] 12021(a) (1) charge that a .22-caliber rifle was found
during the search warrant of [defendant’s] house.
“THE COURT: Usually there is a stipulation that there is a felony conviction, or
you can ask to bifurcate the felony-conviction portion of that as well. I’ll grant that if
that’s—you know what the party’s intention was.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]” That’s what I’d like to do, Your Honor, and we can
work out a stipulation.
“THE COURT: The instructions, though, are kind of modified. It would be
almost, you know, possession of a firearm and, you know—in this particular situation,
you know, if he’s found in violation of a firearm or possession of a firearm per the
CALCRIM instruction would probably change your strategy, so you may want to just
consider that.
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Well, I’m asking it not be bifurcated and I can give my
reasons for that now, or we can take it up another time. I mean—
28 “THE COURT: Why don’t we take it up another time, because we’ve got our
jurors sitting out there. Maybe a little more a convenient break if you are not going to
use you[r] opening statement.
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I’ll stay with my opening.
“THE COURT: Okay. And—
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I will talk about part of that search warrant, though, in
the sense that gang indicia w[ere] found during—
“THE COURT: You can indicate there was a firearm that was—that was found as
well as, but you know the—the portion of the—that he had a prior conviction, you know,
that’s—there might be another way of doing that without prejudicing the defendant.
So—
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yeah. I’ll stay away from that, Your Honor.”
Ultimately, the prosecutor introduced evidence that defendant possessed a firearm;
however, the jury did not hear any evidence of, nor were they instructed on, defendant
being a felon. The verdict form also omitted any reference to defendant being a felon.
Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct because, “while
the jury was not informed that it was unlawful for [defendant] to own a firearm because
he had previously been convicted of a felony . . . it is a virtual certainty that one or more
of the jurors knew that convicted felons were prohibited from owning firearms, and
assumed that [defendant] had previously been convicted of a felony.”
29 “The standards under which we evaluate prosecutorial misconduct may be
summarized as follows. A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the
conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it
involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the
trial court or the jury. Furthermore . . . when the claim focuses upon comments made by
the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable
fashion. [Citation.]” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)
“[A] claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not preserved for appeal if defendant
fails to object and seek an admonition if an objection and jury admonition would have
cured the injury. [Citation.] (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839-840.) The
record reflects defendant did not object to the prosecutor introducing evidence that
defendant possessed a firearm. Further, the record shows that prior to trial, the court
indicated it would entertain a stipulation that defendant suffered a felony conviction or
grant a request to bifurcate the felony-conviction portion. Thus, it appears there is
nothing indicating that an objection would have been fruitless. As the People argued in
their brief and during oral argument, defendant should not be raising a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct for the first time on appeal. The time to raise it was during the
trial, and the place to raise it was the trial court. As a result, we conclude defendant has
30 forfeited this issue for appeal. Nevertheless, we will address the merits of defendant’s
contention because it is easily resolved.
As we previously noted, defendant was charged with attempted premeditated
murder. In his interview, he initially denied any involvement in the incident, claiming
the weapon found under his bed was purely for protection, and that he had never fired the
weapon. In order to prove intent, along with defendant’s knowledge of the dangers that
firing a firearm could produce (§ 246), evidence that a rifle with a loaded magazine was
stored underneath his bed was relevant. According to defendant, he was just scaring
Calvillo, and when Calvillo came around, defendant “discharged” the weapon a few
times. He claimed that he panicked and fired two shots at the ground while Calvillo was
running. Defendant denied ever pointing the weapon at Calvillo’s face. Thus, even if the
prosecutor had not tried defendant on the former section 12021, subdivision (a)(1)
charge, he would have introduced evidence of the loaded weapon found under
defendant’s bed in support of the charge of attempted premeditated murder.
Nonetheless, even if we assume prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that it was
harmless because it was not reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a
more favorable result had the misconduct not occurred. (People v. Zurinaga (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1248, 1260; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Defendant’s
claim that “it is a virtual certainty that one or more of the jurors knew that convicted
felons were prohibited from owning firearms, and assumed that [he] had previously been
convicted of a felony” amounts to nothing more than mere speculation. Despite the
evidence admitted at trial, including defendant’s unlawful possession of a firearm, the
31 jury found him not guilty of attempted premeditated murder. Defendant pled guilty to the
weapons possession charge, and thus, the fact that the jury also found him guilty of the
charge is harmless. As defendant admitted, fellow gang members gave him a gun, he
intended to scare Calvillo, and he committed the assault on Calvillo. Accordingly, the
jury convicted him of gang charges, shooting at an inhabited dwelling and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm. In other words, he received a fair trial.
VI. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P.J.
CODRINGTON J.