2025 IL App (2d) 240574 No. 2-24-0574 Opinion filed July 29, 2025 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 22-CF-1440 ) MCRED VALDERAMA, ) ) Defendant-Appellee ) ) Honorable (Zacharias Sexual Abuse Center, ) Mark L. Levitt, Contemnor-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hutchinson and Mullen concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Zacharias Sexual Abuse Center (Zacharias) appeals the trial court’s order finding it in
indirect civil contempt for refusing to respond to defendant Mcred Valderama’s subpoena
requesting records related to the counseling of the alleged sexual assault victim, defendant’s
daughter, A.V. For the following reasons, we reverse. 2025 IL App (2d) 240574
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant is charged with seven counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, two
counts of criminal sexual assault, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse arising out of
allegations that defendant sexually abused A.V. between 2014 and 2021.
¶4 A.V. gave four interviews at the Lake County Children’s Advocacy Center (Advocacy
Center) between August 26, 2022, and April 28, 2023. Although the parties had access to
recordings of these interviews, no recording or transcript was entered into the record. Instead, the
trial court relied on the parties’ representations of what was contained in those interviews.
¶5 The most detail regarding A.V.’s interviews comes from the State’s proffer in its verified
petition to deny pretrial release. According to the proffer, on August 26, 2022, A.V., a 14-year-old
high school freshman, told her counselor that defendant had been sexually abusing her for years.
Police and the Department of Children and Family Services were notified, and a victim sensitive
interview was conducted that same day at the Advocacy Center.
¶6 At the interview, A.V. stated that she lived with her paternal grandparents, her mother, her
brother, and defendant. A.V. described the abuse as beginning when she was 6 to 8 years old and
continuing until she was 14. A.V.’s earliest memory of abuse was from fourth grade. She slept
with her mother and defendant in their room. Her mother would wake up early to go to work,
leaving her and defendant alone in the room. A.V. would be on her back, and defendant would rub
his penis on her vagina and then masturbate until he ejaculated on her clothing. Defendant also
made A.V. stroke his exposed penis with her hand. Defendant would tell her to keep this secret
from her mother. This same pattern continued almost daily through fourth grade. A.V. described
this behavior as continuing during sixth grade, but not as often; stopping during seventh grade;
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and then picking up again in eighth grade, with the most recent abuse occurring within the last
couple months of giving the interview at the age of 14.
¶7 The same day as A.V.’s interview, police went to defendant’s residence and spoke with
him. When defendant was informed that A.V. was accusing him of sexually abusing her, he told
police that whatever his daughter said was true.
¶8 While in custody between August 26 and September 16, 2022, defendant called A.V.’s
mother, Theresa, and his mother (A.V.’s grandmother) several times, in an attempt to get people
to say “the right things” so he could get out of jail. On August 26, 2022, defendant called Theresa
and asked her to come up with a plan to get him out of jail. On August 28, 2022, Theresa told
defendant he would be represented by private counsel and that they were going to do everything
they could to help him out. On August 29, 2022, defendant and Theresa discussed coordinating
with defendant’s attorney to get the case thrown out. Defendant constantly asked if everyone was
on his side, and they told him they were. While talking with his parents, defendant said, “I hope
the right things can be said and I can get out of here.” He also asked if they had talked to the
Filipino consulate because, if things went wrong, he then might want to be deported. Defendant
also told his parents that he was going to talk to Theresa, saying, “if the right things get said to [his
attorney] it’ll get better.” On September 6, 2022, defendant told Theresa about speaking with his
attorney, saying that “if everything goes like it should, he should be back by Fright Fest,” and that
his attorney was going to give the “DA” some new information. On September 12, 2022, at
approximately 8:33 a.m., Theresa told defendant she spoke with defendant’s attorney and knew
what she had to do to “get the ball rolling.” She told defendant that she was doing a lot to get him
back to the family and that she wanted to tell him what she was doing but could not.
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¶9 On September 12, 2022, at approximately 10:15 a.m., less than two hours after her
conversation with defendant, Theresa took A.V. to the Lake County Sheriff’s Office and asked to
speak with someone regarding A.V.’s case. Theresa told a detective that her daughter had come to
her with a typed statement, dated September 6, 2022, stating that she made up the allegations
against defendant.
¶ 10 A second interview was held at the Advocacy Center that same day. At this interview, A.V.
explained that her statements from the August 26, 2022, interview were not true. A.V. told the
interviewer that she was taken to defendant’s attorney’s office, where she told her mother that she
had lied, and defendant’s attorney suggested that she write a statement and be reinterviewed.
¶ 11 On September 13, 2022, police interviewed R.S., an “outcry witness” and A.V.’s friend.
R.S. told police that A.V. told her that defendant had been raping her for the past seven or eight
years. After defendant’s arrest, A.V. stayed at R.S.’s house for the weekend. While there, A.V.
told R.S. that her grandmother had told her to lie about how long the abuse had been occurring and
say that it happened for only one or two years in order to “take a few years off.” On September 15,
2022, police interviewed R.S. again, after being contacted by R.S.’s grandmother. R.S. told police
that she had been in gym class with A.V. that day and that A.V. told her that her mom had asked
her to lie and say that defendant did not abuse her.
¶ 12 On November 7, 2022, a police detective and victim advocate spoke with A.V. at the
Advocacy Center. A.V. was asked about the statements she made to R.S., and A.V. said that she
remembered making those statements. A.V. said that she knew her grandmother wanted her to say
that nothing happened so that defendant could get out of jail, and that is why she changed her story.
A.V. acknowledged that she had told friends that her family had asked her to change her story.
A.V. said that the typed statement she gave to the sheriff’s office on September 12 was not true.
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She confirmed that she had been sexually abused by defendant and that she was telling the truth
when she was first interviewed at the Advocacy Center.
¶ 13 On March 27, 2023, A.V. wanted to speak to detectives to provide more information about
the abuse, stating that she gained confidence from going to therapy and was ready to fully disclose
the abuse. Another interview was conducted on April 28, 2023, at the Advocacy Center. A.V. told
the interviewer that, at the first interview, she was really scared and had not disclosed everything.
A.V. added that when she was 8 to 12 years old, defendant made her perform oral sex on him
“once or twice.” This also occurred early in the morning in her parents’ bedroom while her mother
was at work. Defendant ejaculated into her mouth, and she spit it out because “it was gross.” A.V.
also disclosed that, during the same time period, defendant would rub his hand on her bare vagina
in an up-and-down motion. A.V. also reaffirmed that her grandmother previously wanted her to
say that she lied, and that she felt she had to say that she had lied to make everyone else happy.
¶ 14 As a result of A.V.’s fourth interview, defendant was charged on May 24, 2023, via
supplemental indictment with two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (counts
IX and X).
¶ 15 On April 8, 2024, defendant filed a motion for disclosure of protected records, requesting
leave to subpoena Zacharias for “any records or notes for A.V., containing statements or a
summary of statements made by A.V. regarding allegations of sexual abuse committed against her
by the Defendant.” Defendant’s motion was brought pursuant to the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2022)).
¶ 16 A hearing was held on defendant’s motion on April 22, 2024. At the hearing, defendant
argued that,
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“we believe any notes or any records of what was said at Zacharias Center has direct
bearing on her credibility. It also provides a basis for potentially why statements have
changed; if there was any influence in now creating this fourth statement, that I think is
certainly relevant, and we just wouldn’t know that without the records, but we do know
that this incident was discussed with Zacharias Center.”
¶ 17 Following the hearing, the trial court ordered that Zacharias “disclose any written report or
notes *** containing statements or summary of statements made by minor A.V. regarding
allegations of sexual abuse for acts of sexual abuse committed by the Defendant against minor
A.V.” for an in camera review.
¶ 18 On April 24, 2024, the State filed a Motion to Reconsider and Quash Subpoena, in which
it argued that section 8-802.1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/8-802.1(d)
(West 2022)) created an absolute privilege from the disclosure of the requested information even
for in camera inspection.
¶ 19 The defendant filed a response to the State’s motion on April 26, 2024. Defendant argued
in his response that, in her third interview, “A.V. did not indicate that anything other than what
she described in her first statement occurred,” and that A.V.’s fourth interview “made additional
allegations that differed from those made in her first interview.” Defendant maintained that the
statements A.V. made to Zacharias between her third and fourth interview directly resulted in the
State filing additional charges, and that the statements made to Zacharias would be “by their very
nature, inconsistent with at least 3 of her prior statements.” Therefore, defendant argued, because
the statements made to Zacharias were relevant and material, A.V.’s statements to Zacharias were
discoverable in spite of the statutory privilege.
¶ 20 A hearing was held on the State’s motion to reconsider on April 30, 2024. At the hearing
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the State proffered that on March 24, 2023, A.V.’s mother reached out to police at the Advocacy
Center and told them that A.V. wanted “to talk more about what happened to her because she’s
been going to therapy, and she’s been talking about what happened to her in therapy.” The State
further proffered that, at the fourth interview, A.V. was asked why she decided to reveal the
additional incidents of sexual abuse, and she responded, “[t]he defendant’s been in jail, and now I
don’t feel in danger anymore. I am not scared, *** I’m not scared anymore.” Defendant argued
that his sixth amendment right to confrontation required an in camera inspection. See U.S. Const.,
amend. VI. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the State’s motion.
¶ 21 On June 3, 2024, defendant filed a petition for rule to show cause against Zacharias. The
trial court issued a rule to show cause against Zacharias on June 25, 2024. On June 26, 2024,
Zacharias filed a response to the rule to show cause, arguing that service of the subpoena was
improper and that the information requested was absolutely privileged, even against in camera
review. Zacharias likewise filed a motion to quash subpoena.
¶ 22 On July 24, 2024, a hearing was held on the rule to show cause and Zacharias’s motion to
quash. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Zacharias was a “rape crisis organization,” its
treatment providers were “rape crisis counselors,” and A.V.’s communications were “confidential
communications” as defined by the Code. The trial court ultimately denied Zacharias’s motion,
stating that “[i]t’s unconscionable to think that a defendant such as Mr. Valderama could be
convicted where information that could be viewed as exculpatory, noncumulative, and not
inadmissible, and certainly not available by other means were to be hidden from him.”
¶ 23 On July 31, 2024, the trial court requested additional briefing from the parties. After
reviewing the parties’ briefs, on September 9, 2024, the trial court stated that although the
legislature intended to create a very strong privilege, the legislature could not abrogate a
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defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court went on to pronounce:
“In this case Defendant has offered a reason to believe that counseling records
would provide a source of impeaching material that are [sic] unavailable from other
sources, namely Defendant stating that A.V. participated in four separate interviews,
second interview A.V. recanting her allegations; in the third interview A.V. recanting again
her recantation; in the fourth interview, additional allegations were made that were not
made in the first interview.
Between the third and fourth interviews, counseling sessions began at Zacharias
Center. As for knowing without a doubt whether there is impeaching material in the
records, Defendant cannot know for sure without in-camera inspection, but there is, in my
estimation, good reason to believe that impeaching material is present in the records in this
case, and for that reason I am ordering Zacharias Center to turn over the records.”
¶ 24 Following the court’s pronouncement, Zacharias requested that the trial court enter an order
instanter, finding Zacharias in contempt with a $1 per day fine, to allow for an immediate appeal.
The trial court granted Zacharias’s request, and Zacharias timely appealed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 At issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Zacharias in contempt for
refusing to comply with its order to produce A.V.’s confidential communications for an in camera
inspection. Zacharias frames its argument as a matter of statutory interpretation regarding whether
the Code permits in camera inspection of confidential communications made by victims of sexual
abuse to rape crisis counselors, and it therefore concludes that the matter is subject to de novo
review. We disagree with this framing.
¶ 27 First, civil contempt orders are ultimately reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tirio v.
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Dalton, 2019 IL App (2d) 181019, ¶ 72. Second, the trial court’s basis for ordering the in camera
inspection of A.V.’s confidential communications was based not on an interpretation of the Code,
but rather on the trial court’s belief that the privilege created by the Code must yield to defendant’s
sixth amendment confrontation rights (see U.S. Const., amend. VI). The question of whether
abrogation of the statutory privilege created by the Code is necessary to preserve defendant’s
confrontation rights presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See People v. Leach,
2012 IL 111534, ¶ 64.
¶ 28 The Code provides that, “Except as provided in this Act, no rape crisis counselor shall
disclose any confidential communication or be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal
proceeding as to any confidential communication without the written consent of the victim or a
representative of the victim ***.” 735 ILCS 5/8-802.1(d) (West 2022). The parties have stipulated
that A.V.’s communications with Zacharias are “confidential communications” as defined by the
Code, and that Zacharias’s treatment providers are “rape crisis counselors.”
¶ 29 The express purpose of the Code is
“to protect victims of rape from public disclosure of statements they make in confidence
to counselors of organizations established to help them. *** Because of the fear and stigma
that often results from those crimes, many victims hesitate to seek help even where it is
available at no cost to them. As a result they not only fail to receive needed medical care
and emergency counseling, but may lack the psychological support necessary to report the
crime and aid police in preventing future crimes.” Id. § 8-802.1(a).
¶ 30 The seminal case regarding the Code is People v. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d 337 (1988). Regarding
the construction of the Code, our supreme court held that the legislature intended the privilege to
be unqualified and absolute, barring even in camera inspection of a victim’s confidential
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communications. Id. at 347. The Foggy court noted that the legislature had eliminated a provision
from the predecessor statute that expressly provided for an in camera inspection, replacing it with
a broader statement of confidentiality, and adding a provision making unauthorized disclosure of
victims’ communications a Class C misdemeanor. Id. at 348.
¶ 31 In Foggy, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and unlawful
restraint, following an incident where the defendant abducted the victim from in front of her home,
drove her to a park, sexually assaulted her, and ultimately released her near a convenience store.
Id. at 339. In the aftermath, the victim received counseling, and the defendant sought to subpoena
her counseling records, ultimately requesting that the trial court conduct an in camera inspection
of the records relating to communications regarding the commission of the offense. Id. at 340-41.
The trial court quashed the defendant’s subpoena, refusing to conduct an in camera inspection on
the basis that the communications were privileged under the Code. Id. at 342. On appeal, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Code. Id. at 339. The Foggy court framed the
issue as “whether an absolute privilege must yield to a criminal defendant’s pretrial discovery
request for otherwise privileged information that may provide material for use in cross-examining
witnesses.” Id. at 347. The Foggy court relied primarily on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
¶ 32 In Davis, the defendant had been charged with grand larceny and burglary relating to the
theft of a safe from a bar. Id. at 309. A “crucial witness” in the prosecution of the State’s case was
Richard Green, who identified the defendant as being near the location where the emptied and
opened safe was ultimately discovered. Id. at 309-10. At the time of Green’s identification, he was
on probation by order of a juvenile court after having been adjudicated delinquent for burglarizing
two cabins. Id. at 310-11. At the State’s request, the trial court entered a protective order preventing
the defendant from referencing Green’s juvenile record, relying on Alaska Rule of Children’s
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Procedure 23, and Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080(g) (Alaska Stat. § 47.10.080(g) (1971)).
Davis, 415 U.S. at 310-11.
¶ 33 The United States Supreme Court in Davis held that, in barring the introduction of Green’s
juvenile record, the trial court denied the defendant the right of effective cross-examination, as the
defendant was then unable to challenge Green’s credibility generally on the basis of his prior
juvenile adjudication and, more specifically, was unable to develop against Green a claim of bias
based on his vulnerable status as a probationer and concern that he might have been the suspect of
the investigation. Id. at 316-18. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction,
concluding that “[t]he State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile
offender’s record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-
examination for bias of an adverse witness.” Id. at 320.
¶ 34 Regarding Davis, the Foggy court maintained that the ability to challenge a claim of
privilege depends on the criticality to the defense of the matter protected by the privilege, noting
that, in Davis, the privileged matter represented a significant and irreplaceable means of
impeaching the State’s chief witness. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 344 (quoting McCormick on Evidence
§ 74.2, at 179 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)).
¶ 35 The Foggy court found that, unlike the defendant in Davis, the defendant’s request “was
merely general” and “not supported by any allegations that material useful to the defense *** was
likely to be found.” Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 347. Likewise, the Foggy court emphasized that “[the]
defendant had access to the array of unprivileged statements made by the complaining witness to
other persons following the commission of the offenses, including the nearly contemporaneous
statements made by the victim to the store clerk, and also had available the victim’s testimony at
the preliminary hearing.” Id. at 349. The Foggy court ultimately concluded that,
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“[u]nlike the defendant in [Davis], who knew of specific information that could show bias
or motive to fabricate on the part of the prosecution witness, and who had no other means
of achieving that end, the defendant here has offered no reason to believe that the victim’s
counseling records would provide a source of impeaching material unavailable from other
sources.” Id. at 350.
¶ 36 The Foggy court also emphasized the “strong public policy in favor of the confidentiality
of communications between sexual assault victims and counselors” and noted that the role of rape
crisis counselors is not to investigate, but rather to help the victim understand and resolve their
feelings about the event, and therefore counseling records are unlikely to result in the disclosure
of matters material to the defense. Id. at 348-50. The Foggy court concluded that the defendant
“was not denied due process, nor was his confrontation right violated, by the trial judge’s refusal
in this case to conduct an in camera inspection of the victim’s counseling records.” Id. at 350.
¶ 37 Later, this court considered the application of the Code in People v. Harlacher, 262 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 9 (1994), where we found that the trial court properly quashed a subpoena issued to a
rape counseling center without subjecting the records to an in camera examination. We reasoned
that the Code creates an absolute privilege that bars in camera examination of such records. Id.
However, Harlacher did not involve any discussion regarding the content of the victim’s
statements or the confrontation clause.
¶ 38 In People v. Miller, 2022 IL App (2d) 210601-U, this court again considered the application
of the Code, as well as our supreme court’s holding in Foggy. In Miller, the defendant appealed
from the denial of his postconviction petition at the second stage. Id. ¶ 2. The defendant argued,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in quashing a subpoena seeking the victim’s rape counseling
records following an in camera inspection of the documents. Id. The defendant claimed, based on
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a Department of Children and Family Services report, that the victim had told her counselor that
defendant had not touched her and had reported additional instances of sexual abuse after the
defendant’s last contact with the victim. Id. ¶ 48. The defendant suggested that the counseling
records might also have shown improper influence by the victim’s mother. Id.
¶ 39 The defendant argued that the privilege set forth in the Code was not absolute and that “in
situations where a defendant has cited direct, specific evidence that rape counseling records
contain exculpatory evidence, Foggy permits the disclosure of those counseling records.” Id. ¶ 124.
We rejected the defendant’s argument, and instead found that Foggy never expressly provided that
the absolute privilege codified in the Code
“should yield to a defendant who makes a specific showing that rape counseling records
contain exculpatory evidence. Instead, our supreme court found that there, where the
defendant made no specific showing as to a need to obtain the absolutely privileged
materials, there was no need to abrogate the victim’s privilege over her counseling
records.” Id. ¶ 125.
Put another way, Foggy did not set forth a rule or test under which a defendant’s confrontation
rights may abrogate the absolute privilege established by the Code. Rather, Foggy found that,
under the specific facts of the case (i.e., where the defendant offered no reason to believe that the
records would provide a source of impeaching material unavailable from other sources), there was
no need to breach the privilege.
¶ 40 We ultimately held that the trial court’s quashing of the subpoena was not an abuse of
discretion because the evidence sought would have been cumulative, inadmissible, or available by
other means. Id. ¶ 128. Specifically, there was already evidence of other recantations by the minor
victim, there were statements regarding abuse by the defendant that were objectively false, and the
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victim and her mother had been examined regarding any improper influence. Id. ¶ 118.
¶ 41 Defendant maintains that, in the instant case, unlike the defendant in Foggy, his “request
is far from a fishing expedition but is, instead, narrowly tailored and entirely germane to the instant
case.” Defendant also relies on the trial court’s finding that there was “good reason to believe that
impeaching material is present in the records” that was unavailable from other sources. We
disagree.
¶ 42 Defendant has offered no reason to believe that A.V.’s confidential statements would
provide a source of impeaching material unavailable from other sources. First, defendant has failed
to allege any specific facts regarding the victim’s statements in the fourth interview that would
suggest that her prior counseling sessions would contain a source of impeachment. Instead, he
merely alleges that the fourth interview statements are inconsistent with prior interviews. The only
indication of what was said in the fourth interview comes from the State’s petition to deny pretrial
release, which stated that A.V. told the interviewer that defendant forced her to perform oral sex
“once or twice” when she was between the ages of 8 and 12 years old. There is no indication that
this additional accusation in any way contradicts A.V.’s initial interview statements, let alone that
anything she said in her counseling sessions would provide a source of impeachment to her
eventual trial testimony. Obviously, the additional accusations are inconsistent with A.V.’s
recantation in the second interview, but the recantation and its subsequent withdrawal occurred
prior to A.V. attending counseling with Zacharias.
¶ 43 Further, to the extent that A.V.’s four statements are inconsistent with one another, there
are other ample sources of potential impeachment evidence. A.V. can be cross-examined regarding
her different statements, her recantation, and statements she made outside of counseling. Likewise,
defendant can question A.V.’s mother, to whom A.V. spoke regarding going to the police with the
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new accusations, as well as R.S. and A.V.’s grandmother who can testify regarding A.V.’s
recantation. As such, potential impeachment was not unavailable from other sources.
¶ 44 The express purpose of the privilege created by the Code is to enable institutions such as
Zacharias to provide victims with “the psychological support necessary to report the crime and aid
police in preventing future crimes,” which is precisely what happened in this case. A.V. attended
counseling and, through that process, decided to speak with police regarding additional instances
of abuse. In light of the strong policy considerations in favor of protecting victims’ confidentiality,
and the lack of any reason to believe that A.V.’s confidential statements would provide a source
of impeaching material unavailable from other sources, the trial court’s order calling for an
in camera inspection of A.V.’s counseling records was a clear abuse of discretion at odds with
explicit precedent to the contrary, including Foggy and Harlacher (and, though Miller is
unpublished, its reasoning is consistent with precedent and persuasive) (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) (eff.
Feb. 1, 2023)). Accordingly, the trial court’s finding of contempt was likewise an abuse of
discretion.
¶ 45 Defendant also contends that our supreme court in People v. Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 47,
held that the “showing for obtaining in camera review of confidential documents need not be more
specific than the one presented by the defendant in [Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)]”
and that the trial court was endeavoring to apply the Ritchie framework adopted by Sauls. We
disagree with this assertion. First, there was no discussion of Ritchie or Sauls by the trial court.
Second, the Foggy court expressly considered the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Ritchie and determined that the unqualified privilege created by the Code was an “issue unresolved
by Ritchie.” Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 347. Therefore, we reject defendant’s argument that Sauls is
applicable here.
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¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 48 Reversed.
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People v. Valderama, 2025 IL App (2d) 240574
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 22-CF-1440; the Hon. Mark L. Levitt, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys David R. Del Re, of Del Re Law Group, of Waukegan, for for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Jason S. Dreifuss, of Waukegan, for appellee. for Appellee:
Amicus Curiae: Eric F. Rinehart, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Stephanie Hoit Lee, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for amicus curiae People of the State of Illinois.
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