NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250457-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 25, 2026 NO. 4-25-0457 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County TERRANCE L. TUSON, ) No. 12CF1098 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Katherine S. Gorman, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, as no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶2 Defendant, Terrance L. Tuson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion
for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)). On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) moves to withdraw as counsel on the ground no issue of arguable merit can be
raised. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, has set forth the underlying facts of
this case in defendant’s prior appeal. See People v. Tuson, 2016 IL App (3d) 130861.
Accordingly, we will set forth only those facts necessary to resolve the issue presented in this case.
¶5 In November 2012, defendant was indicted on charges of first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2010)), attempted first degree murder (id. §§ 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)),
and aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)) for his involvement in the shooting
death of Shannon Elmore and the attempted murder of Jemeral Linwood on October 10, 2011.
¶6 In May 2013, the trial court vacated a trial date of June 3, 2013, after defendant’s
appointed counsel requested time to file a motion to suppress defendant’s statements to police.
After the court set trial for August 19, 2013, defendant interjected, “I refuse my continuance.”
Defendant claimed counsel was not working on his case and “97 days” had already passed. The
court informed defendant counsel needed time to be “100 percent ready,” explained it was
“logical” to grant the continuance, and set the case for hearing on the motion to suppress.
Following the hearing on August 1, 2013, the court denied the motion to suppress defendant’s
statements.
¶7 In August 2013, following the jury trial, defendant was found guilty of all
charges. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 45 years in prison for first degree
murder and 25 years in prison for attempted first degree murder. On direct appeal, defendant
argued the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Third District affirmed. See Tuson,
2016 IL App (3d) 130861, ¶ 30.
¶8 In December 2016, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to
the Act, alleging, among other things, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a
speedy trial claim on appeal after defendant had objected to the continuance at 97 days. The
petition was advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings and counsel was
appointed. Postconviction counsel filed two amended petitions without the speedy trial claim.
-2- The amended petition asserted ineffective assistance claims against trial counsel and appellate
counsel on other grounds. In August 2021, the trial court dismissed defendant’s amended petition
at the second stage.
¶9 In August 2022, the Third District entered a summary order affirming the trial
court’s dismissal and granting appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. People v. Tuson, No. 3-
21-0428 (2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶ 10 In April 2024, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. In the motion, defendant alleged trial counsel’s request for a continuance
over his refusal in May 2013 violated his right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment (U.S.
Const., amend. VI) and fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Further, defendant
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the speedy trial violation on
direct appeal. Lastly, defendant alleged his postconviction counsel failed to comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) where, “had counsel examined the record,” he
would have identified the speedy trial violation.
¶ 11 In the motion, defendant acknowledged communications where appellate counsel
and postconviction counsel both explained there was no viable speedy trial issue to be raised in
his case. Defendant also acknowledged receiving a copy of the amended postconviction petition
in September 2020, which omitted the speedy trial claim. Defendant attached to the motion a
letter from appellate counsel asserting there was no speedy trial claim, along with a transcript of
the May 2013 hearing and his initial pro se postconviction petition.
¶ 12 In April 2025, the trial court issued an order denying defendant’s motion for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition. The court’s order stated defendant’s motion had “not
satisfied the cause and prejudice test,” nor was the motion “based on a claim of actual
-3- innocence.” The court explained the “objective factor” element required to show cause could not
be satisfied “based on a review of the record.”
¶ 13 Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial, and OSAD was appointed to represent
him. In October 2025, OSAD filed a motion for leave to withdraw as defendant’s counsel and
attached a supporting memorandum of law. Defendant did not file a response.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 OSAD contends no meritorious argument can be made the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. After
examining the record on appeal and OSAD’s brief in support of its motion to withdraw as
counsel, we agree this appeal presents no arguably meritorious issues. We therefore grant the
motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 16 The Act provides a means by which criminal defendants can attack convictions
based on a substantial denial of state or federal constitutional rights. People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL
112020, ¶ 14. The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). Claims of a substantial denial of constitutional rights
not raised in the initial or amended postconviction petition are waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West
2024). A defendant must obtain leave from the trial court in order to file a successive petition
under the Act. Id. § 122-1(f).
¶ 17 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a defendant must do
one of the following: (1) show cause and prejudice for the failure to raise a claim in his or her
earlier petition or (2) set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at
459. Cause is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense” that prevented the
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NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250457-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 25, 2026 NO. 4-25-0457 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County TERRANCE L. TUSON, ) No. 12CF1098 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Katherine S. Gorman, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, as no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶2 Defendant, Terrance L. Tuson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion
for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)). On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) moves to withdraw as counsel on the ground no issue of arguable merit can be
raised. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, has set forth the underlying facts of
this case in defendant’s prior appeal. See People v. Tuson, 2016 IL App (3d) 130861.
Accordingly, we will set forth only those facts necessary to resolve the issue presented in this case.
¶5 In November 2012, defendant was indicted on charges of first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2010)), attempted first degree murder (id. §§ 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)),
and aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)) for his involvement in the shooting
death of Shannon Elmore and the attempted murder of Jemeral Linwood on October 10, 2011.
¶6 In May 2013, the trial court vacated a trial date of June 3, 2013, after defendant’s
appointed counsel requested time to file a motion to suppress defendant’s statements to police.
After the court set trial for August 19, 2013, defendant interjected, “I refuse my continuance.”
Defendant claimed counsel was not working on his case and “97 days” had already passed. The
court informed defendant counsel needed time to be “100 percent ready,” explained it was
“logical” to grant the continuance, and set the case for hearing on the motion to suppress.
Following the hearing on August 1, 2013, the court denied the motion to suppress defendant’s
statements.
¶7 In August 2013, following the jury trial, defendant was found guilty of all
charges. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 45 years in prison for first degree
murder and 25 years in prison for attempted first degree murder. On direct appeal, defendant
argued the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Third District affirmed. See Tuson,
2016 IL App (3d) 130861, ¶ 30.
¶8 In December 2016, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to
the Act, alleging, among other things, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a
speedy trial claim on appeal after defendant had objected to the continuance at 97 days. The
petition was advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings and counsel was
appointed. Postconviction counsel filed two amended petitions without the speedy trial claim.
-2- The amended petition asserted ineffective assistance claims against trial counsel and appellate
counsel on other grounds. In August 2021, the trial court dismissed defendant’s amended petition
at the second stage.
¶9 In August 2022, the Third District entered a summary order affirming the trial
court’s dismissal and granting appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. People v. Tuson, No. 3-
21-0428 (2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶ 10 In April 2024, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. In the motion, defendant alleged trial counsel’s request for a continuance
over his refusal in May 2013 violated his right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment (U.S.
Const., amend. VI) and fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Further, defendant
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the speedy trial violation on
direct appeal. Lastly, defendant alleged his postconviction counsel failed to comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) where, “had counsel examined the record,” he
would have identified the speedy trial violation.
¶ 11 In the motion, defendant acknowledged communications where appellate counsel
and postconviction counsel both explained there was no viable speedy trial issue to be raised in
his case. Defendant also acknowledged receiving a copy of the amended postconviction petition
in September 2020, which omitted the speedy trial claim. Defendant attached to the motion a
letter from appellate counsel asserting there was no speedy trial claim, along with a transcript of
the May 2013 hearing and his initial pro se postconviction petition.
¶ 12 In April 2025, the trial court issued an order denying defendant’s motion for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition. The court’s order stated defendant’s motion had “not
satisfied the cause and prejudice test,” nor was the motion “based on a claim of actual
-3- innocence.” The court explained the “objective factor” element required to show cause could not
be satisfied “based on a review of the record.”
¶ 13 Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial, and OSAD was appointed to represent
him. In October 2025, OSAD filed a motion for leave to withdraw as defendant’s counsel and
attached a supporting memorandum of law. Defendant did not file a response.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 OSAD contends no meritorious argument can be made the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. After
examining the record on appeal and OSAD’s brief in support of its motion to withdraw as
counsel, we agree this appeal presents no arguably meritorious issues. We therefore grant the
motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 16 The Act provides a means by which criminal defendants can attack convictions
based on a substantial denial of state or federal constitutional rights. People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL
112020, ¶ 14. The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). Claims of a substantial denial of constitutional rights
not raised in the initial or amended postconviction petition are waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West
2024). A defendant must obtain leave from the trial court in order to file a successive petition
under the Act. Id. § 122-1(f).
¶ 17 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a defendant must do
one of the following: (1) show cause and prejudice for the failure to raise a claim in his or her
earlier petition or (2) set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at
459. Cause is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense” that prevented the
defendant from raising the claim in an earlier proceeding. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
-4- at 460. Prejudice is an error so infectious to the proceedings that the resulting conviction or
sentence violates due process. Id. at 464. For a defendant to obtain leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, both prongs of the cause and prejudice test must be satisfied. Guerrero,
2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. People v. Crenshaw, 2015 IL App (4th) 131035, ¶ 38.
¶ 18 OSAD asserts it can make no meritorious argument defendant’s motion satisfied
the cause and prejudice test. We agree.
¶ 19 In his motion, defendant argues his pro se postconviction petition raised the
speedy trial claims he now wishes to raise in a successive postconviction petition. According to
defendant, after postconviction counsel was appointed, he received a copy of the first amended
postconviction petition in September 2020, and he “noticed” counsel “had disregarded” the
claims. However, defendant’s motion does not allege any actions he took to raise the speedy trial
claims after noticing their omission from the first amended petition. Defendant has likewise
failed to identify an objective factor which prevented him from subsequently raising the claims.
See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024) (to show cause, a defendant must identify an objective
factor which impeded his ability to raise the claims in his initial postconviction petition).
¶ 20 Indeed, a review of the record shows defendant had multiple opportunities to raise
the speedy trial issue in the postconviction proceedings that followed the first amended petition
but did not. When postconviction counsel informed the trial court he was filing a second
amended petition to add a separate theory at defendant’s request, the court asked defendant to
confirm whether he heard, understood, and agreed with the proceedings. Defendant responded
affirmatively and did not inform the court of any other claims. Defendant was present at the
August 2021 hearing and did not raise any objections when the court ultimately dismissed his
-5- postconviction petition.
¶ 21 Because we find defendant did not show cause, we need not address the prejudice
prong. See Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. Therefore, we agree with OSAD no meritorious
argument can be raised the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
-6-