People v. Truell

Opinion

People v Truell

2026 NY Slip Op 05197

September 2, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

James Truell, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 2, 2026

2021-01809, (Ind. No. 2320/16)

Mark C. Dillon, J.P.

Helen Voutsinas

Laurence L. Love

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Law Offices of Joseph Z. Amsel, PLLC, New York, NY, for appellant.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Danielle M. O'Boyle, and Catherine J. Kim of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Gene Lopez, J.), rendered November 5, 2020, as amended February 5, 2021, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and identification evidence. The notice of appeal is deemed to be from the judgment rendered November 5, 2020 (see CPL 460.10[6]).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence at the suppression hearing failed to establish probable cause for his arrest is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Rodgers, 228 AD3d 961, 962). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. The evidence elicited at the hearing established that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant (see People v Battle, 239 AD3d 764, 766; People v Rodgers, 228 AD3d at 962).

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence at the suppression hearing established that exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest that would justify the warrantless search of a backpack. The circumstances supported a reasonable belief that the backpack contained a weapon (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458; People v Alvarado, 126 AD3d 803, 805).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence. The evidence adduced at the Wade hearing (see United States v Wade, 388 US 218) established that the pretrial identification procedures were not unduly suggestive (see People v Bell, 188 AD3d 904, 905-906; People v Bookman, 232 AD2d 498, 498-499; People v Rosado, 222 AD2d 617, 618). Moreover, the defendant improperly relies, in part, upon trial testimony in contending that the hearing court erred in denying suppression of identification evidence. "Trial testimony may not be considered in evaluating a suppression ruling on appeal" (People v Perez-Rodriguez, 166 AD3d 659, 659).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in admitting evidence of his uncharged crimes or prior bad acts is without merit (see People v Byers, 247 AD3d 1055, 1055; People v Cedillo, 242 AD3d 1107, 1107; People v Khan, 88 AD3d 1014; see also People v Molineux, 168 NY 264). The court providently exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence, as it was inextricably interwoven with the narrative of events, provided necessary background information, and the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect (see People v Cedillo, 242 AD3d at 1107; People v Henry, 173 AD3d 900, 901). Additionally, the court gave the jury appropriate limiting instructions, to which defense counsel did not object, as to the limited purpose for which that evidence was received (see People v Dudley, 203 AD3d 1066, 1066). Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in admitting the evidence, such error was harmless because the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the Molineux evidence, was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for that evidence (see People v Byers, 247 AD3d at 1055; see generally People v Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439, 469-471).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by alleged prosecutorial misconduct based upon the prosecutor's comments during his summation is unpreserved for appellate review, as defense counsel either failed to object to the challenged comments or failed to object with sufficient specificity (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Adorno, 210 AD3d 113, 121). In any event, the challenged comments were fair comment on the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, fair response to defense counsel's summation, or constituted harmless error, and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial (see People v Johnson, 248 AD3d 1279, 1280; People v Murphy, 218 AD3d 795, 797).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel is without merit, as the record reveals that defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712), and the defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; People v Oden, 248 AD3d 1283, 1283).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., VOUTSINAS, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court