People v. Trotter

2018 NY Slip Op 5211
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 11, 2018
Docket2014-07784
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 NY Slip Op 5211 (People v. Trotter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Trotter, 2018 NY Slip Op 5211 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

People v Trotter (2018 NY Slip Op 05211)
People v Trotter
2018 NY Slip Op 05211
Decided on July 11, 2018
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.


Decided on July 11, 2018 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P.
SHERI S. ROMAN
ROBERT J. MILLER
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

2014-07784

[*1]People of State of New York, respondent,

v

Guy Trotter, appellant.


The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY (Nancy E. Little of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Timothy R. McGrath of counsel), for respondent.



DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Elisa S. Koenderman, J.), dated July 21, 2014, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, and the defendant is designated a level one sex offender.

In this proceeding pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art. 6-C; hereinafter SORA), the Supreme Court designated the defendant a level two sex offender based on its assessment of 75 points on the risk assessment instrument. The defendant challenges only the assessment of points under risk factor 11 (Drug or Alcohol Abuse).

At a risk-level determination hearing under SORA, the People bear the burden of proving the facts underlying the assessments by clear and convincing evidence (see Correction Law § 168-n[3]; People v Eaton, 105 AD3d 722, 723). "[R]eliable hearsay" is admissible (Correction Law § 168-n[3]; see People v Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 572). In its Commentary to the SORA Guidelines, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders has stated that the proof "can be derived from the sex offender's admissions; the victim's statements; the evaluative reports of the supervising probation officer, parole officer or corrections counselor; or from any other reliable source" (SORA: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 5 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]). Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals expressly recognized in Mingo, admissible evidence is not necessarily persuasive: "[o]f course, information found in a case summary or presentence report need not always be credited — it may be rejected when it is unduly speculative or its accuracy is undermined by other more compelling evidence" (People v Mingo, 12 NY3d at 573).

Assessment of points under risk factor 11 may be appropriate if the offender has a "history" of substance abuse or if the offender "was abusing drugs and or alcohol at the time of the offense" (Guidelines at 15; see People v Palmer, 20 NY3d 373, 379-380; People v Santogual, 157 AD3d 737, 737; People v Madison, 153 AD3d 737, 737-738). Here, the People did not meet their burden of proving the facts underlying the disputed point assessment by clear and convincing evidence (see People v Santogual, 157 AD3d at 737). The presentence report contained only [*2]ambiguous information about the extent of the defendant's use of alcohol and marijuana between the ages of 16 and 20, at least 7 years before the sex offense at issue in this proceeding, and no information about the defendant's use of those substances in the 7 years before the sex offense. Moreover, the evidence at the hearing did not establish that the defendant abused or was under the influence of alcohol or marijuana at the time of the offense (see People v Madison, 153 AD3d at 737-738; cf. People v Villanueva, 143 AD3d 794, 794). Accordingly, the defendant should not have been assessed 15 points under risk factor 11. Without the assessment of those points, the point total was 60, within the range for a presumptive designation as a level one sex offender. Therefore, the defendant should have been designated a level one sex offender.

BALKIN, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court



Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Mingo
910 N.E.2d 983 (New York Court of Appeals, 2009)
People v. Villanueva
2016 NY Slip Op 6692 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2016)
People v. Madison
2017 NY Slip Op 6200 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
People v. Palmer
984 N.E.2d 917 (New York Court of Appeals, 2013)
People v. Eaton
105 A.D.3d 722 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2018 NY Slip Op 5211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-trotter-nyappdiv-2018.