People v. Tribble

2025 IL App (1st) 240619-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-0619
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 240619-U No. 1-24-0619

SIXTH DIVISION December 19, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12 CR 22425 ) HAMIDULLAH TRIBBLE, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Thomas J. Hennelly, ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment. Justice Gamrath specially concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s order denying defendant’s postconviction petition is reversed where the court improperly recharacterized defendant’s petition as a petition for relief from judgment. We remand the matter for further second-stage postconviction proceedings.

¶2 Defendant Hamidullah Tribble appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his petition for

relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). On

appeal, defendant contends that his conviction for possession of a firearm with a defaced serial

number is void because the statute, as constructed at the time of the offense, was unconstitutional 1-24-0619

on its face. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the matter for further second-stage

postconviction proceedings.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was charged by information with one count of possession of a firearm with a

defaced serial number (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2012)) and four counts of aggravated unlawful

use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(C), (I) (West 2012)). These charges arose from events on

November 25, 2012, wherein defendant, who was under the age of 21, allegedly carried a handgun

with an altered or removed serial number, and he lacked a currently valid Firearm Owner’s

Identification Card (FOID).

¶5 A. Initial Guilty Plea

¶6 On January 2, 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm with

a defaced serial number in exchange for two years’ probation. The court considered facts which

were presented to it during an off-the-record pretrial Rule 402 conference to be a sufficient factual

basis to accept the guilty plea. Defendant did not file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea

or a direct appeal.

¶7 B. Violation of Probation

¶8 On February 27, 2013, the State filed a petition alleging that defendant violated his

probation on February 26, 2013, by committing the offenses of possession of a stolen motor vehicle

and aggravated fleeing and eluding. These new cases were filed under circuit court case number

13 CR 4980.

¶9 Defendant pleaded guilty to the violation of probation and possession of a stolen motor

vehicle under case number 13 CR 4980 on April 17, 2013. 1 The court accepted the plea based upon

1 The matters under circuit court case number 13 CR 4980 are not at issue in this appeal. -2- 1-24-0619

facts presented to it during an off-the-record pretrial Rule 402 conference. The court ordered

defendant to attend the one-year Cook County Impact Incarceration Boot Camp Program, and

admonished him that if he violated “any phase” of the program, the court would “more likely than

not” sentence him to consecutive terms of three and four years’ imprisonment for the offenses.

Defendant did not file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a direct appeal.

¶ 10 C. Violation of Boot Camp

¶ 11 On October 16, 2013, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s sentence to the Impact

Incarceration Program because he failed to meet the conditions of the post release phase of the

sentence. According to the petition, defendant was reported “A.W.O.L. from V.R.I.C. (Boot

Camp) Post Release” on October 8, 2013. The Sheriff’s Electronic Monitoring Unit made a house

check and then officially declared him “AWOL.” The court ordered that a warrant be issued against

defendant. Defendant was subsequently arrested for a new matter in Markham, Illinois.

¶ 12 On November 20, 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to violating the terms of boot camp in

exchange for a sentence of three years’ imprisonment consecutive to a four-year sentence imposed

under circuit court case number 13 CR 4980.

¶ 13 On December 17, 2014, defendant mailed a one-page form motion to withdraw his guilty

plea and vacate his sentence. On January 14, 2015, he filed a more detailed motion through

counsel, alleging that he was “tricked” by counsel and the court “into not understanding that he

was being sentenced to probation based on a plea to a Class 3” felony in 2013. On February 27,

2015, pursuant to the advice of his defense counsel, defendant orally moved to withdraw his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence. The court granted the oral motion.

Defendant did not appeal.

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¶ 14 D. Pro Se Postconviction Petition

¶ 15 On February 21, 2020, defendant filed a pro se form postconviction petition wherein he

alleged that he was a juvenile charged as an adult at the time that he was initially sentenced for the

possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number charge. He also alleged that “[d]ue to a void

judgment,” his second amendment constitutional right to bear arms was violated, and the firearm

at issue had no firing pin when he was arrested. Defendant attached his affidavit but no other

exhibits in support of the petition.

¶ 16 The court, initially treating the petition as a postconviction petition, advanced the petition

to the second stage of proceedings and appointed postconviction counsel. The half sheet for the

court appearance on July 31, 2020, includes a parenthetical stating “is this a 1st stage or a 2-1401

petition,” and the court mused during that day’s status hearing that defendant filed the matter

“under the Post Conviction [sic] but it becomes a 214 [sic] petition.” On the half sheet for the

September 11, 2020, court date, the court noted that defendant “did file this as a PC.” On January

27, 2023, postconviction counsel filed his Rule 651(c) certification and asserted that he was

adopting defendant’s pro se petition.

¶ 17 On March 3, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, arguing that

defendant’s petition was untimely and that he failed to make a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation. The State also contended that defendant’s conviction was not void because

the offense of possession of a weapon with a defaced serial number is a meaningful regulation

under the second amendment.

¶ 18 The matter proceeded to a hearing on November 17, 2023, where postconviction counsel

first argued that defendant alleged actual innocence, which would circumvent untimeliness

concerns. Counsel further contended that under a recent federal case from West Virginia, United

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States v. Price, 635 F. Supp. 3d 455 (S.D. W.Va. 2022), rev’d, 111 F. 4th 392 (4th Cir. 2024), a

defendant’s conviction due to mere possession of a defaced firearm was unconstitutional. Thus,

defendant was convicted of a crime that it was “no longer constitutional to prosecute.”

¶ 19 On February 23, 2024, the court denied defendant’s petition in an oral ruling. In ruling, the

court commented that defendant’s petition did not comply with the Act, so it would construe the

petition as a petition for relief from judgment as the court believed “that was the intent.” The court

noted that defacing a firearm is a meaningful regulation under the second amendment, and so

defendant’s conviction was not void.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 On appeal, defendant argues that the statute under which he was convicted, possession of

a firearm with a defaced serial number, was unconstitutional under the second amendment to the

United States Constitution as it was construed when defendant was convicted of the offense.

Defendant specifically contends that the construction of the statute at the time he was convicted

required only that the State prove that he possessed a firearm with a defaced serial number, rather

than additionally prove that he knew the firearm he possessed was defaced. See People v. Stanley,

397 Ill. App. 3d 598 (2009), overruled by People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123. The supreme court

has since ruled that the State must prove both a defendant’s knowledge of the possession of the

firearm and knowledge that the firearm the defendant possessed was defaced, in part to comport

with the second amendment, as the statute would otherwise criminalize knowing possession of a

firearm. See Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 23. Defendant argues that the construction of the statute

at the time he was convicted impermissibly burdened his constitutional right to keep and bear arms,

such that his conviction was rendered void and must be vacated.

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¶ 22 A. Possession of a Firearm with a Defaced Serial Number

¶ 23 In 2013, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

His postconviction petition raises a claim directed at the constitutionality of the statutory provision

for the offense. The statute specifies that “[a] person who possesses any firearm upon which any

such importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number has been changed, altered, removed or obliterated

commits a Class 3 felony.” 720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2012). The statute does not specify a mens

rea. 2

¶ 24 Prior to defendant’s conviction, the statute had been interpreted in People v. Stanley. In

Stanley, the defendant argued that the State did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

because it did not present evidence of his knowledge that the firearm in his possession was defaced.

Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 3d 598, 603 (2009). We noted that the statute “clearly lack[ed] any mens

rea,” but the legislature did not intend to create an absolute liability offense. Id. at 605-07. We

found that the State could meet its burden by proving the defendant’s “knowing or intentional

mental state,” and the State’s allegation that defendant knowingly possessed the firearm met the

requirement. Id. at 607. We further found that the State did not need to prove that the defendant

knew that the firearm was defaced “in conformance” with the legislature’s recognition of the

dangerousness posed by defaced weapons. Id. at 608.

¶ 25 In 2023, ten years after defendant was convicted, the supreme court revisited this issue in

People v. Ramirez. In Ramirez, the supreme court overruled Stanley, finding that the State was

additionally required to prove that the defendant knew that the firearm he possessed was defaced.

2 This is in contrast to 720 ILCS 5/24-5(a) (West 2012), the provision which controls the offense of defacement of identifying marks on a firearm, which states “[a]ny person who shall knowingly or intentionally change, alter, remove or obliterate the name of the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number of any firearm commits a Class 2 felony.” (emphasis added) 720 ILCS 5/24- 5(a)(West 2012). -6- 1-24-0619

Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 24. The supreme court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to

make a violation of section 24-5(b) an absolute liability offense, and like the Stanley court

determined that a mens rea must be inferred into the statute. Id. at ¶ 21. The Ramirez court

determined that, in addition to proof of knowledge of possession of the firearm, the State must

prove knowledge that the possessed firearm is defaced because without such knowledge, a

defendant’s otherwise innocent possession of a firearm would be criminalized. Id. at ¶ 24. It further

commented that requiring proof of knowledge of both elements was necessary to avoid

impermissibly burdening a defendant’s constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.

The court noted that “[a] statute that criminalizes the knowing possession of a firearm, without

more, would run afoul of the second amendment.” Id. at ¶ 26 (citing New York State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

¶ 26 Defendant’s pro se postconviction petition raised a claim directed at the constitutionality

of this provision under the second amendment of the United States Constitution. The statute, as

noted, is ambiguous in its wording, and has not been revised despite confusion about its

interpretation. Further, the precedent interpreting this provision has been in flux from the time

defendant was originally convicted to his current postconviction challenge. With this backdrop in

mind, we address the propriety of the court’s recharacterization of defendant’s pro se

postconviction petition as a petition for relief from judgment.

¶ 27 B. Procedural Vehicles for Postconviction Collateral Relief

¶ 28 The Act provides a three-stage method by which imprisoned persons may collaterally

challenge their convictions for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v.

LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 43 (2007). A petition survives dismissal at the first stage of proceedings

if it is not frivolous or patently without merit, and the defendant alleges facts to state a claim that

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is arguably constitutional. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020); People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1,

9 (2009). At the second stage, counsel is appointed if a defendant is indigent, and the State may

file a motion to dismiss or an answer to the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-4, 122-5 (West 2020); People

v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33.

¶ 29 In order to survive dismissal at the second stage, the defendant bears the burden of making

a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. The question

is whether the petition’s well-pled allegations, taken as true, would entitle the defendant to relief

if proven at an evidentiary hearing. Id. Here, the circuit court advanced the petition to the second

stage of proceedings before denying the petition as a petition for relief from judgment.

¶ 30 Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) is a civil remedy that extends to

criminal cases and provides a statutory mechanism for vacating final judgments more than 30 days

from their entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2020); People v. Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 18. “A

section 2-1401 petition for relief from a final judgment is the forum in a criminal case in which to

correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and

court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition.”

People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 461 (2000).

¶ 31 “[W]here a pro se pleading alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights cognizable under

the Act, a trial court may treat the pleading as a postconviction petition.” People v. Shellstrom, 216

Ill. 2d 45, 51 (2005). In doing so, the court must (1) notify the pro se defendant of its intent to

recharacterize the pleading; (2) warn the defendant that, accordingly, any subsequent

postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive postconviction petitions;

and (3) provide the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading or amend it so that it

contains all of the claims appropriate to a postconviction petition. Id. at 57.

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¶ 32 B. Whether the Court Appropriately Recharacterized Defendant’s Petition

¶ 33 Here, the court advanced the petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings

and appointed postconviction counsel, who subsequently filed a 651(c) certificate and adopted the

arguments in defendant’s pro se petition. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the parties

argued at a hearing. The court first treated defendant’s pro se petition as a petition for relief from

judgment during its ruling regarding the State’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 34 In People v. Stoffel, the supreme court discussed a situation that is remarkably similar to

the matter at bar. 239 Ill. 2d 314 (2010). In Stoffel, the court recharacterized the defendant’s

postconviction petition as a petition for relief from judgment during second-stage proceedings. Id.

at 318-21. The supreme court first noted that the defendant’s pro se petition alleged a constitutional

violation which was cognizable as a postconviction claim, and that “Rule 651(c) pertains solely to

postconviction counsel appointed pursuant to the Act.” Id. at 327. It determined that the circuit

court erred in recharacterizing the petition where it did not offer a reasonable basis for treating the

pleading as a petition for relief from judgment after the petition had already survived summary

dismissal as a postconviction petition. Id. at 329. The supreme court noted that no facts showed

that postconviction counsel investigated the matter and determined that the defendant’s substantive

claims would be more appropriately addressed in another procedural vehicle. Id.

¶ 35 Here, as in Stoffel, there can be no doubt that the body of defendant’s pro se petition alleged

a constitutional violation which was cognizable as a postconviction claim. See id. at 327.

Defendant alleged that his conviction for possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number

violated the second amendment of the United States Constitution. Because defendant characterized

his conviction as “void,” the circuit court could have interpreted his pro se petition as a petition

for relief from judgment from the outset. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 29 (where

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a petition for relief from judgment is filed after the two-year limitations period, the court

recognizes an exception to forfeiture where the petition challenges a “void” judgment). However,

as in Stoffel, it did not do so; nor did it give a reasonable basis for recharacterization and

postconviction counsel did not determine that a petition for relief from judgment more

appropriately addressed defendant’s claims. See Stoffel, 239 Ill. 2d at 329. Thus, the court erred in

recharacterizing defendant’s pro se petition after second-stage proceedings.

¶ 36 As the court improperly recharacterized defendant’s petition, we reverse and remand the

matter for further proceedings. In this case, we believe that another second-stage postconviction

hearing is the appropriate remedy. On remand, defendant will need to establish facts which could

potentially warrant an evidentiary hearing on his constitutional claim. See Domagala, 2013 IL

113688, ¶ 35 (a substantial showing of a constitutional violation “is a measure of the legal

sufficiency of the petition’s well-pled allegations of a constitutional violation”). The factual basis

for defendant’s initial guilty plea was based upon facts presented to the court in an off-the-record

402 conference. In order to advance defendant’s petition, postconviction counsel should

investigate whether facts exist which support defendant’s constitutional claim and amend the

petition accordingly. See People v. Collins, 2021 IL App (1st) 170597, ¶ 49 (postconviction

counsel is required to investigate and properly present defendant’s raised claims).

¶ 37 As a final matter, we note that defendant further alleged in his pro se petition that the

firearm at issue lacked a firing pin and defendant was only 17 years old at the time of the offense.

These allegations were largely ignored by postconviction counsel, the State, the circuit court, and

appellate counsel. Nor does the record reveal any evidence either supporting or refuting

defendant’s allegation regarding the firing pin because, as noted above, the record lacks the factual

basis for defendant’s plea.

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¶ 38 “The right to postconviction counsel is statutory, not constitutional.” People v. Milam,

2012 IL App (1st) 100832, ¶ 21; 725 ILCS 5/122-4(West 2020). “[C]riminal defendants seeking

relief in postconviction proceedings have no constitutional right to counsel, effective or

otherwise.” People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30. “[P]etitioners are only entitled to the level of

assistance provided for by the [Act].” People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007). “The required

quantum of assistance has been judicially deemed to be a ‘reasonable level,’ ” which is

“significantly lower” than the constitutional right to counsel. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30.

¶ 39 To that end, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) mandates certain duties

postconviction counsel must undertake at the second stage of proceedings. See People v. Jackson,

2021 IL App (1st) 190263, ¶ 42. Appointed counsel must consult with the defendant, examine the

record of trial proceedings, make any necessary amendments to the petition, and file a certificate

indicating compliance with the rule. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017); People v. Cotto, 2016

IL 119006, ¶ 27. The “primary purpose” of the Rule “is to ensure that counsel shapes the

petitioner’s claims into proper legal form and presents those claims to the court.” People v.

Kuehner, 2015 IL 117695, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 43-44 (2007)).

¶ 40 While we express no opinion on the legal merits of defendant’s contentions regarding his

age and that his firearm lacked a firing pin, we find it troubling that the matters were not addressed

by postconviction counsel or the State. In particular, defendant clearly challenges whether the

firearm at issue satisfies the definition of “firearm” under the statute governing defendant’s

conviction, as the firearm lacked a firing pin and, thus, was inoperable. See People v. McCarty, 94

Ill. 2d 28, 38 (1983) (“[J]urisdiction is lacking where the circumstances alleged do not constitute

the offense charged as it is defined in the statute and nothing short of alleging entirely different

facts could cure the defect.”); see also, People v. Kayer, 2013 IL App (4th) 120028, ¶ 9 (quoting

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McCarty, 94 Ill. 2d at 38) (“ ‘The effect of a plea of guilty is a record admission of whatever is

well alleged in the indictment. If the latter is insufficient [the plea] confesses nothing.’ ”).

Nevertheless, on remand it is the duty of postconviction counsel to ultimately determine whether

this issue is suitable for an expanded argument and address the argument unless he or she

determines that the issue is without merit. As noted, postconviction counsel has a duty to at least

attempt to present or shape defendant’s claims in order to satisfy Rule 651(c). See id.; see also,

Collins, 2021 IL App (1st) 170597, ¶ 49. We must consider this a cautionary tale for both the State

and defense counsel to learn all the facts relevant to a defendant’s conviction both during the

underlying case and postconviction proceedings. In particular, postconviction counsel always has

the duty to scrutinize the petition and consult with the defendant in order to ensure that the petition

includes the claims that the defendant wished to raise during the postconviction proceedings. Ill.

S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the

matter for further second-stage postconviction proceedings.

¶ 43 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 44 JUSTICE GAMRATH, specially concurring:

¶ 45 I concur and agree remand is appropriate. However, I do not join paragraphs 37 and 40 of

the majority's decision for two reasons. First, Tribble has not raised on appeal the issue of the

firing pin; neither should we, sua sponte. Second, I submit that postconviction counsel did

not “ignore” the firing pin issue but recognized the frivolity of it.

¶ 46 Tribble's pro se postconviction petition raises a sufficiency-of-evidence argument about

the firing pin. This does not give rise to a constitutional or jurisdictional claim. The cases cited in

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paragraph 40 are inapplicable, as they both involve a defect in the charging instrument, which

affected subject matter jurisdiction. While I appreciate the majority's thorough analysis, nothing

here suggests Tribble was invalidly charged with a crime based on a flaw in the charging

instrument. Accordingly, I disagree that further consideration of the firing pin issue is

appropriate on remand.

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