People v. Toynbee

2 Park. Cr. 490
CourtCourt Of Oyer And Terminer New York
DecidedMarch 15, 1856
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2 Park. Cr. 490 (People v. Toynbee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court Of Oyer And Terminer New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Toynbee, 2 Park. Cr. 490 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1856).

Opinion

Selden, J.

The question which lies at the threshhold of this case, and which should be determined in advance of every other, is, whether the act for the prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime, considered in reference to its object, the means adopted to secure that object, and its alleged effect in virtually annihilating a large amount of property, is void, as being without the pale of legislative power. It is claimed, 1. That irrespective of any positive restrictions, the principles of natural equity and justice set bounds to the power of the legislature, which are transcended by this law. And. 2. That it is in conflict with the express provisions of the constitution.

[509]*509In examining this subject, speculative opinions in regard to 1 he wisdom of the act, or the beneficial results likely to flow from it, can have nothing whatever to do with a question, which depends upon abstract principles of governmental law; principles which can not be moulded to meet the views or interests of any portion of the people. It is a question not of expediency, but of power. •

Every sovereign state, possesses -within itself, absolute and unlimited legislative power. It is true, that as government is instituted for beneficent purposes, and to promote the welfare of the governed, it has no moral right to enact a law which is plainly repugnant to reason and justice. But this principle belongs to the science of political ethics, and not that of law. There is no arbiter beyond the state itself, to determine what legislation is just. Whatever, therefore, is to be declared by the ultimate power of a state, as there can be no appeal, must in view of the law, be taken to be just and right. The union of the functions of making and deciding upon laws, constitutes of necessity absolute legislative power. While, therefore, the right of a sovereign state to pass arbitrary and tyrannical laws may, its legal power can not, be denied. This is self-evident, and needs no proof. I speak of course, of a state as a whole, where all its powers are concentrated in the hands of the people at large, or of one or more of its members.

It follows, that if a society of people wishing to form an organized government, should simply create the three essential departments, vesting the whole executive power in one, the legislative in another, and the judicial in a third; as the three departments combined would possess'all the powers which belonged to the people in their collective capacity, the legislative department could make any law which the people themselves could have made, arbitrary, oppressive or otherwise; unless, under such a distribution of the governmental powers, some authority, is vested in the judiciary, to pass upon the propriety or justice of the laws.

But it is evident that this is a legislative and not judicial power. It is necessarily to be exercised in the first instance [510]*510at least, when the law is passed, and obviously constitutes the most essential portion of the duty of the legislature itself. To suppose the same power vested in the judiciary, tends to confound the distinction between the two departments. Besides, when exercised by the latter, it becomes a supervisory and appellate power, and thus virtually subversive of all legislation. It is clear, therefore, in my judgment, that in a perfectly natural and simple distribution of the governmental powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to pronounce any act of the legislature void. It may, however, acquire this right through an artificial distribution of those po wers, by means of the organic law.

Let us look then at our state constitution. Section 1, art. 3, declares that The legislative poWer of this state, shall be vested in a senate and assembly.” This means of course the whole legislative power. The words are general and unlimited, nothing is reserved. It was decided by this court, in the case of Barto v. Himrod, (4 Seld. 483,) that the people had parted with all their power of legislation, except in the single case provided for in art. 7, sec. 12.

Why then, as it has been shown that the people could make any law just of unjust, is not the legislature equally absolute! It is because by other clauses in the constitution hereafter to be noticed, a portion of this absolute power has been transferred to the judiciary. Not, it is true, in direct terms; but the constitution, being the result of legislation by the people themselves, before parting with their power, is the paramount law. When, therefore, any law passed by the legislature, conflicts with this, the judiciary pronounces between them, as it' does between the acts of two successive legislatures, and the paramount law prevails. It will be seen, that, in this mode, a restriction upon the power of the legislature is effected, without confounding "the distinction between the two departments, as the judiciary continues to exercise only its appropriate judicial functions.

To determine then, the'extent of the law-making power, we have only to look to the provisions of the constitution. It has, [511]*511and can have no other limit than such as is there prescribed, and the doctrine, that there exists in the judiciary some vague, loose and undefined power, to annul a law, because in its judgment it is “ contrary to natural equity and justice,” is in conflict with the first principles of government, and can never I' think be maintained.

I am aware that some eminent judges, when the question was not before them, have expressed a belief in the existence of such a power; but no court has ever, I believe, assumed to declare an explicit enactment of the legislature void, on that ground.

Blackstone, in his commentaries, after referring to the doctrine advanced by some other writers on this subject, that acts of parliament, “ contrary to reason,” are void, says: “ But if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the constitution that is vested with power to control it; and the examples usually alleged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that when the main object of a statute is unreasonable, the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above the legislative, which would be subversive of all government.” (1 Black. Com. 91.)

Christian; in his commentary upon this passage, says, “ When the signification of a statute is manifest, no authority, less than that of parliament, can restrain its operation.” {See note to Black,) These authorities, it is true, have reference to the British constitution; but the following relate to those of our own country.

Lieber, in his work on civil liberty and self-government, says, that the state legislatures have the right, as a general rule, to do all that seems necessary for the general welfare, and is not specially prohibited.” He suggests no exceptions. (See chap. 15, §25.)

Mr. Justice Irdell, in the case of Calder v. Bull (3 Dall 386,) when this question was incidentally considered, uses the following emphatic language: “If then a government, com[512]

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State v. Barrett.
50 S.E. 506 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1905)
State v. Beswick
13 R.I. 211 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1881)

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Bluebook (online)
2 Park. Cr. 490, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-toynbee-nyoytermct-1856.