People v. Townsend

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Townsend

44 A.D.3d 970, 843 N.Y.S.2d 687

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided October 23, 2007·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chambers, J.), rendered August 12, 2004, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and attemptéd robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court providently exercised its discretion in preclud[971]*971ing defense counsel from eliciting testimony from a defense witness regarding a collateral issue (see People v Petty, 7 NY3d 277, 286 [2006]; People v Aska, 91 NY2d 979, 981 [1998]; People v LaPetina, 34 AD3d 836, 841-842 [2006], affd 9 NY3d 854 [2007]; People v Mason, 256 AD2d 595 [1998]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review. Rivera, J.P., Covello, Balkin and McCarthy, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chambers, J.), rendered August 12, 2004, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and attemptéd robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court providently exercised its discretion in preclud[971]*971ing defense counsel from eliciting testimony from a defense witness regarding a collateral issue (see People v Petty, 7 NY3d 277, 286 [2006]; People v Aska, 91 NY2d 979, 981 [1998]; People v LaPetina, 34 AD3d 836, 841-842 [2006], affd 9 NY3d 854 [2007]; People v Mason, 256 AD2d 595 [1998]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review. Rivera, J.P., Covello, Balkin and McCarthy, JJ., concur.

People v. Townsend, 44 A.D.3d 970, 843 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

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