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3 By!
4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 5 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0315-22 6 ) 7 vs. ) ) 8 ) LEONARDO MANGLONA TOVES 11, ) DECISION AND ORDER 9 aka "Leo" RE. DEFENDANT'S MOTION ) 10 DOB: 08/23/1977 ) TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ) 11 Defendant. ) ) 12 1. INTRODUCTION 13
This matter came before the Honorable Judge Maria T. Cenzon on September 27, 2022 14
15 and November 22, 2022 for hearings on Defendant Leonardo Manglona Toves ITs (the
16 "Defendant") motion to suppress evidence (the "Motion"). At each hearing, the Defendant was 17 , 1 . . present with his counsel, Attorney Peter Sablan. Assistant Attorney General Katherlne Nepton 18 appeared on behalf of the People. After reviewing the parties' briefs, oral arguments, the 19 20 underlying record, and the applicable case law and stahltes, the Court DENIES Defendant's
21 Motion as set forth herein.
22 11. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL FINDINGS 23 This matter involves a search and seizure that occurred during the early morning hours of 24 25 December 14, 2021. The following account of the incident was testified to by several witnesses
26 who were Guam Police Department ("GPD") officers who responded to a dispatch call:
Page 1 of20 28 People v. Tove5 11, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress At approximately 5:00 AM on December 14, 2021, GPD officers Benjamin Cruz, Troy 1
2 Pangelinan, Jason Young and J.C. Connor responded to a dispatch call regarding a possible self-
3 inflicted gunshot wound. Hr'g Tr. at 3:48 PM, 4:03 PM (Sept. 27, 2022). They found the 4 . . . Defendant bleeding by the road amid the darkness. Id. at 3:47 PM. He was conscious and alert 5 but Officer Cruz observed Defendant to be bleeding "enough to warrant medical attention." Id. at 6 3:48:05. Officer Cruz testified that medics were already en route to the scene, but GPD had to 7
8 secure the premises before the medics could perform treatment. Id. at 3:49:30 PM. Officer Cruz
9 indicated that "securing the scene" involves locating the weapon/firearm involved in the incident 10 . . . as well as any other possible suspects or victims in the event officers needed to triage more people. 11 Id Similarly, Officer Young testified that upon confirming the injury to the Defendant, the 12
13 officers' first priority was to locate and secure the weapon causing the injury in order to ensure
14 that it is safe for the fire department and others respond without fear that anything else would
15 happen to endanger them while rendering assistance. Id at 4:24:30 PM to 4:24:54 PM. The fire 16 department will not come on an active scene until GPD renders the scene safe. Id at 4:58:12 PM. 17 Officer Cruz testified that even though the report from dispatch indicated only one person 18
19 involved in a self-inflicted gun shot wouNd, officers could not assume that this was an accurate
20 representation of the scene. Id. Officer Cruz was concerned with officer safety upon first arriving 21 on the property. Id at 3:40 PM. He attempted to elicit information from the Defendant about the 22 wound (e.g. "is the wound from the gun?", "where is the gun'?", and "is anybody else on the 23
24 property?"), however, the Defendant would not answer his questions. Id. at 4:04PM. Instead, he
25 repeatedly asked if he was going to jail and pleaded with the officers to not take him to jail. Id.
26 Consequently, Defendant's failure to respond to his initial questions caused officer Cruz to 27
28 Page 2 of20 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress become concerned that there might be others who might be injured or possible suspects still 1
2 remaining on the property. Id at 4: 14:00 PM.
3 Officer Connor stayed with the Defendant while the other officers were searching for the 4 . . . . . firearm(s) and any other individuals who might be present at the scene. Id. at 4:12 PM. Medlcs 5 arrived while Officers Cruz, Pangelinan and Young were conducting their search and it was 6
7 during this this time that Defendant admitted to police that he had shot himself. Id at 3:57: 17 to
8 3:57:48 PM.
9 GPD Officer Jason Young observed blood pooling beside the Defendant. Id. at 4: 10 PM,
10 4:26 PM, Hr'g Tr. at 2: 11 PM (Nov. 22, 2022). He and Officer Cruz began to follow two separate 11 blood trails (which they described as fresh, as the blood was still wet and of a red color, no signs 12
in of congealing, no signs of drying) and they split up when the blood tracks led to two different
14 directions. Officer Cruz was concerned that the trails were made by two separate people. Hr'g Tr.
15 at 4: 16:40 PM (Sep. 27, 2022). The blood trail followed by Officer Cruz was formed by penny or 16 dime-sized drops which were about a foot apart from each other, indicating that the person was 17
18 walking around, while the blood pools which Officer Young tracked were closer together,
19 indicating that the bleeder was in a standing position. Id at 3 :55 PM. Officer Young followed one
20 trail that led to the container home, and Officer Cruz followed one trail that led to vegetation. 21 Hr'g Tr. at 3:55 PM, 4:01-02 PM (Sept. 27, 2022). 22 Officer Young's trail led him to a pool of blood resting at the base of the front door to the 23
24 container home and blood on the door frame. Id. at 4:27 PM. He checked the door knob and "it
25 was open" so when he opened the door, he saw "a lot of blood inside the container." Id at 4:28:00
26 PM. He testified that he became concerned that there might be a second person who may be a 27
Page 3 of20 28 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress victim because of the sheer amount of blood he observed. Id. at 4:28 PM. Describing how he l
2 entered the home, he testified that he drew his gun and knocked two times on the door, calling
3 out: "GPD, is anybody in there?" and then "GPD, I'm coming in!" when he did not hear a 4 . . response. Id. at 4:40-41 PM. Imrnedlately upon entering, Officer Young was confronted by an 5 object he described as a bookshelf or a rack. Id. at 4:31 PM. He stepped beside it and then he 6
"ha[d] a view of the whole container." Id. He observed "a living room type set up there was a 7
8 couch, a tv, some tables, other places to sit but no bed or anything like that and ... a bullet hole
9 in the wall ... drugs and needles out in the open and just lots of blood." Id. Officer Young testified
10 that he then stepped further into the container to get a better view of the bullet hole and observed
"a shell casing on the ground [and] drugs kind of more or less everywhere on various tables and 12
13 surfaces throughout the container but it was otherwise empty at the time." Id. at 4:31-32 PM.
14 Officer Young did not see any people in the container. Id. at4:32 PM. Nor did he see any firearms.
15 Id. at 4:35 PM, 4:52 PM. 16 After securing the container, Officer Young stepped out of the container home and called 17 18 out to Officer Cruz that there was more blood inside the container home and that he found
19 methamphetamines and "more stuff' inside the home. Id at 4:17:48 PM. Officers Cruz and
20 Pangelinan then went into the container. Id. at 4:52 PM. Officer Cruz testified that when he 21 entered the container home, the first thing he did was to look for other persons who may be inside 22 the dwelling because the amount of blood inside the container home appeared to him to indicate 23
24 that whomever got shot in the dwelling stayed in the dwelling. Id at 4:08:42 PM to 4: 12:17 PM.
25 Upon cross-examination by defense counsel, Officer Cruz confirmed that the Defendant did not
26 give oral consent to enter into the container home. Hr'g Tr. at 4:00:40 PM (Sept. 27, 2022). 27
Page 4 of 20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress However, although officers did not hear anyone screaming or calling out for help or chase anyone I
2 into the container home, Officer Cruz believed there to be exigent circumstances to enter into the
3 home because the amount of blood which led officers to the home was of an amount sufficient to 4 . . . . . cause them to believe someone needed medical attention. Id. at 4:01 :32 PM. By thls point, Officer 5 J.C. Connor had gathered information from the Defendant that he had accidentally shot himself 6 7 and that he had tossed the firearm outside. Hr'g Tr. at 2:09 PM (Nov. 22, 2022). After leading
8 Officer Cruz and Pangelinan to the container, Officer Young assisted in the search for the missing
9 firearm which Defendant referenced. Hr'g Tr. at 4:53 PM (Sept. 27, 2022). 10 Officers Cruz and Pangelinan remained in the container and Officer Pangelinan observed 11 "a smaller caliber handgun in plain view right on a makeshift table where the drug paraphernalia 12
13 was located as well." Hr'g Tr. at 2:12 PM (Nov. 22, 2022). Standing from the rear-end of the
14 container looking out towards the entrance, Officer Pangelinan noticed to his left "a rolled-up
15 carpet [with] a firearm protruding out of the rolled-up part." Id. at 2: 13 PM. The missing firearm 16 with which the Defendant allegedly shot himself was eventually located outside. Id. at 2:09 PM. 17 18 Officer Cruz testified that the items were confiscated at approximately 5:45 AM, approximately
19 40 - 45 minutes after officers arrived at the scene. Hr'g Tr. at 4:03:33 PM (Sept. 27, 2022).
20 The Defendant now faces the following charges : 21 1. Three Counts of POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WITHOUT A FIREARM 22 IDENTIFICATION CARD (As a 3rd Degree Felony) 2. Three Counts of POSSFSSION OF AN UNREGISTERED FIREARM (As a 3rd 23 Degree Felony) 24 3. POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (As a 3rd 25 Degree Felony) 4. TERRORIZING (As a 3'd Degree Felony) 26 5. FAMILY VIOLFNCE (As a 3'd Degree Felony)
Page 5 of 20 28 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress 6. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF (As a 3rd Degree Felony) 1 7. VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER (As a Misdemeanor) 2.
3 Indictment (May 19, 2022).1
4 The Defendant claims his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
5 was violated when GPD officers entered and searched his container without a warrant, and that 6 such violation compels the exclusion of all evidence found within the container. See Def.'s Br. at 7 4. Therefore, this Motion exclusively concerns Counts Two and Three of Charges One and Two 8
9 and Charge Three. The People counter that "[t]he items found in the container should not be
10 suppressed as they were legally discovered by GPD officers" who entered the abode under exigent
11 circumstances. People's Br. at 3-4. 12 111. DISCUSSION 13 "The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects against unreasonable searches 14
15 and seizures and is made applicable to Guam by 48 U.S.C.A § l421b(c) of the Organic Act of
16 Guam."People v. Yerten, 2021 Guam 8 17 (citing People v, Johnson,1997 Guam 91]4) (internal
17 citations omitted). "It is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against 18 which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' And a principal protection against 19 unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth 20
21 Amendment ...." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (quoting United States v. US.
22 District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (l972)). It therefore follows that "[a] warrantless search or 23
25 1 The Defendant has filed two motions: the present Motion to suppress and another to sever the charges since they 26 apparently stem from separate incidents. Despite the People's non-opposition to severing the charges, the Defendant requested that the severance motion be held in abeyance to apparently ease plea negotiations, which the Court 27 granted. Hr'g Tr. at 3:38 PM (Sept. 27, 2022).
28 Page 6 of 20 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress seizure is presumed to be unreasonable." People v. Quintanilla, 2020 Guam 8 11 27 (citing People 1
2 v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 1114).
3 However, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches which are unreasonable. 4 People v. Superior Ct. (Chapman), 204 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1011, 139 Cal. Rptr. ad 298, 304 5 (Cal. 2012) (citing Florida v. Jimeno (1991)500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 6 7 see also Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 ["the
8 ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness'..."].) Thus, while a search
9 conducted without a warrant is per Se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the requirement
10 is subject to certain exceptions. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). One of the established 11 exceptions to the warrant requirement is when the entry and search is based upon exigent 12
13 circumstances. See, Minced v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-391, 98 S.ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290
14 (1978). An exigent circumstance is "an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent
15 imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a 16 suspect or destruction of evidence." People v. Rama (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 276, 127 Ca1.Rptr. 17 629, 545 P.2d 1333, see also Stuart, supra, at p. 403, 126 S.ct. 1943. 18
19 Moreover, "[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of ... an
20 article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to ire warrant
21 requirement, the seizure is also legitimate." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 22 (1971)(emphasis added). "[T]he People bear the burden of proof when a warrantless search or 23
24 seizure occurs." People v. Calhoun, 2014 Guam 26 1] 9 (quoting People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1
25 1151).
Page 7 of20 28 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress The Court begins its analysis by determining whether the law enforcement officers' I
2 warrantless entry (and reentry) into Defendant's container home was a violation of his Fourth
3 Amendment rights. Should the Court find that the officers did not need a warrant to enter the 4 . . . . . . container home under the specific circumstances of thls case, the Court wlll then consider whether 5 the evidence was lawfully seized under the Plain View Doctrine. 6 A. Whether Exigent Circumstances Justified the Warrantless Entry (And Reentry) 7 by Officers into Defendant's Home 8 A recognized exception to the warrant requirement as articulated by the United States 9 Supreme Court is that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the 10
11 course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. 77
12 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). In recognition of the 'emergency doctrine,' the
13 Ninth Circuit has identified a two-fold test that must be met for a warrantless search exception to 14 be made in the name of personal danger, and it turns on whether: 15
16 1. considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate 17 need to protect others or themselves from serious harm, and
18 2. the search's scope and manner was reasonable to meet the need. 19 United States v. Snipe, 515 F. ad 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). In order to determine whether the 20 officers were lawfully in the container home under the emergency doctrine when they observed 21 22 the drugs and the firearms, the Court will tum to address each part of the two-fold test as dictated
23 in Snipe.
24 // 25 //
26 // 27
28 Page 8 of 20 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress 1. Considering the totality of the circumstances, did officers have an l objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate 2 need to protect others or themselves from serious harm?
3 In determining whether such an entry is objectively reasonable, the Supreme Court has 4 "consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the 5 reasonableness inquiry," and looked to the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Srzzpe, 6 515 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Ohiov. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.ct. 417, 136 7
8 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996), accord United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S.ct. 521, 157 L.Ed.2d
9 343 (2003)("[W]e have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that
10 no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a 11 given case, it is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to details that turn out to 12 13 be important in a given instance, and without inflating marginal ones."). "Reasonableness
14 'depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security
15 free from arbitrary interference by law officers." People v. Calhoun, 2014 Guam 261] 12 (quoting
16 Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)). 17 The facts of this case illustrate that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer 18
19 Young possessed an objectively reasonable basis to enter the container without a warrant. Officer
20 Young testified that even though the call was for a self-inflicted gunshot wound, as a trained
21 officer, he could not assume that to be accurate for safety purposes. Hr'g Tr. at 4:22 PM (Sept. 22 27, 2022). Officer Cruz corroborated this point. Id. at 3:48 PM. Officer Young explained that 23 "anything is possible" when arriving upon a scene. Id. at 4:24 PM. The officers were attending to 24
25 a gunshot wound, but the weapon was as of yet unaccounted for. Asked if he felt in danger, Officer
26 Young answered "whenever there's a firearm [involved]'? Always." Id. at 4:27 PM. Officer Cruz 27
Page 9 of 20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress was concerned about officer safety, too. Id. at 3:50 PM. Apart from their own safety, the officers 1
2 were also concerned others were at risk or may have been injured. Officer Cruz testified that he
3 thought there was another person involved after realizing there were two blood trails. See Id. at 4 . . . 4:01-02 PM. Officer Young testified that the amount of blood in front of the door to the container 5 made him believe there was a second person involved. Id. at 4:28 PM. Upon entering the 6
7 container house to secure the premises and ensure that no other individuals were harmed or could
8 cause harm, Officer Young viewed the various items which Defendant now wishes to suppress.
9 The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S. Ct. 546, 10 549, 175 L. Ed. ad 410 (2009), supports a finding that the officers' warrantless entry into the 11 container was reasonable. In Fisher, police officers responded to a disturbance call at a residence 12
13 and am'ved to chaos: blood on the hood of a truck and at the entrance of the house, smashed
14 Windows, and damaged fenceposts. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 at 45-46. The defendant there answered
15 the door with a bloody hand, refused to answer officers' questions about whether anybody needed 16 medical attention, and refused ("with accompanying profanity") to let them enter without a 17 18 warrant. When Fisher later moved to suppress any evidence seized during that warrantless search,
19 the Michigan Court of Appeals granted his motion, opining that the situation "did not rise to a
20 level of emergency justifying the warrantless intrusion into a residence" because while "there was 21 evidence an injured person was on the premises ... the mere drops of blood did not signal a likely 22 serious-life threatening injury." Id. at 48 (quoting People v. Fisher, 2008 WL 786515 at *2 (Mich. 23
24 Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008)).
25 T he Supr eme Cour t soundly r ejected the a ppella te cour t's r ea soning, holding tha t
26 "[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the 27
Page 10 of20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress emergency aid exception." Fisher at 49 (citing to Brigham City, Utah v. Sturm 547 U.S. 398, 1
2 404-05, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948, 164 L. Ed. ad 650 (2006)). Moreover, the standard is whether
3 "[a]n action is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's 4 state of mind, "as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action." Brigham 5 City at 404 (citingScottv. Unitea'Stafes,436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) 6
(emphasis in original)). The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant. MY Here, the exigent 7
8 circumstances exceed even those found in Fisher and Brigham City, where the Court held in both
9 cases the warrantless entry by officers was justified. 10 In Fisher, drops of blood signaled to police officers someone might be in need of aid while 11 in Brigham City Ir was a bloody lip. Similarly, upon arriving at the scene of the incident, Officers 12
13 Young, Cruz and Pangelinan observed a man bleeding profusely from a gunshot wound, two
14 separate blood trails at the site, and a pool of blood in front of the container home which 15 evidenced, in the minds of the officers, that another person might have been injured. Under these 16 circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer Young to enter into the container home without a 17 warrant. That no other person was ultimately found on the property is not determinative of 18
19 whether their actions were appropriate.United States v. Velasco, 849 Fed. Apps. 645, 647-48 (9th
20 Cir. 2021) ("Even if the situation were clear in hindsight [that there was no thi'eat], ... the police 21
23 2 See Bondv. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338, n. 2, 120 S.ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000) ("The parties properly 24 agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment ..., the issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions"), 25 Whrenv. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("[W]€ have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers"),Graham v. Connor, 26 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ("[O]ur prior cases make clear" that "the subjective motivations of the individual officers ha[ve] no bearing on whether a particular seizure is 'unreasonable' under the 27 Fourth Amendment").
Page 11 of20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress had only a few minutes in which to determine whether a lurking predator or injured person in 1
2 need of assistance might be [on property].") (alterations in the original) (quoting United States v.
3 Russell, 436 F. ad 1086, 1090-93 (9th Cir. 2006)), see also Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 at 49 ("It was 4 . . . . . . . . error for the Mlchlgan Court of Appeals to replace that objective inquiry Into appearances wlth 5 its hindsight determination that there was in fact no emergency."). 6
Apart from entering for the sake of the safety of others, the officers were also justified in 7
8 entering for their own safety. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)("Speed here was
9 essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured
10 that [the defendant] was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which 11 could be used against them or to effect an escape.") The urgency of police action here was 12
13 supported by several circumstances. Having already recognized the Defendant needed urgent
14 medical attention, Hr'g Tr. at 3:47 PM (Sept. 27, 2022), Officer Young testified that the fire
15 department and other emergency personnel would not respond until the officers rendered the 16 scene safe to approach. Officer Cruz corroborated this point. Id. at 3:51 PM, 4:24 PM, 4:58 PM. 17 8 It is noteworthy that the officers observed the blood to be a vibrant red color and wet, see id. at 1
19 3:55 PM, suggesting the emergency was ongoing rather than having occurred in a distant time.
20 Moreover, the Defendant's evasiveness in not answering the officers' questions regarding the 21 location of the gun which caused the injury and whether anyone else was on the property only 22 added to the heightened need to secure the premises immediately and without a warrant. See 23
United States v. Harris, 158 Fed. Appx. 719, 724 (6th Cir. 2005) (Finding exigent circumstances 24
25 partly because "neither [defendant] was providing information that would negate the existence of
26 exigent circumstances and the need to continue the search."). 27
Page 12 of20 28 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress For these reasons, the Court finds that the officers' entry into the container home without 1
2 a warrant were justified under the circumstances. The Court next determines whether the officers '
3 manner and scope of their entry was appropriate under the circumstances. 4 2. Whether the manner and scope of Officers Cruz and Pangelinan's entry 5 was reasonable.
6 "While the fir st fa ctor consider s whether ther e is a r ea sona ble ba sis to believe a n 7 as emergency exists, the second factor necessarily deals with the manner and scope of the search. 8 United States v. Nagar, 451 F. ad 710, 720 (10th Cir. 2006). Defendant does not dispute the 9
10 validity of Officer Young's warrantless entry and his observation of items which would later be
seized. Rather, the Defendant argues that, after officers determined that no other person was
12 present and once the premises were secured, the officers should then have obtained a search 13 warrant before re-entering the container. Hr'g Tr. at 4:47 PM (Sept. 27, 2022). 14 Other than arguing the general principles of law regarding the requirement of a warrant 15
16 for general searches of property, the Defendant does not cite to any case law to support his
17 argument that, in this case, officers were required to have first secured a warrant before entering
18 (and reentering) the Defendant's container home. Instead, he relies on these general principles of 19 law requiring a warrant for such searches, while recognizing (without further discussion) that 20 exceptions to the warrant do exist. Although the Guam Supreme Court has not passed upon the 21
22 particular question before the Court in this case, in addition to the cases cited herein, the Court
23 finds as highly persuasive a California Supreme Court case in determining whether the seizure 24 . . . . was unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment under the specific facts of thls case. 25 In People v. Superior Court (Chapman), 204 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 298 26 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), police responded to a call that shots had been fired in Defendant's house.
Page 13 of 20 28 People v. Toves 11, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress Upon their an*ival at 5:05 p.m. that evening, police observed a crowd of neighbors outside the 1
2 house yelling that there was somebody shooting inside the house. Id at 1007. Defendant was
3 ordered by police to exit the home and, during the putdown of his body, his girlfriend who had 4 also exited the house with him was screaming hysterically, "Help us, he shot him, he shot him," 5 while pointing to the Defendant. Id Officers conducted a protective sweep to search for suspects 6
or victims who needed aid. This occurred between 2 to 10 minutes after they aniseed at the scene 7
8 and took about 5 minutes to complete. Id The victim's body was found on the floor of the home
9 and he had been shot. A sledgehammer also lay next to him. Id at 1008. The crime scene was
10 described as follows: 11 During the sweep, officers observed shell casings on the ground in the kitchen area, 12 bullet holes in the walls, and blood, but did not disturb anything. Paramedics, who 13 had already arrived at the scene, were allowed to enter the house as soon as the protective sweep was over. One of the officers (Officer Lopez) secured the premises 14 by remaining with the body in the house until the coroner arrived much later. 15 Chapman, who was in one of the police vehicles, was transported to the police 16 station about 5:25 p.m. About 5:45 p.m., two detectives (Porch and Phillips) arrived at the scene and were briefed by the officers standing outside the residence. 17 Porch was advised that a shooting had occurred and a dead body was lying in the house, that Chapman was in custody, and that there were no other victims or 18 suspects in the house. 19 As a result, Detectives Porch and Phillips immediately entered with one of the 20 officers who had conducted the protective sweep. The officer walked the detectives through the scene. Porch saw a shell casing from a handgun in the kitchen area, 21 strike marks on the wail or refrigerator, a handgun on the floor in the kitchen, and 22 a dead body on the threshold between the kitchen and laundry areas. The handgun was on the kitchen floor about two feet from the body. All of these items were 23 unobstructed and in plain view. The walkthrough took about 30 to 40 minutes. No evidence was disturbed or seized. 24
25 Id at 1008. Two hours after this "first wave" of first responders conducted the protective sweep,
26 arrested the Defendant and allowed paramedics to enter the home, a "second wave" of law 27
Page 14 of 20 28 People v. Toves 11, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress enforcement officers (detectives, a photographer, criminalists and coroner) began to an'ive, l
2 entered the home and proceeded to retrieve evidence, including a shell casing that was found
3 under the dead body of the victim. The "second wave" of law enforcement were at the scene until
4 the early morning hours of the following day. At no time was a search warrant obtained because, 5 as one officer would later testify to, "everything was in plain view." Id at 1009. Defendant was 6
arrested and charged with murder. 7
8 Although the Defendant inChapman conceded that all evidence that was retrieved dLu'ing
9 the "first wave" of officers who conducted the protective sweep was valid based upon exigent 10 . . . circumstances, he moved to suppress the evidence observed or seized by the "second wave" 11 without a warrant. He argued that, although officers in the "first wave" entered the premises 12
13 pursuant to a lawful emergency, that emergency dissipated at 5:22 p.m., when the victim was
14 pronounced dead, and most definitely by 5:25 p.m., when Defendant was taken into custody. The
15 tal court agreed that the emergency ended before the "second wave" entered into the home and, 16 therefore, suppressed all evidence observed or seized by the "second wave" of responders. Id 17
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversedthe trial court's decision, finding evidence lawfully 18
19 seized upon reentry of the officers when the evidence was initially observed in plain view during
to a lawful entry but not seized during that initial stage. Id The rationale for their determination was 21 that the officer (who was conducting the protective sweep) "was performing a duty that took 22 priority over seizure of evidence." Id at 1014. Additional basis for this ruling was that there was 23 24 also an "uninterrupted police presence in the residence" during the relevant time period, citing
25 People v. Amaya, 93 CaLApp.3d 424, 431, 155 Cal.Rptr. 783 (Cal. Ct. App. l 979)(the court
26 upheld reentry of detectives to observe and collect evidence observed in plain view about two 27
28 Page 15 of 20 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress hours earlier by the first responding officer because there was effectively an uninterrupted police I
2 presence at the residence, the officer could have seized the evidence during the original entry, and
3 it was not unreasonable for police to wait a reasonable time for trained personnel before disturbing 4 lawfully seizable evidence). 5 Similarly, in People v. Ngaue, 8 Cal.App.4th 896, 901-905, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 (Cal. Ct. 6
7 App. l992), the court upheld a police reentry into a residence to retrieve a gun seen in plain view
8 when arresting the occupant. The occupant promptly escaped from custody, and the arresting
9 officer turned his attention to containing the area in order to apprehend him, but later called 10 another officer and instructed him to return to the house to retrieve the gun. The appellate court 11 held that the reentry was constitutionally valid under Peopl e v. McDowell, 46 CaI.3d 551, 564, 12
13 250 CaI.Rptr. 530, 763 P.2d 1269 (Cal. 1988), because "there was no intent on the part of the
97 14 officers to abandon the gun and retrieval of the gun took place without inexcusable delay.
15 In short, despite the length of time between the arrival and protective sweep conducted by 16 the "first wave" of first responders and the final departure of the last of the "second wave" of 17 18 responders, the Chapman court reversed the trial court's suppression of the evidence collected by
19 the "second wave" without a warrant, but distinguished the retrieval from the case involving a
20 "general exploratory search of a residence, for which a warrant would be required," reasoning 21 "[W]e are presented [in contrast, here] with an uninferrupfedpolice presence in the residence and 22
Page 16 of 20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress a close-in-time successive search of areas already validly searched in order to begin processing 1
2 and collecting evidence observed in plain view." Id at 1020 (emphasis added).3
3 In this case, Officer Young (the "first wave") entered Defendant's abode to ensure no 4 other person was inside that was harmed or could cause harm. As discussed above, the initial 5
warrantless entry was proper for this purpose, and Defendant concedes as such. Although the 6
testimony of the officers was inconsistent relative to the reason each had for entering the container 7
8 home, the subsequent reentry by Officers Cruz and Pangelinan resulting in the seizure of the
9 additional firearms was also appropriate under Snipe, Chapman and numerous other cases cited 10 therein, including those from other jurisdictions.4 The reentry by the "second wave" of officers
here was a close-in-time successive search of the container house which Officer Young had 12
13 already searched for the purpose of processing and collecting evidence in plain sight does not
14 constitute an unreasonable and additional invasion of privacy. Officer Cruz testified that
15 approximately 45 minutes had lapsed from the time they arrived at the scene to the time that all 16 of the evidence was seized.5 Therefore, the Court finds that Officers Cruz and Pangelinan's 17 warrantless reentry was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 18
19 Having determined that the officers' entry and reentry without a warrant was justified
20 under the exception of exigent circumstances, the Court now applies the "plain view" doctrine to 21
3 The Ninth Circuit engaged in a lengthy discussion of authority from other jurisdictions which have upheld under 23 the Fourth Amendment the warrantless reentry of a home in order to retrieve plain view evidence previously observed 24 during a valid and proximate entry and search. See, Id at 1017 - 1021 (numerous citations omitted). 4 Officer Young testified that the purpose of Officers Cruz and Pangelinan's reentry (the "second wave") was to 25 confiscate the illegal items, Hr'g Tr. at 4:52 PM (Sept. 27, 2022), while Officer Pangelinan testified that the reason for his reentry was to search for possible suspects or injured persons. Hr'g Tr. at 2:19 PM (Nov. 22, 2022). 26 5 Hr'g Tr. at 4:03:33 PM to 4:04:08 PM (Sept. 27, 2022). Even if the evidence was confiscated hours later on the same date of the incident, the Court finds that such reentry and seizure was close in time and was for the purpose of 27 processing and collecting evidence in plain sight.
Page 17 of20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress determine whether the seizure of the evidence was in violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment 1
2 rights.
3 B. Application of the Plain View Doctrine 4 The plain view doctrine holds that "if police are lawfully in a position from which they 5 view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a 6 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant." P e o p l e v . C a m a c h o , 7
8 2004 Guam 6 1[ 20 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)). Having
9 determined that the police officers were in the container home under exigent circumstances which
10 justified their warrantless entry into the container home, the Court now determines whether the 11 plain view doctrine applies in this case. 12 The Guam Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test as pronounced by the United States 13
14 Supreme Court to determine when the plain view doctrine applies to evidence confiscated during
15 a warrantless search:
16 1. [T]he officer must 'an°iv[e] at the place from which the evidence could be 17 plainly viewed' without violating the Fourth Amendment, 2. the evidence must be in 'plain view' and its 'incriminating character must also 18 be immediately apparent,' and 19 3. the officer 'must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself. '
20 Id. (quoting Horton v . C a li for n i a , 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (l990)). The Court now turns to analyze
21 each part of the test in tum. 22 1 . The Officers arrived at the place from which the evidence could be 23 viewed without violating the Fourth Amendment. 24 Having determined that the Officers were within the container home without violating 25 the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, above, the Court proceeds to consider the second 26 factor. 27
Page 18 of20 28 People v. Toves II, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress 2. The evidence was in "plain view" and their incriminating nature was 1 immediately apparent. 2 "The incriminating nature of an item is immediately apparent 'where the officer ha[s] 3
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.' " People v. Camacho, 2004 Guam 4
5 6 1125 (alteration in the original) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 100 F. ad 1409, 1420 (9th
6 Cir. 1996)). In Camacho, the Guam Supreme Court found sufficient probable cause when an 7 . . . . . officer deduced a white powdery substance in plastic straws was methamphetamine. See zd. The 8 Camacho court also cited a Ninth Circuit decision where that court held that the criminal nature 9
10 of a defendant possessing a torch and a glass pipe with a white residue was immediately apparent.
11 Id. (citing United States v. Nohara, 3 F. ad 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1993)).
12 This Court finds that the testimony of Officers Young, Cruz and Pangelinan supports a 13 finding that the drugs, related paraphernalia and firearms were in plain view and their 14 incriminating character clearly apparent when Young first entered the container home (and exited 15
16 leaving everything undisturbed) and when Cruz and Pangelinan subsequently reentered the
17 container home lawfully.
18 3. There was a lawful right of access to the drugs. 19 The lawful right of access factor serves as a gatekeeper, "emphasizing that even though 20 contraband plainly can be seen and identified from outside the premises, a warrantless entry into 21
22 those premises to seize the contraband would not be justified absent exigent circumstances."G &
23 G Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 989 F. ad 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, "[i]t is
24 implicated in situations such as when an officer on the street sees an obi et through the window 25 of a house, or when officers make observations via aerial photography or long-range surveillance. 26 In those cases the officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure, 27 Page 19 of 20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress because to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises." United States v. l 2 Naugle, 997 F. ad 819, 823 (Tenth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 997 (1993),see also United
3 States v. Paige, 136 F. ad 1012, 1024 (5th Cir. 1998). Because no such problem exists here and
4 . . because the Court has already found that Officers Young, Cruz and Pangellnan were lawfully in 5 the container when they observed the drugs, paraphernalia and firearms, there was a lawful right 6 of access to the evidence. See United States v. Santiago, 410 F. ad 193, 201 (5th Cir. 2005) 7
8 ("However, under the facts of this case, this final prong has far less importance in our plan view
9 doctrine calculus because the gun was located in place where the deputies had a lawful right to 10 be."). 11 In sum, the circumstances surrounding the seizure of the drugs and all firearms pass 12
13 muster under theCamac/'zo analysis. All evidence seized in this case were in plain view when the
14 officers entered into the container home under exigent circumstances.
15 Iv. CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion. Trial dates 17 shall be issued under separate cover. 18
19 SO ORDERED this MAR 0-12023 20
21 J
22 HONORALE MARIA T. CENZON Judge, Superior Court of Guam 23
Page 20 of 20 28 People v. Toves ll, CF0315-22 Decision & Order Re. Motion to Suppress