People v. Tooks

2024 IL App (4th) 240259-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 29, 2024
• Docket: 4-24-0259
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240259-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 29, 2024 NO. 4-24-0259 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County ISAAC FRANK TOOKS, ) No. 24CF107 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Scott Kording, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court committed no error in finding defendant committed a detainable offense and did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant, Isaac Frank Tooks, appeals the trial court’s order denying him pretrial

release. He contends his charged offenses were not detainable offenses and the State otherwise

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his detention was warranted. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 26, 2024, the State charged defendant with harassment by telephone

(720 ILCS 5/26.5-2(a)(2) (West 2022)) and harassment through electronic communications (id.

§ 26.5-3(a)(5)). The charges were based on allegations that defendant threatened to kill his wife,

Tanella Tooks, using both methods of communication. ¶5 The same day, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial release under

article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)),

hereinafter as recently amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as

the Pretrial Fairness Act. It alleged defendant was eligible for pretrial detention and his release

posed “a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” The

State’s eligibility claim was based on the assertion that both charged offenses qualified as

detainable offenses under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)), which applies

to defendants charged with forcible felony offenses that are explicitly listed in that section “or any

other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability

or disfigurement.”

¶6 Also on January 26, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition.

The State presented evidence by way of proffer that on January 25, 2024, Tanella reported to the

police that defendant believed she was cheating on him, and he began making calls and sending

messages threatening to kill her. The police officers observed text messages that stated, “I’m gonna

kill you” and “b***, come outside.” They also heard a video chat, during which defendant stated

that even if Tanella got an order of protection, he would kill her and would do it in front of her

children. The State asserted that defendant made the following statements:

“[Y]our life is over, your life is over. I swear on my daughter, your life is over. I’m

gonna kill you. You can call, get an OP, everything you want, you can do. I am

going to kill you and that’s on my life. I’m not playing. I’m gonna kill you in the

worst way.”

-2- The State represented that Tanella answered a series of domestic violence questions, reporting that

she believed defendant was capable of killing her, defendant had tried to choke her, and defendant

was violently and constantly jealous of her.

¶7 The State’s evidence further showed that defendant’s criminal history included a

2010 conviction for resisting a peace officer, a 2010 conviction for domestic battery, a 2013

conviction for criminal damage to property, and a 2014 conviction for driving under the influence

(DUI). At the time of the underlying offenses, defendant was free on bond in Grundy County case

No. 22-DT-276001, in which he was charged with DUI. Also, defendant had been the respondent

in an order of protection case in which Tanella was the protected party. The State represented that

the order of protection had been served on defendant on October 26, 2023, and that it expired on

December 19, 2023, a little more than one month before the underlying offenses. Finally, at the

State’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of defendant’s McLean County public safety

assessment report, which showed defendant scored a 6 out of 6 on both the new criminal activity

scale and the failure to appear scale. The report stated maximum conditions were recommended if

defendant was to be released.

¶8 On his own behalf, defendant proffered that he was 32 years old, had been a

McLean County resident for 15 years, worked full-time for the same employer for the last three

years, and had 10 children. He asserted that he provided financial support for his children and that

he had regular visitation with three of them. Defendant also stated that he suffered from bipolar

disorder and schizophrenia. He saw a doctor for those conditions and was on medication.

Defendant proffered that he had successfully completed conditional discharge in connection with

two of his prior convictions. Additionally, he pointed out that most of his prior criminal history

-3- was over 10 years old and that there was no active order of protection against him at the time of

the alleged offenses.

¶9 In presenting argument to the trial court, the parties initially disputed whether

defendant had been charged with detention eligible offenses under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the

Code. The State argued the charged offenses fell within the residual clause of section

110-6.1(a)(1.5), in that they involved the threat of great bodily harm or permanent disability or

disfigurement. It relied on facts showing defendant communicated multiple threats that he would

kill Tanella through both text messages and a video chat. Conversely, defendant argued the

requirements of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) were not met because his threats to Tanella were not made

“in person.”

¶ 10 Ultimately, the trial court granted the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial

release on the ground that defendant posed a danger to Tanella. Regarding whether the charged

offenses were detainable, the court acknowledged that neither of the charged harassment offenses

was explicitly listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) as a forcible felony offense. Nevertheless, it agreed

with the State that both fell within the “catch-all provision” of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). The court

noted defendant’s charged conduct involved threats to kill Tanella, which it found “certainly would

be a threat of great bodily harm.”

¶ 11 This appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023)

followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s detention order, arguing that

neither of his harassment charges were detainable offenses. He also argues the State failed to prove

-4- either that he posed a danger to Tanella or that no set of conditions could mitigate the safety threat

he allegedly posed.

¶ 14 Under the Code, all defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). However, the trial court may deny release where the State files a verified

petition for denial and, relevant to the circumstances of this appeal, proves by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a

detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person

based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and (3) no condition or combination of

conditions can mitigate the real and present safety threat that the defendant poses. Id.

§§ 110-6.1(a), (e).

¶ 15 As noted, the State relied on section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code when asking the

trial court to deny defendant’s pretrial release. That section provides for the denial of pretrial

release when:

“the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the

case, and the defendant is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this

Section, means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory

criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal

sexual assault, armed robbery, aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary where there

is use of force against another person, residential burglary, home invasion,

vehicular invasion, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping,

aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or

disfigurement or any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great

-5- bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

§ 110-6.1(a)(1.5).

¶ 16 “On appeal following a detention hearing, we apply the abuse-of-discretion

standard of review to the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence presented.” People v. Minssen,

2024 IL App (4th) 231198, ¶ 17. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, fanciful,

or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would agree with the position it has adopted. People

v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864 ¶ 10. Additionally, to the extent defendant’s appeal raises an

issue of statutory construction, our review is de novo. Minssen, 2024 IL App (4th) 231198, ¶ 17.

The primary goal when construing a statute “is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent

as evidenced by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” People v. Washington,

2023 IL 127952, ¶ 27. Further, “[i]n construing a statute, we may consider the reason and necessity

for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Minssen, 2024 IL App (4th) 231198, ¶ 17.

¶ 17 Here, defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that his charged offenses—

harassment by telephone and harassment through electronic communications—fall within the

residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code. Defendant suggests that for the residual

clause to apply, a statute defining the charged offenses must “involve a threat *** of severe or

great bodily harm” as an element of the offense “regardless of the State’s factual allegations.” He

contends that because neither of the defining statutes in this instance contain such a requirement,

the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) is inapplicable. We disagree.

¶ 18 In Minssen, 2024 IL App (4th) 231198, ¶ 3, the defendant was charged with several

offenses, including aggravated assault based on allegations that she knowingly attempted to bite a

police officer. The parties disputed whether that offense fell within section 110-6.1(a)(1.5)’s

-6- residual clause. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. On review, this court rejected an argument by the State that

attempting to bite someone inherently posed a threat of great bodily harm such that the

circumstances surrounding the attempted bite did not matter. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. We stated the State’s

position that the specific circumstances of the defendant’s conduct were irrelevant to determining

whether the residual clause applied was “in tension” with principles embodied in the Code,

including that the State had to prove the defendant committed a detainable offense by clear and

convincing evidence and that decisions regarding detention had to be individualized. Id. ¶ 20

(citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1), (f)(7) (West 2022)). We concluded “that the specific facts and

details of the charged offense matter when determining whether a defendant’s conduct implicates

the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code.” Id. ¶ 23; see People v. Rodriguez, 2023

IL App (3d) 230450, ¶ 10 (relying on the facts of the case to show that the charged felony offense

involved the threat of great bodily harm for purposes of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5)).

¶ 19 In this case, although neither defining statute for the charged felony offenses

explicitly required the “threat of *** great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement”

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)), it was the facts and details of defendant’s particular

case and the charges against him that were relevant to determining whether the residual clause of

section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) applied. Both the charging instrument and the State’s evidence at the

detention hearing showed defendant made multiple threats to kill Tanella through both text

messages and a video chat heard by the police. We find no error in the trial court’s determination

that a threat to kill someone is the equivalent of a threat of great bodily harm to that person.

¶ 20 Defendant also argues that his charged conduct did “not rise to the high level of a

true threat of great bodily harm,” asserting the alleged offenses did not involve any “in-person

communication” and that there was no evidence he “took a substantial step in furtherance of a

-7- harmful act.” Again, we disagree. Evidence showed defendant communicated the seriousness of

his threats by repeatedly stating he intended to kill Tanella or that her life was over, telling Tanella

that he was “not playing” and suggesting that he would not be stopped even if Tanella obtained an

order of protection against him. Evidence also indicated a history of domestic violence between

defendant and Tanella, with her reporting to the police that she believed defendant was capable of

killing her, defendant had choked her in the past, and defendant was violently and constantly

jealous of her. Based on such evidence, the trial court determined defendant’s threats were serious

and credible. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to those determinations.

¶ 21 Finally, contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, we also find the evidence

presented at the detention hearing was more than sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that

(1) defendant posed a threat to Tanella’s physical safety and (2) no condition or combination of

conditions could mitigate that threat. Again, defendant made multiple threats to kill Tanella. He

represented that his threats were serious, and Tanella could not be protected even by obtaining an

order of protection against him. Defendant had a prior conviction for domestic battery, he had

recently been the respondent in an order of protection in which Tanella was the protected party,

and Tanella indicated there was a history of domestic violence between them. Further, at the time

of the alleged offenses, defendant was out on bond in a pending DUI case, which the court noted

would have included an order that he not commit any new offenses. The court indicated that under

the circumstances presented, it lacked confidence defendant would comply with any conditions it

could impose. The court’s determinations were not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.

¶ 22 We find the trial court committed no error in finding defendant committed a

detainable offense under the Code and that it did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant

pretrial release.

-8- ¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order.

¶ 25 Affirmed.

-9-