People v. Toms

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 11, 2026
• Docket: 5-24-1107
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 241107-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/11/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-1107 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-923 ) ANDREW C. TOMS, ) Honorable ) Randall B. Rosenbaum, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s petition for mandamus. The County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2022)) does not apply to the defendant’s sentence because the defendant was not sentenced to confinement in a county jail for a fixed term of imprisonment. Moreover, the defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement that included an express agreement to 762 days of sentencing credit for pretrial custody; accordingly, People v. Wells, 2024 IL 129402, bars the additional sentencing credit sought by the defendant, which was not included in the plea agreement.

¶2 The defendant, Andrew C. Toms, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign

County that denied his petition for mandamus, in which he requested sentencing credit in addition

to that provided for by the express terms of his fully negotiated plea agreement. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The majority of the facts necessary to our disposition of this appeal are found in the

transcript of the defendant’s September 20, 2022, guilty plea proceedings. For reasons that are not

clear from the record, that transcript was not included in the record on appeal in this case. However,

the transcript was included in the record in a different appeal the defendant is currently pursuing,

which is case No. 5-25-0582. This court may take judicial notice of the record in another case

involving the same party or of public documents contained in the record of any other judicial

proceeding if doing so would aid us in deciding the instant appeal. See, e.g., In re Wilma T., 2018

IL App (3d) 170155, ¶ 14. We may do so sua sponte, even if the parties have not asked us to do

so. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 32. Accordingly, we take judicial notice of the September 20,

2022, transcript, contained in the record on appeal in 5-25-0582, and derive from that transcript

the following facts related to the defendant’s guilty plea proceedings.

¶5 At the outset of the September 20, 2022, proceedings, the trial court noted that it was the

trial court’s understanding that the defendant, who was present with counsel, and the State were

“in discussion about a possible plea,” but that the trial court had “jurors downstairs waiting” for a

possible trial on that date. The parties attended to some pretrial matters outside the presence of the

potential jurors, then the trial court announced a brief recess. Among the issues discussed prior to

the recess was that the currently-existing offer from the defendant was for the defendant to plead

guilty to aggravated battery with a firearm in exchange for a 15-year prison sentence to be served

at 85%. Following the recess, the trial court stated that it understood that there had “been further

negotiations,” the State had consulted with the alleged victim, and that there “may very well be a

plea to count [I].”

2 ¶6 The trial court explained to the defendant that count I alleged that on August 1, 2020, the

defendant “committed aggravated battery with a firearm in that [the defendant], in committing a

battery, knowingly discharged a firearm causing bodily harm to” the victim, Christian Mbemba.

The trial court ensured the defendant understood the charge and the possible penalties he faced,

that he was not impaired by medication or disability, and that he understood the rights he was

giving up by pleading guilty. The trial court then ensured the defendant’s plea was voluntary, not

the result of coercion or pressure.

¶7 Thereafter, the State explained the terms of the plea agreement, which included that in

exchange for the plea of guilty to count I, the State would dismiss three additional felony criminal

charges, found in counts II-IV. The State added that the defendant “would receive credits for–

credit for 262 days served.” The State began to state that the defendant would provide DNA

samples, but the defendant interrupted, saying “No, no.” The defendant thereafter stated, “700–,”

the trial court stated, “You said 262–,” and the State clarified “762.” The State added, “Yeah.

Sorry. I–762 days served.” The State continued that it would dismiss an additional misdemeanor

charge, and that the defendant “would owe $934 per the financial sentencing order before any

waiver.” The defendant, and defense counsel, both agreed that the foregoing were the terms of the

plea agreement. The defendant agreed that no additional promises had been made to him to entice

him to plead guilty.

¶8 The State recited the factual basis for the plea, which included that following “an

altercation” with the victim, “[t]he defendant produced a revolver, chased after the victim, shot

him two times and then fled the scene.” Defense counsel agreed that the State could produce

witnesses who would testify to that factual basis. The defendant then entered his plea of guilty to

the charge of aggravated battery with a firearm, and the trial court stated that it found him guilty.

3 The trial court added that it found that the defendant’s plea was “knowingly, understandingly, and

voluntarily made,” that it was supported by a factual basis, and that the trial court accepted it.

¶9 The trial court entered judgment on the plea and proceeded to sentencing. The parties

waived a presentence investigation, the State recited the defendant’s criminal history, and the trial

court entered a sentence “of 15 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections at 85%.” The trial

court added that the defendant was “entitled to credit for 762 previously served,” and was “to pay

financial obligations as set forth in the attached” financial assessment schedule. The trial court

admonished the defendant of his appeal rights, and stated that a mittimus was to issue.

¶ 10 The following facts are taken from the certified record in this appeal. Also on September

20, 2022, the defendant executed a written waiver of a trial by jury. That same day, a written

sentencing order was filed, which contained the terms discussed above, and which stated that,

inter alia, the defendant was “entitled to credit for 762 days previously served in the Champaign

County Correctional Center.” The mittimus, which was also filed on September 20, 2022, likewise

contained the terms discussed above, and stated that, inter alia, the defendant was “entitled to

receive credit for time actually served in custody” in the amount “of 762 days as to the date of this

order.”

¶ 11 Nearly two years later, on September 16, 2024, the defendant filed pro se a motion for

leave to file a petition for mandamus, as well as a proposed petition for mandamus (petition). In

the petition, the defendant contended, inter alia, that he “should have been credited 2,256 days but

only received 762 days of time served,” which he alleged meant that he was “missing a total of

1,524 days of time served.” He further alleged that the record demonstrated “that the parties ***

discussed specific sentence credits during plea negotiations,” and that the record did “not

conclusively show that the parties agreed to exclude” any earned sentencing credit as part of the

4 plea agreement. He based his legal argument entirely upon the County Jail Good Behavior

Allowance Act (Act) (730 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2022)), which he claimed was applicable to

his sentence.

¶ 12 On September 17, 2024, the trial court entered an order in which it stated that the defendant

entered his plea of guilty in exchange “for a negotiated sentence of 15 years in prison with 762

days credit, to be served at 85%.” The trial court ruled, inter alia, that “this was a negotiated plea

and contract principles apply.” The trial court added that “[the d]efendant received the benefit of

his bargain pursuant to People v. Wells, 2024 IL 129402.” The trial court denied the petition for

mandamus, and this timely appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 The question of whether a mittimus is correct, or must be modified, is a purely legal

question that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., People v. Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st) 131144, ¶ 86.

In his pro se brief on appeal, the defendant again claims that he “should have been credited 2,256

days but only received 762 days of time served,” which he again claims means that he “is missing

a total of 1,524 days of time served.” He also reiterates his trial court claim that “the record shows

that the parties discussed specific sentence credits during plea negotiations and does not

conclusively show that[ ] the parties agreed to exclude sentencing credit as part of a plea

agreement.” As he did in the trial court, the defendant bases his legal argument entirely upon the

Act (730 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2022)), which he claims is applicable to his sentence.

¶ 15 However, the Act is not applicable to the defendant’s sentence. Section 3 of the Act

requires that a “good behavior allowance” be granted to “any person who commences a sentence

of confinement in a county jail for a fixed term of imprisonment after January 1, 1987,” with

exceptions that are not applicable to this case. (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 130/3 (West 2022).

5 Thus, by its plain and express language, the Act applies only to a defendant who is sentenced to a

fixed term in the county jail, not to one who, like the defendant here, was in jail awaiting trial.

Because the defendant did not commence a sentence of confinement in a county jail for a fixed

term of imprisonment, but instead commenced a determinate sentence in the Illinois Department

of Corrections following his plea of guilty, the Act is not applicable to the defendant’s claim for

additional sentencing credit, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s petition for

mandamus.

¶ 16 In addition, the defendant’s claim that “the record shows that the parties discussed specific

sentence credits during plea negotiations and does not conclusively show that[ ] the parties agreed

to exclude sentencing credit as part of a plea agreement,” is not supported by the record. As

described above, the transcript of the defendant’s guilty plea proceedings shows that the

defendant’s fully negotiated plea agreement 1 contained an express agreement by the defendant to

762 days of pretrial sentencing credit. In fact, when the State mistakenly stated that the defendant

“would receive credits for—credit for 262 days served,” the defendant interrupted, saying “No,

no.” The defendant thereafter stated, “700–,” the trial court stated, “You said 262–,” and the State

clarified “762,” adding, “Yeah. Sorry. I–762 days served.” Thereafter, the defendant agreed that

the terms of the plea agreement had been stated accurately for the trial court. When sentencing the

defendant, the trial court specifically stated that the defendant was “entitled to credit for 762

previously served,” and this was also stated in the written sentencing order, and in the mittimus.

¶ 17 We therefore agree with the trial court that People v. Wells, 2024 IL 129402, bars the

defendant’s claim. In Wells, the defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement. 2024 IL

1 “A fully negotiated plea agreement *** is one in which a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence.” People v. Wells, 2023 IL 127169, ¶ 31. 6 129402, ¶ 1. One of the provisions of the agreement was that the defendant “would receive credit

for the 54 days he had spent in custody.” 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 1. After the defendant was sentenced

in accordance with the agreement, the defendant filed a motion to receive credit for time the

defendant spent on home detention prior to entering his plea. 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 1. The Wells court

noted the longstanding rule “that plea agreements are governed to some extent by contract law

principles.” 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 21. The court further noted that if a contract is facially

unambiguous, a court must interpret the contract as a matter of law, without resorting to parol

evidence. 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 23. The court held that if a fully negotiated plea agreement represents

the complete and final expression of the parties’ agreement, there is a presumption “that every

material right and obligation is included and neither party may unilaterally seek modification of

the agreement.” 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 24. Applying these principles to the case before it, the Wells

court first noted that the defendant’s agreement with the State included, as “a clear and

unambiguous term,” that the defendant was “to receive exactly 54 days of credit.” 2024 IL 129402,

¶ 24. The court stated that the inclusion of that term “made the agreement contingent on the” award

of 54 days of credit. 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 24. The court reasoned that there was “no ambiguity in

what the parties intended the sentence and credit to be,” which meant that the parties were “bound

by the terms of the written agreement” and that the defendant was “not entitled to additional credit

not included in the agreement.” 2024 IL 129402, ¶ 24. In the present case, as in Wells, the amount

of credit the defendant was to receive for time spent in pretrial custody was an express term of the

fully negotiated plea agreement, as made clear by the defendant’s interruption of “No, no” when

the State mistakenly stated that 262 days was the agreed amount of credit, as well as by the

defendant’s subsequent assertion that the corrected amount–762 days–was the term to which he

was agreeing.

7 ¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is

affirmed.

¶ 20 Affirmed.