Young, J.
Defendant pleaded guilty of malicious destruction of property valued at more than $100, MCL 750.377a; MSA 28.609(1). He was sentenced to six to forty-eight months of imprisonment to be served consecutively to a prior two- to ten-year sentence for breaking and entering, from which sentence defendant had been paroled at the time he committed the instant offense. Defendant appeals as of right his sentence and also challenges whether he is obligated to serve the maximum term of the sentence for the breaking and entering conviction before he may begin to serve the sentence imposed in this case.
i
The victim in this case lived in an apartment across the hall from defendant. On the morning of the crime, defendant rang the victim’s doorbell and asked to use her telephone. She declined because she was using the telephone at that moment. Approximately fifteen minutes later, defendant again rang the victim’s bell. This time defendant asked her for a ride. The victim
indicated that she was still on the telephone but would consider giving defendant a ride later. In response, defendant yelled: “If you don’t open the door, you’ll be sorry.”
Thereafter, the victim observed defendant from her apartment window walking across the parking lot carrying a concrete block, which he threw through the windshield of her automobile. The damage exceeded $100.
Defendant waived his right to trial and pleaded guilty of malicious destruction of property. In exchange for defendant’s plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss an habitual offender charge.
At the time of the malicious destruction crime, defendant was on parole from a two- to ten-year sentence imposed for a conviction of breaking and entering. The sentencing court noted that the manner in which the sentences would be served would be determined by the Department of Corrections. The parties agree that pursuant to
People v Young,
206 Mich App 144; 521 NW2d 340 (1994), lv gtd 448 Mich 932 (1995), the Department of Corrections will require the ten-year maximum sentence to be served in full before defendant begins serving any part of the sentence imposed in this case.
H
A
Defendant first challenges the proportionality of his malicious destruction sentence. The scope of this Court’s review of sentencing decisions is narrow, and we may not disturb a sentence imposed unless the trial court abused its discretion under the principles
of proportionality announced in
People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
The sentence imposed in this case fell within the sentencing guidelines’ prescribed range (zero to nine months) and, therefore, is presumptively proportionate.
People v Broden,
428 Mich 343, 354-355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987). Defendant has presented no evh dence of “unusual circumstances” to remove his case from that presumption.
Milboum, supra
at 661. Accordingly, we find no error in the sentence the trial court imposed for the malicious destruction conviction.
B
The more significant appellate challenge defendant has raised concerns whether he must serve the maximum term of the sentence imposed for his breaking and entering conviction before the sentence imposed in this case commences. Where, as in this case, a person commits a crime while on parole, MCL 768.7a(2); MSA 28.1030(1)(2) (hereinafter the Act) requires that the sentence for the new conviction be served consecutively to the “remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.”
Defendant does not challenge that he must serve his new sentence consecutively to his prior sentence, but does challenge whether the quoted portion of the Act
requires that the
maximum term
of the prior sentence must first be served.
Defendant frontally challenges this Court’s decision in
People v Young,
wherein another panel of this Court concluded that the Act required that the maximum term of a prior sentence must be served before the commencement of a sentence imposed for a new crime. With due respect to our learned colleagues who formed the panel in
Young,
for the reasons stated herein we believe that defendant’s challenge to
Young
is well-founded and that the
Young
case was wrongly decided.
In
Young,
this Court was compelled to resolve a dispute regarding whether the portion of the Act quoted above required that the new term of imprisonment commence at the conclusion of the
maximum
term of the prior sentence or some lesser period. The Parole Board, through the Department of Corrections, in reliance on statutes
that address its jurisdiction
over convicted felons and the manner in which it is to calculate terms for consecutive sentencing purposes, argued that parolees who commit a felony offense while on parole are subject to consecutive sentences, but that the subsequent sentence begins to run at the conclusion of the
minimum
term of the prior offense. Young,
supra
at 155. The prosecutor urged, and the trial court held, that the Parole Board’s interpretation of the Act was flawed and that the Act required that the
maximum
of the prior term be served before the new sentence began.
The
Young
panel did not give the phrase “remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense” its plain and customary meaning. Instead, that panel held that the phrase meant the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed for the previous offense.
Id.
at 157-159. No dictionary we have consulted equates “remaining” with “maximum” or suggests that they are even loosely synonymous. Manifestly, “remaining portion” definitionally means
residuum
— that which is left over.* **
Courts do
not have broad discretion to interpret unambiguous language in a statute:
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc,
442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act.
Dep’t of Social Services v Brewer,
180 Mich App 82, 84; 446 NW2d 593 (1989). Nothing will be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.
In re Marin,
198 Mich App 560, 564; 499 NW2d 400 (1993). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute.
House Speaker v State Administrative Bd,
441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Young, J.
Defendant pleaded guilty of malicious destruction of property valued at more than $100, MCL 750.377a; MSA 28.609(1). He was sentenced to six to forty-eight months of imprisonment to be served consecutively to a prior two- to ten-year sentence for breaking and entering, from which sentence defendant had been paroled at the time he committed the instant offense. Defendant appeals as of right his sentence and also challenges whether he is obligated to serve the maximum term of the sentence for the breaking and entering conviction before he may begin to serve the sentence imposed in this case.
i
The victim in this case lived in an apartment across the hall from defendant. On the morning of the crime, defendant rang the victim’s doorbell and asked to use her telephone. She declined because she was using the telephone at that moment. Approximately fifteen minutes later, defendant again rang the victim’s bell. This time defendant asked her for a ride. The victim
indicated that she was still on the telephone but would consider giving defendant a ride later. In response, defendant yelled: “If you don’t open the door, you’ll be sorry.”
Thereafter, the victim observed defendant from her apartment window walking across the parking lot carrying a concrete block, which he threw through the windshield of her automobile. The damage exceeded $100.
Defendant waived his right to trial and pleaded guilty of malicious destruction of property. In exchange for defendant’s plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss an habitual offender charge.
At the time of the malicious destruction crime, defendant was on parole from a two- to ten-year sentence imposed for a conviction of breaking and entering. The sentencing court noted that the manner in which the sentences would be served would be determined by the Department of Corrections. The parties agree that pursuant to
People v Young,
206 Mich App 144; 521 NW2d 340 (1994), lv gtd 448 Mich 932 (1995), the Department of Corrections will require the ten-year maximum sentence to be served in full before defendant begins serving any part of the sentence imposed in this case.
H
A
Defendant first challenges the proportionality of his malicious destruction sentence. The scope of this Court’s review of sentencing decisions is narrow, and we may not disturb a sentence imposed unless the trial court abused its discretion under the principles
of proportionality announced in
People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
The sentence imposed in this case fell within the sentencing guidelines’ prescribed range (zero to nine months) and, therefore, is presumptively proportionate.
People v Broden,
428 Mich 343, 354-355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987). Defendant has presented no evh dence of “unusual circumstances” to remove his case from that presumption.
Milboum, supra
at 661. Accordingly, we find no error in the sentence the trial court imposed for the malicious destruction conviction.
B
The more significant appellate challenge defendant has raised concerns whether he must serve the maximum term of the sentence imposed for his breaking and entering conviction before the sentence imposed in this case commences. Where, as in this case, a person commits a crime while on parole, MCL 768.7a(2); MSA 28.1030(1)(2) (hereinafter the Act) requires that the sentence for the new conviction be served consecutively to the “remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.”
Defendant does not challenge that he must serve his new sentence consecutively to his prior sentence, but does challenge whether the quoted portion of the Act
requires that the
maximum term
of the prior sentence must first be served.
Defendant frontally challenges this Court’s decision in
People v Young,
wherein another panel of this Court concluded that the Act required that the maximum term of a prior sentence must be served before the commencement of a sentence imposed for a new crime. With due respect to our learned colleagues who formed the panel in
Young,
for the reasons stated herein we believe that defendant’s challenge to
Young
is well-founded and that the
Young
case was wrongly decided.
In
Young,
this Court was compelled to resolve a dispute regarding whether the portion of the Act quoted above required that the new term of imprisonment commence at the conclusion of the
maximum
term of the prior sentence or some lesser period. The Parole Board, through the Department of Corrections, in reliance on statutes
that address its jurisdiction
over convicted felons and the manner in which it is to calculate terms for consecutive sentencing purposes, argued that parolees who commit a felony offense while on parole are subject to consecutive sentences, but that the subsequent sentence begins to run at the conclusion of the
minimum
term of the prior offense. Young,
supra
at 155. The prosecutor urged, and the trial court held, that the Parole Board’s interpretation of the Act was flawed and that the Act required that the
maximum
of the prior term be served before the new sentence began.
The
Young
panel did not give the phrase “remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense” its plain and customary meaning. Instead, that panel held that the phrase meant the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed for the previous offense.
Id.
at 157-159. No dictionary we have consulted equates “remaining” with “maximum” or suggests that they are even loosely synonymous. Manifestly, “remaining portion” definitionally means
residuum
— that which is left over.* **
Courts do
not have broad discretion to interpret unambiguous language in a statute:
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc,
442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act.
Dep’t of Social Services v Brewer,
180 Mich App 82, 84; 446 NW2d 593 (1989). Nothing will be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.
In re Marin,
198 Mich App 560, 564; 499 NW2d 400 (1993). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute.
House Speaker v State Administrative Bd,
441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed.
Frasier v Model Coverall Service, Inc,
182 Mich App 741, 744; 453 NW2d 301 (1990). As explained in
Nat’l Exposition Co v Detroit,
169 Mich App 25, 29; 425 NW2d 497 (1988):
“A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts may not speculate as to tire probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words employed in the statute. A word or phrase in a statute is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. . . . When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Such a statute must be applied, and not interpreted, since it speaks for itself.
[In re Schnell,
214 Mich App 304, 309-310; 543 NW2d 11 (1995).]
The
Young
panel examined the statutes relied upon by the Department of Corrections, MCL 791.238(5); MSA 28.2308(5) and the statute referred to therein, MCL 791.234(2); MSA 28.2304(2) (renumbered in 1994 as MCL 791.234[3]; MSA 28.2304[3]; hereafter referred
to as the “Parole Statutes”; see footnote 3,
supra),
and concluded that they supported the department’s position.
Young, supra
at 156. Notwithstanding, the
Young
panel held that “the interpretation of the Department of Corrections is contrary to a plain reading of [the Act] and contrary to the legislative intent.”
Id.
The panel was able to do so because it found conflict between the Act and the two Parole Statutes (addressed to the jurisdiction of Parole Board), and further found — not on the basis of a construction of the language of the Act, but on the basis of an informal House legislative analysis of the Act when it was proposed — that our Legislature intended that the maximum term of the prior sentence be served before the new consecutive sentence began.* ***
Id.
at 156-158.
Having found a “conflict” between these three statutes, the
Young
panel resolved it by resort to the questionable doctrine of “implied repeal.”
The
Young
Court held that the Act, being enacted later than the Parole Statutes, evidenced the Legislature’s implied repeal of the Parole Statutes.
Id.
at 158. The frank error of the
Young
panel’s statutory construction and its implied repeal rationale were proved by the Legis
lature’s reenactment of the Parole Statutes — on June 27, 1994, approximately a week before
Young
was decided.
Contrary to our colleagues on the
Young
panel, we conclude that the Act and the Parole Statutes work in harmony with one another and that there is no conflict between them. The three statutes respect the division of roles between the courts, which sentence defendants, and the executive branch (through the Department of Corrections), which has jurisdiction over the disposition of persons who have been sentenced. See MCL 791.266; MSA 28.2326 (defendants are sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections).
The Act is addressed to the judiciary and mandates consecutive sentences for parolees who commit crimes while on parole. It does not, however, concern postsentencing dispositional issues such as how much time of a prior indeterminate sentence a convicted person must serve before the new sentence to be consecutively served commences. The Parole Statutes, on the other hand, address the jurisdiction of the Parole Board. Not surprisingly, the Parole Statutes
do
prescribe dispositional issues, including the amount of time of a prior sentence a parolee must serve before his new sentence begins.
Given the differing roles of the judiciary and the Department of Corrections in the sentencing and disposition of persons convicted of crimes, it is entirely consistent that the Legislature chose to use “remaining portion” rather than “maximum term” in the Act.
If, as the
Young
panel presumed, it had been the Legislature’s intent to change these roles and impose on the courts dispositional issues that customarily have been within the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, it could have made that intent clear by using “maximum term” rather than “remaining portion” in the Act to signify that the Parole Board’s traditional jurisdiction was extinguished.
But for the compulsion mandated by Administrative Order No. 1994-4 that we follow Young, we would hold that the Act does not require that the defendant serve the maximum term imposed as a consequence of his breaking and entering conviction before commencing his sentence for malicious destruction.
Affirmed.