NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 220778-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/10/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-22-0778, 5-22-0783 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County. ) v. ) Nos. 19-CF-473, 20-CF-176 ) KEVONTA C. THOMAS, ) Honorable ) Ralph R. Bloodworth III, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where postplea counsel did not include any recognized basis for withdrawal of a plea in the defendant’s motions to vacate his guilty plea and acknowledged that he had filed the motions for the sole purpose of being allowed to file motions to reconsider the defendant’s sentences, counsel did not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 604(d) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017)). The appropriate remedy is to remand the cause for strict compliance and further proceedings on a new motion to vacate the plea.
¶2 The defendant, Kevonta C. Thomas, pled guilty to one count each of identity theft and
unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon in a negotiated plea agreement involving
multiple cases pending against him. In exchange for his plea, the State dropped numerous
additional charges, waived a mandatory Class X sentence enhancement on one charge (see 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2020)), and agreed to recommend a sentence cap of 10 years on the
other charge. The court held a sentencing hearing at which it considered evidence related to the
1 defendant’s mental health diagnoses. The court imposed consecutive sentences of nine years for
the weapons charge and six years for identity theft.
¶3 The defendant subsequently filed motions to withdraw his plea along with motions to
reduce his sentences. He initially asserted that he wished to withdraw his plea because no
psychological examination of him was performed by the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC); however, he dropped this argument at the hearing on his motions and acknowledged that
he was seeking to withdraw his plea because he was required to do so in order to challenge his
sentences. The court denied the motions. The defendant appeals, arguing that (1) his attorney did
not strictly comply Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017)
because he failed to set forth a legal basis for the withdrawal of his plea and (2) the appropriate
remedy is remand for strict compliance with the rule and new proceedings. We reverse and remand.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In October 2019, the defendant was charged with one count of identity theft (720 ILCS
5/16-30(e)(1)(A)(iii) (West 2018)) in Jackson County case No. 19-CF-473. The charge stemmed
from an incident in which his sister, Keshauna Thomas, stole a wallet. The defendant then used a
credit card found in the wallet to purchase over $2,000 worth of merchandise. The charging
information stated that although the offense is a Class 2 felony, the defendant was subject to
mandatory Class X sentencing due to two prior felony convictions. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)
(West 2020).
¶6 In May 2020, the State filed a seven-count information in Jackson County case No. 20-CF-
176 charging the defendant with one count of being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-
1.7(a) (West 2020)), two counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-
1.1(a)), one count of unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3(a)), one count of criminal trespass to a residence
2 (id. § 19-4(a)(2)), one count of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS
5/11-204.1(1)), and one count of driving 35 or more miles per hour over the posted speed limit (id.
§ 11-601.5(b)). The information stated that the defendant was eligible for extended term
sentencing on five of the charges.
¶7 On April 19, 2021, the defendant pled guilty in a negotiated plea agreement involving 19-
CF-473, 20-CF-176, and six other pending cases. Pursuant to the agreement, the defendant pled
guilty to one count of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon in 20-CF-176 and the
charge of identity theft in 19-CF-473. In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the six
remaining charges in 20-CF-176 and to dismiss six other pending cases in their entirety. We note
that those six cases involved four felony charges and five misdemeanor charges. The State also
agreed to waive the mandatory Class X sentence enhancement on the identity theft charge and to
recommend a sentence cap of 10 years on the unlawful use or possession of a weapon charge,
which otherwise carried a potential term of 3 to 14 years. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2020).
Despite these sentencing concessions, the court referred to the plea as an “open plea” several times
during the hearing.
¶8 The court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI prepared pursuant to
this order contained substantial information concerning the defendant’s mental health diagnoses.
It indicated that he had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,
posttraumatic stress disorder, antisocial personality disorder, bipolar disorder, and pica, a mental
health condition involving compulsive ingestion of non-food items. The report indicated that the
defendant’s condition improved when he was treated at Madden Mental Health Center.
¶9 The PSI also set forth the defendant’s history of delinquency adjudications, criminal
convictions, and disciplinary infractions while incarcerated in IDOC. The PSI indicated that the
3 defendant, who was 25 years old at the time it was prepared, had been adjudicated delinquent twice
and convicted as an adult of 11 felony charges in addition to those involved in the plea agreement
at issue here. The report further indicated that he had incurred numerous disciplinary infractions
in prison.
¶ 10 The matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing on June 23, 2021. Neither party presented
additional evidence at the hearing, instead relying upon the evidence included in the PSI to make
their arguments. The State asked the court to sentence the defendant to 7 years for identity theft,
the maximum nonextended term for a Class 2 felony (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020)),
and to 10 years for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, the agreed-upon
recommended cap. The defendant asked the court to sentence him to probation on the identity theft
charge and impose the three-year minimum sentence for unlawful use or possession of a weapon
by a felon (see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2020)).
¶ 11 Assistant State’s Attorney Andrew Suthard began his argument by stating, “Mr. Thomas,
the only way I know how to describe him is that he is a habitual criminal.” Suthard further
emphasized that the identity theft charge involved the use of a stolen credit card to purchase a
substantial amount of merchandise, valued at approximately $2,500. Suthard argued that two
statutory factors in aggravation were present in both cases: (1) the defendant’s substantial criminal
history (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2020)) and (2) the need to deter others (id. § 5-5-
3.2(a)(7)). He argued that an additional factor was applicable to the unlawful use or possession of
a weapon charge: the defendant’s conduct threatened serious harm (id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(1)). Suthard
explained that the defendant, while armed, barricaded himself in an apartment with two individuals
and refused to allow them to leave.
4 ¶ 12 Suthard acknowledged the defendant’s youth and noted that if the court imposed the
aggregate sentence of 17 years the State was requesting, the defendant could serve 50% of that and
be released when he was “still young” with ample opportunity to “make something of himself” if
he chose to do so. He expressed doubts, however, that the defendant had much if any rehabilitative
potential considering his significant criminal history.
¶ 13 Defense counsel Christian Baril emphasized the defendant’s diagnoses with “serious
mental health conditions.” He acknowledged the defendant’s significant criminal history, but he
argued that this conduct was largely the result of the defendant’s mental illnesses. He noted that
the defendant had improved somewhat since his treatment at Madden, which involved a change in
his medications.
¶ 14 Baril argued that three factors in mitigation were present. First, he argued that the defendant
was suffering from serious mental illnesses that substantially impacted his ability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(16)). Second, he contended that the
defendant was a person with an intellectual disability (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(13)). He explained that this
factor was relevant due to the defendant’s apparent “inadequate social adjustment.” See id. § 5-1-
13. Third, he argued that the character and attitude of the defendant indicated that he was unlikely
to reoffend (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(9)). Baril acknowledged that the defendant had a substantial criminal
history, but he argued that the defendant’s willingness to take responsibility for his conduct
demonstrated an intent to rehabilitate himself. He also pointed to evidence in the PSI that the
defendant’s new medication appeared to be working, which made him less likely to reoffend.
¶ 15 Baril argued that two additional factors were applicable with respect to the identity theft
charge. First, he pointed out that the defendant’s sister admitted that she was the person who
actually stole the victim’s wallet. He argued that, as such, the defendant’s conduct was induced or
5 facilitated by someone else (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(5)). Second, he argued that no serious harm occurred
or was contemplated as a result of the defendant’s conduct in committing this offense (id. § 5-5-
3.1(a)(1), (a)(2)).
¶ 16 Suthard responded to the defense arguments concerning the defendant’s mental health by
arguing that the behavior underlying these diagnoses was “calculated” so that the defendant could
get out of jail and be transferred to a mental health facility. He further speculated that the
improvement observed after the defendant was transferred to Madden was the result of the
defendant experiencing a mental health facility and deciding that it was “scarier” than prison.
Suthard acknowledged, however, that this was speculation. Both Baril and the defendant
responded to Suthard’s allegations, stating that there was no basis for his assumptions.
¶ 17 The court allowed the defendant to make a statement in allocution. The court then ruled
from the bench. The court stated that it considered the following factors: (1) that the defendant has
taken responsibility for his actions; (2) the cost to the State of incarceration; (3) that the defendant
has a prior history of criminal activity and delinquency (id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(3)); (4) the need to deter
others (id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(7)); and (5) that the defendant has a daughter (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(18)). The
court next stated that it considered “whether or not” various statutory factors in mitigation applied.
Addressing the defendant, the court stated, “I have known you a while and I have noticed a change
in particular since you went to that Madden facility. So, I certainly will consider that.”
¶ 18 Before pronouncing sentence, the court noted that consecutive sentences were mandatory
and that the court was not bound by the State’s recommendation of a 10-year sentence cap on the
unlawful use or possession of a weapon charge. The court sentenced the defendant to six years for
identity theft in 19-CF-473 and nine years for unlawful use or possession of a weapon in 20-CF-
176. The court stated that the mandatory minimum fines on both charges “will be assessed but
6 vacated after any bond posted is applied and found uncollectable.” The court noted that this would
give the defendant “a chance to make a fresh start” after his release.
¶ 19 The court then provided the following admonishments: “Mr. Thomas, you got 30 days to
do several things. You can file a motion to reconsider these sentences if you would like to do that.”
The court explained that the motion must be in writing and must set forth the legal bases for
reconsidering the sentence and that any reason not included in the motion would be forfeited on
appeal. Next, the court stated, “You can also file a motion to vacate and withdraw your open pleas
in these two cases.” Again, the court explained that the motion must be in writing and that any
argument not contained in the written motion would be forfeited on appeal. The court reiterated
that any motion must be filed within 30 days and informed the defendant that if either type of
motion was denied, he could appeal that ruling. The court did not admonish the defendant that he
must file a motion to withdraw his plea in order to challenge his sentences.
¶ 20 On July 22, 2021, Baril filed on behalf of the defendant motions to withdraw his plea in
both cases along with motions to reduce his sentence. In the motions to withdraw plea, the
defendant asserted that (1) he was moving to withdraw his plea because he was required to file
such a motion to be allowed to file a motion to reconsider his sentence under People v. Linder, 186
Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1999); and (2) he wanted to withdraw his plea because he was not given a mental
health examination by IDOC. Baril requested leave to file an amended motion if necessary, noting
that the plea hearing transcript was not yet available and that he had encountered difficulties
conferring with the defendant because his scheduled calls with the defendant had been rescheduled
multiple times by IDOC. Baril indicated that he intended to file a certificate of compliance with
Rule 604(d) after reviewing the transcript of the plea hearing.
7 ¶ 21 Subsequently, Baril filed motions for transcripts in both cases and multiple motions to
continue the hearing on the motions to withdraw plea due to difficulties arranging calls with the
defendant. The court granted the requests for continuances. On February 9, 2022, Baril filed
facially valid certificates of compliance with Rule 604(d) in both cases. He did not file an amended
motion to withdraw the defendant’s plea in either case.
¶ 22 On November 30, 2022, the matter came for a hearing on the defendant’s motions to
withdraw his plea and his motions to reduce his sentences. Addressing the motions to withdraw
plea, Baril acknowledged to the court that the “sole reason” the defendant sought to withdraw his
plea was the requirement of doing so in order to challenge his sentences. Baril noted that although
he “did mention in paragraph 4 [of the motion to withdraw plea] that the defendant indicated that
he wished to withdraw his plea because he was not given a mental health examination by the
Department of Corrections,” he was “not arguing that today.” In response, the State argued that
the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea without presenting a recognized basis for doing
so. The court denied the motions to vacate the defendant’s plea.
¶ 23 Despite denying the motions to vacate the plea, the court next allowed the parties to present
arguments on the defendant’s motions to reduce his sentence. The defendant argued that the court
gave too little weight to the mitigating evidence, highlighting the significant evidence of his mental
health diagnoses. In response, the State argued, “Your Honor, I’m not sure how Counsel can know
what weight you actually gave those factors, but I would note that in the sentencing hearing, you
considered all of them.” The State also emphasized the defendant’s significant criminal history.
We note that the State did not contend that the court could not consider the defendant’s motions to
reduce his sentences because it had not granted his motions to withdraw his plea; it only addressed
the merits of the motion to reduce the sentences.
8 ¶ 24 In ruling from the bench, the trial judge noted that he reviewed the transcript from the
sentencing hearing and considered the arguments of both parties. The court denied the motions
and advised the defendant of his appeal rights. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, the defendant argues that Baril failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d)
because he failed to amend the motion to withdraw plea to state a recognized basis for the
withdrawal of a guilty plea. He further contends that the appropriate remedy is remand for the
opportunity to file new motions and proceedings that comply with the rule’s requirements. The
State argues that remand is not required because despite any shortcomings in Baril’s performance,
the defendant nevertheless had a full and fair hearing on his claims. See People v. Brown, 2023 IL
App (4th) 220573, ¶ 50. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant.
¶ 27 Rule 604(d) provides that a defendant who has pled guilty may not appeal the judgment
entered on his plea unless he files a motion to withdraw the plea within 30 days after sentencing.
If he is challenging only his sentence, he must file a motion to reconsider the sentence within the
same time. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Where, as here, a defendant agrees to plead
guilty in exchange for a recommended sentence cap, he may not challenge a sentence below the
agreed-upon cap without first seeking to withdraw his plea. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. The purpose
of these motion requirements is to allow the trial court to engage in any necessary fact-finding
concerning matters outside the record while “ ‘witnesses are still available and memories are
fresh’ ” and to correct any errors in the plea proceedings. People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 31 (1994)
(quoting People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 104 (1988)).
¶ 28 As the trial court in this case correctly advised the defendant, any issue not raised in a
motion to withdraw plea is deemed forfeited on appeal. Id. at 35 (citing People v. Dickerson, 212
9 Ill. App. 3d 168, 171 (1991)). Because of this strict forfeiture rule, it is imperative that a defendant
have the assistance of counsel in presenting his motions to the court. Id.
¶ 29 To that end, Rule 604(d) also requires that an attorney representing a defendant in postplea
proceedings certify to the court that he has (1) consulted with the defendant to ascertain the
defendant’s claims of error, (2) examined the trial court record and the transcripts of the plea
proceedings and sentencing hearing, and (3) “made any amendments to the motion necessary for
adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d)
(eff. July 1, 2017). The certification requirement “enables the trial court to [e]nsure that counsel
has reviewed the defendant’s claim and considered all relevant bases for the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea [and/or the motion] to reconsider the sentence.” Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 69.
¶ 30 Strict compliance with these requirements is mandatory. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33; Brown,
2023 IL App (4th) 220573, ¶ 30. The remedy for failure to comply with any of Rule 604(d)’s
requirements is to remand the matter to the trial court “for the filing of a new motion to withdraw
guilty plea or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.” Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33.
The appropriateness of this remedy does not depend upon a showing of ineffective assistance of
postplea counsel. People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 6 n.1.
¶ 31 Here, Baril filed certificates of compliance in both cases, each stating that he consulted
with the defendant, that he reviewed the trial court record and the transcripts from the plea hearing
and sentencing hearing, and that he made any necessary amendments to his motions for adequate
presentation of the defendant’s claims. However, even when postplea counsel files a facially valid
Rule 604(d) certificate, like those filed by Baril, we must review the record to determine whether
he did, in fact, fulfill his obligations under the rule. Id. ¶ 8. The question of strict compliance with
Rule 604(d) is subject to de novo review. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573, ¶ 31.
10 ¶ 32 The defendant argues that the motions to withdraw plea filed by Baril refute the claim in
his certificates of compliance that he made any necessary amendments to the motions. This is so,
he contends, because the motions “did not allege any legal grounds upon which a guilty plea could
arguably be withdrawn.” We agree.
¶ 33 A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his plea. People v. Burge, 2021
IL 125642, ¶ 37. Instead, he must establish a legally recognized basis for withdrawal of the plea.
People v. Milsap, 2022 IL App (4th) 210192, ¶ 17. A defendant should be allowed to withdraw his
plea if he can show that he pled guilty due to a misapprehension of pertinent facts or law or where
there is doubt as to his guilt and justice would be better served by allowing him to withdraw the
plea and proceed to trial. Id. (citing People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32). Another basis upon
which to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea is ineffective assistance of plea counsel. See People
v. Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 31. To succeed on such a claim, a defendant must show
both that plea counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that he was prejudiced as
a result. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 44. To demonstrate the necessary prejudice, a defendant “must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have [pled]
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Conclusory allegations are insufficient to make this showing. People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860,
¶ 29. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that it would have been reasonable under the
circumstances of the case to reject the plea deal and insist on going to trial. Id.; Hughes, 2012 IL
112817, ¶ 65.
¶ 34 In contending that Baril failed to allege any recognized basis to withdraw his plea, the
defendant likens this case to the Fourth District’s recent decision in People v. Cline, 2023 IL App
(4th) 220471-U. There, the defendant pled guilty to one count of being an armed habitual criminal
11 and one count of theft in two separate pending cases. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. In exchange for his plea, the State
dropped a total of eight additional charges in both cases and dismissed three other pending cases
in their entirety. Id. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years for being an armed
habitual criminal and 4 years for theft. Under truth-in-sentencing provisions, the armed habitual
criminal sentence was required to be served at 85% while the sentence for theft was required to be
served at 50%. Id. ¶ 7.
¶ 35 Acting through his plea attorney, the defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, arguing that he was not aware of the requirement that he serve his first sentence at
85% and did not contemplate this requirement when he pled guilty. Id. ¶ 8. Plea counsel withdrew
and was replaced by a new attorney. Postplea counsel did not make any amendments to the motion
filed by the defendant’s original attorney. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14. 1 He likewise did not attach any affidavits
in support of the defendant’s claim (id. ¶ 8), nor did he present evidence at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw (id. ¶ 15).
¶ 36 On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw plea, the Fourth District
agreed with the defendant that postplea counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 18.
In reaching this conclusion, the Cline court explained that counsel
“failed to provide any legally recognized basis for defendant to withdraw his guilty plea,
such as defendant would not have pled guilty if he was correctly advised as to truth-in-
sentencing or, alternatively, that [plea counsel] provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by either (1) failing to properly advise him as to truth-in-sentencing or (2) incorrectly
advising him as to truth-in-sentencing. This failure was further compounded by [postplea
The trial court originally denied the motion after a hearing. Cline, 2023 IL App (4th) 220471-U, 1
¶¶ 11-12. However, the matter was remanded after an appeal due to postplea counsel’s initial failure to file any Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance. Id. ¶ 13. 12 counsel] not calling defendant or [plea counsel] as witnesses at the hearing on defendant’s
motion.” Id. ¶ 22.
The court concluded that the record thus refuted the postplea attorney’s attestation in his facially
valid certificate of compliance that he made any necessary amendments to the original motion. Id.
¶ 37 The defendant contends that here, similarly, Baril failed to “connect [the defendant’s]
alleged misapprehension” concerning whether he would be given a mental health examination in
IDOC to any legally recognized basis to withdraw his plea. He notes, for example, that Baril did
not allege that the defendant would not have pled guilty had he known he would not be given a
mental health examination, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, or that there was any
doubt as to his guilt. He argues that, “[a]t a minimum, by not pleading that [the defendant] would
have proceeded to trial rather than plead guilty had he known he would not be given a mental
health examination by IDOC, counsel failed to present [the defendant’s] claims of any alleged
defects in the proceedings.”
¶ 38 In response, the State argues that Cline is “problematic” because truth-in-sentencing is a
collateral consequence of pleading guilty. See Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 43-45 (explaining that
while a plea is not knowing and voluntary if the court fails to advise the defendant of the direct
consequences of his plea, a failure to advise the defendant of collateral consequences does not
render the plea unknowing or involuntary). The State further argues that the allegations the
defendant suggests Baril should have added to his motion would not have provided a basis for
withdrawing the plea. More specifically, the State contends that because receiving a mental health
examination from IDOC is not a direct consequence of pleading guilty, any alleged
misapprehension about it would not provide a basis to withdraw the plea. Likewise, the State
contends, the defendant could not prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel where
13 it would not have been rational to insist on going to trial due to the significant amount of prison
time the defendant would have faced had he rejected the plea agreement.
¶ 39 We need not resolve the State’s arguments concerning the validity of Cline or the adequacy
of the additional allegations the defendant suggests Baril might have included in his motions to
withdraw the defendant’s plea. As the defendant emphasizes and the State acknowledges, at the
hearing on the motions, Baril abandoned the defendant’s claim that he wanted to withdraw his plea
because he did not receive a mental health examination while in IDOC. Instead, he acknowledged
that the sole reason he filed a motion to withdraw the plea was to allow the defendant to ask the
court to reconsider and reduce his sentence. As the State recognizes, this fact is dispositive.
¶ 40 To satisfy the requirement of strict compliance with Rule 604(d), the “hearing on a motion
to withdraw a defendant’s guilty plea must be more than a charade performed only to allow an
appeal to proceed.” Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 10. The rule contemplates something
more than a “ ‘perfunctory type of motion and hearing’ ” intended only to overcome procedural
hurdles. Id. ¶ 11 (quoting People v. Keele, 210 Ill. App. 3d 898, 903 (1991)). Because Baril
conceded at the hearing that the motion to withdraw the defendant’s plea was being offered only
as a prerequisite to seeking to have the court reconsider his sentence, we must conclude that he did
not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 604(d) despite his facially valid certificate of
compliance.
¶ 41 The State argues, however, that remand is not necessary here because the defendant
received a full and fair hearing on his claim. In support of this contention, the State cites another
recent Fourth District decision, People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573. We find Brown
distinguishable.
14 ¶ 42 That case involved a motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance
of plea counsel. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Postplea counsel failed to allege in the motion that the defendant
would not have pled guilty if not for his plea counsel’s alleged mistakes. In addition, he failed to
attach affidavits to the motion in support of claims concerning matters outside the record. Id. ¶ 29.
Despite these flaws in the motion, however, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at which both the defendant and his plea counsel testified.
Id. ¶¶ 16-21. In denying the motion to withdraw the plea, the court also considered the trial judge’s
own recollection of the plea proceedings. Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 43 On appeal, the Fourth District held that where counsel files a facially valid certificate of
compliance and “the trial court determines after a full and fair hearing that the defendant’s claims
are meritless, defects in the pleadings do not justify a remand for further proceedings.” Id. ¶ 50.
The court emphasized the importance of attorneys ensuring that the postplea motions they file “are
in proper form before signing Rule 604(d) certificates.” Id. However, the court explained that “it
would be an exercise in futility and a waste of judicial resources to remand for an attorney to
replead a claim that has already been adjudicated meritless.” Id.
¶ 44 The State argues that here, too, the defendant received a hearing on his claims and the court
found them to be meritless. As such, the State contends, remand is unnecessary. We disagree.
¶ 45 In Brown, as we have just discussed, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on the
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Id. ¶¶ 16-21. In other words, the defects
in the motion to withdraw plea did not prevent the court from considering the merits of the
defendant’s argument that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. Here, by contrast, Baril
presented no arguments in support of the defendant’s request to withdraw his plea at the hearing.
Instead, he acknowledged that the sole purpose of filing the motions to withdraw plea was to allow
15 the defendant to go forward with his motions to reduce his sentences. The court thus denied the
defendant’s motions to withdraw his plea without considering the merits of any arguments to
support them. As such, unlike what occurred in Brown, Baril’s failure to strictly comply with Rule
604(d) prevented the court from hearing any arguments in support of the defendant’s request to
withdraw his guilty plea. Under these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to remand the
matter to the trial court to allow the defendant to file new motions, if he so desires, and to hold a
hearing on those motions. See Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 34.
¶ 46 The State argues that there are flaws in what it characterizes as the defendant’s argument
that he received ineffective assistance of postplea counsel. As we explained earlier, however, the
necessity of remanding for compliance with Rule 604(d) does not depend on ineffective assistance
postplea counsel. See Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 6 n.1.
¶ 47 In addition, the State contends that under Brown, the crucial analysis in determining
whether remand is required is whether the defendant has shown “the requisite prejudice” from
counsel’s failure to strictly comply. We disagree with this reading of Brown. In Janes, the Illinois
Supreme Court expressly rejected a harmless error analysis. See Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 34; see also
People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 370-71 (1998) (reaffirming the Janes court’s “call for strict
compliance” and its renunciation of “the prior practice of determining whether errors in failing to
comply with Rule 604(d) were harmless or prejudicial”); Cline, 2023 IL App (4th) 220471-U,
¶¶ 23-24 (rejecting the State’s argument that the record refuted the defendant’s underlying claims
because in failing to comply with Rule 604(d), postplea counsel failed to put evidence into the
record that might have supported the claims and remanding for compliance without expressing an
opinion as to the merits of the defendant’s claims). Thus, we interpret Brown as simply holding
that remand is not necessary where technical defects in a motion do not preclude the court from
16 considering the merits of a defendant’s claims on a postplea motion. As we have already explained,
that is not what happened here. We therefore conclude that it is necessary to remand this matter to
the trial court for new postplea motions, if the defendant wishes to file them, and a new hearing in
compliance with Rule 604(d).
¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court’s order denying the defendant’s postplea
motions. We remand for an opportunity to file new motions in compliance with Rule 604(d).
¶ 50 Order vacated; cause remanded.