2020 IL App (1st) 173120-U
FOURTH DIVISION September 30, 2020
No. 1-17-3120
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) Nos. 12 CR 1729901 ANDREW THOMAS, ) 13 CR 227901 ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Thaddeus L. Wilson, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Reversing the summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition where he stated a gist of a constitutional violation in regard to whether the trial court properly admonished him during his guilty plea hearing under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012).
¶2 Defendant Andrew Thomas appeals from the circuit court of Cook County’s dismissal of
his pro se postconviction petition at the first stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). On appeal, defendant maintains that 1-17-3120
his petition should not have been dismissed where he presented an arguable claim of a violation
of his due process rights because he was not adequately admonished by the trial court as required
by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). Specifically, defendant argues that he
was not informed of the nature of the charges against him prior to pleading guilty to aggravated
criminal sexual assault and attempted first degree murder and was also not apprised of his right
to confront witnesses. Accordingly, defendant maintains his guilty plea was not knowingly and
intelligently entered. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court
and remand the matter for second-stage proceedings.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In September 2012, defendant was charged by information in case number 12 CR
1729901 with 23 counts related to the assault of his former girlfriend, A.D., inside her home
while their three-month-old child was present. These charges included home invasion,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted first degree murder, residential burglary,
kidnapping, aggravated domestic battery, aggravated battery, aggravated unlawful restraint, and
criminal trespass to residence.
¶5 Two months later, in November 2012, defendant solicited a fellow inmate and an
undercover Cook County sheriff to murder A.D. and her three children who were not
biologically related to defendant. Based on this, defendant was indicted in January 2013 under
case number 13 CR 227901 for 12 counts of solicitation of murder. The matter proceeded before
the same trial court judge as related matters.
¶6 On September 15, 2014, defense counsel informed the trial court that, pursuant to plea
negotiations with the State, defendant wished to plead guilty to the offenses of aggravated
criminal sexual assault, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of solicitation of murder
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in exchange for an aggregate 28-year sentence. The State nol-prossed the remaining charges.
¶7 The trial court then admonished defendant as follows:
“THE COURT: Sir, in case number 12 CR 1729901 in count three, you’re
charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault. It is charged as a class X felony. This
means that if you were found guilty or were to plead guilty, you could be sentenced from
six to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, fined up to $25,000 and be
required to serve a period of mandatory supervised release formerly known as parole of
three years to life after your period of incarceration.
In count nine you are charged with attempt first degree murder. It is charged as a
class X felony, six to 30. That means if you were found guilty or were to plead guilty,
you could be sentenced from six to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections,
fined up to $25,000 and be required to serve a period of mandatory supervised release
formerly known as parole of three years after your period of incarceration.
In case number 13 CR 0227901, in count five you are charged with solicitation of
murder. It is charged as a class X felony. In count nine again you’re charged with
solicitation of murder. It is charged as a class X felony. That means with respect to those
counts if you were found guilty or were to plead guilty, you could be sentenced from six
to 30 years.
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: It’s a special class X. It’s 15 to 30
years.
THE COURT: You could be sentenced from 15 to 30 years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections, fined up to $25,000 and be required to serve a period of
mandatory supervised release formerly known as parole of three years after your period
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of incarceration. Do you understand each of the four charges against you and the
possible penalties?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: With respect to each of those charges how do you plead, guilty or
not guilty?
DEFENDANT: Guilty.”
¶8 The court then admonished defendant of the rights he would be relinquishing by pleading
guilty:
“THE COURT: Do you understand you have a right to plead not guilty and have
a trial before a jury or a judge?
THE COURT: Do you know when [sic] a jury trial is?
THE COURT: I have in my hand two jury waiver forms, is that your signature at
the bottom of each?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you read them or were they explained to you before you
signed them?
THE COURT: Do you understand that by signing those forms you waive your
right to a trial before a jury?
THE COURT: Do you understand you’re also waiving your right to a trial of any
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kind including before a judge?
THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or promised you anything to get you
to plead guilty?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty of your own free will?
DEFENDANT: Yes.”
The trial court then advised defendant of the impact of pleading guilty to these charges if he was
not a United States citizen and defendant stated that he understood. The court also advised
defendant that it was not bound by any agreement among defendant, his counsel, and the
prosecution, and defendant stated he understood. The trial court accepted defendant’s jury
waiver as “knowingly and voluntarily given.”
¶9 The State then presented the factual basis of the plea as follows. On August 30, 2012, the
defendant and A.D. had a child in common who, at the time, was three months old. On that date,
A.D. went to her residence with the baby. When she entered the residence, she observed
defendant inside her home. Defendant instructed her to put the child down and then grabbed
A.D. by the hair and pushed her to the floor. He then grabbed her neck with both hands and
strangled her, squeezing her neck while he forced her face into the couch cushions. Defendant
told A.D. he wanted to kill her and that if she was not going to be with him, she was not going to
be with anyone else. Then defendant pushed her to the floor, kicked her in the legs, and told her
he was going to treat her like a dog. Defendant struck A.D. in the back and the back of the legs
with a pan he had retrieved from the kitchen. Defendant told A.D. to go into the bedroom and
stated he wanted to have sex with her to get her pregnant again. Defendant ordered A.D. to take
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off her clothes, which she did. Defendant then vaginally raped A.D.
¶ 10 After the assault, A.D. informed defendant she had to pick up her other children from day
care. Defendant stated A.D. could not take the baby with her and that if she called the police, he
would harm the baby. Defendant said he was going to kill A.D. because he knew that she was
going to call the police.
¶ 11 A.D. was able to leave the apartment without her baby and contacted the police who went
to the residence. The police officers observed defendant trying to exit through a window while
carrying the baby in his arms. The officers announced their office and defendant retreated back
into the apartment where he was ultimately arrested. In addition, the State indicated that A.D.
would identify defendant in open court during trial. Defense counsel stipulated that this would
be the testimony if the matter were to proceed to trial.
¶ 12 The State then presented the factual basis for the plea in 13 CR 227901, which was
stipulated to by defense counsel as follows. On November 5, 2012, an individual named
Alexander Peebles was in custody when he met defendant. Peebles and defendant began
speaking and Peebles learned that defendant had been talking to another individual about his case
and the possibility of having A.D. killed. Peebles told defendant that he could have his cousin do
it for cheaper than the first individual. Peebles and defendant agreed to have the cousin visit
defendant. Peebles also obtained a note where defendant wrote A.D.’s name and address as well
as a map of A.D.’s home.
¶ 13 Peebles contacted the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. An undercover officer by the
name of Andrew Gutter posed as Peebles’ cousin and hitman. Defendant was provided with
Gutter’s phone number and on November 8, 2012, defendant called Gutter and asked him to
visit. Gutter would testify that on November 11, 2012, he visited defendant and recorded their
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conversation under court order. Gutter asked defendant what was going on and defendant
indicated he had “some baby mama drama” and went on to discuss how A.D. was not going to
discuss dropping the charges. Gutter told defendant “that he doesn’t talk to people, he doesn’t
scare people. He doesn’t – all he does is kill people and that’s the bottom line.” Defendant
agreed and the two made “a deal.” Thereafter, defendant provide Gutter with A.D.’s name and
address, as well as a description of her children and her schedule. When discussing what would
happen if the children were at home when Gutter arrived, defendant stated he “wouldn’t care
whether or not those people had to be taken care of so long as it wasn’t his one child that he had
with [A.D.].” Defendant stated that “without no witness there’s no case” and Gutter replied that
that is what “usually happens.” Defendant ended their meeting by saying “it’s going to be good”
and Gutter agreed. Defendant was arrested the next day.
¶ 14 The trial court then accepted defendant’s guilty plea stating:
“Let the record reflect that the Defendant understands the nature of the charges
against him, the possible penalties under law. The plea has been given freely and
voluntarily. A factual basis exists to support the plea.
The plea will be accepted. There will be a finding of guilty to each of the four
offenses and judgment is hereby entered on those findings.”
¶ 15 The matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing. Defendant waived a presentence
investigation report and the trial court sentenced him to two concurrent prison terms of 16 years
for two counts of solicitation of murder, to be served consecutively to two consecutive prison
terms of six years each for aggravated criminal sexual assault and attempted murder. Defendant
did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a direct appeal.
¶ 16 On September 10, 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging two
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claims, ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not intelligently made
because the trial court failed to ensure he understood the elements of the charges and that he had
the right to confront witnesses against him. The petition was supported by his own affidavit in
which defendant averred, in pertinent part, that his defense counsel did not inform him of the
elements of the charges. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition in a written order
finding that defendant’s claims did not have an arguable basis in law or fact. This appeal
followed.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, defendant maintains that his petition should not have been dismissed where he
presented an arguable claim of a violation of his due process rights because he was not
adequately admonished by the trial court as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff.
July 1, 2012). Specifically, defendant asserts that he was not informed of the nature of the
charges against him prior to pleading guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault and attempted
first degree murder where the trial court did not explain the elements of the offenses. Defendant
also argues that the trial court failed to inform him that by pleading guilty he would be giving up
his right to confront witnesses. Accordingly, defendant requests we reverse the circuit court’s
dismissal of his postconviction petition and remand the matter for second-stage proceedings
under the Act.
¶ 19 In response, the State asserts that the trial court substantially complied with Rule 402 and
therefore defendant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The State notes that
the trial court informed defendant of the charges against him: aggravated criminal sexual assault,
attempted first degree murder, and two counts of solicitation of murder. The court also asked
defendant if he knew what a jury trial was and after defendant stated that he did, the court
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explained that by pleading guilty he was giving up the right to a jury or bench trial. The court
further confirmed that no one had forced or threatened defendant to plead guilty, nor promised
him anything to plead guilty, and assured that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. The
State observes that the trial court then accepted defendant’s plea as “knowingly and voluntarily
given” and after hearing the factual basis for the charges in both cases, made a finding of guilty
as to each of the charged offenses and entered a judgment of guilty on each of those findings.
The State concludes that on this record, there was substantial compliance with Rule 402 and
therefore the circuit court did not err when it summarily dismissed defendant’s postconviction
petition.
¶ 20 We begin our analysis with a discussion of the Act. The Act provides a remedy to
criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional
rights occurred in their original trials. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016). A postconviction
proceeding not involving the death penalty contains three distinct stages. People v. Hodges, 234
Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009). At the first stage of a postconviction proceeding, a defendant need only
allege enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for purposes of invoking
the Act. Id. at 11-12.
¶ 21 The first stage of postconviction proceedings involves the circuit court independently
reviewing the petition and, taking the allegations as true, determining if it is frivolous or patently
without merit. Id. at 10. A petition can be dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit if it
has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. Id. at 11-12. More precisely, a petition lacks an
arguable basis in law or in fact if the claim is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory,”
meaning a theory that is completely contradicted by the record, or a “fanciful factual allegation,”
meaning assertions that are fantastic or delusional. Id. at 16-17. This includes claims that are
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barred by res judicata and forfeiture. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 445 (2005).
¶ 22 “The court is further foreclosed from engaging in any fact finding or any review of
matters beyond the allegations of the petition.” People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 99 (2002). At
this stage, a defendant “need only present a limited amount of detail in the petition” and the
“threshold for survival” is “low.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. A pro se defendant need only “allege
enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for purposes of invoking the
Act.” Id. “Thus, in our past decisions, when we have spoken of a ‘gist,’ [of a constitutional
claim] we meant only that the section 122-2 pleading requirements are met, even if the petition
lacks formal legal arguments or citations to legal authority.” Id. “At the first stage of
proceedings, we must accept as true all facts alleged in the postconviction petition, unless the
record contradicts those allegations.” People v. Barghouti, 2013 IL App (1st) 112373, ¶ 16.
This court reviews the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo. People v. Tate,
2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10.
¶ 23 At issue here is whether defendant set forth the gist of a constitutional claim that he was
denied due process where the trial court failed to properly admonish him as required by Rule
402. In order to satisfy due process, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that a defendant’s
guilty plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244-45
(1969) (finding that the court cannot presume waiver of important constitutional rights from a
silent record); People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 322 (2002). Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012), every defendant who enters a plea of guilty has a due process right
to be properly and fully admonished. People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 188 (2005). The goal
of Rule 402 is to ensure that a defendant understands his plea, the rights he has waived, and the
consequences of his actions. People v. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d 134, 139 (2009) (citing
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People v. Johns, 229 Ill. App. 3d 740 (1992)). The rule requires “substantial, not literal,
compliance with its provisions.” People v. Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (1974) (citing People v.
Mendoza, 48 Ill. 2d 371, 373-74 (1971)). “ ‘Substantial compliance’ means that although the
trial court did not recite to the defendant, and ask defendant if he understood, all the components
of Rule 402(a), the record nevertheless affirmatively and specifically shows that the defendant
understood them.” Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 138. Illinois courts have found substantial
compliance with Rule 402 where the record indicates a defendant understandably and voluntarily
entered his plea, even if the circuit court failed to admonish defendant as to a specific provision.
Id.
¶ 24 In reviewing admonishments under Rule 402, a court may consider the entire record,
including the record of earlier proceedings, in determining whether the accused voluntarily pled
guilty. Id. at 139. Although the best practice is to give admonishments at the time the circuit
court accepts the waiver of the plea, failure to do so is not necessarily fatal. People v. Dennis,
354 Ill. App. 3d 491, 497 (2004). Rather, each case must be determined on its own peculiar
circumstances, with a focus on the length of time between the waiver and plea. Id.
¶ 25 Failure to properly admonish a defendant does not automatically establish grounds for
reversing judgment or vacating a guilty plea. People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 250 (1991).
Whether reversal is required depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether
defendant had been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment. People v. Dudley, 58 Ill. 2d 57,
60-61 (1974). It is the defendant’s burden to establish prejudice. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d at
139. A defendant’s arguments are subject to de novo review. People v. Dismuke, 355 Ill. App.
3d 606, 608 (2005).
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¶ 26 Elements of the Offenses
¶ 27 Defendant first asserts that the trial court failed to substantially comply with Rule 402
where it did not inform him of the elements of the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault
and attempted first degree murder. Defendant maintains that he has set forth the gist of a
constitutional claim of due process where the United States Supreme Court stated in Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005), that a guilty plea is not knowingly and voluntarily given when
a defendant is not informed of the elements of the offense.
¶ 28 In response, the State asserts that Rule 402 only requires the trial court inform the
defendant of the “nature of the charge” and does not expressly require the trial court to state the
elements of the offense. The State maintains that in this case, the trial court told defendant he
was pleading guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault and to one count of
attempted first degree murder. When asked if he understood the charges against him, defendant
replied in the affirmative. The State also notes that defendant was present for the reading of the
factual basis for the offenses, which also served to inform him of the nature of the charges.
¶ 29 In Bradshaw, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated
murder after a colloquy with the presiding judge and the factual basis for the charges was
accepted. Id. at 179. Thereafter, the defendant filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus,
which alleged, in pertinent part, that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
because he was not aware of the specific intent element of the charge. Id. at 182. In reviewing
the defendant’s petition, the Supreme Court observed that the defendant’s “guilty plea would
indeed be invalid if he had not been aware of the nature of the charges against him, including the
elements of the aggravated murder charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. at 182-83. The Court
explained, “A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done
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voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.’” Id. at 183 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970)). Thus, “[w]here a defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been
informed of the crime’s elements, this standard is not met, and the plea is invalid.” Id.
¶ 30 Upon reviewing the record, however, the Court observed that while the presiding judge
had not expressly informed the defendant of the elements of the offenses as charged, the
constitutional requirements of his guilty plea were met where his counsel had informed him of
the elements of the charges:
“But the Court of Appeals erred in finding that [the defendant] had not been
properly informed before pleading guilty. In [the defendant’s] plea hearing, his attorneys
represented on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the
aggravated murder charge; [the defendant] himself then confirmed that this representation
was true. [Citation.] While the court taking a defendant’s plea is responsible for
ensuring ‘a record adequate for any review that may be later sought’ [citation], we have
never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the
defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be
satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the
elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.”
¶ 31 Here, the record is clear that the trial court did not state the elements of the offenses to
defendant at the plea hearing or at any other time. While the record does indicate that defendant
was arraigned and made aware of the charges against him, the elements of those charges were
not expressly stated on the record. The record further fails to demonstrate that defense counsel
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informed defendant of the elements of the offenses. Though the record indicates that defense
counsel spoke with defendant about the charges, it is silent as to whether the specific elements of
the offenses were discussed. Moreover, while the record indicates that defense counsel spoke
with defendant regarding the ramifications and possible sentences he could receive if convicted
of the charged offenses, it does not disclose that defendant was made aware of the elements of
the offense as is his argument in his postconviction petition. Indeed, defendant averred in his
affidavit that his counsel did not so advise him and, at this stage in the postconviction
proceedings, we must accept as true all facts alleged unless they are contradicted by the record.
Barghouti, 2013 IL App (1st) 112373, ¶ 16. Thus, applying Bradshaw to the record before us, it
appears defendant has stated the gist of a constitutional claim to survive the first-stage dismissal
of his postconviction petition. See id.
¶ 32 In rendering this determination, we have also considered the Third District case People v.
Stone, 2018 IL App (3d) 160171, which defendant raised in his reply brief. In that case, the
defendant directly appealed his guilty plea arguing that the trial court itself was required to
admonish him of the elements of the charges so as to comply with Rule 402 and cited Bradshaw
in support. Id. ¶ 14. The Third District instead found the defendant was properly admonished
and was not required to advise him of the elements of the offense. Id. ¶ 16. In so holding, the
reviewing court addressed the defendant’s reliance on Bradshaw, maintaining that Bradshaw
“rejects defendant’s assertion that the court must explain the elements of the charge before
accepting a guilty plea. Instead, [Bradshaw] indicates that this obligation is best left to defense
counsel.” Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 33 Defendant requests that we find Stone to be “incorrectly reasoned;” however, we find that
Stone is not in disagreement with our conclusion in this case. We first observe that the
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procedural posture of our case varies significantly from that of Stone. Whereas the Stone
defendant raised this issue on direct appeal, defendant here raises it in a postconviction petition
which was dismissed at the first stage. As previously discussed, at this stage a defendant need
only assert the gist of a constitutional claim and the threshold of survival is low. Hodges, 234 Ill.
2d at 9. Second, unlike the defendant in Stone, defendant here is not merely alleging that the
trial court alone had a duty to inform him of the elements of the offenses, but that both the trial
court and defense counsel failed to do so and thus his due process rights were violated. This
nuanced argument is exactly what the Stone court addresses when distinguishing Bradshaw; that
the Supreme Court “indicated that this obligation is best left to defense counsel.” Stone, 2018 IL
App (3d) 160171, ¶ 17. Here, defendant’s postconviction petition alleged defense counsel did
not inform him of the charges, and he provided his own affidavit in support of that fact.
Moreover, the record of the plea hearing is silent as to whether defense counsel informed him of
the elements of the offense. In light of these facts and the law, we conclude that the circuit
court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition was in error.
¶ 34 In reaching this conclusion, we observe that the State makes no effort to distinguish
Bradshaw or explain how it is inapplicable to the case at bar. Instead, the State relies on People
v. English, 42 Ill. App. 3d 958 (1976), and People v. Davis, 24 Ill. App. 3d 758 (1974), as being
instructive. We disagree. Considering the fact English was decided over 40 years ago and
before the Supreme Court’s Bradshaw decision, we are not moved by the State’s reliance on this
case. In English, the defendant pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm into an establishment
licensed to sell intoxicating beverages. English, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 959. On appeal, he
maintained that his guilty plea was not given in accordance with Rule 402 where he was not
personally informed of the nature of the charge. Id. at 960. Upon examination of the record, the
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reviewing court observed that the “public defender representing [the defendant] assured the court
that he had explained the offense to defendant, who indicated that he understood the nature of the
charge.” Id. When the trial court indicated it was not satisfied with this statement, the public
defender had defendant speak to the charges as he understood them. Id. The trial court then
accepted that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and entered the guilty plea. The
reviewing court found that, based on this record, the trial court substantially complied with Rule
402. Id. Unlike in English, the record here does not disclose whether defense counsel informed
defendant of the nature of the charges. The record also does not include a lengthy colloquy with
the trial court regarding the nature of the charges.
¶ 35 While the facts of Davis are similar to the facts in the case at bar, we decline to find
Davis supports the dismissal of defendant’s first-stage postconviction petition. In Davis, the
defendant pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery. Davis, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 759. On appeal,
the defendant maintained that the trial judge failed to inform her of the nature of the charges and
determine that she understood them. Id. at 761. The Davis court observed that, “[t]he Illinois
Supreme Court has recently held that the trial judge’s reference to the offense by name
accompanied by an accused’s acquiescence to the recital of the anticipated prosecution evidence
is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 402(a)(1).” Id. (citing People v. Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d
187, 193 (1974)). Upon examining the record, the reviewing court noted that the defendant was
informed, on two separate occasions, that she was charged with two counts of armed robbery.
Additionally, “neither the defendant nor her counsel demurred to the prosecutor’s rendition of
the factual basis of the charges.” Id. Thus, the reviewing court concluded that the defendant had
been properly admonished under Rule 402. Id. Although under Davis it is arguable that the
facts in this case would be sufficient to find compliance with Rule 402, the Davis court did not
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have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s Bradshaw decision, which effectively calls into question
whether such a practice satisfies due process. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the circuit
court for second-stage proceedings under the Act.
¶ 36 Given our disposition in this case, we need not address defendant’s remaining claim that
he was not admonished about his right to confront witnesses. See People v. Robinson, 2020 IL
123849, ¶ 83; People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 370-74 (2001); People v. Rogers, 372 Ill. App.
3d 859, 868 (2007).
¶ 37 CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the
matter for further proceedings under the Act.
¶ 39 Reversed and remanded.
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