NO. 5-06-0585 NOTICE
Decision filed 04/17/08. The text of IN THE this decision may be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS Peti tion for Rehearing or th e
disposition of the same. FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) v. ) No. 05-CF-291 ) WILLIAM L. B. THOM AS, ) Honorable ) Sherri L. E. Tungate, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SPOM ER delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, William L. B. Thomas, appeals the denial, by the circuit court of
Marion County, of his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the order of the circuit court.
The gist of the defendant's claim is that when he pled guilty on November 8, 2005,
to the offenses of unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (count
I) and aggravated battery (count II), in exchange for concurrent sentences of seven years and
five years, respectively, in the Department of Corrections, the defendant, who at the time was
serving a term of mandatory supervised release for a prior murder conviction, was not
informed that a mandatory supervised release term would be added to his new sentences by
operation of law.
The record in this case shows that when the trial judge informed the defendant of the
range of penalties for each offense to which the defendant was pleading guilty, the judge told
the defendant, inter alia, that with regard to count I "[a]ny sentence of imprisonment would
carry with it upon a release from prison a period of mandatory supervised release for a period
1 of two years" and that with regard to count II "[a]ny sentence of imprisonment would carry
with it upon a release from prison a period of mandatory supervised release for a period of
one year." The defendant contends that because the judge began the general admonitions
about the range of penalties for each count with the phrase "without the benefit of this plea
agreement," the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, because "a
reasonable person" who heard the admonitions "would justifiably conclude that [mandatory
supervised release] is a necessary part of non[]negotiated sentences only[] and that pleading
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement allows a defendant to avoid the additional loss of liberty
that [a mandatory supervised release] term entails."
In support of this argument, the defendant cites People v. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d
846, 850 (2007), wherein this court held insufficient an admonition that the defendant would
be subject to a term of mandatory supervised release if convicted at a trial but that under the
plea agreement into which he was entering, instead of that possible sentence, he would
receive the agreed sentence of 15 years, with no mention by the trial court of mandatory
supervised release. Company is easily distinguishable from the present case; in Company,
the defendant was given a misleading admonition in which the trial judge explicitly stated
that instead of the sentence described in the range of penalties that included mandatory
supervised release, the defendant would receive an agreed-upon sentence of 15 years. 376
Ill. App. 3d at 851. Moreover, the mandatory supervised release term the court had earlier
described was not accurate and was in fact one year less than the one to which the defendant
was actually subject. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 851. The errors in Company, in other
words, were far more egregious than those alleged in the case at bar and resulted in actual
prejudice to the defendant. As we noted in Company, the defendant bears the burden of
establishing that, when judged by objective standards, the circumstances surrounding a plea
justify the defendant's mistaken impression that the sentence rendered did not include a term
2 of mandatory supervised release. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 851. In this case, the defendant is
unable to meet that burden. Although the defendant contends that because the judge
prefaced the general admonitions regarding the range of penalties with the phrase "without
the benefit of this plea agreement," the defendant could reasonably have believed that
mandatory supervised release would not apply to the sentences flowing from his pleas, we
do not agree that such an interpretation would be objectively reasonable. The judge in this
case clearly and unequivocally stated, after finishing her general description of the range of
penalties for each offense, that any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a term of
mandatory supervised release. The defendant knew, as he stood before the court to enter his
plea, that he was about to receive a sentence of imprisonment, and in fact he did receive a
sentence of imprisonment. Under those circumstances, any misunderstanding about the
applicability of mandatory supervised release, although perhaps unfortunate, cannot be
deemed objectively reasonable.
The defendant also relies upon People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005), from which
the defendant claims this case is indistinguishable. In fact, Whitfield, like Company, is
factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Whitfield, no mention at all was made of
mandatory supervised release. 217 Ill. 2d at 180. In the case at bar, not only was mandatory
supervised release explicitly mentioned, but as explained above, the trial judge specifically
stated that with regard to each count, any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a
term of mandatory supervised release. As the Whitfield court itself recognized, an imperfect
admonishment is a violation of due process only where real justice has been denied or a
defendant has shown prejudice. 217 Ill. 2d at 195. We conclude that in this case, the
admonitions of the trial judge that any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a term
of mandatory supervised release were sufficient to inform the defendant of mandatory
supervised release and that real justice has not been denied, nor has the defendant shown
3 prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Marion County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GOLDENHERSH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.
4 NO. 5-06-0585
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) v. ) No. 05-CF-291 ) WILLIAM L. B. THOM AS, ) Honorable ) Sherri L. E. Tungate, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: April 17, 2008 ___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.
Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J., and Honorable James K. Donovan, J., Concur ___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, John H. Gleason, Assistant Defender, Office for of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 117 North Tenth Street, Appellant Suite 300, Mt.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NO. 5-06-0585 NOTICE
Decision filed 04/17/08. The text of IN THE this decision may be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS Peti tion for Rehearing or th e
disposition of the same. FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) v. ) No. 05-CF-291 ) WILLIAM L. B. THOM AS, ) Honorable ) Sherri L. E. Tungate, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SPOM ER delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, William L. B. Thomas, appeals the denial, by the circuit court of
Marion County, of his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the order of the circuit court.
The gist of the defendant's claim is that when he pled guilty on November 8, 2005,
to the offenses of unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (count
I) and aggravated battery (count II), in exchange for concurrent sentences of seven years and
five years, respectively, in the Department of Corrections, the defendant, who at the time was
serving a term of mandatory supervised release for a prior murder conviction, was not
informed that a mandatory supervised release term would be added to his new sentences by
operation of law.
The record in this case shows that when the trial judge informed the defendant of the
range of penalties for each offense to which the defendant was pleading guilty, the judge told
the defendant, inter alia, that with regard to count I "[a]ny sentence of imprisonment would
carry with it upon a release from prison a period of mandatory supervised release for a period
1 of two years" and that with regard to count II "[a]ny sentence of imprisonment would carry
with it upon a release from prison a period of mandatory supervised release for a period of
one year." The defendant contends that because the judge began the general admonitions
about the range of penalties for each count with the phrase "without the benefit of this plea
agreement," the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, because "a
reasonable person" who heard the admonitions "would justifiably conclude that [mandatory
supervised release] is a necessary part of non[]negotiated sentences only[] and that pleading
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement allows a defendant to avoid the additional loss of liberty
that [a mandatory supervised release] term entails."
In support of this argument, the defendant cites People v. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d
846, 850 (2007), wherein this court held insufficient an admonition that the defendant would
be subject to a term of mandatory supervised release if convicted at a trial but that under the
plea agreement into which he was entering, instead of that possible sentence, he would
receive the agreed sentence of 15 years, with no mention by the trial court of mandatory
supervised release. Company is easily distinguishable from the present case; in Company,
the defendant was given a misleading admonition in which the trial judge explicitly stated
that instead of the sentence described in the range of penalties that included mandatory
supervised release, the defendant would receive an agreed-upon sentence of 15 years. 376
Ill. App. 3d at 851. Moreover, the mandatory supervised release term the court had earlier
described was not accurate and was in fact one year less than the one to which the defendant
was actually subject. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 851. The errors in Company, in other
words, were far more egregious than those alleged in the case at bar and resulted in actual
prejudice to the defendant. As we noted in Company, the defendant bears the burden of
establishing that, when judged by objective standards, the circumstances surrounding a plea
justify the defendant's mistaken impression that the sentence rendered did not include a term
2 of mandatory supervised release. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 851. In this case, the defendant is
unable to meet that burden. Although the defendant contends that because the judge
prefaced the general admonitions regarding the range of penalties with the phrase "without
the benefit of this plea agreement," the defendant could reasonably have believed that
mandatory supervised release would not apply to the sentences flowing from his pleas, we
do not agree that such an interpretation would be objectively reasonable. The judge in this
case clearly and unequivocally stated, after finishing her general description of the range of
penalties for each offense, that any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a term of
mandatory supervised release. The defendant knew, as he stood before the court to enter his
plea, that he was about to receive a sentence of imprisonment, and in fact he did receive a
sentence of imprisonment. Under those circumstances, any misunderstanding about the
applicability of mandatory supervised release, although perhaps unfortunate, cannot be
deemed objectively reasonable.
The defendant also relies upon People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005), from which
the defendant claims this case is indistinguishable. In fact, Whitfield, like Company, is
factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Whitfield, no mention at all was made of
mandatory supervised release. 217 Ill. 2d at 180. In the case at bar, not only was mandatory
supervised release explicitly mentioned, but as explained above, the trial judge specifically
stated that with regard to each count, any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a
term of mandatory supervised release. As the Whitfield court itself recognized, an imperfect
admonishment is a violation of due process only where real justice has been denied or a
defendant has shown prejudice. 217 Ill. 2d at 195. We conclude that in this case, the
admonitions of the trial judge that any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a term
of mandatory supervised release were sufficient to inform the defendant of mandatory
supervised release and that real justice has not been denied, nor has the defendant shown
3 prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Marion County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GOLDENHERSH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.
4 NO. 5-06-0585
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) v. ) No. 05-CF-291 ) WILLIAM L. B. THOM AS, ) Honorable ) Sherri L. E. Tungate, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: April 17, 2008 ___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.
Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J., and Honorable James K. Donovan, J., Concur ___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, John H. Gleason, Assistant Defender, Office for of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 117 North Tenth Street, Appellant Suite 300, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 ___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Matt Wilzbach, State's Attorney, Marion County Courthouse, P.O. Box 157, for Salem, IL 62881; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Appellee Patrick D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 ___________________________________________________________________________________