People v. Teran

2025 IL App (4th) 250272-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0272
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250272-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 11, 2025 NO. 4-25-0272 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County DAVID B. TERAN, ) No. 25CF21 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William A. Yoder, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order of pretrial detention because the State showed that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community and no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat.

¶2 In January 2025, defendant, David B. Teran, was charged with one count of

traveling to meet a child (720 ILCS 5/11-26(a) (West 2024)), two counts of indecent solicitation

of a child (id. § 11-6(a-5)), one count of solicitation to meet a child (id. § 11-6.6(a)), and one count

of grooming (id. § 11-25(a)). That same day, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial

release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art.

110 (West 2024)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act, which the trial court denied

following a hearing. ¶3 Later in January 2025, the State filed a motion for relief, requesting that the trial

court reconsider its denial of the State’s petition to deny pretrial release. In February 2025,

following a hearing, the court granted the State’s motion and ordered defendant to be denied

pretrial release. Defendant filed a motion for relief, which the court denied.

¶4 Defendant appeals, challenging the trial court’s findings that (1) he poses a real and

present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific,

articulable facts of the case, and (2) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the

real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific

facts of the case. We affirm.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 A. The First Detention Hearing

¶7 On January 9, 2025, the State charged defendant by information with one count of

traveling to meet a child (720 ILCS 5/11-26(a) (West 2024)), two counts of indecent solicitation

of a child (id. § 11-6(a-5)), one count of solicitation to meet a child (id. § 11-6.6(a)), and one count

of grooming (id. § 11-25(a)). That same day, the State filed a petition to deny pretrial release,

alleging defendant was charged with detainable offenses and that he posed a real and present threat

to the safety of the community. The motion requested an order that defendant have no contact with

anyone under 18 years old.

¶8 1. The State’s Proffer and the Trial Court’s Probable Cause Finding

¶9 The trial court (Judge Scott Black, presiding) immediately conducted a pretrial

detention hearing, at which the State made the following proffer regarding probable cause.

“On January 8 of 2025, a special agent with the Illinois State Police worked

in an undercover capacity and had communications with the defendant. The

-2- undercover officer posted an online advertisement for sexual services on a website.

Within the website, the posting was listed in the section for advertising

female escorts. Within the advertisements, the undercover posted images of a

young-looking female who was displaying herself in a sexual manner, including

the image of her in her underwear.

The advertisement lists the age of the female as 22 years of age, and this is

specifically identified as a female providing sexual services, including intercourse,

kissing, oral, deep throat and others. The listing included a phone number to text in

order to get rates for the sexual services, and specified that special requests cost

money.

Using the phone number listed on the website, the defendant initiated

contact with the undercover officer and engaged in a text message conversation on

the afternoon of January 8. At 12:21 p.m., the defendant sent a text saying, how

much for a QV. QV would be a shorthand term in prostitution to describe a quick

visit for services.

The undercover officer sent a message to the defendant to tell him that the

quick visit rate is $80. The defendant asked where the undercover officer was

located. The defendant also stated in the text that he would meet with the

undercover officer before 2 p.m.

At 12:55 p.m., the undercover officer sends the defendant a text saying, you

just have to wear condoms because I’m 15 [sic] years of age, but I don't have any

other rules. The defendant initially stated he did not want to meet with the

-3- undercover officer because of her age, and he told her that the advertisement stated

she was 22.

The defendant then asked if the undercover officer had Snapchat and said,

do you have Snap? I would feel a little safer with verification. The undercover

officer told the defendant she would not send him pictures, and asked if you come

see me in person and you don't like how I look, you can just leave then.

The defendant asked for her location. The undercover officer asked the

defendant if he was coming, and the defendant asked, do you provide protection.

The undercover officer confirmed she had condoms at the location, and the

defendant replied by saying, okay, I have to get ready.

At 2:03 p.m., the defendant texts, ‘here’. The undercover officer provided

him with a room number. The defendant then went to that room and met with the

undercover officer. She again told the defendant she was 16 years of age. The

defendant then gave her the $80 that had been agreed upon.

The defendant was taken into custody by other officers. After his arrest and

after being informed of his Miranda rights [(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966))], the defendant agreed to speak with officers. The defendant admitted he

had communicated with a female on the website known for its work in sexual acts,

and that he really came to the hotel to meet with a 16-year-old girl.

He told the officer he traveled to the hotel from his residence with his two

children inside the vehicle. The two children were ages two and three, and that he

left them in the car when he went into the hotel to meet with the undercover officer.

-4- He confirmed to the officer that once he met with the undercover officer

when he got into the hotel room and then he gave her $80, and then he began to

remove his clothes before being arrested. The defendant’s age is 25 years of age.”

¶ 10 The trial court stated that it found probable cause for defendant’s detention.

¶ 11 2. Arguments Regarding Denial of Defendant’s Pretrial Release

¶ 12 Upon request by the State, the trial court took judicial notice of (1) the probable

cause proffer, (2) defendant’s conviction in a separate case for failure to notify damage to an

unattended vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor, for which defendant was on court supervision since

March 2023, (3) a 2016 juvenile adjudication for driving without a valid license, a Class A

misdemeanor, (4) a 2013 juvenile adjudication for theft, a Class 3 felony, and (5) the pretrial

investigation report. The hearing proceeded to argument.

¶ 13 a. The State’s Argument

¶ 14 The State argued as follows:

“As the Court is aware, what we have here in our State’s petition to deny

pre-trial release, there are three prongs that the State has to prove, the first of which

is that these charges fall under a qualifying offense, and I believe all the charges

that are listed, I believe, as Counts I through V, all qualify as offenses.

And we have to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they

occurred, and I believe from the proffer established today by the State, it’s very

clear that these offenses occurred.

***

Next, we move on to whether the defendant, through the pre-trial release,

poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the

-5- community. And the State’s argument is that the defendant very much is a threat to

various members of the community, namely underage females.

Now, from the proffer, we’ve established that there is no named victim.

However, this was a defendant who was going to a hotel to have sex with a child.

The defendant had roughly an hour and a half to decide not to do this. He still

traveled to that location to meet a minor for the purpose of having sex.

And I think some of the concerning language used in the text messages that

are established in the [probable cause] statement are also concerning when he asks

how much for a QV. I don’t believe most people know QV is a shorthand term in

prostitution to describe a quick visit. So this shows this is a person who’s most

likely participated in this type of activity before. So I think various language like

that, it shows he’s a danger.

And I think most troubling about this entire situation is we have a defendant

who left two children, ages two and three, inside a motor vehicle to try to have sex

with another child. So I think from a dangerous elements point, I believe it’s very

clear and it’s very apparent that he is a danger to anyone under the age of 18 who’s

a female.

*** I understand it’s a Class A misdemeanor. I understand he’s on

supervision, but he’s still under court monitoring while he’s engaging in this, and

part of the terms of court supervision are that you do not commit another illegal

offense, and these are all clearly offenses. So I think for the second prong, I believe

that it’s very much proven by the State that this defendant is a danger.

-6- So then we move on to whether there’s less restrictive means involved that

could potentially prohibit this danger, and the State would argue that there simply

is nothing that we can do at this point, outside of pre-trial incarceration, to avoid

this defendant potentially being a danger.

This is a defendant who sought out on a website to participate in a sexual

act. He was informed multiple times that this person was 16 years of age. He still

followed through with it. He still traveled there. So what restrictive means can we

put in place to avoid this defendant continuing to go on websites like these?

And most importantly, if we’re looking at something like electronic

monitoring, how is that going to—if he’s at home, how is that going to monitor

who comes in and out of the house? I think this is a defendant who very much

seems, from the language he uses, that he participated in these types of activities

before.

And what we would have here is a situation where he could potentially use

his phone, use electronic devices to go on social media sites, go on these various

dating apps and bring potentially children to the household. So I don’t think

electronic monitoring is able to avoid some of these pitfalls that we would find here.

In addition, I believe the defendant, he has four children from the pre-trial

service report all inside his household. Nine, seven, three and two. He’s trying to

sleep with a 16-year-old. That isn’t that far off from a nine-year-old. I mean we

have a situation here where [electronic monitoring] is not a good use, and I don’t

believe it would be appropriate.

-7- When we look at other less restrictive means, a no contact with anyone

under 18, it’s also not practical. So I don’t believe there are any possible conditions

in place that are less restrictive that could potentially avoid some of the dangers that

this defendant now poses to the community, mainly individuals under the age of 18

female. Thank you.”

¶ 15 b. Defendant’s Argument

¶ 16 Defendant argued as follows:

“Your Honor, just briefly in regard to the probable cause statement that was

made, they said that my client texted many things that show he has done this before

or knew what he was doing. There’s also text in there that says he was trying to

verify that this was not a minor and trying to confirm that, and so it does show—

I’m not sure if there’s a motion that will be filed in the future or anything like that.

Obviously, probable cause is found, but I don’t think the case may be as clear as

the State wants it to be based on some of the things it sounds like he tried to do.

In regards to conditions for release, my client is employed, has a good job,

supports his family. And for the State to say that a charge like this, that there are

basically no conditions for release, that basically flies in the face of everything

we’ve kind of been told about the statute and why it was made.

The State is not allowed to argue that because of a certain type of offense,

that a person can't be released. Every, every charge, no matter how serious or

heinous, the presumption is that a person should be released. It’s only when the

State shows that a person can’t be released for a specific reason, that they should

be detained. And basically the State hasn’t shown that specifically for my client.

-8- They said that because this act and this crime is a certain crime, then there

is no conditions that could be allowed, and my client shouldn’t be released, but

specifically to my client, they haven’t shown that.

My client has barely any criminal history. Scores a 2 on our new scale with

a report that we have, has lived locally, has a job, has children that he cares for, and

would be willing to comply with anything the Court ordered in regards to protecting

society. And so the State has basically just argued that because of this type of

offense, there’s no conditions that exist that would keep the community safe.

And, basically, that’s just not a valid argument because all of these, every

crime in Illinois that’s detainable, the presumption is that they should be released,

unless there’s specific arguments. They don’t exist because my client doesn’t have

a criminal record basically, and so we would ask the Court to find that they have

not proven their certificate.”

¶ 17 c. The Trial Court’s Decision

¶ 18 Following arguments, the trial court found that (1) the offense was a qualifying

offense for detention and (2) defendant posed a real and present safety threat to the community.

However, the court concluded that the State had not proved by clear and convincing evidence that

there was no condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate the threat posed by

defendant’s pretrial release. The court stated as follows:

“So here, we have a particularly heinous offense, but at the same time, the

defendant is a resident in the community, family ties, children. He has a job, which

he apparently is supporting these children in his household. And I have [a risk

assessment instrument] that scores him at a level 2.

-9- Based upon all of those factors, the Court’s going to find that—and also

taking into consideration the statutory presumption of release, as [defense counsel]

pointed out, I’m going to find that the State has not proven by clear and convincing

evidence that there is no condition or combination of conditions that can mitigate

the threat.”

¶ 19 3. Arguments Regarding Conditions of Defendant’s Pretrial Release

¶ 20 The trial court then proceeded to a hearing on appropriate release conditions.

¶ 21 The State asked that as a condition for his release, the trial court order defendant to

not be around anyone under the age of 18 and be placed with pretrial services. Defense counsel

responded as follows:

“Your Honor, we have no objection to pre-trial services. In regards to any

minors under 18, as the State pointed out, my client has four children that live with

him and his wife. He is a caretaker for them, and so that restriction makes it very

difficult for him to go back home, so we would be objecting to that. Restrictions on

minors that are not his children, I think, would be more appropriate. There is no

indication that he is any danger to his own children. I understand that they have

implied that, but I don’t think that’s (something).”

¶ 22 The State rebutted that defendant not being allowed to be around people under 18

years old was appropriate because defendant’s conduct of leaving his 2 and 3 year old children in

the car while he engaged in sexual conduct with a prostitute endangered the children: they were

too young to be left alone in a vehicle in January, whether the car was idling or off.

¶ 23 The trial court then delivered its decision, stating that it had taken judicial notice of

the proffers, arguments, and pretrial investigation report. Based on that information, the court

- 10 - ordered that as conditions for defendant’s pretrial release, he (1) shall appear in court to answer

the charges as ordered by the court until discharged or the final order, (2) must admit to the orders

and process of the court, (3) must not violate any criminal statute or law of any jurisdiction,

(4) must file a written notice of any address change with the circuit clerk within 24 hours of any

change, (5) shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with any individual under the age of 18

years of age, and (6) shall immediately report to the Office of Statewide Pretrial Services and

comply with all reporting requirements of the pretrial supervision programs.

¶ 24 B. The State’s Motion for Relief

¶ 25 On January 30, 2025, the State filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), requesting that the trial court reconsider its denial of the

State’s petition to deny pretrial release filed on January 9, 2025. The motion alleged, among other

things, that (1) “the court failed to acknowledge that the ‘mitigating factors’ are actually

aggravating in the Defendant’s situation” and (2) “the court failed to acknowledge pre-trial

services[’] inability to properly monitor someone to prevent them from having contact with

children.”

¶ 26 On February 28, 2025, the trial court (Judge William Yoder, presiding) conducted

a hearing on the motion for relief. At the start of the hearing, the court noted that it had taken

judicial notice of the entire court file, reviewed the State’s petition, and read through the transcript

of the detention hearing.

¶ 27 1. The State’s Argument

¶ 28 The State argued that the trial court had incorrectly attributed certain evidence as

mitigating when it was actually aggravating. First, the text messages to the victim asking for

verification on Snapchat were better characterized as an attempt to avoid leaving a record because

- 11 - “a lot of people believe [they are] not recoverable, the messages that are sent.” Despite the

undercover officer’s not sending a verification photo, defendant nonetheless arrived at the hotel.

Second, the court did not give sufficient weight to the defendant’s use of the term “QV,” meaning

quick visit, which was “prostitution lingo.” This showed that this offense was not defendant’s first

time soliciting prostitution. Third, the court did not put enough weight on the circumstances of

defendant’s arrest—specifically, the allegations that “there was a two- and a three-year-old child

left inside a vehicle in a parking lot in December, while the defendant goes upstairs in an attempt

to have sex with what he believes is a 16-year-old.” Instead, the court gave too much weight to

defendant having a family and needing to support them. Last, regarding the possibility of defendant

violating the release order, the State argued the following:

“And I guess what the State is attempting to state is that this took place six

weeks ago, this hearing. And in that six weeks, there’s been nothing put in place

that could monitor the defendant effectively. At this time the defendant could leave

this courthouse, get on his phone, go to the same website that he went to that started

this, and do the same exact thing. There would be nothing to prevent that. Pretrial

cannot monitor his internet usage. They cannot monitor his phone. Nobody can

monitor it. At this time, the only thing that’s put in place is that this defendant is

not allowed to be around anyone under the age of 18. We have no way of enforcing

that at this time. We have no ability to regulate his phone, his internet searching,

any type of monitoring. At this time the defendant is free to do exactly what brought

him here six weeks ago.”

¶ 29 2. Defendant’s Argument

- 12 - ¶ 30 Defense counsel argued that defendant had responded initially to an advertisement

of an individual purporting to be a 22-year-old adult, and only after he solicited her did she tell

him that she was 16 years old. At that point, he attempted to verify her age by asking for a photo

of her through Snapchat. That verification did not come until just before defendant was arrested.

Counsel argued that the use of “QV” did not necessarily indicate unlawful activity. Further,

counsel noted that defendant had no violent criminal history.

¶ 31 Defense counsel noted that according to the “Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment

Instrument Revised, the PRI score,” defendant was the lowest level for violating the conditions of

release. Further, the trial court correctly considered the mitigating evidence at the detention hearing

that defendant (1) wanted to support his children and needed to be on pretrial release, (2) was a

resident of the county with familial ties in the community, (3) was working at Rivian, and (4) had

no mental health, substance abuse, or violence concerns.

¶ 32 Citing People v. Smith, 2025 IL App (4th) 241441-U, defense counsel argued that

the State was “asking for a broad sweep, *** because there’s no way to keep my client from having

any contact with any minor, that therefore he should be detained. And I believe the caselaw shows

that that is flawed.”

¶ 33 3. The Trial Court’s Decision

¶ 34 Following arguments, the trial court agreed the nature of the charge was insufficient

to order detention. However, the court concluded that the facts of this case showed that no less

restrictive conditions than detention would be appropriate, explaining as follows:

“So in this case, the defendant was on court supervision when he was

charged with this offense. The defendant answered an ad *** that offered sexual

services, claiming that the person providing those services was 22 years old. When

- 13 - the defendant responded to that add [sic] by way of, I think it was text, he received

a response back *** at some point indicating that they would do just about anything

that you want me to do, outlining exactly what services could be. And the defendant

*** sent a text saying: How much for a QV? That apparently being shorthand for

quick visit for services.

*** The undercover officer sent a message back indicating the rate that was

going to be charged, and also sent back a message indicating: You just have to wear

condoms because I’m 16 years old, but other than that, I don’t have any other rules.

The defendant then questioned her age, indicating he didn’t want to meet

with her because of her age. And the entry restated: The advertisement said you

were 22. *** The defendant then asked her if she had Snapchat, because he said he

would feel a little safer with verification. The undercover officer indicated that she

would not be sending pictures, but then indicated to him, if you come and see me

in person and you don’t like how I look, you can just leave.

At that point, in the defendant’s mind, he was going to meet a 16-year-old

child. He asked for her location, and the undercover officer asked if the defendant

was coming. He asked if she provided protection. She said: Yes. He said: Okay. I

have to get ready.

*** [A]n hour and a half after the initial contact, the defendant sent a text

saying he was there. She then provided a room number to him, and he went to that

room to meet with her. She again reaffirmed that she was 16 years of age in person

with the defendant. The defendant gave her $80 that had been agreed upon.

The *** defendant, after he paid her, then began to remove his clothes, at

- 14 - which time he was arrested. Defendant’s 25 years old at that time. The defendant

indicated to the officers that he traveled to the hotel from his residence, but there

were two children inside of his vehicle; the two children were ages 2 and 3; that he

left them in the car outside. The State indicated this occurred in December. It

actually occurred January the 8th of this year. There’s been no indication in the

record as to what the temperature was. I’m going to guess the odds are in Illinois,

on January the 8th, it was cold.

The interesting part of this—so the judge at the [Pretrial Fairness Act]

hearing established that there was probable cause for the charged offenses. He

established, and this Court agrees, *** that the defendant committed a qualifying

offense, and the court agreed that the defendant posed a real and present threat to

the safety of the community, or one or more persons in the community. *** [T]he

court used the language, this was a heinous offense—he said specifically I think,

that would classify as a sex offence [sic], it’s a heinous offense. He indicated that

the court is to consider the identity of person or persons whose safety the defendant

is believed to pose a threat, and to the nature of the threat, and it is a serious threat.

In this case with young females. That I think is proven by the proffer. *** And the

Court found that the first and second elements of the current statute in relation to

detention has been proven. Then the Court went through the nature of the factors

that could mitigate the defendant’s risk.

When you look at the factors in relation to this defendant, and you look at

the facts of this case and the individual factors of the defendant, going backwards,

- 15 - number one, he was on a continuing order, don’t violate the law. He had time to

contemplate his decision. He knew he was driving to have intercourse with a

16-year-old. He *** knew the ramifications of having sex with a 16-year-old. When

he found out that—she said, I’m 16, that’s when he said, let’s move over to

Snapchat. I don’t know if that was to verify that she was in fact 16, or to figure out

if this was some form of law enforcement trap.

The defendant *** potentially used code, I’m going to say, to describe he

wanted a quick visit with this 16-year-old. The defendant knew the risks when he

was told that the girl was 16. And the defendant indicated—which indicates the

defendant was suspicious. Even with those suspicions, *** instead of saying, you

know what, maybe this prostitute isn’t one I want to risk exposure to. Maybe I’ll

just go find somebody that doesn’t tell me that they’re 16. Despite the fact that he

knew the risk, he *** proceeded an hour and a half later to the hotel. He did that

knowing the risks but disregarding them. He took his two—he was apparently

babysitting his children, because I can’t think of any other reason that you would

take your 2 and 3-year-old children in the car with you to visit a prostitute knowing

they are not going in—it’s January 8th, you know they’re not going in. They’re

going to stay in the car. Which is what he did. He then enters the room, pays, and

begins to undress.

All of that conduct shows an uncontrollable desire to engage in sex with a

minor. That resembled an addiction. It resembles what we see everyday in this court

as it would relate to a heroin addiction. They know the ramifications. They know

they might die from taking the next injection of heroin. Because, number one, they

- 16 - could overdose on the heroin; number two, it might be laced with fentanyl. But ***

they disregard that risk and they inject themselves anyway. That’s the nature of

addiction. Doing something that you know could have significant adverse effects

to you, yet you disregard those obvious risks or ramifications, and you engage in a

conduct. That’s what it appears to this Court that this defendant was doing on

January the 8th, *** that he could not stop himself from proceeding over this hour

and a half period of time to visit a 16-year-old for sexual purposes, to the extent

that he took his children in the car with him on what had to be a cold day, to leave

them in the car. He did not consider the ramifications of his conduct. He just had,

in this court’s opinion, it would seem, an addictive need that needed to be

addressed.

This makes the defendant in this case an extreme risk that cannot be

supervised by pretrial service[s]. Similar to the way that an addiction to heroin

cannot be adequately addressed by pretrial services. When pretrial services—it’s

clear, number one, they do not do home visits. They do check-ins. They don’t

necessary [sic] have in-person visits with the individual. They remind them of court

dates and whatnot. And although it’s a quality program, there’s no dispute that they

cannot—in the proffer it was indicated that they acknowledge that they cannot

adequately supervise an individual’s electronic social media involvement, whether

that person’s having contact with minor victims. They cannot supervise it.

This Court believes that the risk to the public, the dangerousness to the

public, cannot be adequately [m]itigated by less restrictive conditions than

detention. The Court is going to find that—I’m going to go through an initial

- 17 - detention and find that probabl[e] cause has been established for the charged

offenses. That detention on *** —dangerousness grounds; that the State has proven

by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident, or the presumption is

great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense for which he is

statutorily eligible for detention; that the defendant poses a real and present threat

to the safety of the community, or one or more persons in the community; and the

Court finds that no release conditions or combination thereof can mitigate the

foregoing safety threat.”

¶ 35 Ultimately, the trial court granted the State’s motion for relief, concluding:

“[L]ess restrictive conditions cannot be meaningfully achieved with the available

conditions of pretrial release; that otherwise appropriate and available release

conditions have been unsuccessful in the defendant’s other matters, the fact that he

was on supervision and required not to violate the law while on supervision; that

there’s a high likelihood that he would commit new criminal offenses that granted

pretrial release. *** [T]his Court believes this, in relation to what would appear to

this Court to be addictive behavior. I’m going to show that the defendant has a

history of disobeying court orders, that being supervision.”

¶ 36 Defense counsel then filed a motion for relief, reasserting the same arguments she

had made against the State’s motion for relief. Neither party made oral arguments, and the trial

court ultimately denied defendant’s motion for the same reasons it already stated.

¶ 37 This appeal followed.

¶ 38 II. ANALYSIS

- 18 - ¶ 39 Defendant appeals, challenging the trial court’s findings that (1) he poses a real and

present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific,

articulable facts of the case, and (2) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the

real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific

¶ 40 A. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 41 Under section 110-6.1 of the Code, “[D]efendants shall be presumed eligible for

pretrial release” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). “[T]he fact that a person is charged with a

detainable offense is not enough to order detention.” People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th)

231028, ¶ 18.

¶ 42 Once the State files a petition to deny pretrial release, the trial court must hold a

hearing. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024). At the hearing, the State must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant

committed a detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of

any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and

(3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety

of any person or the community, based on the specific facts of the case. See id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-

(3).

¶ 43 When assessing dangerousness, the trial court may consider, among other things,

(1) the nature and circumstances of the charged offense, (2) the history and characteristics of the

defendant, (3) the identity of the person whose safety the defendant threatens, (4) any statements

made by the defendant, (5) the defendant’s age and physical condition, (6) the age and physical

condition of any victim, (7) the defendant’s possession of or access to weapons, (8) whether the

- 19 - defendant was on probation or other similar conditions at the time of the current offense, and

(9) any additional factors bearing on the defendant’s “propensity or reputation for violent, abusive,

or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior.” Id. § 110-6.1(g)(9).

¶ 44 Regarding whether conditions exist that can mitigate a defendant’s dangerousness,

the trial court must consider various factors, including (1) “the nature and circumstances of the

offense charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence against the defendant”; (3) “the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” including “the defendant’s character, physical and mental

condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,

community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, history criminal history [sic], and

record concerning appearance at court proceedings”; (4) “the nature and seriousness of the real

and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

articulable facts of the case”; and (5) “the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or

attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the defendant’s release,

if applicable.” Id. § 110-5(a)(1)-(5). In each case, a court must conduct an “individualized”

assessment of the propriety of detaining the defendant versus releasing him or her with conditions.

Id. § 110-6.1(f)(7).

¶ 45 Because the parties here relied on proffer and documentary evidence at the pretrial

detention hearing, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. See People v. Morgan, 2025 IL

130626, ¶ 54 (“[W]hen the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the

reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its

own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary

in nature.”).

¶ 46 B. This Case

- 20 - ¶ 47 We earlier set forth the trial court’s lengthy, thoughtful, and detailed analysis of

the circumstances of the offense, the statutory factors for detention, and least restrictive

alternatives at the hearing on the State’s petition for relief (supra ¶¶ 33-35), and for the same

reasons, we fully agree with the trial court’s findings that pretrial detention is necessary in this

case.

¶ 48 Contrary to defendant’s assertion that the charges are the only information

supporting a finding that he poses a real and present safety threat and thus are insufficient to

order detention, the evidence proffered by the State in this case shows that he poses a threat to

his children and underage girls. As the trial court noted, defendant left his two toddlers in a car

during likely freezing weather conditions while he solicited an underage sex worker. Further, he

was on court supervision at the time of the offense.

¶ 49 Likewise, the trial court was correct when it determined that there were no

conditions or combination of conditions that would mitigate the real and present threat defendant

poses to his community. Defendant clearly demonstrated interest in and willingness to pay a 16-

year-old for sex and to plan for this transaction via cell phone text and app messages, such as by

attempting to move the conversation to Snapchat under the apparent belief that his conversation

would not be recoverable. Ultimately, his compulsion to engage in this behavior caused him to

leave two toddlers in their car seats in the parking lot of a motel in January. Notably, we are

aware of no conditions for defendant’s pretrial release that could mitigate the threat of additional

digital communication with underage girls, given defendant’s risk-taking behavior.

¶ 50 Because we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law

(1) adequately explain the decision and (2) were correct, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION

- 21 - ¶ 52 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 53 Affirmed.

- 22 -