People v. Tedtaotao

Opinion

S UI T ra-A 2UI JUN 19 PH 2. 11 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF G j� -�NC� !RT C(.f-r,t:

PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRII*INAL SE N D . CF0218-13-01

V.. ) DECISION & ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S RAYMOND TORRES TEDTAOTAO, ) TRIAL MOTIONS

Defendant. )

1.

INTRODUCTION 10 This matter came before the Honorable Maria T. Cenzon for a Jury Trial which

commenced on November 4, 2013 and ended with a verdict of guilty on all charges on 12 November 26, 2013 . Raymond T. Tedtaotao ("Defendant") was present for all of trial, 13

14 excepting a review of jury instructions on November 25, 2013, and represented by Attorney

15 Samuel Teker. Assistant Attorneys General Brian Gallagher and David Rivera represented the 16 People of Guam (the "People"). 17 Several dispositive or significant motions were made by Defendant during the course of I8 trial: 1) two motions to dismiss for violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy 19

20 trial; 2) A motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the People's case in chief which was

21 subsequently renewed at the close of Defendant ' s case in chief; and 3) a motion to exclude the 22 testimony of Kyle James Cruz as a sanction for the People' s failure to disclose exculpatory 23 information. The Court DENIED all three motions from the bench and now memorializes its 24 rulings in this Decision & Order. 25

26 I

27 II 28 People v. Tedmorao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Order on Defendant's Trial Motions Page I of 11

5 If. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

3 Defendant was indicted on May 7, 2013 on one charge of Attempted Murder (as a 1st

Degree Felony), one charge of First Degree Robbery (as a Ist Degree Felony), one charge of 5 Aggravated Assault (as a 2nd Degree Felony), and one charge of Burglary (as a 2nd Degree 6 Felony). See Indictment (May 7, 2013). Also named in the Indictment were Anthony Paul 7

8 Mendiola and Kyle James Cruz.

The factual basis for the Indictment was an incident the evening of April 20, 2013 when

three individuals entered a residence in Piti, Guam and stole a number of items. During this

theft, the occupant of the house, Rebecca Piper ("Victim") was struck and bound with duct tape. 12

13 When two of Victim's roommates returned to the home, they discovered her unconscious and

14 called 911. Victim later underwent neurosurgery and was transported to California for U rehabilitation.

The Court granted the People's motion to sever the three defendants on October 16,

2013, based upon a Bruton issue.' On October 30, 2013, Kyle Cruz pled guilty to one count of

9 Burglary (as a 2nd Degree Felony). In his plea agreement, Mr. Cruz agreed to testify truthfully 1 20 against his co-defendants, Anthony Mendiola and Raymond Tedtaotao at their trials. Plea 21 Agreement ¶ 5c (Oct. 31, 2013). 22 Trial for Raymond Tedtaotao was scheduled before Anthony Mendiola's trial and began 23 on November 4, 2013. After submission of all the evidence and closing arguments on 24 25 November 25, 2013, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges on November 27, 2013.

26 'Bruton v. US, 391 US 123 (1968) held that admission of a defendant' s confession, implicating another co- 27 defendant, when the confessing defendant did not take the witness stand, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 28 People v. Tedtawao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Order on Defendant's Trial Motions Page2 ofll LAW AND ANALYSIS

3 A. Motions to Dismiss for Violation of Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial

At the close of the Victim's testimony on November 7, 2014, Defendant moved to 5 dismiss for a violation of his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment. The motion was 6 based upon a 90-day delay in commencing trial due to the unavailability of the Victim who the 7 People stated was an essential witness, although at trial she testified that she could not recall the

9 events of that night. Minute Sheet at 11:10:07 (Nov. 7, 2013). Defendant repeated his motion 10 to dismiss on November 22, 2013 based upon the delay caused by the Court granting the II People' s motion to sever the three defendants named in the Indictment. Minute Sheet at 12

13 10:44:31-10:45:18 (Nov. 22. 2013). As the "substance of the speedy trial right is defined only

14 through an analysis of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case" (People v. Flores, 15 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 41), the Court will address both of Defendant's reasons for dismissal under the

constitutional" speedy trial right in totality.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[ijn all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...." U.S.

20 Const. amend. VI. To determine if the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, 21 the United States Supreme Court developed a four-part balancing test in Barker v. Wingo (407 22 US 514 (1972)), which has been applied by the Guam Supreme Court in Flores and People v. 23 Mendiola, 1998 Guam 8. The Barker test considers the following four factors: "(1) the length 24 25 26 2 Guam also has astatutory speedy trial right codified at 8 GCA § 80.60 which, in Defendant's case, provides that a criminal action shall be dismissed if the trial of a defendant in custody at the time of his arraignment has not 27 commenced within 45 days, unless good cause is shown for failing to commence trial therein. Defendant's motions to dismiss were not based upon the statutory speedy trial right and are not addressed in this Decision and Order. 28 People v. Tedtaotao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Order on Defendant's Trial Motions Page 3 of 11 0

of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy

trial; and (4) the presence or absence of prejudice resulting from the delay." Flores ¶ 42 (citing

Barker at 530). Of these four factors, the first factor serves as a threshold inquiry, as "Barker

held that length of the delay serves to trigger the analysis," and "[u]ntil there is some delay that

is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inauirv into the other factors that go into

the balance." Mendiola 124 (citing Barker at 530-53) )(emphasis added).

8 In the. instant case, Defendant was arrested and brought before a magistrate judge on

9 April 27, 2013, indicted on May 7, 2013, and Defendant's trial began on November 4, 2013.

The elapsed time from arrest to trial was 191 days or 6 months and 8 days.

Defendant has not met his burden of showing the interval between accusation and trial

has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from "presumptively prejudicial" delay." Doggett v.

14 U.S., 505 US 647 (quoting Barker at 530-531). The Court does not find that 191 days from 15 arrest to trial is beyond the ordinary amount of delay in a criminal matter considering that the 16 indictment charged three First Degree Felonies and two Second Degree Felonies and, for 172 17 days of that period, the criminal matter had three defendants joined. As Doggett noted, 18

19 "[d]epending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation

delay "presumptively prejudicial" at least as it approaches one year." Doggett at 652, fit. I

(citing W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure & 18.2, p. 405 (1984); Joseph, Speedy Trial 22 Rights in Applicati on. 48 Ford.L.Rev. 611, 623, n. 71 (1980) (cases omitted)). 23 By way of illustration, this Court is currently bound by Administrative Rule No. 13-003 24

25 (May 13, 2013), which as ires to conclude 75% of criminal felony cases within 9 months and

26 98% within 12 months. Defendant's adjudication in this matter was not only far from 27 "presumptively prejudicial" and triggering Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis, it was also 28 People v. Tedlaorao, CF02IS-13-01, Decision & order oo Defendant 's Trial Motions Page 4 of 11 well within the "ordinary amount of delay" envisioned by Doggett as measured by its

aspirational time standards. The Court therefore, need not engage in the question of Sixth

Amendment constitutional analysis when, on its face, the claim fails to meet the threshold

inquiry.

B. Motions for Judgment of Acquittal

The People rested their case on November 21, 2013 (seeMinute Sheet at 3:31:59) after 7

8 presenting the testimony of Kyle Cruz. At the resumption of trial on November 22, 2013, and

9 before Defendant presented his case in chief, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal 10 under 8 GCA § 100.10. Minute Sheet at 9:46:24 (Nov. 22, 2013). The motion for judgment of II acquittal was presented with (and substantively contingent upon) a concurrent motion to strike 12

13 the testimony of Kyle Cruz.' The Court took oral argument on both motions and reserved

14 ruling. Later that afternoon, at the close of the Defense case-in-chief, Defendant again renewed 15 his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Id at 2:36:53. Before addressing the renewed motion 16 for judgment of acquittal, the Court denied Defendant's motion from that morning to exclude 17 the testimony of Kyle Cruz. With the inclusion of Mr. Cruz's testimony, the Court found that 18

19 sufficient evidence had been presented to the jury as to each of the essential elements of the

20 charged crimes and denied both of Defendant's motions for a judgment of acquittal. 21 A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted " if the evidence is insufficient to 22 sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." 9 GCA § 100.10 (2005). Under Guam law, 23 [t]he trial court determines whether a motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted by 24

25 applying the same test used when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged." People v.

26 ' The denial of the motion to strike the testimony of Kyle Cruz is discussed separately in section III.C. of this 27 Decision & Ord" infra. The Court's consideration of Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal discussed in this section was informed by its denial of Defendant' s motion to stake Kyle Cruz's testimony. 28 People v. Tediaorao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Ord" on Defendant' s Trial Motions Page s of I l 0

Diego, 2013 Guam 15 ¶ 30 (citing People v. George, 2012 Guam 22 ¶ 49)(citing People v. Chin

Song, 2012 Guam 12 ¶ 27). When ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, a court is only

"concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight." Chin Song ¶ 29

(citing State v. Weston, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (S.C. 2006)).

The People's key evidence in this case came from Defendant's former co-defendant, 6 Kyle Cruz. Kyle Cruz's testimony over two days provided the evidence that linked Defendant 7

I to the time and place of the alleged crimes. Kyle testified he received a phone call from

9 Anthony Mendiola to go on a "mission" i.e. a robbery. Minute Sheet at 11:33:19 (Nov. 20, 10 2013). Mr. Cruz testified he went to their agreed upon meeting point and got into a green 1I Nissan Pathfinder driven by the Defendant with Mr. Mendiola in the passenger seat. Id. at 12

11:38:06-11:40:22. The jury viewed surveillance footage taken from the Sinajana Mobil gas

14 station (Trial Exhibit 114) which showed Mr. Cruz, Mr. Mendiola, and Defendant were together

15 in a green Pathfinder the night of the alleged events. Mr. Cruz then testified that all three went 16 to a house in Nimitz Hill and knocked on the door. When the Victim answered the door, Mr. 17 Cruz testified that Defendant tackled her, asked where the money was, and struck her on the IS

19 head with an airsoft pistol. Id. at 3:02:59-3:08:17. Mr. Cruz then testified that when the three

20 of them left the residence, the victim was unconscious and duct-taped at the mouth, wrists, and 21 ankles. Id.at 4:00:34-4:02:21. 22 Based upon Mr. Cruz's testimony and identification of Defendant, the jury was provided 23 with sufficient evidence to make a finding that Defendant was actually the person charged in the 24

25 Indictment. Mr. Cruz's testimony also provided evidence that Defendant intended to commit a

26 robbery, entered a habitable property with the intent to commit theft, and that Defendant struck 27 and duct taped the Victim's mouth, legs, and arms, leaving her in that condition when they fled 28 People v. Tedtaotao, CF0218-13-o1, Decision & Orderon Defendant's Trial Motions Page 6 of 11 I R

the premises. Mr. Cruz also provided evidence that a theft actually occurred when he testified I that the three of them took various items from the Victim's residence, including a cell phone,

3 camera, duffle bag filled with clothing, and two laptop computers. 4 The Court finds that Mr. Cruz was competent to testify to these matters as his Plea

Agreement (Trial Exhibit 115) established him as a witness with personal knowledge of the 6 matter under Guam Rules of Evidence ("GRE") 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter

8 unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal

9 knowledge of the matter.") and Mr. Cruz's testimony was clearly relevant evidence under GRE

401 not meeting the criteria for exclusion under GRE 403 ("evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or by considerations of undue delay").

14 The state of the evidence given W. Cruz's testimony was sufficient for the jury to find

15 that Defendant committed Burglary (as a 2nd Degree Felony) by entering the Victim's home 16 with the intent to commit theft and was instrumental in the theft of several items from the 17 Victim's home. Evidence of the actual commission of the theft, in conjunction with evidence is 19 that Defendant used force against the Victim by tackling her and striking her on the head with

20 an airsoft gun is sufficient for a jury to find Defendant guilty of a robbery. W. Cruz's 21 testimony on Defendant's use of force, in conjunction with earlier testimony from the Victim 22 and the doctors who treated her as to the seriousness of the injuries she suffered from 23

24 /

25 26 /

27 // 28 People v. Ted'aotao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Order on Defendant's Tri al Motions Page 7 of II 0

Defendant's use of force, was sufficient to bring the charges of Attempted Murder and 1 2 Aggravated Assault before the jury, as well as the charge of First Degree Robbery.4

As stated earlier, the Court can only be concerned with "existence or nonexistence of 4 evidence, not its weight " Chin Song ¶ 29. That evidence relating to each and every element of 5 the crimes charged in the Indictment was presented is clear. ' To determine the credibility of 6

7 Mr. Cruz's testimony or to infer the state of mind of Defendant is beyond the purview of the

8 Court in a criminal jury trial. It is the jury which must fulfill "the responsibility of the trier of

9 fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 10 inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Chin ¶ 18 (citing People v. Jesus, 2009 Guam 2 ¶ 11 60 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))). 12 13 It was the jury's weighing of all the evidence presented in this case which resulted in a

14 guilty verdict of Attempted Murder (as a 1st Degree Felony), First Degree Robbery (as a 1st 15 Degree Felony), Aggravated Assault (as a 2nd Degree Felony), and Burglary (as a 2nd Degree 16 Felony). Defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal under 8 GCA § 100.30 after the

jury's verdict was read.

C. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Kyle Cruz

20 Concurrent with Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after the People rested 21 their case in chief, was a motion to strike the testimony of Kyle Cruz based upon the People's 22

23 4 As required by Guam law in Angoco v. Brlanga,2001 Guam 17, the Court provided the jury with instructions on the lesser-included offense of Second Degree Robbery to First Degree Robbery and the lesser-included offenses of 24 Aggravated Assault (as a 2nd Degree Felony) and Assault (as a Misdemeanor) to Aggravated Assault (as a 2nd Degree Felony). See also 8 GCA § 105.58 for the definition of an "included offense". 25 s Assuming arguendo the Court had granted Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of KJC, discussed infra, there might have been a reasonable basis for granting the motion for judgment of acquittal as it was Mr. Cruz's 26 testimony that placed Defendant at the scene of the alleged crime and established Defendant as the source of Victim' s injuries. 27

28 People v. Tedtoowo, CF0218-13-01, Decision& Ordwon Defendant' s Trial Motions Page 8 of 1 r 9

failure to provide discovery and to disclose exculpatory Brady material. Minute Sheet at

9:49:43 (Nov. 22).

Defendant alleges the People should have immediately informed him when Mr. Cruz

retracted part of his earlier written statement. On October 23, 2013, W. Cruz retracted his 5 earlier written statement that when he told Defendant he didn't want to join in the robbery, 6

7 Defendant "popped" a gun and told him "you are." Id. at 10:12:41. Assistant Attorney General

8 David Rivera stated that, based upon his recollection, he became aware of this retraction during

9 witness preparation on November 15, 2013. Id. at 10:15:49. No written discovery was 10 provided to this effect, nor was Defendant notified in any way. Defendant became aware of the

retraction during cross examination of Mr. Cruz, when Mr. Cruz admitted that the written

statement was false and he had retracted it. Defendant sought the exclusion of all of Mr. Cruz's

testimony as a sanction for the People's failure to disclose this retraction once they became 15 aware of it. 16 After reserving ruling on the motion to exclude, the Court denied the motion that 17 afternoon as the retraction did not go to any of the factual elements of the charges against

Defendant6 and declined to impose any exclusionary sanction. Id. at 2:44:26. However, the

Court admonished the People that it is not within their purview to determine what information is

exculpatory nor are they obligated to only turn over exculpatory information which exists in the 22 form a written report. While disclosure of the retraction occurred very late and during trial, the 23 Court noted it occurred during Defendant's cross-examination of Mr. Cruz. Furthemore, Mr. 24

25 Cruz was also listed on Defendant's witness list and Defendant was free to call him on the

27 ' Therefore consideration of W. Cruz' s exculpatory statement would have not had any effect on this Court' s review of Defendant's motions forjudgment of acquittal discussed in section III.B. of this Decision & Order supra. 28 People v. Tedmomo, CF0218- 13-01, Decision& Order on Defendant' s Trial Motions Page 9 of 11 0

stand, further question Mr. Cruz in front of the jury, and further attack his credibility, bias, and

truthfulness.'

As the comment to 8 GCA § 70.45 states, " it seems better policy for the court to `apply 4 sanctions which affect the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as little'." People 5 v. Tuncap, 1998 Guam 13 ¶ 23 . Exclusion of Mr. Cruz' s entire testimony would have been an

extreme sanction in light of the Sarcinelli factors cited in Tuncap: 1) reasons why the disclosure

was not made; 2) the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party; 3) the feasibility of rectifying

that prejudice by a continuance, and 4) any other relevant circumstances. Tuncap ¶ 25 (citing U.S. v.

Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cit. 1982)). Exclusion is not warranted here, where applying the Sarcinelli

factors: I) the P eople state their disclosure was inadvertent and based upon a mistaken belief that the

retraction was neutral; 2) the prejudice was minimal when the retraction was discovered during and

reinforced by Defendant' s cross examination of Mr. Cruz; 3) Defendant did not ask for a continuance in 14 this matter in order to prepare his case in chief based upon the newly discovered information; and 4) 15 Defendant did not avail himself of the opportunity to call Mr. Cruz in his case in chief in an attempt to 16

17 impeach him.

I8

19 //

20 // 21 / 22

24 / 25 / 26

27 ' At the time of mling, Defendant had closed his case in chief without calling Mr. Cruz as a witness. 28 People v. Tedmmao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Order onDefendant's Trial Motions Page l0of li CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Defendant's motions to dismiss based upon the

Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial are DENIED; Defendant's motions for judgment of

acquittal are DENIED and; Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of Kyle Cruz is

DENIED.

A Restitution Hearing in this matter is scheduled for August 4, 2014 at 2 PM.

SO ORDERED this- 1$ day of June, 2014. 10

1I

12 13 HONORABLE MARIA T. CENZON 14 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 15

23 SERv1Mvi A COURT BOX 1 ackavalSdV dw • copy & im 24

28 People v. Tedlao ao, CF0218-13-01, Decision & Order on Defendant's Trial Motions Page 11 of 11