People v. Tedtaotao

Opinion

2 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 3

4 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO.: CF0218-l3 )

5 )

) DECISION AND ORDER 6 vs. ) RE. MOTION FOR ) SEVERANCE AND 1 RAYMOND TEDTAOTAO, ) SEPARATE TRIAL ANTHONY MENDIOLA, )

8 )

KYLE J. CRUZ, )

Defendants.

9 ______________________________) )

lO This matter came before the Honorable Maria T. Cenzon on July 1, 2013 on Defendant 11

12 Cruz's Motion for Severance and Separate Trial ("Motion"), which was filed on May 30,

13 2013. Assistant Attorney General Brian D. Gallagher represented the People of Guam (the 14 "People"). Defendant Kyle Cruz was represented by Attorney John Terlaje. The Court, 15 having considered the Motion and the arguments presented during the hearing of this matter, 16

17 issues the following written Decision and Order DENYING the Motion.

18 BACKGROUND

19 On May 7, 2013, Defendant Cruz was indicted by a Superior Court Grand Jury of the 20

21 following charges: (1) Guilt By Complicity to Commit Attempted Murder (As a 1st Degree

22 Felony); (2) First Degree Robbery (As a 1st Degree Felony); Aggravated Assault (As a 2nd 23 Degree Felony); and Burglary (As a 2nd Degree Felony). Indictment, CF0218-13 (5/7/13). Co-

24 defendants Anthony Mendiola and Raymond Tedtaotao are charged with identical crimes;

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26 however, Defendant Tedtaotao is additionally charged with Attempted Murder. Defendants

27 Mendiola and Tedtaotao have asserted their right to a speedy trial while Defendant Cruz has 28 waived his right to a speedy trial. The Court initially scheduled the trial to commence on June

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26, 2013; however, the court continued the trial for good cause. See Decision and Order Re.

2 Motion for Good Cause Continuance of Trial, CF0218-13 (6/25/2013}.

3 Defendant Cruz moved for severance, arguing that "[b ]ecause of the breadth of the 4 charges, and the number of defendants, and collective indictment of the co-defendant in 5

6 general, there is the severe and very real danger that the jury may use the evidence of one of the

7 crimes charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of Cruz." Motion, at 2. Defendant 8 Cruz maintains that he is prejudiced because: (1} he has waived speedy trial; (2} his defenses 9 will be antagonistic to those of the co-defendants; (3} his trial strategy will be different from 10

11 that of the co-defendants; and (4} he will not be able to fully cross-examine the witnesses,

12 specifically, the defendants. See id. Although the People did not file a written response, the

13 People oppose the Motion, arguing that granting Defendant Cruz's Motion would cause 14 hardship on the victim, who is currently off-island undergoing medical treatment, as she would 15 have to testify at two separate trials.

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17 LAW AND ANALYSIS

18 "Generally, defendants who are charged together should be jointly tried." United States 19

20 v. Buena-Lopez, 987 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1993} (citing United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d

21 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1991}}. "Joint trials promote efficiency and 'serve the interests of justice 22 by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts."' I d. at 660 (quoting Zafiro v.

23 United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993}}. However, where it appears that a defendant may be 24 prejudiced by a joint trial with other defendants, the Court may grant the defendant a separate 25

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26 trial. See 8 G.C.A. § 65.35.

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28 1 Since section 65.35 parallels Rule 14(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court will look to federal case law for guidance.

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The Court has considerable discretion when ruling on whether to grant a separate trial.

2 See Parker v. U.S., 404 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986). The defendant, however, bears the 3 burden to prove "'clear,' 'manifest,' or 'undue' prejudice from a joint trial." United States v.

4 Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1554 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 901 5

6 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)). "The test is

7 whether joinder was so prejudicial that the trial judge was compelled to exercise his discretion 8 to sever." United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986) (United States v. Nolan, 9 700 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.

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11 1975). "Serious consideration must be given to judicial economy." Polizzi, 801 F.2d at 1553

12 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977)). 13 In this case, Defendant Cruz has failed to establish that undue prejudice exists from 14 continuing with a joint trial. It is insufficient to merely state that prejudice exists without 15 providing enough evidence or explanation to support that claim. "The mere fact that there may 16

17 be more incriminating evidence against one codefendant than another does not provide a

18 sufficient justification for separate trials." Polizzi, 801 F.2d at 1554 (citing United States v. 19 Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1984)); see United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 20 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (Prejudice must be shown, and "[e]ven where large amounts of testimony are 21 irrelevant to one defendant, or where one defendant's involvement . . . is far less than the 22

23 involvement of others, we have been reluctant to second guess severance denials.") (quoting

24 United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990)). Further, it is insufficient to simply 25 assert that Defendant Cruz's defenses will be antagonistic to those of the co-defendants because 26 there must be a showing of "mutual exclusivity." See Polizzi, 801 F.2d at 1554.

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Defendant Cruz asserts fmally that with all of the evidence that the jury would have to 2 consider against multiple defendants and involving several charges that the jury would not be 3 able to attribute the evidence properly to the defendants, possibly resulting in a conviction for 4

5 Defendant Cruz when the evidence, if presented during a separate trial, would not so warrant.

6 Although this case does involve three defendants, the charges are virtually identical, except for 7 the additional charge against Defendant Tedtaotao for Attempted Murder. Although the parties 8 have not discussed in any detail the length of the trial, the exhibits that will be presented or the 9 witnesses who will testify, the evidence is not anticipated to be so complex and confusing that 10

11 the jury would be unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to each of the

12 defendants. See United States v. Guillen-Rivas, No. 11-cr-857-WFK-5 (WFK)(IMA), 2013 13 WL 3120194 at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 947 (2nd 14 Cir. 1993) ("even 'joint trials involving defendants who are only marginally involved alongside

those heavily involved are constitutionally permissible."'). In this case, a limiting instruction at 16

17 the conclusion of the evidence would be sufficient to cure any risk of prejudice from the

18 presentation of evidence that might not be admissible against or be relevant to Defendant Cruz. 19 ld. (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539) ("[L]ess drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, 20 often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.") At this time, Defendant Cruz has not shown 21 that there would be any prejudice so great as to deprive him of his right to a fair trial.

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CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant Cruz's Motion for 3 Severance and Separate Trial.

4 SO ORDERED on this 9th day of July, 2013.

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8 J!JkJ:_

HONORABLE MARIA T. CENZON Judge, Superior Court of Guam 9

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