The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY June 11, 2026
2026 COA 50
No. 25CA2151, People v. Taylor — Crimes — Serious Bodily Injury — Substantial Risk of Protracted Loss or Impairment
A division of the court of appeals concludes, as a matter of
first impression, that People v. Vigil, 2021 CO 46, ¶ 33 — in which
the supreme court held that the “facts of the actual injury control
the substantial risk of death determination under section
18-1-901(3)(p)[, C.R.S. 2025, which defines serious bodily injury],
not the risk generally associated with the type of conduct or injury
in question” — extends to a trial court’s determination under a
different clause of section 18-1-901(3)(p): whether the injury
involved “a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any part or organ of the body.” The division also concludes that the prosecution’s evidence
didn’t establish probable cause that the suffered injury amounted
to serious bodily injury. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 50
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2151 Chaffee County District Court No. 24CR170 Honorable Dayna Vise, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Monroe Taylor,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur
Announced June 11, 2026
Jeffrey D. Lindsey, District Attorney, Stephanie B. Miller, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Canon City, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Magdalena Rosa, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 The People appeal the district court’s order dismissing
multiple charges against defendant, Monroe Taylor, after finding
that the prosecution failed to prove probable cause for the elements
of serious bodily injury (SBI) during the preliminary hearing. In
addressing the People’s appeal, we consider, as a matter of first
impression, whether People v. Vigil, 2021 CO 46, ¶ 33 — in which
the supreme court held that the “facts of the actual injury control
18-1-901(3)(p)[, C.R.S. 2025, which defines SBI], not the risk
generally associated with the type of conduct or injury in question”
— extends to a trial court’s determination of whether the injury
involved “a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any part or organ of the body,” under section
18-1-901(3)(p). We hold that it does and affirm. We remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
¶2 Taylor is an inmate at a correctional facility. In June 2024,
correctional officer Valerie Cerisene went into Taylor’s cell to
confiscate a radio, which had been playing too loudly. Taylor had
been outside of his cell but followed Cerisene in after he entered the
1 cell. Taylor asked what Cerisene was doing with the radio and then
started to punch Cerisene’s head and face. Taylor put Cerisene in a
chokehold, which caused Cerisene to lose consciousness “for a bit.”
Cerisene suffered injuries to his face, including a lacerated lip, and
was dazed. Cerisene went to the hospital. Dr. Kevin Merrell, the
physician who treated Cerisene, didn’t think that Cerisene suffered
SBI. A few days later, Cerisene saw Kevin Percy, a physician’s
assistant, who also opined that there was no SBI.
¶3 In August 2024, Cerisene was treated by an optometrist, Dr.
Gavin Walters. Dr. Walters completed and signed an “SBI Medical
Professional Form.”1 Dr. Walters checked a box on the form
indicating that Cerisene’s injuries fit the statutory definition of SBI
because they involved
1 An “SBI Medical Professional Form” is a standard form completed
by a medical professional to indicate the extent of a patient’s injuries. See generally People v. Vigil, 2021 CO 46, ¶¶ 6-8. Because neither party challenges Dr. Walters’ qualifications to complete and sign the SBI medical professional form, we assume, without deciding, that Dr. Walters was authorized to do so. We express no opinion on whether an optometrist is a “medical professional” for purposes of completing an SBI medical professional form.
2 a substantial risk of PROTRACTED LOSS or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, specifically, the left eye.
On the form, Dr. Walters described Cerisene’s injuries and Dr.
Walters’ reason for the SBI determination as follows:
The patient received trauma to the head that resulted in traumatic iritis and had a significant risk of retinal detachment with flashes of light and floaters reported in the vision. Retinal detachment, if not promptly treated, may lead to a permanent substantial reduction of vision.
¶4 As relevant here, the prosecution charged Taylor with one
count of first degree assault as a crime of violence, alleging SBI and
use of a deadly weapon (hands) in violation of section
18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; one count of first degree assault as a
crime of violence against a person employed in a detention facility
with a deadly weapon (hands) in violation of section 18-3-202(1)(f);
one count of second degree assault as a crime of violence against a
peace officer performing a lawful duty by causing SBI in violation of
section 18-3-203(1)(c.5), C.R.S. 2025; and one count of second
degree assault as a crime of violence, alleging that Taylor was
lawfully confined or in custody after being convicted of a crime and
unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly, and violently applied physical
3 force against a person employed by a detention facility, in violation
of section 18-3-203(1)(f). The prosecution also charged Taylor with
crime of violence sentence enhancers under section
18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A)-(B), C.R.S. 2025, for each substantive assault
charge.
¶5 The district court held a preliminary hearing in October 2025.
The correctional facility investigator assigned to the case, Heather
Gaffney, was the only person who testified. Gaffney testified that
she met with Cerisene shortly after he had been assaulted and that
he seemed dazed and confused and had injuries on his face, so she
interviewed him later. Gaffney also testified that she “attempted to
get an SBI form signed” by Dr. Merrell but that he “did not believe
that there was SBI.” Similarly, Gaffney confirmed that Percy also
opined that there was no SBI.
¶6 Gaffney testified that Dr. Walters signed an SBI form, which
indicated that “there was a substantial risk of protracted loss or
impairment of the function of Cerisene’s left eye.” Gaffney testified
that she was able to obtain Cerisene’s medical records from Dr.
Merrell and Percy but that she didn’t obtain any medical records,
“like the full statement,” from Dr. Walters aside from the completed
4 SBI form. Gaffney didn’t interview any of the medical staff who
treated Cerisene.
¶7 At the end of the hearing, the court raised concerns regarding
a finding of SBI based on the supreme court’s holding in Vigil, ¶ 33,
which instructs that the “facts of the actual injury control the
substantial risk of death determination under [the statute defining
SBI], not the risk generally associated with the type of conduct or
injury in question.” In relevant part, the court directed the parties
to submit briefs addressing whether Vigil “should factor in, and to
what extent that may affect the evidence” that had been presented.
¶8 After reviewing the briefs, the court issued a written order
finding that Vigil “directs that the facts of the actual injury control[]
whether the prosecution has established [SBI],” and because the
prosecution failed to “establish that the injury actually sustained by
. . . Cerisene constituted [SBI],” the court dismissed all counts
containing an SBI element and all crime of violence counts related
5 to the dismissed substantive charges.2 The People appeal the
district court’s preliminary hearing order.
II. Discussion
¶9 The People first contend that Vigil doesn’t apply because the
charges against Taylor don’t involve a substantial risk of death but a
substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any part or organ of the body. Alternatively, even if Vigil applies, the
People argue that the prosecution established probable cause of SBI
and that the court erred by dismissing all substantive and crime of
violence charges containing SBI as an element. We disagree with
both contentions, addressing each in turn.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
1. Serious Bodily Injury and Vigil
¶ 10 SBI is defined as
bodily injury that, either at the time of the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of death; a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement; a substantial risk of protracted loss or
2 After finding probable cause existed for all elements of the lesser
included offense of second degree assault under section 18-3- 203(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, the court reduced Taylor’s charge of first degree assault to second degree assault (causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon).
6 impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body; or breaks, fractures, a penetrating knife or penetrating gunshot wound, or burns of the second or third degree.
§ 18-1-901(3)(p). “Bodily injury,” on the other hand, means
“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental
condition.” § 18-1-901(3)(c). The difference between bodily injury
and SBI is the degree of the injury. See Stroup v. People, 656 P.2d
680, 685 (Colo. 1982) (“The plain language of the ‘serious bodily
injury’ and ‘bodily injury’ definitions focuses on the injury the
victim actually suffered rather than the risk to the victim posed by
the defendant’s conduct.”).
¶ 11 In Vigil, the issue before the supreme court was whether the
prosecution established sufficient probable cause that the
defendant committed first degree assault — SBI with a deadly
weapon — when he stabbed the victim in the neck, but the knife
missed all vital organs and the injury resulted in the victim needing
7 only stitches.3 The doctor treating the victim “believed there was a
substantial risk of death, based on the vital areas that could be
damaged” in the neck. Vigil, ¶ 8. This shifted the doctor’s analysis
from the actual injury suffered to the risk associated with what
could have been damaged following a knife wound to the neck. Id.
at ¶¶ 38, 40.
¶ 12 The supreme court reversed the trial court’s finding that there
was probable cause to bind over the first degree assault charge and
concluded that the testimony at the preliminary hearing failed to
demonstrate that the victim sustained bodily injury that “involves a
substantial risk of death.” Id. at ¶¶ 38, 48. As the court explained,
the “stab wound to the neck would involve substantial risk of death
if the knife injured certain vital structures.” Id. Relying on Stroup,4
3 When Vigil was decided, the definition of SBI was slightly different
under section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2020. As relevant to Vigil’s circumstances, SBI was defined as “bodily injury which, either at the time of the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of death.” Id. The legislature amended the definition of SBI in 2023 — after Vigil — to include any penetrating knife or penetrating gunshot wounds. 4 In Stroup v. People, 656 P.2d 680, 685 (Colo. 1982), the supreme
court analyzed an earlier version of the SBI statute and held that the plain language of the statute “focuses on the injury the victim actually suffered rather than the risk to the victim posed by the defendant’s conduct.”
8 the supreme court held that “the facts of the actual injury control
the substantial risk of death determination” for SBI and not the
“risk generally associated with the type of conduct or injury in
question.” Id. at ¶ 4.
2. The Preliminary Hearing
¶ 13 “[A] preliminary hearing is not a mini-trial; rather, it is a
screening tool that seeks to weed out those cases in which
prosecution is unwarranted.” People v. Platteel, 2023 CO 18, ¶ 33.
Specifically, it is used “to determine whether probable cause exists
to support charges that an accused committed a particular crime.”
Miller v. Dist. Ct., 641 P.2d 966, 967 (Colo. 1982). To establish
probable cause at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must
present evidence sufficient to induce a person of ordinary prudence
and caution to entertain a reasonable belief that the defendant
committed the crime charged. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 221
(Colo. 2000). It’s unnecessary for the prosecution to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, or even
the probability of the defendant’s conviction. People v. Dist. Ct., 926
P.2d 567, 570 (Colo. 1996). Instead, the court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw all
9 reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. The prosecution is therefore
given latitude to establish probable cause that the defendant
committed the crime charged. Id.
¶ 14 Generally, we review a trial court’s finding of no probable
cause for an abuse of discretion. Hall, 999 P.2d at 221. Under the
abuse of discretion standard, our review is narrowly circumscribed,
and we can only reverse if the district court’s ruling was manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if the court misapplied the
law. See People v. Chavez, 2020 COA 80M, ¶ 8 (“A court abuses its
discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.”).
¶ 15 But we review conclusions of law de novo, and if we determine
that the district court applied an erroneous construction of law at
the preliminary hearing, we review the record and determine
whether the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, would induce a reasonably prudent and cautious
person to entertain the belief that the defendant committed the
crime charged. Hall, 999 P.2d at 221. Thus, we must first consider
whether the district court based its rulings on correct conclusions
of law. As explained below, we conclude that it did and review the
court’s decision for abuse of discretion.
10 B. Vigil Applies When Evaluating Substantial Risk of Protracted Loss or Impairment Under Section 18-1-901(3)(p)
¶ 16 The People contend that Vigil is inapplicable because it
involved a finding of a substantial risk of death arising from an
injury, Vigil, ¶¶ 30-31, while the present case concerns a
substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment. According to the
People, extending Vigil’s application to the loss or impairment
portion of the SBI definition is problematic because, while medical
professionals can typically evaluate an injury and determine almost
immediately if there’s a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk
of protracted loss or impairment is more intangible. In support,
they argue that risk can be substantial even if the chance that
harm will occur is below fifty percent. See Hall, 999 P.2d at 217.
We are unpersuaded. Moreover, we regard the People’s argument
as further proof that parameters are necessary when evaluating the
“substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment” prong of SBI
under section 18-1-901(3)(p).
¶ 17 Although Vigil considered whether a substantial risk of death
arose based on the victim’s injury, and the issue before us is
whether Cerisene’s injuries involved a substantial risk of protracted
11 loss or impairment to the function of his eye, Vigil’s key principle
remains: The determination of substantial risk is controlled by the
actual injury, not by the hypothetical or commonly associated risks
of the injury. See Vigil, ¶ 38. We therefore hold that Vigil applies
when a court is asked to determine whether there is probable cause
of SBI under section 18-1-901(3)(p) based on a substantial risk of
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of
the body.
C. The Prosecution’s Evidence Didn’t Establish Probable Cause that Cerisene’s Injury Amounted to SBI
¶ 18 The People contend that the district court’s findings
“mistakenly equated the substantial risk of retinal detachment”
with Vigil’s speculative language of “could,” “might,” and “generally
does.” Specifically, the district court found that “the evidence
showed . . . Cerisene suffered traumatic iritis and the injury could
have led [to] retinal detachment which may have led, if not properly
treated, to a permanent substantial reduction of vision. But there
was no evidence that . . . Cerisene[’s] actual injury included retinal
detachment.” This construction, the People argue, is problematic
because it focuses on whether there could have been a substantial
12 risk of retinal detachment rather than on the facts of the actual
injury. But the district court’s findings were consistent with the
evidence that the prosecution presented.
¶ 19 Dr. Walters’ description of the injury on the completed SBI
form indicated that Cerisene received head trauma that resulted in
traumatic iritis and that Cerisene reported flashes of light and
floaters in his vision. Dr. Walters’ description also noted that
traumatic iritis had a significant risk of retinal detachment. And
retinal detachment, if not treated promptly, may lead to a
permanent substantial reduction of vision. These statements by Dr.
Walters on the SBI form focus on the possible risks associated with
traumatic iritis — retinal detachment; and if retinal detachment
occurs and isn’t treated promptly, it could lead to permanent
substantial reduction of vision. The hypothetical risks weren’t
supported by evidence that Cerisene’s injury, either at the time of
the actual injury or later, carried a substantial risk of protracted
loss or impairment to his eye, consistent with the definition of SBI.
Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by finding no probable cause of SBI existed because the
prosecution’s evidence focused on what might have happened if
13 Cerisene suffered retinal detachment and if he failed to receive
proper treatment, when Cerisene’s actual injury was only traumatic
iritis. See Vigil, ¶ 31 (explaining the SBI definition “does not speak
of bodily injury which ‘could,’ ‘might,’ or ‘generally does’ involve
substantial risk of death”).
¶ 20 The People also contend that Cerisene’s injury met the
definition of SBI because his head trauma (the injury in question)
caused traumatic iritis (the actual injury), and he had a significant
risk of retinal detachment, which involved a substantial risk of
further loss or impairment associated with the actual injury. Thus,
they claim, the prosecution met the probable cause standard
because, as Vigil instructs, “the injury actually created by the
defendant’s actions is the crux for determining” SBI. According to
the People, Cerisene’s traumatic iritis, which resulted in symptoms
of flashes of light and floaters reported in Cerisene’s vision, met the
“impairment of the function” of the eye definition under the SBI
statute.
¶ 21 In contrast to Vigil, which considered the substantial risk of
death that a stab wound could have caused if the knife had injured
vital structures, the People claim that Dr. Walters’ completed SBI
14 form isn’t about the danger of being hit in the head but about
actual injuries and impairment of function. Namely, Cerisene’s
injury was traumatic iritis that caused flashes of light and floaters
in his left eye, which met the SBI standard because the plain and
ordinary meaning of “impairment” is a “diminishment or loss of
function or ability.”
¶ 22 Although Dr. Walters noted on the SBI form that Cerisene
“received trauma to the head that resulted in traumatic iritis and
had a significant risk of retinal detachment with flashes of light and
floaters reported in the vision,” neither Cerisene nor Dr. Walters
testified — and the prosecution presented no evidence — that the
flashes of light and floaters impaired Cerisene’s vision. There was
also no evidence presented regarding how often the flashes and
floaters occurred, how long the symptoms lasted, how much they
impacted Cerisene’s daily activities, how they affected Cerisene’s eye
function, or how traumatic iritis met the definition of SBI. Indeed,
the prosecution didn’t even offer evidence explaining traumatic
iritis. Likewise, Gaffney testified that she didn’t interview Dr.
Walters or obtain a full medical report from him. Rather, the only
evidence the prosecution presented in support of SBI was Dr.
15 Walters’ SBI form indicating that the injury “may” lead to
complications if left improperly treated.
¶ 23 The facts here stand in contrast to People v. Duncan, 2023
COA 122, where the victim suffered hearing loss for five months
after the defendant struck the side of her face and perforated her
eardrum. In Duncan, medical testimony established not only that
such an injury can cause hearing loss, but that the victim in fact
experienced hearing loss for a sustained period, which was an
injury that involved a substantial risk of “protracted loss or
impairment of the function” of the victim’s hearing under section
18-1-901(3)(p). Duncan, ¶¶ 20-21.
¶ 24 No comparable showing was made here. The prosecution’s
evidence didn’t establish probable cause that traumatic iritis — the
actual injury — either at the time of the injury or later, carried a
substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment to Cerisene’s eye,
consistent with the definition of SBI.
¶ 25 The People are correct that the prosecution’s burden is
relatively low at the preliminary hearing stage, but even under this
low standard, we cannot say that the district court erred by finding
that the prosecution didn’t establish probable cause that Cerisene’s
16 injuries met the statutory definition of SBI. The prosecution didn’t
present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
Cerisene’s injuries involved a “substantial risk of protracted loss or
impairment of the function of his left eye.” See People v. Tafoya,
2019 CO 13, ¶ 14 (“A preliminary hearing is designed to provide a
judicial determination as to whether probable cause exists to
believe that the charged offense was committed by the defendant.”);
Duncan, ¶¶ 20-21.
¶ 26 Because the prosecution didn’t establish probable cause that
Cerisene suffered SBI, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion
by dismissing all counts containing an SBI element and all crime of
violence counts related to the dismissed substantive charges.
III. Disposition
¶ 27 We affirm the order and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.