People v. Tarantola

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Tarantola

187 A.D.2d 546, 589 N.Y.S.2d 925, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12753

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 9, 1992

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 187 A.D.2d 546 (People v. Tarantola) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Tarantola, 187 A.D.2d 546, 589 N.Y.S.2d 925, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12753 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992).

Pincite

Opinion

by the defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Slavin, J.), imposed November 2, 1990, as imposed mandatory surcharges upon his conviction of burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, after a plea of guilty.

Ordered that the sentence is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and the mandatory surcharges imposed upon the defendant’s conviction of burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree are vacated.

We agree with the defendant that the court imposed mandatory surcharges upon the defendant’s conviction of burglary in [547]*547the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in clear violation of Penal Law § 60.35 (2), which forbids the imposition of multiple surcharges upon the defendant’s conviction of multiple crimes arising from the commission of a single act or through an act which "in itself constituted one of the crimes and * * * also was a material element of the other”. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree (felony murder), burglary in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree arising from the death of one victim. He could receive only one mandatory surcharge with respect to those counts. Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Eiber, O’Brien and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

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by the defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Slavin, J.), imposed November 2, 1990, as imposed mandatory surcharges upon his conviction of burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, after a plea of guilty.

Ordered that the sentence is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and the mandatory surcharges imposed upon the defendant’s conviction of burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree are vacated.

We agree with the defendant that the court imposed mandatory surcharges upon the defendant’s conviction of burglary in [547]*547the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in clear violation of Penal Law § 60.35 (2), which forbids the imposition of multiple surcharges upon the defendant’s conviction of multiple crimes arising from the commission of a single act or through an act which "in itself constituted one of the crimes and * * * also was a material element of the other”. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree (felony murder), burglary in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree arising from the death of one victim. He could receive only one mandatory surcharge with respect to those counts. Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Eiber, O’Brien and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

187 A.D.2d 546, 589 N.Y.S.2d 925, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-tarantola-nyappdiv-1992.

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