~P ED auP•E&~oR COURT 1 OS~ f;~Jj~ 2 2~fJ SEP -8 MI 10:27 3 CLERic OF COURT
6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, Criminal Case No. CF0138-20 8 GPD Report No. 20-05890 V. 9 DECISION AND ORDER 10 CURTIS J. TAITAGUE, DENYING DEFENDANT’S DOB: 05/02/1992 MOTION TO DISMISS 11 Defendant. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III on August 13, 2020 for 15 hearing on Defendant Curtis J. Taitague’s (“Defendant’s”) Motion to Dismiss the Indictment 16 (“Motion”). Assistant Attorney General Sean Brown represents the People, and Assistant Alternate 17 Public Defender Heather M. Zona represents Defendant. Having duly considered the parties’ briefs, 18 oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and Order and 19 DENIES Defendant’s Motion. 20 BACKGROUND 21 The Guam Police Department (“GPD”) arrested Defendant on February 25, 2020 after 22 responding to an alleged burglary in process at the Verona Resort. Magistrate’s Compl., Decl. (Feb. 23 26, 2020). The People subsequently filed a Magistrate’s Complaint, charging Defendant with ‘24 Burglary (as a Second Degree Felony), Criminal Trespass (as a Misdemeanor), and Theft (as a 25 Petty Misdemeanor). Id. at 1. 26 The following facts are undisputed. On March 5, 2020, the grand jury indicted Defendant on 27 the same charges alleged in the Magistrate’s Complaint. During the grand jury proceedings, the 28 People called GPD Officer Craig Peter Camacho Calvo to testify. Officer Calvo was not involved
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss CF0138-20, People of Guam v. Taitague Page 1 of 4 1 in the investigation of the case. The People asked Officer Calvo whether the police report, drafted 2 by another officer, contained various assertions and allegations. Officer Calvo testified for 3 approximately twelve minutes. The prosecution did not call any other witnesses. 4 Defendant filed the present Motion on July 17, 2020, asking the Court to dismiss the 5 indictment. Defendant submits a number of arguments regarding the Court’s jurisdiction to dismiss 6 the indictment and the permissibility of hearsay statements in grand jury proceedings. The People 7 opposed Defendant’s request to dismiss the Indictment, arguing the Court does not have jurisdiction 8 to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds requested and that hearsay constitutes competent 9 evidence. See Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment (“Opposition”) (July 24, 2020). 10 Defendant replied to the People’s opposition. See Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss the 11 Indictment (“Reply”) (July 28, 2020). 12 The Court held a hearing on August 13, 2020. After hearing the arguments of the parties, the 13 Court took the matter under advisement. 14 DISCUSSION 15 Defendant asserts that the hearsay statements elicited from Officer Calvo during the grand 16 jury proceeding do not constitute “competent evidence” under 8 G.C.A. § 50.42. Mot. at 7. The 17 People argue that hearsay constitutes “competent evidence” under the statute and that case law 18 interpreting the statute holds the same. Opp’n at 2. 19 Guam law requires that grand juries receive only “competent evidence.” 8 G.C.A. § 50.42. 20 Chapter 50, nor any other provision in Title 8, does not define “competent evidence.” Defendant 21 asserts that “competent evidence” must equate to “admissible evidence.” Mot. at 7. Defendant goes 22 on to explain that because hearsay is inadmissible evidence (generally), Officer’s Calvo’s recitation 23 of the police report and the statements within that police report must constitute incompetent 24 evidence in violation of the statute. The Court disagrees. 25 The Ninth Circuit in People v. Quidachay, in analyzing and interpreting 8 G.C.A. § 50.42, 26 has addressed the issue of the meaning of “competent evidence” under the statute: “If it is evidence 27 that a reasonable person would rely upon in conducting his or her daily affairs, then it is competent 28 within the meaning of the statute, regardless of whether it would be admissible at trial under the
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss CF0138-20, People of Guam v. Taitague Page 2 of 4 1 rules of evidence.” 815 F.2d 1131, 1313 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). The Quidachay court’s 2 analysis on the comparisons between the current and previous versions of 8 G.C.A. § 50.42 are 3 further instructive. 4 The former version of section 50.42 provided that “The grand jury shall receive only 5 evidence which would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal action “ The 1980 6 revision by Public Law 15-94 eliminated this requirement. The 1980 amendment, the version of 7 section 50.42 in force today, only required that the evidence be “competent,” not necessarily 8 admissible. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Guam Legislature’s amendment as intending ‘some 9 restriction on the evidence that can be presented to and relied upon by a grand jury” but not 10 requiring only admissible evidence to be presented to a grand jury. Id. Otherwise, “the Guam 11 Legislature would have accomplished nothing by its amendment of the section.” Id. In light of this 12 precedent, the Court declines to hold that “competent evidence” means “admissible evidence.” 13 Defendant asks the Court to ignore the prior federal court decisions in Quidachay and People 14 v. Garrido, 1984 WL 48828 (D. Guam App. Div., May 4, 1984), aff’d and remanded, 752 F.2d 15 1378 (9th Cir. 1985) as “poorly reasoned, unsupported in law, and wrongly decided.” Mot. at 10. 16 The Court declines to do so, as the Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Quidachay that 17 had the Guam Legislature intended “competent evidence” to mean “admissible evidence,” the 1980 18 amendment to 8 G.C.A. § 50.42 via Public Law 15-94 would have accomplished nothing. 19 Defendant further makes comparisons of section 50.42 to Guam’s preliminary hearing statute 20 under 8 G.C.A. § 45.60. At preliminary hearings, as opposed to grand jury proceedings, defendants 21 may make objections to the admissibility of evidence on any grounds that would be available at 22 trial. Id. § 45.60(a). However, comparison to Guam’s preliminary hearing statute only further 23 solidifies the People’s argument and the Court’s holding: had the Guam Legislature intended 24 hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence to constitute “incompetent evidence” under section 25 50.42, the Legislature would not have amended the statute through 15-94 and kept the original 26 admissibility requirement. 27 Defendant cites Klinestiver v. Drug Enforcement Administration and Fonteneaux v. Shell Oil 28 Co. for the proposition that, generally, “competent evidence” is understood to mean “admissible
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss CF0138-20, People of Guam v. Taitague Page 3 of 4 1 evidence.” Mot. at 7; 606 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 289 F. App’x 695 (5th Cir. 2008). However, 2 these cases discuss “competent evidence” in a civil context, outside the realm of grand jury 3 proceedings. The Court does not find Defendant’s cited cases persuasive. 4 Turning to the evidence presented, the Court holds “competent evidence” within the meaning 5 of section 50.42 was presented to the grand jury. All that is required under the statute is “evidence 6 that a reasonable person would rely upon in conducting his or her daily affairs.” Quidachay, 815 7 F.2d at 1313. Defendant has not presented anything which suggests that a reasonable person would 8 not rely upon statements of others in conducting his/her daily affairs, nor does Defendant present 9 any case law holding the same. Similarly, the Court finds the evidence presented to the grand jury 10 satisfies the test laid out in Quidachay.
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~P ED auP•E&~oR COURT 1 OS~ f;~Jj~ 2 2~fJ SEP -8 MI 10:27 3 CLERic OF COURT
6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, Criminal Case No. CF0138-20 8 GPD Report No. 20-05890 V. 9 DECISION AND ORDER 10 CURTIS J. TAITAGUE, DENYING DEFENDANT’S DOB: 05/02/1992 MOTION TO DISMISS 11 Defendant. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III on August 13, 2020 for 15 hearing on Defendant Curtis J. Taitague’s (“Defendant’s”) Motion to Dismiss the Indictment 16 (“Motion”). Assistant Attorney General Sean Brown represents the People, and Assistant Alternate 17 Public Defender Heather M. Zona represents Defendant. Having duly considered the parties’ briefs, 18 oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and Order and 19 DENIES Defendant’s Motion. 20 BACKGROUND 21 The Guam Police Department (“GPD”) arrested Defendant on February 25, 2020 after 22 responding to an alleged burglary in process at the Verona Resort. Magistrate’s Compl., Decl. (Feb. 23 26, 2020). The People subsequently filed a Magistrate’s Complaint, charging Defendant with ‘24 Burglary (as a Second Degree Felony), Criminal Trespass (as a Misdemeanor), and Theft (as a 25 Petty Misdemeanor). Id. at 1. 26 The following facts are undisputed. On March 5, 2020, the grand jury indicted Defendant on 27 the same charges alleged in the Magistrate’s Complaint. During the grand jury proceedings, the 28 People called GPD Officer Craig Peter Camacho Calvo to testify. Officer Calvo was not involved
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss CF0138-20, People of Guam v. Taitague Page 1 of 4 1 in the investigation of the case. The People asked Officer Calvo whether the police report, drafted 2 by another officer, contained various assertions and allegations. Officer Calvo testified for 3 approximately twelve minutes. The prosecution did not call any other witnesses. 4 Defendant filed the present Motion on July 17, 2020, asking the Court to dismiss the 5 indictment. Defendant submits a number of arguments regarding the Court’s jurisdiction to dismiss 6 the indictment and the permissibility of hearsay statements in grand jury proceedings. The People 7 opposed Defendant’s request to dismiss the Indictment, arguing the Court does not have jurisdiction 8 to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds requested and that hearsay constitutes competent 9 evidence. See Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment (“Opposition”) (July 24, 2020). 10 Defendant replied to the People’s opposition. See Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss the 11 Indictment (“Reply”) (July 28, 2020). 12 The Court held a hearing on August 13, 2020. After hearing the arguments of the parties, the 13 Court took the matter under advisement. 14 DISCUSSION 15 Defendant asserts that the hearsay statements elicited from Officer Calvo during the grand 16 jury proceeding do not constitute “competent evidence” under 8 G.C.A. § 50.42. Mot. at 7. The 17 People argue that hearsay constitutes “competent evidence” under the statute and that case law 18 interpreting the statute holds the same. Opp’n at 2. 19 Guam law requires that grand juries receive only “competent evidence.” 8 G.C.A. § 50.42. 20 Chapter 50, nor any other provision in Title 8, does not define “competent evidence.” Defendant 21 asserts that “competent evidence” must equate to “admissible evidence.” Mot. at 7. Defendant goes 22 on to explain that because hearsay is inadmissible evidence (generally), Officer’s Calvo’s recitation 23 of the police report and the statements within that police report must constitute incompetent 24 evidence in violation of the statute. The Court disagrees. 25 The Ninth Circuit in People v. Quidachay, in analyzing and interpreting 8 G.C.A. § 50.42, 26 has addressed the issue of the meaning of “competent evidence” under the statute: “If it is evidence 27 that a reasonable person would rely upon in conducting his or her daily affairs, then it is competent 28 within the meaning of the statute, regardless of whether it would be admissible at trial under the
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss CF0138-20, People of Guam v. Taitague Page 2 of 4 1 rules of evidence.” 815 F.2d 1131, 1313 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). The Quidachay court’s 2 analysis on the comparisons between the current and previous versions of 8 G.C.A. § 50.42 are 3 further instructive. 4 The former version of section 50.42 provided that “The grand jury shall receive only 5 evidence which would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal action “ The 1980 6 revision by Public Law 15-94 eliminated this requirement. The 1980 amendment, the version of 7 section 50.42 in force today, only required that the evidence be “competent,” not necessarily 8 admissible. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Guam Legislature’s amendment as intending ‘some 9 restriction on the evidence that can be presented to and relied upon by a grand jury” but not 10 requiring only admissible evidence to be presented to a grand jury. Id. Otherwise, “the Guam 11 Legislature would have accomplished nothing by its amendment of the section.” Id. In light of this 12 precedent, the Court declines to hold that “competent evidence” means “admissible evidence.” 13 Defendant asks the Court to ignore the prior federal court decisions in Quidachay and People 14 v. Garrido, 1984 WL 48828 (D. Guam App. Div., May 4, 1984), aff’d and remanded, 752 F.2d 15 1378 (9th Cir. 1985) as “poorly reasoned, unsupported in law, and wrongly decided.” Mot. at 10. 16 The Court declines to do so, as the Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Quidachay that 17 had the Guam Legislature intended “competent evidence” to mean “admissible evidence,” the 1980 18 amendment to 8 G.C.A. § 50.42 via Public Law 15-94 would have accomplished nothing. 19 Defendant further makes comparisons of section 50.42 to Guam’s preliminary hearing statute 20 under 8 G.C.A. § 45.60. At preliminary hearings, as opposed to grand jury proceedings, defendants 21 may make objections to the admissibility of evidence on any grounds that would be available at 22 trial. Id. § 45.60(a). However, comparison to Guam’s preliminary hearing statute only further 23 solidifies the People’s argument and the Court’s holding: had the Guam Legislature intended 24 hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence to constitute “incompetent evidence” under section 25 50.42, the Legislature would not have amended the statute through 15-94 and kept the original 26 admissibility requirement. 27 Defendant cites Klinestiver v. Drug Enforcement Administration and Fonteneaux v. Shell Oil 28 Co. for the proposition that, generally, “competent evidence” is understood to mean “admissible
Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss CF0138-20, People of Guam v. Taitague Page 3 of 4 1 evidence.” Mot. at 7; 606 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 289 F. App’x 695 (5th Cir. 2008). However, 2 these cases discuss “competent evidence” in a civil context, outside the realm of grand jury 3 proceedings. The Court does not find Defendant’s cited cases persuasive. 4 Turning to the evidence presented, the Court holds “competent evidence” within the meaning 5 of section 50.42 was presented to the grand jury. All that is required under the statute is “evidence 6 that a reasonable person would rely upon in conducting his or her daily affairs.” Quidachay, 815 7 F.2d at 1313. Defendant has not presented anything which suggests that a reasonable person would 8 not rely upon statements of others in conducting his/her daily affairs, nor does Defendant present 9 any case law holding the same. Similarly, the Court finds the evidence presented to the grand jury 10 satisfies the test laid out in Quidachay. Defendant acknowledges the lessened-restrictions on section 11 50.42 but asserts that “the evidence still needs some indicia of reliability.” Reply at 3. The Court 12 reiterates that the proper test is that laid out in Quidachay and finds that the evidence presented 13 meets this test. 14 Finally, Defendant asserts his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 15 of the U.S. Constitution by the People for failing to present “competent evidence” to the jury. As 16 explained, the Court does not find the evidence presented to the jury to be “incompetent evidence.” 17 Therefore, no due process violation exists here. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the 20 Indictment for failure to present “competent evidence” to the grand jury. The Court shall hold a pre 21 trial conference on September 10, 2020 at 2:00pm. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of September, 2020. 24 SERVICE VIA E-MAIL I acknowledge that an electronic 25 copy of the onginal was e-mailed to: A~ ~ 26 AL4€r,~J& ~iof~t- O~ ~~-~‘c’~-~ ç HONORABLE ALBERTO C. LAMORENA, III Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Guam 27 Dàte:ø~-O,I~me: I ~t~-~-’
28 i~ ~+~v~14~ C~2~- Deputy Clerk, ~~ehor Court of Guam
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