IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
2 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, )
3 CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0522-ll )
4 vs. )
) DECISION AND ORDER 5 JUNIOR J. SYKAP, )
)
6 Defendant. )
7
8 INTRODUCTION
9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 suppress, filed March 12, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on September 9, 2013. Assistant 11 Attorney General James L.G. Stake appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant Public 12 Defender Suresh Sampath represented the Defendant. Having considered the parties' briefs, 13 oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and Order.
14 BACKGROUND
15 Defendant is charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol based upon the 16 following alleged events. On April 26, 2011 at approximately 1:49 a.m., Guam Police Officer 17 James N. Muna observed Defendant's vehicle with rear-end damage, pulled over the car, and 18 met with Defendant. (Testimony of James N. Muna, Record Log at 2:58, September 9, 2013).
19 Officer Muna inquired whether Defendant was involved in an auto-accident. Defendant 20 answered that he had not been in an auto-accident. !d. As the Defendant spoke, Officer Muna 21 noted a strong smell of alcohol from Defendant's breath. !d. Officer Muna requested that the 22 Defendant perform a field sobriety test, and Defendant refused to perform that test. !d. At 23 approximately 1:55 a.m., Officer Muna handcuffed the Defendant, placed Defendant in the 24 caged patrol vehicle, and subsequently transported Defendant to the Tumon/Tamuning precinct.
25 !d. Defendant was informed of his arrest at approximately 2:45 a.m. !d. Defendant was never 26 informed that he was under arrest before that time. !d.
27 Prior to being informed of his arrest, Defendant was informed that he was being taken to 28
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the precinct for "further investigations" and "to take the breathalyzer." (Testimony of Junior J.
2 Sykap, Record Log at 3:06, September 9, 2013). Defendant was not informed of his Miranda 3 rights when he was placed in Officer Muna's patrol vehicle. !d. Defendant felt that he had no 4 choice but to follow Officer Muna's directions. !d. 5 It is undisputed that Defendant signed an implied consent form and completed a
6 breathalyzer test before being informed of his arrest at 2:45a.m. 7 On March 12, 2012, Defendant moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the 8 investigative detention, the refusal to take the Standardized Field Sobriety Test, and the results 9 of the breathalyzer test because he asserts: 1) Defendant's detention lasted longer than fifteen 10 (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA § 30.30; 2) no reasonable suspicion existed to stop 11 Defendant; and 3) the administration of the breathalyzer test before the formal arrest was a 12 violation of 16 GCA §1820l(b). The Government contends that Defendant was legally arrested l3 within 15 minutes of the time Officer Muna stopped Defendant, and therefore the 15 minute 14 rule of 8 GCA § 30.30 does not apply in this case. The Government further asserts that there 15 was reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant under the circumstances.
16
17 DISCUSSION
18 1. The 15-Minute Time Limit of the Stop and Frisk Act 19 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 20 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 21 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the entitled Stop and Frisk 22 Act at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40.
23
24 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states:
Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which 25 reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 26 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person.
27 \\\
Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states:
Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of 2 the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which 3 lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be compelled to answer any 4 inquiry of the peace officer. 5 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states:
6 No person shall be detained under the provisions of§ 30.10 longer than is reasonably 7 necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the place where it was first 8 effected or the immediate vicinity thereof. 9 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states:
10 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.1 0, probable cause II for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable cause for the 12 arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released. 13
14 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 15 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 16 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20 (2005). When this investigative detention reveals probable 17 cause for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40 (2005). However, "in no event 18 [shall a person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be
19 released," if no probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 & 30.40 (2005). 20 Despite the plain language of the statute, the Guam Supreme Court has found that 21 voluntary consent tolls the lapse of time accrued for purposes of the 15-minute rule. People v.
22 Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~ 15. Furthermore, the Guam Supreme Court held that "the
23 development of probable cause obviates the fifteen-minute limit imposed by Guam's Stop and 24 Frisk Act on investigative detentions that are supported by reasonable suspicion, because the 25 appearance of probable cause transforms the nature of the detention and thereby removes the 26 encounter from the strict parameters of the statute." !d. at~ 27. Therefore, when a person is 27 detained without arrest for more than 15 minutes, without voluntary consent by the detainee or
the appearance of probable cause to arrest the detainee, the Stop and Frisk statutes are violated.
2 See id at, 30. 3 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the 4 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 5 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 6 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 7 2006 Guam 12, 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 8 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 9 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 10 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 11 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 12 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. l3 Guam law defines an arrest as "an actual restraint of the person, or. .. submission to the 14 custody of the person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10 (2005). An officer must announce the 15 arrest pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful 16 arrest based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ,, 25-26, 35-36 (quoting People v. 17 Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 18 (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. !d. at ~~ 19-20 19 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)). 1 Even without physical 20 restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. !d. at ~~ 21-22 (quoting 21 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an 22 arrest and requires probable cause)). 23 In this case, Officer Muna pulled over Defendant's vehicle between approximately 1:49 24 a.m. and 1:55 a.m. A traffic stop is "unquestionably a seizure within the meaning ofthe Fourth 25 Amendment." People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ~ 26 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 26
27 1 Cf People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 ~~ 44-45; People v. Santos, 2003 Guam l ~ 51 (police custody ultimate! determined by use of physical restraint comparable to formal arrest).
· 420, 436-439 (1984)). See also People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 1 17. Defendant was 2 placed in handcuffs and placed in a caged patrol car before he was transported to the precinct 3 for further questioning. Under these circumstances, Defendant was arrested pursuant to 8 GCA 4 § 20.10 because there was an actual restraint where his movement was curtailed when he was 5 handcuffed and placed in a caged patrol vehicle. See Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 11 19-20 (finding 6 that Defendant was actually and physically restrained, and therefore arrested in accordance with 7 the definition set forth in 8 GCA § 20.10 when Defendant was placed in handcuffs). For this 8 reason, there was an arrest within the 15-minute time limit, and thus there was no violation of 9 the Stop and Frisk Act.
10 2. Reasonable Suspicion It To support an officer's investigative detention of a suspect, an officer need only have a 12 "reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged in or is about to be engaged in illegal 13 conduct." Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12140 (quoting People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 91 4). 14 The Guam Supreme Court confirmed in Taman that the language of Guam's Stop and 15 Frisk Act utilizes the same standard for reasonable suspicion that is articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 16 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Taman, 2013 Guam 22121. "Reasonable suspicion" arises in the following 17 instance: 18 [W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 19 conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 20 persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 21 makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety....
22 Taman, 2013 Guam 22121 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31).
23 In this case, Officer Muna observed Defendant's car to have sustained rear-end damage 24 significant enough to capture his attention and cause him to stop the vehicle to inquire of 25 Defendant whether he had been involved in a vehicle collision. It was reasonable for Officer 26 Muna to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, at the very least, in the form of a violation 27 of Guam Vehicle Code's vehicle safety requirements. See 16 GCA § 3201 through § 3220, inclusive ("Vehicle Equipment"). After detaining the driver, identifying himself as a police 2 officer, and making inquiries of Defendant, all of which were within the scope of the initial 3 stop, Officer Muna smelled a strong smell of alcohol from the Defendant's breath. Thus the 4 Court finds that Officer Muna possessed a valid reasonable suspicion to support his 5 investigative detention of Defendant for his possibly driving while under the influence of
6 alcohol. 7 For this reason, the motion to suppress shall not be granted for a lack of reasonable
8 suspicion to stop Defendant. 9 3. Implied Consent Statute 10 Defendant further argues that the administration of the breathalyzer test before being 11 formally informed of his arrest at 2:45 p.m. was a violation of 16 GCA § 18201(b) of Guam's 12 implied consent statute, and therefore, the breathalyzer test should be suppressed. The section
13 ofthe statute provides as follows:
14 (b) The blood or urine, or breath tests shall be administered at the request of the 15 peace officer having reasonable cause to believe the person driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways or roadways is 16 under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances only after: (1) a lawful 17 arrest, and (2) the person has been informed by a peace officer of the sanctions that may result from his or her refusal to be tested.
18 16 GCA § 1820l(b) (2005).
19 Having already found that Defendant was arrested, see supra, the Court must next 20 determine if the arrest was lawful by assessing whether there was probable cause to support the 21 arrest. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 25. 2 Under Guam law, "[t]o legally arrest ... the Government 22 must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime." People v. Mendiola, 23 1999 Guam 8 ~57 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463 24
25 2 While Defendant argues the breathalyzer may only be administered after a "formal" arrest, the Court need only
26 determine that the arrest was "lawful" per 16 GCA § l820l(b). There can be no dispute that a de facto arrest still constitutes a valid arrest, as the Guam Supreme Court holds that a failure to inform an arrestee he is arrested 27 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.35(a) does not itself warrant suppression of evidence. People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 36.
(1971)). The Guam Supreme Court has defined probable cause as follows: "[W]hether at that 2 moment the facts and circumstances within [the police officers'] knowledge and of which they 3 had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 4 that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense." Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~ 23 5 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 (1964)). "Determining the existence 6 of probable cause requires determining whether officers had reasonably trustworthy 7 infom1ation." Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 After a review of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, the Court finds that 9 there was probable cause for Officer Muna to arrest Defendant after his initial detention. In this 10 case, Officer Muna stopped Defendant due to the extent of the damage he observed to 11 Defendant's vehicle. Once Officer Muna detained Defendant, the officer noticed a strong smell 12 of alcohol emitting from Defendant's breath. Although the prosecutor failed to elicit this 13 evidence at the motion hearing, the declaration attached to the magistrate's complaint explains 14 Officer Muna also observed Defendant hold onto his vehicle to maintain his balance, and that 15 Defendant admitted to earlier drinking alcoholic beverages. Thus the evidence shows that, at 16 the time of Defendant's de facto arrest, Officer Muna had reasonably trustworthy information 17 which warranted a belief that Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence 18 of alcohol. Thus, Defendant was lawfully arrested when he was handcuffed and placed in 19 Officer Muna's patrol vehicle. For all of these reasons, the motion to suppress shall not be
20 granted. 21 CONCLUSION 22 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED.
23
24 SO ORDERED this 21-'111 day of November, 2013. 25
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26
27 HON. JAMES L. CANTO II
28 Judge, Superior Court of Guam