People v. Stott

4 N.Y. Crim. 306
CourtNew York Court of General Session of the Peace
DecidedMay 15, 1886
StatusPublished

This text of 4 N.Y. Crim. 306 (People v. Stott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of General Session of the Peace primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Stott, 4 N.Y. Crim. 306 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1886).

Opinion

The Recorder charged the jury as follows:

Gentlemen of the Jury

I ask your attention to the statute under which this indictment is framed. The statute pro-, vides as follows (Laws 1886, chapter 31):

Sec. 282. “A person who, 1. Takes, receives, employs, harbors or uses, or causes or procures to be taken, received, employed, harbored or used, a female under the age of sixteen years, for the purpose of prostitution; or, not being her husband, for the purpose of sexual intercourse, or without the consent of her father, mother, guardian or other person having legal charge of her person, for the purpose of marriage; or,.

“ 2. Inveigles or entices an unmarried female of previous chaste character into a house of ill fame, or of assignation, or elsewhere, for the purpose of prostitution or sexual intercourse; or,

“ 3. Takes or detains a female unlawfully against her will, with the intent to compel her by force, menace or duress, to marry him, or to marry any other person, or to be defiled; or,

“ 4. Being parent, guardian or other person having legal charge of the person of a female under the age of sixteen years, consents to her taking or detaining by any person for the purpose of prostitution or sexual intercourse,

“ Is guilty of abduction, and punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both.”

The indictment charges that this defendant, on the 13th day of April last, did take, receive, harbor and use a female under the age of sixteen years, for the purpose of sexual intercoursej he not- then being the husband of said female. That is the charge, briefly stated.

Although, gentlemen, there is a great deal of evidence in this case, and a considerable length of time has been taken up by it—I do not say improperly—the questions involved are very [308]*308few, in my judgment, and easily passed upon by gentlemen of intelligence who have heard the evidence.

It appears that this girl was fourteen years of age on the 17th day of February last. You have the testimony of the mother upon that point, which is entirely uncontradicted. In addition to that, you have a right, under a statute which was passed in 1884, to take into consideration, in determining the age of this girl at the time "this offense is alleged to have been committed, her appearance here upon the witness stand. The statute provides {Penal Code, § 19), “ Whenever, in any legal proceeding, it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, the child may be produced for personal inspection, to enable the magistrate, court or jury to determine the age thereby; and the court or magistrate may direct an examination by one or more physicians, whose opinion shall also be competent evidence upon the question of the age.” You have had this girl before you, and you have the right to determine, in connection with her mother’s testimony, from personal inspection, what her age was on the 13th day of April last; and if she was under the age of sixteen on that day, it is immaterial, so far as this case is concerned, whether the defendant had actual knowledge of it or not.

It is equally immaterial, gentlemen, so far as this case is concerned, except upon the question of this girl’s credibility, whether she was or was not, prior to the 13th day of April last, a person of unchaste character. Under this statute, it is just as much a crime to take a female of previous unchaste character, under the age of sixteen years, either for the purpose of prostitution, or for the purpose of sexual intercourse; and, under this statute, it is also immaterial whether the girl was taken ior either of those purposes, with or without the consent of her parents, or of the person having legal custody of her person The object of the statute is very apparent The legislature intended to protect females, under the age of sixteen years, from prostitution, or from lending themselves for purposes of sexual intercourse. That is clearly the intention of the legislature, and it is equally clear that the legislature intended to punish, and does punish, as a crime, any person who violates, employs, harbors or uses a female under the age of sixteen, either for the [309]*309purpose of prostitution, or for the purpose of sexual intercourse. That is the law of this State; and it is your duty, if the evidence in this case clearly satisfies you, beyond all reasonable doubt, that this defendant has violated the provisions of this statute, to say so.

There are two questions in this case which you will be called upon to respond to, and, as you respond to those questions, you will have to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

First. Did this defendant, on the 13th day of April last, receive, harbor and use this girl, Huida Wissler, for the purpose of sexual intercourse ? If you answer that question, upon the evidence in the case, in the affirmative, the next question will be:

Second. Was she a female, at that time, under the age of sixteen years ?

It is conceded in this case, and proved, that the defendant was not. at that time, the husband of the said Huida Wissler. So that third question, which would otherwise arise in this -case, does not do so, because the fact is conceded. Therefore, if you answer both of those questions in the affirmative, this defendant is guilty under this indictment

The evidence is necessarily disgusting, and much of it has emanated from witnesses of impure and unchaste character. I allude to the testimony of the complainant herself, and the testimony of Kitty Campbell. There can be no question in this case that both of them are girls of unchaste character. Their demeanor on the stand, and their language, all indicate that that is so; and, notwithstanding that fact, if this girl was under the age of sixteen years, and the defendant took, harbored, received or used her for the purpose of prostitution or sexual intercourse, he is just as guilty as though she had been one of the most virtuous girls.

The law very properly provides, in cases of this character (Penal Code, % 283), that no conviction can be had upon the testimony of the female abducted, compelled or defiled, unsupported by other evidence. The meaning of that section of the statute is, if her evidence—I mean the evidence of Huida Wiss[310]*310ler—stood alone and unsupported by other evidence, you could not convict this defendant under this indictment. The law requires that her evidence should be supported by the evidence of other witnesses. It does not necessarily follow that the law requires that the supporting evidence must emanate from persons of previously chaste or unspotted character; but the law does require that the testimony of this girl must be-supported, in every material particular, by evidence that is satisfactory to the jury.

How, did this defendant, on the 18th day of April last, take, receive, harbor or use this girl, for the purpose of sexual intercourse ? Both the complainant and the defendant substantially agree as to the manner in which they met for the first time. He was within a few feet of the house in which the girl resided with her mother. She was standing either by or in the hallway leading into the house in which she resided. She was' crying, and by that means undoubtedly attracted the attention of this defendant, because he admits that she did. She told him, in answer to his questions, what she was crying for.

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Related

The People v. . Plath
3 N.E. 790 (New York Court of Appeals, 1885)
Remsen v. . the People
43 N.Y. 6 (New York Court of Appeals, 1870)

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Bluebook (online)
4 N.Y. Crim. 306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-stott-nygensess-1886.