People v. Stiegler

2021 IL App (1st) 200880-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 1, 2021
• Docket: 1-20-0880
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2021 IL App (1st) 200880-U

No. 1-20-0880

Order filed June 1, 2021.

Second Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 184002058 ) SUSAN STIEGLER, ) The Honorable ) Kristyna C. Ryan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass to state supported land is affirmed over her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Susan Stiegler was found guilty of criminal trespass to

state supported land and sentenced to two years of conditional discharge. 1 On appeal, defendant

1 The trial court reduced defendant’s term of conditional discharge to one year after she filed her notice of appeal, but the record on appeal does not reflect why. No. 1-20-0880

contends her conviction should be reversed where the State failed to establish she received notice

her entry into a Berwyn Police Department parking lot was prohibited, failed to establish she acted

knowingly, and failed to establish she interfered with another person’s use or enjoyment of the

parking lot. We affirm.

¶3 Defendant was charged with one count of criminal trespass to state supported land (720

ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2018)), which alleged she knowingly entered an employee parking lot on

the land of the Berwyn Police Department after receiving notice from a sign that read, “Do Not

Enter No Unauthorized Vehicles” and “Police Business Only,” and that the property was supported

with State of Illinois funds.2

¶4 Berwyn police detective Carl Gray testified he was on duty on March 22, 2018. At

approximately 11:30 a.m., he went to the Berwyn police station’s parking lot for officers’ personal

vehicles in response to a radio dispatch that a person was video recording in the lot. When Gray

arrived, he saw his partner talking to defendant, whom he identified in court. Gray saw defendant

walking away from his partner holding a cell phone and a camera on a “selfie stick.” Gray and his

partner arrested defendant for criminal trespass to state supported land.

¶5 Gray transported defendant to an interview room in the police station and read her Miranda

warnings. Defendant acknowledged she saw a “Do Not Enter” sign in the parking lot, but claimed

it only applied to vehicles, not people. Defendant also stated her “hobby” was “First Amendment

auditing where she would go to police stations, public buildings where there was no trespassing

signs or public areas and to see – basically to see how far they could go before they were stopped

by police.”

2 The State withdrew one count alleging defendant violated her bond.

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¶6 Gray testified defendant filming the license plates of officers’ personal vehicles “would

place every officer who works in that building in fear for their families’ safety.” He testified

“[p]lates have been obtained before, license plates gotten.” The parking lot was also used to store

undercover police vehicles.

¶7 Gray identified photographs of the Berwyn police station as it appeared on March 22, 2018,

which the State moved into evidence. Two photographs depict a sign at a roadway leading to a

parking lot, which Gray identified as the parking lot for officers’ personal vehicles. The sign is

white with large red all-capital lettering which reads, “DO NOT ENTER,” and underneath in

smaller print, “AUTHORIZED VEHICLES ONLY.” Another photograph depicts a sign that says,

“POLICE BUSINESS ONLY.” Gray testified this sign pertained to street parking in front of the

police station.

¶8 On cross-examination, Gray testified Officer Phillip Grazzini called dispatch from his

personal vehicle regarding defendant’s presence in the parking lot. The “DO NOT

ENTER[/]AUTHORIZED VEHICLES ONLY” sign was located directly next to a driveway

leading into the parking lot. Gray testified defendant’s actions made him feel “upset” and

“threatened.”

¶9 The State moved a video recording into evidence. No witness testified about this video

recording, but the parties stipulated to its foundation and admissibility. This video recording

appears to have been taken by defendant, who identifies herself as “Chi-Town Sue.” Defendant

walks into the lobby of the Berwyn police station and remains there for approximately five minutes

but does not interact with anyone. During that time, she records various signs and notices, as well

as commemorative items and a “Blue Lives Matter” display. She then walks outside and says she

is going “in the back where they park.” Defendant walks down a sidewalk next to the police station

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and into a parking lot that contains both marked police vehicles and unmarked vehicles. There are

no signs near the sidewalk leading from the front of the police station to the parking lot. Defendant

focuses her camera on the license plate of almost every vehicle parked in the lot.

¶ 10 An officer approaches defendant and speaks with her. Defendant acknowledges “it says

[she] can’t drive back there,” but claims “it doesn’t say private property” and “it only says ***

[she] can’t *** come in here with a car.” Defendant walks back toward the front of the police

station and a second officer approaches. Defendant’s camera points at the sky and the sound of

handcuffs can be heard.

¶ 11 Benjamin Daish testified he was the finance director for the City of Berwyn. The Berwyn

Police Department received funding from the State of Illinois, including funding for its parking

lots.

¶ 12 Defendant moved five photographs into evidence. No witness testified about these

photographs, but the parties stipulated an investigator employed by the office of the Cook County

Public Defender took them on September 18, 2018. These photographs depict a yellow barrier

across a sidewalk leading toward a parking lot near the Berwyn police station. Affixed to the

barrier are signs that read, “Restricted Area No Unauthorized Personnel Beyond This Point” and

“No Trespassing Violators Will be Prosecuted.”

¶ 13 In closing, the State argued the “DO NOT ENTER” sign gave defendant notice she was

not permitted to enter the personal vehicle parking lot, and defendant interfered with police use of

the parking lot because she was “potentially making public private information that puts lives at

risk and the function of the police department at risk.” In response, defendant conceded she

“knowingly entered” the parking lot but contended the “DO NOT ENTER” sign applied only to

vehicles, not to people entering the parking lot on foot as defendant did. Defendant also argued

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there was no evidence her filming license plates of officers’ personal vehicles actually put anyone

at risk.

¶ 14 The court found defendant guilty of criminal trespass to state supported land. The court

concluded “there was a clear conspicuous notice forbidding entry to the lot.” The court reasoned

the video showed defendant “recording private employee vehicles and zooming in on the license

plates,” which constituted interfering with others’ use and enjoyment of the land.

¶ 15 Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which argued the State failed to prove her guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied this motion.

¶ 16 The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ conditional discharge. Defendant timely

appealed. Six months after defendant filed her notice of appeal, the court reduced her sentence to

one year of conditional discharge. The record does not reflect why.

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant contends her conviction should be reversed because the State failed

to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant argues the evidence did not

establish she received notice her entry into the parking lot was prohibited, did not establish she

acted knowingly, and did not establish her entry into the parking lot interfered with another

person’s use or enjoyment of the land.

¶ 18 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d

255, 269 (2006). The trier of fact has the responsibility to determine the credibility of witnesses

and the weight to be given their testimony, as well as to resolve any conflicts in the evidence and

to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id. We will not reverse a defendant’s conviction

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unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable

doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011).

¶ 19 To prove defendant guilty of criminal trespass to state supported land, the State had to

establish (1) state funds supported the land in whole or in part, (2) defendant received notice

forbidding her entry, and (3) after receiving notice, defendant interfered with another person’s use

or enjoyment of the land. See 720 ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2018); People v. Quiroga, 2015 IL App

(1st) 122585, ¶ 16. The first element is not at issue in this appeal.

¶ 20 Defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence she received notice her entry into

the parking lot was prohibited. A defendant has received notice if a printed or written notice

forbidding entry to her “has been conspicuously posted or exhibited at the main entrance to the

land or the forbidden part thereof.” 720 ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2018).

¶ 21 We find the evidence established defendant received notice her entry to the Berwyn police

station personal vehicle parking lot was prohibited. The main entrance to the parking lot was

marked with an unobstructed sign written in large red all-capital letters on a white background that

stated, “DO NOT ENTER,” and beneath that, “AUTHORIZED VEHICLES ONLY.” Defendant

told Gray she saw this sign, and a reasonable factfinder could infer from the video that defendant

saw this sign, as she referenced it when speaking to the first police officer who approached her. It

is difficult to see how defendant could interpret “DO NOT ENTER” as an indication she was

allowed to enter. Moreover, defendant was not in a vehicle, much less an authorized vehicle, and

the sign stated only authorized vehicles were permitted in the parking lot. Thus, a rational

factfinder could conclude the entrance to the parking lot was conspicuously marked with a printed

notice forbidding defendant’s entry.

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¶ 22 Defendant’s reliance on Sroga v. Weiglen, 649 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2011), is unpersuasive.

Sroga was a civil rights lawsuit in which the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether police officers had

probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for criminal trespass to state supported land. Sroga, 649 F.3d

at 605-10 (“the issue is probable cause to arrest rather than proof of guilt.”). It does not support a

conclusion the evidence defendant committed criminal trespass to state supported land in this case

was insufficient. Accordingly, we find the evidence established defendant received notice she was

forbidden from entering the parking lot at issue.

¶ 23 Defendant next contends the State failed to prove she acted knowingly.

¶ 24 Section 5/21-5(a) does not provide an explicit mental state the State must establish to prove

a defendant guilty of criminal trespass to state supported land. 720 ILCS 5/21-5(a) (West 2018).

Defendant cites no case discussing the required mental state for criminal trespass to state supported

land specifically and we have found none. However, the Criminal Code of 2012 provides that if a

statute does not prescribe a particular mental state to an offense, then “any mental state defined in

Sections 4-4, 4-5, 4-6 is applicable.” 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (West 2018). Those three sections

prescribe mental states of intent, knowledge, and recklessness, respectively. 720 ILCS 5/4-4, 4-5,

4-6 (West 2018).

¶ 25 We need not decide which mental state section 5/21-5(a) prescribes. A rational factfinder

could have concluded the evidence established defendant acted either knowingly or intentionally.

Defendant told Gray her “hobby” involved going to police stations and public buildings with signs

that prohibit trespassing to see how far she could get before police stopped her. Moreover,

defendant admitted to Gray she saw the sign at the entrance to the parking lot that read “DO NOT

ENTER.” On the video recording, defendant announced her intention to enter the lot where “they,”

i.e., police officers, parked their cars. She referenced the sign prohibiting entry into the parking lot

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when she was speaking with Gray and his partner. Accepting defendant’s argument on this point

would essentially require us to find defendant entered the parking lot by accident, which strains

credulity. Thus, we find the evidence sufficiently established defendant’s culpable mental state.

¶ 26 Finally, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing her conduct

interfered with anyone’s use or enjoyment of the parking lot. She concedes she filmed license

plates of vehicles in the parking lot but contends “there was no actual evidence that the license

plates that were recorded were officers’ private vehicles.”

¶ 27 A defendant interferes with the use or enjoyment of land when she engages in the “ ‘kind

of conduct which by its nature tends to hinder, disrupt or obstruct the orderly function of the official

enterprise being carried on in the building or on the land.’ ” Quiroga, 2015 IL App (1st) 122585,

¶ 18 (quoting People v. Holtzman, 10 Ill. App. 3d 528, 529-30 (1973)).

¶ 28 We find the evidence established the interference element of criminal trespass to state

supported land. Defendant’s behavior prompted a complaint from Officer Grazzini, who was in

his personal vehicle, to the Berwyn dispatcher. Defendant’s conduct also required two Berwyn

detectives, Gray and his partner, to spend time arresting and interviewing her rather than handling

other duties.

¶ 29 Moreover, the video established defendant filmed the license plates of vehicles in the

parking lot. Gray testified the parking lot was for the personal vehicles of police personnel, so it is

reasonable to infer defendant filmed the license plates of police officers’ personal vehicles. A

reasonable factfinder could conclude defendant’s conduct would make Berwyn police officers

uncomfortable parking their personal vehicles in the lot, which would make it more difficult for

them to travel to and from work. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence

established defendant disrupted Berwyn Police Department personnel.

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¶ 30 Defendant contends Gray’s testimony she jeopardized officer safety because “[p]lates have

been obtained before, license plates gotten” was inadmissible hearsay. We express no opinion as

to whether this testimony was hearsay. Defendant did not object to this testimony as hearsay at

trial; thus, she has forfeited this argument on appeal. See Guski v. Raja, 409 Ill. App. 3d 686, 695

(2011) (failure to object contemporaneously to allegedly improper testimony results in forfeiture

on appeal).

¶ 31 The cases defendant cites are distinguishable and do not warrant reversal of her

conviction. 3 See, e.g., Quiroga, 2015 IL App (1st) 122585, ¶ 21 (school principal saw parent

approaching other parents on the playground but did not know what he was doing); Holtzman, 10

Ill. App. 3d at 530 (1973) (university student solicited signatures for a petition in a cafeteria and

lobby); People v. Duda, 84 Ill. 2d 406, 412-13 (1981) (protestors held demonstration outside

Illinois capitol building on a holiday weekend Sunday, when the building was closed and no state

employees were interfered with). Accordingly, we find the State proved the interference element

of criminal trespass to state supported land beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

3 Sroga, which defendant claims supports her argument with respect to the notice element, undermines her argument with respect to the interference element. The Seventh Circuit held police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for criminal trespass to state supported land because he entered a police station parking lot and was “peering into police cars and [pestered] the officer whom he found sitting in her police car.” Sroga, 649 F.3d at 609.

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