People v. Stewart

2026 IL App (2d) 240641-U

Opinion

2026 IL App (2d) 240641-U No. 2-24-0641 Order filed March 3, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ZANZIBAH T. STEWART, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable John A. Barsanti, Judge, Presiding. No. 20-CF-2166

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) In prosecution for aggravated criminal sexual assault, the State proved that defendant displayed a dangerous weapon (a knife) while committing the sexual assaults, even though the knife might not have been in the room at the precise time the assaults occurred. (2) Remand was not necessary because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Zanzibah T. Stewart,

was convicted of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(1)

(West 2018)) and one count of aggravated unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3.1(a)). Defendant argues

on appeal that the aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions should be reduced to criminal

sexual assault because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charged aggravating

factor that enhanced criminal sexual assault to aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant also argues that the case must be remanded for the trial court to inquire into allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel that appeared in a document defendant filed pro se in the trial court. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The case proceeded to trial on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, three

counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.20(a)(1)), and a single count of aggravated unlawful

restraint.

¶5 At trial, T.S. testified that she had been romantically involved with defendant and that they

had lived together for five to seven years. On November 8, 2020, the date of the charged offenses,

defendant and T.S. lived in a house on Fairwood Drive in Elgin. Another woman, M.V., lived with

them and had her own bedroom. According to T.S., the front door to the house led to the living

room, but there was a “cutout” into the kitchen. A hallway led to the basement stairway, the garage,

and the bedroom that T.S. and defendant shared. T.S. testified that on the date in question, she

woke up and went to the living room. M.V. was not at home. Defendant was watching television

in the living room. He and T.S. engaged in a casual conversation, but at some point, defendant

stopped speaking and did not respond to T.S. Defendant then walked into the kitchen and started

sharpening a knife. T.S. was sitting at the kitchen table. Defendant tossed the knife on the table

and smoked marijuana. Defendant went back to the living room and started pacing. At some point,

he leaned against the hallway wall and slid to the floor. Although T.S. was afraid, she went to

comfort defendant. He told her not to touch him.

¶6 Defendant stood up and walked toward the part of the hallway near the kitchen. T.S. had

her back against the wall, and defendant pressed his forehead forcefully against hers. He then

walked back into the kitchen and said, “ ‘Zee is asleep, you’re talking to his shadow.’ ” T.S.

-2- explained that “Zee” was defendant’s nickname. Defendant flicked T.S.’s glasses off of her nose

with his finger and then flicked her nose. He told her that if she helped him “locate some targets

and lure them in for him,” no harm would come to her or her family. Defendant retrieved the knife

and used it to “chop[ ]” a drinking cup, splitting it and causing its contents to splatter. While

defendant was wielding the knife, T.S. “fe[lt] like [she was] going to get hurt.” Defendant flicked

T.S.’s robe open with the knife and told her to take it off. She complied. She had nothing on under

the robe. Still holding the knife, defendant told T.S. to follow him down the stairs to the basement.

¶7 In the basement, defendant told T.S. to squat on a folding chair, facing its back, and defecate

onto the floor. She tried but was unable. While holding the knife, defendant told T.S. to follow

him upstairs. Once upstairs, defendant walked toward the bedroom but returned to the kitchen and

said that T.S. was “going to be late,” which she understood to mean that she was going to be late

for work. T.S. was scheduled to work that afternoon.

¶8 Defendant then proceeded to the bedroom. T.S. followed him. She was “shaking and ***

afraid.” Defendant asked her if she was afraid and if she thought he would hurt her. She nodded

her head. Defendant replied, “[O]h, no.” He added, “That’s some human pussy s***. I’m much

worse.” Defendant put a towel on the floor and then had T.S. lie on it on her back. Defendant

undressed. Totally nude, he pinned T.S. down and placed his “rear” on her face and defecated. He

told her to lick his anus, which she did. Defendant then got up, put his penis in T.S.’s mouth, and

urinated. Defendant and T.S. then went into the bathroom. Defendant took a shower, and T.S.

started scrubbing her mouth with a toothbrush and also scrubbing her face. Defendant told her to

get into the shower, and she complied. After washing off defendant’s feces, she returned to the

bedroom to get dressed for work. When she put her panties on, defendant grabbed her arm, bent

her over the bed, and placed his penis in her vagina. Defendant then left. T.S. took another shower

-3- and got dressed. She was afraid to go to the police, so she went to work. However, she left work

early and met with M.V. Together, they went to the police station and later to a hospital, where a

sexual assault examination was performed.

¶9 Defendant testified that on November 7, 2020, he and T.S. agreed to create a “scat” video,

which he described as a video of sexual activity involving feces and urine. They planned to earn

money by uploading the video to a pornographic website. Defendant awoke on November 8, 2020,

between 2:30 a.m. and 2:45 a.m. T.S. was awake and using her phone beneath the blanket.

Defendant went to the living room and watched the movie “Hook,” which was about Peter Pan as

an adult. In defendant’s favorite scene from the movie, a character throws a coconut at Peter Pan,

who grabs a knife or a sword and slices the coconut in half. Defendant tried to reenact the scene

with a kitchen knife and some pieces of fruit. Later, he went to paint in his “meditation room.”

¶ 10 T.S. woke up and emerged from the bedroom between 11 a.m. and noon. Defendant kissed

her, and they started talking. Defendant asked T.S. why she was on the phone in the early morning

hours. Defendant was concerned that she was cheating on him. T.S. became quiet, and defendant

began to worry that his suspicions were correct. However, defendant tried to “brush it off.”

Defendant showed T.S. the knife trick he had been practicing earlier. He tossed an already-

damaged cup into the air and “chopped” it with the knife “to try to imitate what [he had] seen in

the movie.” T.S. did not seem impressed and appeared to have something on her mind. Defendant

testified that he did not threaten T.S. with the knife; he was just acting “goofy.” When he finished

reenacting the movie scene, he placed the knife on the kitchen counter and went into the living

room.

-4- ¶ 11 T.S. followed defendant into the living room and showed him some texts on her phone.

The texts reinforced his belief that T.S. was cheating on him. He lay down on the floor in the

hallway. T.S. tried to place a pillow under defendant’s head, but he told her not to touch him.

¶ 12 Eventually, defendant decided that he had been overreacting. He got up and sat at the

kitchen table. T.S. joined him, and they conversed. He asked if she was still interested in creating

a scat video. T.S. said that she was. Defendant was not holding the knife at this time. They went

down to the basement, but defendant went back to the kitchen, retrieved the knife, and returned to

the basement. He testified that the knife was going to be used as a prop in the video. He also got

a T-shirt bearing a vulgar slogan about one of the candidates in the recent presidential election. He

did not hold the knife up to T.S. and did not use it to flick open her robe. T.S. undressed, and

defendant asked her to stand over the shirt and defecate on it while he recorded the video. When

he noticed the tattoo on her foot, he stopped recording because he did not want any identifying

features on the video. They tried to record the video again, but defendant stopped the recording

when T.S. spoke. Defendant did not want her voice (which could have been used to identify her)

on the recording.

¶ 13 After the second attempt, they abandoned the project and went upstairs. Defendant left the

knife in the basement. Once upstairs, they started kissing, and defendant asked T.S. if she wanted

to engage in “scat play.” She agreed. They went into their bedroom, and T.S. lay down on a towel.

Defendant undressed and straddled T.S., who began to “orally perform” on defendant’s “anal area.”

With T.S.’s permission, defendant then defecated onto her face. After T.S. wiped her face,

defendant placed his penis in her mouth. While T.S. performed oral sex on defendant, he urinated

a little bit. He asked if T.S. was okay, and she indicated that she was. They then went into the

bathroom and took a shower, during which defendant performed oral sex on T.S. After the shower,

-5- defendant checked the time. It was 3:20 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., and T.S. was due at work at either 3

p.m. or 3:30 p.m. However, they decided to have intercourse before she left.

¶ 14 On January 24, 2024, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges. Defendant filed a

timely posttrial motion, which was denied on June 5, 2024. At the June 11, 2024, sentencing

hearing, the trial court merged the criminal sexual assault convictions into the aggravated criminal

sexual assault convictions. The court then sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 2

years for aggravated unlawful restraint and 16 years for each of the three counts of aggravated

criminal sexual assault. Defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied

on September 27, 2024.

¶ 15 The record contains a handwritten document from defendant setting forth various

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the document, which was dated October 15,

2024, and filed by the circuit clerk on October 21, 2024, defendant stated, “I am taking the liberty

in Pro Se to address the Kane County 16th Judicial Circuit Court; and all parties, agents & entities

whom were involved *** in Case No. 2020CF2166, ***.” On October 22, 2024, defendant’s

attorney filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions

of aggravated criminal sexual assault and (2) the case must be remanded for an inquiry into his

pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the second argument, we

note that, in some circumstances, a decision favoring the defendant makes it unnecessary to

address other issues raised on appeal; as pertinent here, a reviewing court that orders a remand

might defer consideration of the other issues until completion of the proceedings on remand. See

e.g., People v. Wilhelm, 2025 IL App (5th) 240389-U, ¶ 56 (retaining jurisdiction of undecided

-6- claims, which the defendant could raise in a subsequent appeal if dissatisfied with the proceedings

on remand). However, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is

appropriate to address that claim, rather than defer consideration. Otherwise, if the proceedings

on remand lead to a new trial, the defendant would be exposed to a possible double jeopardy

violation. People v. Tellor, 2025 IL App (5th) 230096-U, ¶¶ 43-44. To guard against that danger,

we begin our analysis with consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence.

¶ 18 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal proceeding, “ ‘the

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Generally, “a reviewing court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of evidence or the

credibility of witnesses.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009). The testimony

of a single witness is sufficient to convict where the testimony is positive and credible, even when

contradicted by the defendant. People v. Adams, 2023 IL App (2d) 220061, ¶ 97.

¶ 19 Defendant does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to sustain verdicts of guilty of

criminal sexual assault. A person commits criminal sexual assault, as charged here, when he or

she commits an act of sexual penetration and uses force or the threat of force. 720 ILCS 5/11-

1.20(a)(1) (West 2018). T.S. testified that defendant committed three acts of penetration—having

her lick his anus, placing his penis in her mouth, and placing his penis in her vagina. A person

who commits criminal sexual assault is guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault if any of

several aggravating factors “exist during the commission of the offense.” Id. § 11-1.30(a). The

aggravating factor charged here was that defendant “display[ed] *** a dangerous weapon, other

-7- than a firearm[.]” Id. § 11-1.30(a)(1). Defendant does not dispute that the knife T.S. described

was a dangerous weapon. However, defendant argues that the evidence does not establish that he

displayed the knife “during the commission” of the three criminal sexual assaults. We disagree.

¶ 20 It has been observed that:

“[T]he ‘offense’ of criminal sexual assault is not merely sexual penetration, full

stop—it is sexual penetration plus the use or threat of force, a separate element of the

offense. The precise act of sexual penetration occurs at a fixed moment (or moments) in

time. ***.

The use or threat of force, on the other hand, does not occur solely at the precise

time of sexual penetration. To be sure, the use or threat of force may continue during the

sexual penetration—it usually does—but that is not when the use or threat of force begins.

The use of force occurs ‘when the accused overcomes the victim by use of superior

strength or size, physical restraint, or physical confinement’ [Citation.] By definition, that

force will precede the act of sexual penetration by at least some amount of time—seconds,

minutes, whatever amount of time it takes to ‘overcome’ the victim.

So, too, with the ‘threat of force,’ which occurs, in relevant part, ‘when the accused

threatens to use force or violence on the victim ***, and the victim under the circumstances

reasonably believes that the accused has the ability to execute that threat.’ [Citation.] It is

so obvious that it hardly requires saying: A threat of force precedes the sexual penetration

by some amount of time; it lingers over the victim, who is subdued precisely because the

victim has a reasonable belief that the accused ‘has the ability to execute that threat’ of

force. [Citation.]

-8- The point being, the ‘offense’ of criminal sexual assault does not begin and end at

the fixed point in time of the sexual penetration. It begins when the offender first uses

force or the threat of force along the way toward ultimately accomplishing sexual

penetration. So when the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute provides for the

aggravation of the crime based on the ‘display[ ], threat[ ] to use, or use[ ]’ of a dangerous

weapon ‘during the commission of the offense,’ the phrase ‘during the commission of the

offense’ must include the period of time in which the offender used or threatened force.

[Citation.] Any other reading would ignore one of the elements of criminal sexual assault

and focus exclusively on the other, sexual penetration.

So we categorically reject [the] defendant’s claim that he could not have been guilty

of aggravated criminal sexual assault unless he displayed the knife at the precise moment

of sexual penetration.” (Emphases in original.) People v. Smith, 2019 IL App (1st) 161246,

¶¶ 28-33.

¶ 21 In light of these principles, it is clear that defendant’s display of a dangerous weapon

occurred “during the commission” of the criminal sexual assaults in the bedroom. Before the

sexual assaults occurred, defendant took a knife, flicked open T.S.’s robe, and told her to take off

the robe. He then told her to follow him down into the basement. There, while still holding the

knife, he told her to defecate. Afterward, knife still in hand, he told her to follow him upstairs. At

that point, if not earlier, defendant was clearly threatening the use of force, for purposes of the

predicate offense of criminal sexual assault. To be sure, the testimony is unclear as to the knife’s

whereabouts during the sexual assaults. Defendant testified that he left the knife in the basement

while he and T.S. went upstairs and engaged in consensual sexual activity. T.S. did not comment

on the presence of the knife when she testified about the assaults. But even if defendant did not

-9- bring the knife upstairs, the jury could reasonably conclude that the threat of force (which began

no later than when defendant, while armed with a knife, told the victim to follow him upstairs)

“lingered over” the victim as defendant engaged in three acts of sexual penetration with her on the

main floor.

¶ 22 Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Smith and a similar case, People v. Streater, 2023 IL

App (1st) 220640, is unpersuasive. In Smith, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of

aggravated criminal sexual assault. Smith, 2019 IL App (1st) 161246, ¶ 1. The State presented

evidence that the defendant entered the bedroom of his former girlfriend, S.N., while she was

sleeping. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9. He had a knife in one hand and a roll of duct tape in the other. Id. ¶ 9. The

defendant attempted to restrain S.N. with the duct tape and, in doing so, put the knife down. Id.

¶ 10. He was unable to tape her hands, but he held both of her wrists in one hand while he sexually

assaulted her. Id. ¶ 11. He left the room but returned later with the knife and duct tape and sexually

assaulted her a second time. Id. ¶ 13. The Smith court rejected the defendant’s argument that,

because he was not holding or displaying the knife at the precise moment of each sexual assault,

the State failed to prove that he displayed a dangerous weapon during the commission of those

offenses. Id. ¶¶ 24, 33.

¶ 23 In Streater, the defendant, who was holding a baseball bat, dragged the victim into the front

seat of his car and drove away. Streater, 2023 IL App (1st) 220640, ¶ 13. Before driving off, the

defendant put the baseball bat in the back seat of the car. Id. He stopped the car in an alley, threw

the victim into the back seat, climbed over after her, and sexually assaulted her there while the bat

lay nearby; neither she nor the defendant attempted to grab it. Id. ¶ 14. Citing Smith, the Streater

court rejected the defendant’s argument that, because the victim did not testify that the defendant

- 10 - touched the bat after forcing the victim into his car, the State failed to prove that he displayed a

dangerous weapon during the commission of the sexual assault. Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 53.

¶ 24 Defendant argues that, unlike the defendants in Smith and Streater, he “did not display the

knife concurrently with any use of or threat of force intended to accomplish the acts of sexual

penetration.” As discussed, that is untrue. Defendant also argues that, unlike the defendants in

those cases, he abandoned the knife long before he engaged in any acts of sexual penetration. But

while defendant testified that he left the knife in the basement, it is not clear that any significant

amount of time elapsed from that point until he engaged in the acts of penetration. In any event,

so long as the knife was displayed at some point during the commission of the offenses (as we

have concluded it was), it makes no difference when he abandoned the knife. We find nothing to

suggest that the evidence of the proximity of a weapon throughout the commission of the offenses

in Smith and Streater was essential to their outcomes. Rather, in both cases, the court was clear

that the initial display of the knife or bat was sufficient to satisfy the “dangerous weapon”

aggravating factor. See Smith, 2019 IL App (1st) 161246, ¶ 36 (noting that the knife was nearby

during the assaults, but also noting, alternatively, that “the requirement that the knife be displayed

‘during the commission of the offense’ does not require that it be displayed at all times during its

commission.” (Emphasis in original.)); Streater, 2023 IL App (1st) 220640, ¶ 54 (“In this

circumstance, a rational trier of fact could also find that the presence of the bat in the back seat a

short time after the bat was used to force her into the car further constituted a display of a dangerous

weapon during the commission of the criminal sexual assault.” (Emphasis added.))

¶ 25 We note that a single threat of force could be a common element of all three criminal sexual

assaults. See People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶¶ 17-19 (multiple convictions are permissible

when a single physical act is a common element of multiple offenses that require proof of

- 11 - additional acts). Because all three offenses began with the threat of force that occurred no later

than the point when defendant, while armed with a knife, told the victim to follow him upstairs

from the basement, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant displayed the knife

during the commission of all three offenses. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions of aggravated criminal sexual assault.

¶ 26 We next consider whether this case must be remanded for the trial court to inquire into the

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel outlined in the document that defendant filed pro se

in the trial court. In People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 189 (1984), our supreme court held that a

defendant who files a pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is entitled to new counsel

to represent him in connection with the claim. The supreme court later modified the rule, holding

that the trial court should conduct a preliminary inquiry and appoint new counsel if the pro se

allegations show possible neglect of the case. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29.

¶ 27 The State argues that “the trial court did not err by not conducting a Krankel hearing

because it did not have jurisdiction to do so once the notice of appeal was filed. Therefore, this

case should not be remanded for a Krankel inquiry.” The State cites, inter alia, People v. Darr,

2018 IL App (3d) 150562, ¶ 87, where, like here, the defendant sought a remand for a Krankel

hearing. In Darr, the court stated that the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance

of counsel and his notice of appeal were filed “contemporaneously.” Id. ¶ 93. In fact, they were

all part of the same document (id. ¶¶ 41, 93), so it is more accurate to say that they were filed

simultaneously. The Darr court held that because the notice of appeal divested the trial court of

jurisdiction, any ruling it entered based on its Krankel inquiry would be void. Id. ¶ 93. Under

those circumstances, the Darr court refused to remand the case for a Krankel inquiry. Id. ¶ 99. In

- 12 - People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 220616-U, ¶¶ 29-32, an unpublished decision that the State

cites as persuasive authority, the court followed Darr under essentially identical circumstances.

¶ 28 This case, however, presents slightly different circumstances from Darr and Inman.

Defendant filed his pro se assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel before the notice of

appeal, but after the trial court denied his motion to reconsider his sentence. Thus, because that

motion was denied before he asserted his ineffective assistance claims and his claims were filed

more than 30 days after judgment, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to consider his claims.

¶ 29 In reaching this conclusion, we find instructive People v. Orahim, 2019 IL App (2d)

170257. In that case, the defendant timely filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the

trial court denied. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.

The trial court denied the second motion a few months later and the defendant appealed. Id. We

held that the trial court’s jurisdiction lapsed after it ruled on the defendant’s first motion, and

therefore it did not have jurisdiction to consider the second motion. Id. ¶ 5. Crucial to this holding

was the fact that the defendant filed his second motion more than 30 days after the judgment. Id.

¶ 7. Consequentially, we lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal since the notice of appeal was

not timely filed. Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 30 Here, defendant was sentenced on June 11, 2024. He filed his motion to reconsider on June

28, 2024, which was denied on September 27, 2024. Defendant then filed his pro se assertions of

ineffective assistance on October 21, 2024, one day before the notice of appeal was filed through

counsel on October 22, 2024. Although we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the

notice of appeal was timely filed, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the claims of

ineffective assistance because defendant filed his claims after the trial court denied his motion to

- 13 - reconsider and more than 30 days after judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in not

holding a Krankel hearing and we need not remand for such a hearing.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

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