NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2020 IL App (3d) 190166-U
Order filed July 22, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-19-0166 v. ) Circuit Nos. 17-DT-1334 ) 17-TR-79074 ) JENNIFER STERNAL, ) Honorable ) Cory D. Lund, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Carter and McDade concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The circuit court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence where the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to being advised of her Miranda rights; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s request to conduct recross-examination.
¶2 The State charged the defendant, Jennifer Sternal, with driving while under the influence
of alcohol (DUI). The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the circuit court
granted following a hearing. The State appeals from that judgment. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 After being charged with DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)), the defendant
filed a motion to suppress evidence. The motion alleged that the defendant had been seized as
contemplated by the fourth amendment and that said seizure was unsupported by a warrant or
probable cause. Specifically, the defendant alleged that she was told to enter the backseat of a
state trooper’s car, creating circumstances in which no reasonable person would have felt free to
terminate the encounter. The motion sought to suppress evidence in the form of verbal
statements made by the defendant following the alleged seizure.
¶5 At the hearing on the defendant’s motion, Trooper Kyle Klingen testified that at
approximately 10:37 on the night of November 25, 2017, he was dispatched to Interstate 55 in
the area of River Road on a report of a vehicle in the ditch. Klingen proceeded southbound on
Interstate 55 and exited on River Road. As he exited, he saw the defendant walking on the ramp
from northbound Interstate 55 to River Road. He activated his emergency lights, at which point
he noticed the defendant begin to jog up the ramp.
¶6 Klingen arrived at the defendant’s location after she had arrived at River Road. Klingen
exited his vehicle and asked, “what was going on.” The defendant explained that she had been
drinking, had gotten into an argument with her boyfriend, and was kicked out of his car. Klingen
noted that they were in “a very rural area with nothing around,” so he assumed the defendant was
coming from the reported car in a ditch. Klingen asked the defendant questions about the car in
the ditch. She denied knowing anything about the car. When Klingen asked whether the car was
registered to her, the defendant replied, “I don’t think so.”
¶7 Klingen testified that he was wearing his uniform and his squad car was fully marked. He
was standing just outside his car when speaking with the defendant. Klingen testified that he
2 “asked [the defendant] to have a seat in” his car, but later conceded he could not recall whether
he asked her or told her. Klingen testified that he wanted the defendant to be in the squad car
because he suspected she was involved with the car in the ditch and had observed the odor of
alcoholic beverages on her breath, as well as glassy and bloodshot eyes and her admission to
consuming alcohol. Klingen stated that when the defendant entered his car, “[s]he had been
detained at that time.” He added: “[S]he was not free to leave at that point.” Klingen then drove
his car down the ramp to the location of the car in the ditch.
¶8 Klingen asked the defendant a number of questions while she was in his squad car. After
Klingen determined that the car was registered to the defendant, he asked her “to be a little bit
more honest” with him. The defendant then provided him with more information.
¶9 On cross-examination, Klingen testified that the general area in which he stopped the
defendant consisted primarily of farmland and woods. The prosecutor then asked Klingen a
series of questions relating to the defendant’s explanation that she had been a passenger in her
boyfriend’s car:
“[THE STATE]: And did she tell you her boyfriend’s name?
[KLINGEN]: No, she did not.
Q. Was anybody else on the scene outside of the vehicle?
A. No.
Q. Did anybody drive by and say, ‘Hey, I just dropped off my girlfriend’?
Q. And did you ever come in contact with the defendant’s boyfriend that
evening?
A. No, I did not.”
3 Klingen testified that while the defendant was in the squad car, she could have opened the front
door. She was not under arrest and not placed in handcuffs. She never indicated that she did not
wish to be in the car. Klingen testified that after he established that the car in the ditch was
registered to the defendant, he confronted her with that information. The defendant then admitted
to Klingen that “she was a little too drunk when she left the bar and she was trying to pull over to
call her mom.”
¶ 10 On redirect examination, Klingen testified that the defendant was not free to leave the
scene when he initially spoke with her, as he suspected she was involved with the car in the
ditch. He reiterated that the defendant was detained when she was in his squad car. Klingen
confirmed that the defendant “would have gotten in trouble” if she had attempted to open the
squad car door while she was in it. Klingen testified that the events in question occurred between
10:30 and 11 p.m. Klingen testified that the ramp area on which he spoke to the defendant was
“lit” such that he could see “decently well.” He agreed that there was foliage in the area, as well
as hills and guardrails, and that he did not search behind those things. Finally, Klingen testified
that the defendant did not admit to driving the car during their conversation on River Road, but
only admitted as much “later on.”
¶ 11 At the conclusion of redirect examination, defense counsel requested that the video
recording from Klingen’s dashboard camera be played. The following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: Then the trooper is done?
[THE STATE]: I do have one or two questions.
THE COURT: Is the trooper done—
[THE STATE]: No.
THE COURT: On redirect?
4 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay, what questions do you have that you could not have
asked on cross exam?
[THE STATE]: It is in response to [defense counsel’s] redirect. It is very
short.
THE COURT: Time doesn’t matter. No, I am not going to let you ask any
more questions.
[THE STATE]: Okay.
THE COURT: You have had your cross exam.”
¶ 12 The dashcam recording was then played in court. The video shows Klingen stop his
squad car and walk up to the defendant as she sits on a guard rail. Klingen immediately accuses
the defendant of driving the car in the ditch. The defendant insists that she had been a passenger
in her boyfriend’s car. Approximately three minutes into the encounter, Klingen tells the
defendant: “I’m going to have you come over here with me real quick, alright? We’re just going
to have a seat in my car, alright?” Klingen and the defendant walk toward the squad car and out
of the view of the camera. Klingen tells the defendant that he will clear off a seat in the car for
her. After some time, Klingen tells the defendant: “Go ahead and have a seat right back there for
me.” Klingen next asks the defendant: “How come you’re crying?” The defendant responds:
“Because I’ve had the worst luck lately. You seem like such a good guy and I know you’re just
looking out for everybody.” Klingen then begins driving. As Klingen approaches the exit ramp,
he asks: “You were coming off the ramp here?” Upon arriving at the car in the ditch, Klingen
asserts that the car belongs to the defendant, and then asks her: “Do you want to start being a
little bit more honest with me about what happened tonight?” The defendant then explains that
5 she realized after leaving a bar that she was “a little bit too drunk” and tried to pull over to call
her mother.
¶ 13 The defendant testified that she felt that she “had to” get into Klingen’s squad car. She
did not feel free to leave, adding that she would have kept walking if she believed that was an
option.
¶ 14 Following the defendant’s testimony, the State moved for a directed finding. When the
court denied that motion, the State called Klingen in its case-in-chief. Klingen’s testimony for
the State was largely similar to that provided earlier. The State asked again whether Klingen had
seen any other pedestrians or people in the vicinity of the car in the ditch. Klingen responded in
the negative, and the State did not ask any further questions regarding his search for other
people. The State did not ask Klingen about the lighting or topography in the area.
¶ 15 Following the close of evidence, defense counsel argued that Klingen had seized the
defendant illegally and had elicited incriminating responses while she was in custody. Defense
counsel argued that the defendant had not been free to leave. The State insisted that the
encounter had been a proper Terry stop from its inception. After arguments, the court asked each
party to provide supplementary case law, and it set a date for ruling.
¶ 16 Five days later, the court issued an order granting the defendant’s motion and
“suppressing all ev[idence] obtained after Trooper Klingen requested the Defenda[nt] sit in his
squad car.” The State filed a notice of appeal and a certificate of substantial impairment.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in granting the defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence. Specifically, the State contends that the defendant was not subject to fourth
amendment seizure when she was told to sit in Klingen’s squad car because her liberty was not
6 restrained. Alternatively, the State maintains that any seizure was justified by Klingen’s
reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated. The State
also argues that the court erred in denying its motion for a directed finding. Finally, the State
argues that the court abused its discretion in denying its request for recross-examination of
Klingen.
¶ 19 The defendant, meanwhile, concedes that her initial seizure was justified under the
community caretaking function, and that the stop was lawfully extended into an investigatory
detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 1 In short, the defendant admits that “there was
no fourth amendment violation in this case.” Instead, the defendant argues that we should affirm
the circuit court’s suppression ruling because she was subjected to a custodial interrogation while
in Klingen’s squad car without being advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
¶ 20 The State devotes nearly the entirety of its reply brief to an argument that the defendant’s
position on appeal is improper. First, the State argues that the defendant did not “adequately
preserve[ ] this issue for appeal.” The State points out that the defendant did not raise Miranda
grounds in her motion to suppress. It also asserts that defense counsel did not sufficiently raise
Miranda grounds in his closing argument, arguing that defense “counsel merely flung Miranda
like the proverbial mud on the wall and hoped it would stick.”
¶ 21 The State’s argument is irrelevant. It is quite well-settled that a reviewing court “may
affirm a trial court’s judgment on any grounds which the record supports even if those grounds
1 Curiously, the State spends a significant portion of its reply brief disputing the defendant’s concession, continuing to argue that the defendant was not seized at all. However, as the defendant concedes to the legality of every stage of the stop under the fourth amendment, there is no reason for this court to consider the precise grounds on which the stop was justified.
7 were not argued by the parties.” In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 74; see also
People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994) (“The question before a reviewing court is the
correctness of the result reached by the lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning upon
which that result was reached.”). Even in this particular context, our supreme court has made
clear that “a criminal defendant may rely on an alternative legal argument in support of an order
suppressing evidence,” going so far as to point out that the same rule applies at the federal level
as well. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 130 (2003).
¶ 22 In sum, this court is free to contemplate any potential Miranda claims, and consider
whether the circuit court’s suppression order may be affirmed on such grounds. We note that the
State’s substantive argument on that issue is limited. The State asserts in its reply that this court
should reject the defendant’s claim “where the facts demonstrate [the defendant] was not placed
into custody until Trooper Klingen actually arrested her following the completion of his
investigation.” The State’s single-sentence argument is unsupported by legal citation.
¶ 23 A. Miranda
¶ 24 In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a set of
prophylactic warnings that a police officer must provide to a suspect prior to conducting a
“custodial interrogation.” The Miranda warnings assure that any inculpatory statement made by
an individual held in custody is not simply the product of “ ‘the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings.’ ” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661 (2004) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 458). Where an individual is subject to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of the
prescribed warnings, the prosecution may not use that individual’s statements at trial. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 492.
8 ¶ 25 In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), the Supreme Court held that “the
term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police *** that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.” In the present case, the State does not dispute that
the defendant was subjected to an interrogation while in Klingen’s squad car. After the defendant
entered the car, Klingen asked her why she was crying. This question was a blatant attempt to
induce the defendant to incriminate herself. Later, while parked on the exit ramp, Klingen
broadly asked the defendant if she would like to be more honest—another attempt to adduce
incriminating details. We conclude that the defendant was subjected to an interrogation while in
Klingen’s squad car.
¶ 26 In considering whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, we ask if, given
the circumstances involved, “a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
Circumstances relevant to that analysis include:
“(1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning; (2) the
number of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or
absence of family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest
procedure, such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or
fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of
questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.”
People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 150 (2008).
¶ 27 Many of these factors indicate that the defendant was placed in custody. In the dark of
night, the defendant was told—not asked—to sit in Klingen’s squad car. While Klingen testified
9 that she sat in the front seat, he can clearly be heard in the video telling her to “have a seat right
back there.” While Klingen was the only officer on the scene, the defendant had no friends,
family, or transportation to the area. In order to terminate the interrogation, the defendant would
have had to exit the squad car—which, at certain points, was in motion—and proceed on foot in
the darkness.
¶ 28 Far more relevant to the above factors, however, is Klingen’s repeated testimony that the
defendant was not, in fact, free to leave. In essence, Klingen himself testified that the defendant
was in custody. An officer’s subjective belief that a suspect was free to leave is not dispositive.
E.g., People v. Halmon, 225 Ill. App. 3d 259, 269 (1992). However, we are unaware of any court
that has rejected an officer’s statement that a suspect was not free to leave, and instead found that
a reasonable person would have felt otherwise.
¶ 29 Accordingly, we find that the defendant in this case was subjected to custodial
interrogation beginning when she entered Klingen’s squad car. Klingen was thus constitutionally
required to advise the defendant of her Miranda rights prior to that interrogation. See Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444. Any statements made by the defendant after that point were properly suppressed
by the circuit court. See id. at 492.
¶ 30 In reaching this conclusion, we also reject the State’s related argument that the circuit
court erred in denying the State’s motion for a directed finding. The State insists that its motion
should have been granted where the defendant had failed to make the required prima facie
showing. Indeed, to survive a motion for directed finding, a defendant must make “a prima facie
showing that the evidence was obtained illegally.” People v. Jarvis, 2016 IL App (2d) 141231,
¶ 18. The defendant here, as explained above, presented evidence in her case-in-chief sufficient
10 to actually warrant suppression. It follows a fortiori that such evidence constituted a prima facie
showing, and that the circuit court thus properly denied the State’s motion for directed finding.
¶ 31 B. Recross-examination
¶ 32 It is well-settled that rulings regarding the scope or extent of cross-examination—or
recross-examination—lie within the sound discretion of the circuit court. People v. Williams, 161
Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1994); People v. Garner, 2018 IL App (5th) 150236, ¶ 18. Such rulings will be
disturbed only where “an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant”
has occurred. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 43.
¶ 33 “Although circumstances may allow for the exploration on cross-examination of matters
not specifically raised on direct examination, re-cross-examination is limited to responding to the
testimony brought out on redirect examination.” Id. at 44. “Where new evidence is opened up on
redirect examination, the opposing party must be given the right of cross-examination on the new
matter, but the privilege of recross-examination lies within the trial court’s discretion.” United
States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 280 (1952).
¶ 34 We begin our analysis by addressing Garner, a recent case in which the Fifth District
found that the circuit court had abused its discretion in applying a “blanket policy” banning
recross-examinations. Garner, 2018 IL App (5th) 150236, ¶ 19. In that case, the circuit court
denied the defendant’s request for recross-examination, telling him simply: “ ‘State gets last shot
at a witness when they are their witness.’ ” Id. The Fifth District noted that “there is no such
rule,” and found the court’s policy to be arbitrary and thus an abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 35 In its brief, the State initially asserts that the circuit court in this case denied recross-
examination “as a blanket policy.” While this is plainly an attempt to invoke the rationale of
Garner, the State includes minimal supportive argument for that particular point. In this case,
11 after the prosecutor indicated that we wished to respond to redirect, the court told him simply:
“No, I am not going to let you ask any more questions” and that the prosecutor had already had
his cross-examination. These brief statements cannot be characterized as a blanket policy against
recross-examination, and do not give the impression that the circuit court never allows recross.
¶ 36 We next consider whether any “new evidence” was adduced on the redirect examination
of Klingen, such that the State would have been entitled to recross. At the beginning of redirect
examination, Klingen testified that the defendant was not free to leave the area and that she was
detained. He had already offered the same testimony on direct examination. Supra ¶ 7. While he
added on redirect that the defendant would have been “in trouble” had she alighted from his
squad car, that is nothing more than a different way of saying she was not free to leave. Klingen
also testified on redirect that the encounter occurred between 10:30 and 11 p.m. and that it was
dark outside. But he testified earlier that he had been dispatched to the area at 10:37 p.m. (supra
¶ 5), and the circuit court may be expected to know that it would be dark outside at that time.
¶ 37 Klingen also testified on redirect that the defendant did not admit to driving while he was
speaking to her on River Road. On both direct and cross-examination, however, Klingen had
testified that he asked the defendant to be more honest with him only after he ran the car’s
license plate and discovered it was registered to the defendant. Supra ¶¶ 8-9. It was then that the
defendant admitted to having driven the car. Thus, the timing of the defendant’s admission was
already established prior to redirect examination.
¶ 38 Finally, Klingen testified on redirect that the area in question was “lit” such that he could
see “decently well” and that he had not searched behind any trees, bushes, hills, or guardrails in
the area. On cross-examination, the State had asked Klingen about the topography of the area
and whether Klingen had seen anyone else in the vicinity. Supra ¶ 9. Even if specific facts, such
12 as the lighting and the presence of hills were newly adduced on redirect, the State had already
broached the general topic on cross-examination. Any line of questioning it may have intended
on recross could thus fairly have been raised on cross-examination. Indeed, to apply the “new
evidence” standard so rigidly as to find recross-examination mandatory here would result in
interminable cycles of redirect and recross, depriving the court of its inherent authority to
manage the courtroom. At the very least, the court’s decision to decline recross-examination in
the present case was not arbitrary, fanciful, or wholly unreasonable. See People v. Lerma, 2016
IL 118496, ¶ 23 (defining abuse of discretion).
¶ 39 In any event, it is clear that any potential abuse of discretion in denying the State an
opportunity for recross-examination resulted in no prejudice to the State. While the State
declined to make an offer of proof when its initial request for recross-examination was denied, it
subsequently called Klingen as a witness in its case-in-chief. Given that opportunity to question
Klingen again, however, the State did not ask any questions about searching for other people, the
lighting, or the topography of the area. Supra ¶ 14. Had the State had any questions of actual
importance to ask Klingen related to the ostensibly “new” facts raised in his redirect
examination, it surely would have asked those questions when he returned to the witness stand. It
follows that the State plainly suffered no prejudice when it was not allowed to conduct recross-
examination.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 42 Affirmed.