People v. Stanley

2020 IL App (4th) 170557-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 15, 2020
• Docket: 4-17-0557
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 170557-U April 15, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-17-0557 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County KEITH A. STANLEY, ) No. 91CF43 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John Madonia, ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw because no meritorious issues could be raised on appeal.

¶2 This case comes to us on the motion of the Office of the State Appellate Defender

(OSAD) to withdraw as counsel. In September 2017, defendant, Keith A. Stanley, filed a motion

for leave to file a successive postconviction petition in which he raised several claims that are

framed as the State’s failure to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied

defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, concluding that he

failed to show cause and prejudice, and defendant appealed.

¶3 In April 2019, OSAD filed a motion to withdraw. In its brief, OSAD contends

that appeal of this case would be without arguable merit. We agree, grant OSAD’s motion to

withdraw as counsel, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 A. Procedural History

¶6 In April 1991, the State charged defendant with four counts of first degree murder

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, ¶¶ 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)) and one count of aggravated battery (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, ¶ 12-4(a)). The charges were filed after defendant stabbed 73-year-old

John Miletta to death on January 6, 1991. Because the full record of defendant’s trial is

unavailable, the facts of this case are taken from our previous opinion in People v. Stanley, 246

Ill. App. 3d 393, 615 N.E.2d 1352 (1993).

¶7 B. The Jury Trial

¶8 Carolyn Madison, who did housework for Miletta at his home in Springfield,

testified that she met defendant in October 1990 and defendant began going to Miletta’s house to

help Madison with the housework. Madison also testified that she and defendant were forging

some of Miletta’s checks. On January 4, 1991, Miletta discovered that someone was forging his

checks. Madison informed defendant that Miletta knew of the forgeries, and the next day

defendant told Madison that he was leaving Springfield. Defendant had previously expressed his

dislike of Miletta and threatened to kill both him and Madison.

¶9 Madison returned several times to Miletta’s house over the course of the next few

days, but each time the house was empty. On January 6, 1991, the police arrived and searched

the residence. The police found Miletta’s body in the basement of his residence with multiple

stab wounds and skull fractures. The police also found a dented propane tank, which appeared to

have blood smeared on it, and a mop with reddish stains on the handle and sponge. The police

recovered fingerprints from the mop that matched defendant.

¶ 10 At trial, the State introduced defendant’s bloodstained jacket and shoes. Phil

Sallee, a forensic serologist (a person who analyzes blood, urine, saliva, and other bodily fluids

2 found at crime scenes), testified that Miletta’s blood was present, in different degrees of

probability, on Stanley’s jacket, his shoes, and the mop handle recovered from Miletta’s

residence. The doctor who performed the autopsy testified that the mop and propane tank could

have caused several of the wounds observed on the back of the skull.

¶ 11 The jury found defendant guilty of all the charges against him. The trial court

sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 95 years in prison for first degree murder and 10

years for aggravated battery.

¶ 12 C. The Direct Appeal

¶ 13 Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by

denying his Batson challenge; (2) the court erred by admitting the blood frequency probabilities

showing that Miletta’s blood was found on defendant’s jacket and shoes, and the mop handle;

(3) the conviction for aggravated battery should have been vacated because it was a lesser

included offense of first degree murder; and (4) defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating

evidence at sentencing amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. This court vacated

defendant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated battery and affirmed the remainder of trial

court’s judgment. Stanley, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 404.

¶ 14 D. The First Postconviction Petition

¶ 15 In June 1993, defendant filed his first postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1992)). The trial court appointed

counsel, and defendant filed an amended petition in April 1994, arguing that his constitutional

rights were violated when his attorney refused to allow him to testify on his own behalf.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the court dismissed defendant’s petition. In December 1997,

this court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that defendant’s trial attorney did not deny

3 defendant the chance to testify; instead, defendant chose not to testify on his attorney’s advice.

People v. Stanley, No. 4-96-0621 (1997) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

23). Defendant did not raise any other issues in his first postconviction petition.

¶ 16 E. The Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 17 In March 2017, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition and attached to it several claims. Many of defendant’s arguments asserted

the State’s failure to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant first claimed the State

did not prove him guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt because of

(1) Madison’s unreliable testimony, (2) Madison’s numerous entries into Miletta’s house with

another man, and (3) the State’s failure to show defendant was at Miletta’s residence at the time

of Miletta’s murder.

¶ 18 Defendant attached a copy of Madison’s trial testimony and his own affidavit to

support these arguments. Defendant’s affidavit asserted that another man, William Bland,

entered Miletta’s home with Madison several times and previously worked at Miletta’s

residence. Defendant insisted that he would have testified to this fact at trial but for his counsel’s

advising him not to testify.

¶ 19 Defendant also claimed the State mismanaged and mishandled evidence, which

created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. To support this claim, defendant provided trial

testimony from the doctor who performed the autopsy and the lead detective.

¶ 20 Defendant’s third claim asserted two of the jailhouse witnesses at trial failed to

provide enough specific information regarding the crimes charged. Defendant attached both

witnesses’ trial testimony to assert this point and also attacked the credibility of their testimony.

¶ 21 Defendant’s final reasonable doubt claim alleged that Phil Sallee, the forensic

4 serologist, testified he could not determine specific blood types on the mop handle and that he

did not test the mop handle for trace evidence, such as hair fiber content. Defendant attached

Sallee’s trial testimony to assert these points.

¶ 22 Defendant next asserted he was denied a fair trial where “evidence essential to the

commission of the offense” was not submitted for “scientific examinations and review.”

Defendant argued error occurred when the State’s fingerprint analysis of the mop handle failed to

eliminate Madison and Bland, who could have committed the crime during the time period.

Defendant submitted the trial testimony of the officer who analyzed the fingerprints and stated he

did not compare the mop handle fingerprint with the prints of any other individuals and did not

analyze the fingerprints with the Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The testimony

also revealed the officer was not certified in fingerprint analysis.

¶ 23 Defendant next claimed that his defense counsel was ineffective for several

reasons, but he did not attach any supporting documentation for this claim. Defendant’s final

argument was a claim of actual innocence based on the lack of deoxyriboneucleic acid (DNA)

evidence connecting him to Miletta’s murder. To support this claim, defendant attached the lead

detective’s testimony and trial transcripts in which Sallee testified the blood found on Stanley’s

shoes and jacket, and the mop handle, were not submitted for DNA testing.

¶ 24 The trial court dismissed defendant’s successive postconviction petition for

failure to show cause and prejudice. The court noted that these arguments should have been

raised on direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition, and defendant’s actual innocence

claim attacked the State’s case at trial as opposed to setting forth a colorable claim of actual

innocence.

¶ 25 F. The Current Appeal and OSAD’s Motion To Withdraw

5 ¶ 26 In March 2017, defendant filed a notice of appeal, and OSAD was appointed to

represent him. In April 2019, OSAD filed a motion to withdraw, stating that no meritorious issue

could be raised on appeal. Defendant and the State have both filed motions in response.

¶ 27 In his response, defendant asserts that the mop handle should be DNA tested

because his print is not on the handle and that defendant has never been able to obtain testing

because the State has consistently denied it. Defendant requests that the test be ordered in

accordance with 725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 2016). (As the State points out, the correct statute is

725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2016)). Defendant did not make this request in his motion for leave to

file his successive postconviction petition and only raises the issue in his response to OSAD’s

motion to withdraw.

¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 29 A. The Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 30 Petitioners may only file a single postconviction petition, barring a handful of

exceptions. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). In an initial postconviction proceeding,

res judicata and waiver bar the raising of claims that were or could have been adjudicated on

direct appeal. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 458, 793 N.E.2d 609, 620 (2002). “Any

claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended

petition is waived.” 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016). Because the Act accounts for the filing of a

single petition, successive petitions waive claims of substantial denials of constitutional rights

unless fundamental fairness requires a relaxed standard. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655,

¶ 25, 91 N.E.3d 849.

¶ 31 The cause and prejudice test is an analytical tool used to determine whether

fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122-3 so that a claim raised in

6 a successive petition may be considered on its merits. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459. The Act

defines cause as “an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim

during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings” and prejudice as an error that “so infected

the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)

(West 2016). We review the denial of a motion to file a successive postconviction petition

de novo. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 21, 21 N.E.3d 1172.

¶ 32 B. The Cause and Prejudice Test in This Case

¶ 33 When a petitioner attempts to raise a claim that was resolved on direct appeal or

in previous collateral proceedings, he is barred by res judicata. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458.

Two of defendant’s claims assert that the blood testing done by Sallee was unreliable and that

defendant would have testified but for his attorney’s advice against it, and his testimony would

have revealed new information. Because both of these claims have been previously adjudicated

by this court on direct appeal and in defendant’s first postconviction motion, they are barred by

res judicata. Stanley, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 398-400; People v. Stanley, No. 4-96-0621 (1997)

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 34 Additionally, defendant relies entirely on trial testimony and his own proffered

affidavit to prove these claims, both of which were available to the defendant in earlier

proceedings. And because defendant cannot point to any objective factor that prevented him

from raising these claims in earlier postconviction proceedings, he cannot satisfy the cause

aspect of the cause and prejudice test. The same is true of defendant’s multiple other claims—

namely, that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to (1) unreliable

trial testimony from witnesses, (2) failure to establish a sufficient opportunity, (3) the state’s

mismanagement of evidence, (4) the inaccuracy of police documents, and (5) the lack of DNA

7 evidence connecting him to the crime. Because all of these claims rely on information available

to defendant in earlier proceedings, we reject them.

¶ 35 C. Defendant’s Actual Innocence Claim

¶ 36 When a defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive post-

conviction petition, he is excused from showing cause and prejudice. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d

319, 330, 919 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2009). In order to succeed on a claim of actual innocence, a

defendant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would

probably change the result on retrial. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96, 996 N.E.2d 617.

New evidence (1) must have been discovered after the trial and (2) could not have been

discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Id. Evidence is not “newly discovered”

when it presents facts already known to a defendant at or prior to trial, even if the source of these

facts may have been unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative. People v. Jarrett, 399 Ill. App. 3d

715, 723, 927 N.E.2d 754, 763 (2010).

¶ 37 Defendant’s actual innocence claim asserts that (1) the lack of DNA testing on

blood samples taken from him and (2) the failure of the initial police report to mention the blood

on defendant’s shoes establish he was actually innocent. At trial, Sallee testified that no DNA

testing was conducted on the blood recovered from defendant’s jacket or shoes, or the mop

handle. Another officer testified that he did not report seeing any blood on defendant’s shoes at

the time the shoes were collected as evidence. This testimony shows that defendant knew of the

evidence he now claims support his actual innocence at least since the trial. A claim of actual

innocence requires newly discovered evidence and this evidence is clearly not new. Accordingly,

defendant’s actual innocence claim fails.

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

8 ¶ 39 OSAD’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

¶ 40 Affirmed.